Jackson v. Valero, No. 2:2008cv02652 - Document 26 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 . Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on June 9, 2010. (Mays, Samuel)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Jackson v. Valero Doc. 26 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) VALERO REFINING COMPANY – ) TENNESSEE, LLC d/b/a VALERO ) MEMPHIS REFINERY, ) ) Defendant. ) ) CURTIS JACKSON, No. 08-2652 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before the Court is Defendant Valero Refining Company – Tennessee, LLC’s (“Valero”) January 25, 2010, Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Dkt. No. 18.) Plaintiff Curtis Jackson responded in opposition on February 16, 2010, and Valero replied (See Dkt. Nos. 19, 22.) on February 25, 2010. Jackson alleges that Valero discriminated against him because it regarded him as having a disability, Disabilities Act in violation (“ADA”), 42 of U.S.C. § the Americans 12102(2)(C) with (2006). Because Valero’s view of Jackson’s abilities was not mistaken and because it did not regard Jackson as disqualified from holding a broad range of jobs, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, (1999), superseded prospectively by Dockets.Justia.com statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized in Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 2009.) I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Unless otherwise stated in this Order, all facts discussed are undisputed for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Valero and its predecessors in interest have employed Jackson at their Memphis refinery since September 12, 1988. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 54.) (“Def’s SOF”) In September 2006, Jackson held the position of “Assistant Operator – Hydroplex.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Around this time, he began to experience muscle spasms in his shoulder and neck and numbness in his left hand. (Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 5.) (“Pl’s SOF”) Jackson’s physician, Dr. James Rodney Feild, sent a letter to Valero dated September 6, 2006, excusing Jackson from work. (Def’s SOF ¶ 1.) The letter noted that Jackson had complained of “neck and shoulder pain lifting objects of 20 to 25 pounds plus over his head . . . [and] is not able to climb tall structures 20 to 40 feet in height.” (Id.) Feild recommended that Jackson totally off work for six months” from July 2006.1 “should be (Id. ¶ 3.) Jackson’s own application for leave stated that he intended to 1 The record does not reveal why Feild backdated the date Jackson should cease working to July 2006. 2 return to work by February 18, 2007 – later than six months from July 2006. (Id. ¶ 4.) Jackson explained that he was the one to decide when he could come back to work because he was familiar with his condition and how it affected his body. (Pl’s SOF ¶ 5.) As February 2007 approached, however, Jackson determined that he was not yet well enough to return to work. 6.) (Def’s SOF ¶ He submitted to Valero a January 24, 2007, note from Feild excusing him from work for thirty additional days and limiting his climbing for the following thirty days. Thus, Jackson’s new return date was February 24, 2007. In anticipation of (Id.) his return, Valero scheduled a February 22, 2007, appointment with Dr. Claiborne examination. appointment, (Id. but Christian ¶ did 9.) for Jackson appear at a an independent did not appear rescheduled medical for February the 27 examination. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Christian referred Jackson to David an therapist, Brick, capacity occupational evaluation. Jackson Brick on February 28, 2007. took two and one-half hours. Christian evaluated underwent (Id. ¶ 12.) for the a functional evaluation with Brick’s evaluation (Id. ¶ 13.) Brick’s final report on March 6, 2007. conclusions (Id. ¶ 14.) on the same day to review the results. and issued his He met with Jackson Christian concluded that Jackson had “some weakness in his left upper extremity and he 3 also has some functional deficits as it relates to knee flexion, squatting, lifting and climbing.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Consequently, Christian did not recommend a return to full duty and placed restrictions on any work Jackson might perform. 17.) (Id. ¶¶ 15, Christian limited Jackson to lifting 50-75 pounds only occasionally. Jackson also could not repetitively lift more than 25 pounds, climb a ladder, repetitively bend and squat, or lift anything overhead. (Id. ¶ 17.) Because of the breadth of the restrictions, Christian concluded that it would be difficult for Jackson to return to his previous position.2 Brick also concluded published Jackson should not return to his (Id. ¶ 20.) regular work duties. The that (Id. ¶ 19.) requirements for Jackson’s position as an assistant operator – hydroplex included the ability to walk on uneven surfaces; occasional overhead work; lifting up to fifty pounds frequently; frequent lifting from the ground to knees, waist, and shoulder; frequent ladder (Id. ¶ 21.) walking up and down stairways. Christian’s report, Valero climbing; determined that and frequent After receiving Jackson could meet the physical requirements of his prior position. 22.) not (Id. ¶ Mike Sracic, the human resources director for Valero’s Memphis refinery, and Gary Byrd, Valero’s regional director of 2 Although Jackson challenges Christian’s conclusion that he could not return to his former job, Jackson does not dispute that this was the doctor’s conclusion. (Pl’s SOF ¶ 19.) 4 human resources - refinery operations, met with Jackson on March 20, 2007, and told him that, based on Christian’s and Brick’s examinations, operator. him to he could not (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) work as a return to work as an assistant Jackson requested that Valero allow maintenance warehouse or lab position. helper, carpenter, (Pl’s SOF ¶ 27.) or in a Byrd informed Jackson that there were no openings in any of those positions or any other operations or maintenance jobs that he could perform with his work restrictions. (Def’s SOF ¶ 25.) Valero then provided Jackson with an application for long-term disability benefits. (Id. ¶ 31.) Jackson applied for disability benefits on April 11, 2007. When asked to explain why he could not work in his previous occupation, Jackson answered, “I am in good physical condition and can work in my occupation,” reflecting his belief that he was now ready to return to work despite Christian’s findings. (Id. ¶ 35.) The Jackson’s claim. insurance carrier, (Id. ¶ 37.) unsurprisingly, denied Unable to return to work or obtain disability benefits, Jackson asked his employer to fire him so that he could access his 401(k) funds and provide for his family. (Pl’s SOF ¶ 32.) employment. On Valero declined to terminate his (Def’s SOF ¶ 32.) April 4, 2007, Jackson delivered a letter from his personal physician, Dr. Feild, to Valero stating that he could 5 return to work with no restrictions. (Id. ¶ 38.) Valero contacted Feild and learned that his examination of Jackson had been cursory, taking only thirty minutes. Dep., Dkt. No. 18-3, at 135:16-24.) (Id. ¶ 39; Jackson Feild was also unaware of the restrictions Christian had recommended. (Def’s SOF ¶ 39.) At Valero’s request, Christian sent his report to Feild for (Id. ¶ 40.) review. Feild informed Valero in writing on May 16, 2007, that he agreed with Christian’s findings and concurred in the work restrictions. (Id. ¶ 41.) He confirmed his agreement with Christian’s recommendations by facsimile on May 23, 2007. (Id. ¶ 42; see Dkt. No. 18-4, Exh. 24.) Jackson filed for unemployment benefits on May 14, 2007. (Def’s SOF ¶ 47.) The notice Valero received stated Jackson claimed “HE QUIT HIS JOB DUE TO MEDICAL REASONS.”3 see Sutphin Aff., Dkt. No. 18-5, Exh. 6.) that (Id.; Jackson’s union filed a grievance on his behalf on May 25, 2007, asking that Valero allow Jackson to return to work. (Def’s SOF ¶ 44.) Valero and the union reached an agreement that Jackson could return to work on October 8, 2007, if he obtained medical certification that he could perform all of the essential functions of his job. 45.) (Id. ¶ Jackson reported for his medical examination in October and was cleared to return to work without restriction. 3 (Id. ¶ Jackson disputes that he told Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he quit for medical reasons, but he does not dispute that the notice Valero received from the state contained this notation. (Pl’s SOF ¶ 47.) 6 48.) He reported to work on October 8, and Valero assigned him to his former position as assistant operator – hydroplex. ¶ 49.) from (Id. After his return, Jackson successfully gained a transfer the hydroplex and now holds the position of Operator – Sulfur Unit at Valero’s Memphis refinery. Assistant (Id. ¶ 51.) Jackson filed suit pro se on September 19, 2008, alleging that Valero had violated the ADA by failing to allow him to return to work on April 4, 2007. (Compl. ¶ 10.) He seeks back (Id. ¶ 12.) On August 27, pay and all other allowable damages. 2009, attorney James R. Becker, Jr. made an appearance on behalf of Jackson. (See Dkt. No. 16.) Valero’s pending Motion for Summary Judgment tests the trial-worthiness of Jackson’s suit. II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims under the general federal question jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986). 7 The moving party can meet this burden by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his case. See Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the respondent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. A genuine issue for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). See The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). One may not oppose a properly supported judgment motion by mere reliance on the pleadings. Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). summary See Celotex Instead, the nonmovant must present “concrete evidence supporting . . . [his] claims.” Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1989). The district court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence. See InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 110–11 (6th Cir. 1989). The nonmovant has the duty to point out specific evidence in the record that would be sufficient to justify a jury decision in his favor. See id. “Summary judgment is an integral part of 8 the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.” FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). III. ANALYSIS Jackson alleges that Valero’s refusal to reinstate him by April 4, 2007, violated the ADA. Specifically, Jackson asserts that Valero impermissibly regarded him as disabled in the major life activity of working. (Pl’s SOF at 8.) Valero asserts that it never mistakenly regarded Jackson as disabled and, because it based its including liable. work restrictions Jackson’s personal on the advice physician, it of cannot physicians, be found (Defendant’s Memorandum of Facts and Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-10.) To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a claimant must first demonstrate that he has a qualifying disability; and “[i]t is well-settled that not every physical or mental impairment constitutes a disability under the specific parameters of the ADA.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A plaintiff may establish that he has a qualifying disability if he has 1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities”; 2) a record of having such impairment; 9 or 3) an employer who regards him as having such impairment. U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2006). 42 Because Jackson brings his claim under the third, “regarded as” prong, he must prove that his employer either 1) “mistakenly believes that [he] has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” or 2) “mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.”4 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. This mistaken belief on the employer’s part must also lead it to believe that the employee is “precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.” Id. at 492. The employer must believe that the employee is ineligible to perform a broad range or class of jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491; Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 704. The “regarded as” prong separates the ADA from other civil rights statutes because it protects people who are not disabled and “are perfectly able to perform a job, but are rejected . . . because of the myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities.” Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661, 664 4 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 modified these requirements by removing the requirement that the impairment limit a “major life activity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2010). However, because the actions giving rise to Jackson’s claim occurred before the ADA Amendment Act’s effective date of January 1, 2009, the prior version of the ADA and the case law interpreting it control. See Milholland, 569 F.3d 562, 567 (holding that “the ADA Amendments Act does not apply to pre-amendment conduct”); EEOC v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 621 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (same). 10 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, omission in original). Rather than solely examining the abilities of the employee, it also focuses on the employer’s state-of-mind. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has described the claim advanced by Jackson – that his employer mistakenly regarded him as disabled from working – as approaching “the farthest reaches of the ADA.” Id. at 709. Because an employee must provide evidence of the employer’s subjective state-of-mind to succeed, he faces claim. an Id. “extraordinarily difficult” task in proving his “[E]mployers do not regularly consider the panoply of other jobs their employees could perform, and certainly do not often create direct evidence of such considerations.” Id. However, if an employee can demonstrate that his employer acted because of stereotypes rather than facts, an employee’s claim will survive employee was summary judgment. “otherwise See qualified to id. at 706-708 perform his (where job” and employer terminated him after a series of memoranda referring to him as the “back case” and an unexplained decision to dramatically raise his sales quotas, claim was trial-worthy). A. Valero Was Not Mistaken About Jackson’s Status The initial requirement to succeed in a regarded-as- disabled claim is that the employer must have been mistaken in its belief about the employee’s physical abilities. 11 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (“[I]t is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual.”); Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 704 (same). Where an employer places restrictions on an employee’s work that track those recommended by a physician, an employer does not entertain employee’s abilities. “mistaken” perceptions of the Gruener, 510 F.3d at 665 (holding that, when work restrictions “simply tracked the specific and valid restrictions prescribed by her own doctor,” an employee does not have a valid “regarded as” claim); Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 592 (6th Cir. 2002) (employer is “not wrongly viewing [an employee] through a stereotype of disability,” when it follows a physician’s recommendations); Cannon v. Levi Strauss & Co., 29 F. App’x 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting regarded-as claim where “Levi’s did not view [plaintiff] through stereotypes based on her impairment recommendations of but her rather treating followed physician, the the specific course the Supreme Court says is the correct one” (citation omitted)). Here, it is undisputed that Valero relied on Christian’s recommendations in placing restrictions on Jackson’s work that made him ineligible to return to his prior job. 22, 24.) (Def’s SOF ¶¶ When Jackson informed Valero on April 4, 2007, that his personal physician Feild had cleared him to return to work without restrictions, (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 38, 40.) Valero inquired into Feild’s findings. On learning that Feild’s examination had 12 only taken thirty minutes, Valero allowed him to see the report documenting Christian’s 2.5 hour examination. Feild concurred in Christian’s findings after results of the independent medical examination. Thus, every Valero had medical professional contacted, and including (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) reviewing the (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) occupational Jackson’s therapist own treating physician, concluded that he could not return to the position of Cf. Burlington Northern, 621 F. assistant operator – hydroplex. Supp. 2d employer at 595-96 where (refusing employer to relied grant on summary physicians judgment other than for the employee’s treating physician and those doctors “had never seen or examined revealed that [the employee]”). Jackson was again When fit a to position, Valero promptly reinstated him. medical return to examination his prior (Def’s SOF ¶¶ 48-49.) Jackson attempts to raise a disputed issue of material fact by arguing that, although the doctors based their opinions on the job description Valero provided, the official description did not accurately state what Jackson actually did. at 10.) (Pl’s SOF Jackson asserts that he rarely had to lift objects over his head and has “not had to climb a tower 240 feet [tall] in more than 15 years.” Pl’s SOF at 9-10.) (Jackson Aff., Dkt. No. 18-1, ¶¶ 7-15; Any heavy lifting or arduous climbing could be performed by others. (Jackson Aff. ¶ 23.) earlier deposition, Jackson said otherwise. 13 However, in his When handed a copy of the published hydroplex and job asked description whether the for assistant physical duties operator listed those he had to perform, Jackson responded “Correct.” Dep. at 64:16-22.) – were (Jackson The physical requirements listed included frequent lifting of 10 to 50 pounds; occasional overhead work; frequent lifting from and overhead; shoulders, stairs; and surfaces.5 frequent the ground frequent walking to one’s on climbing uneven, knees, of waist, ladders wet, and and slippery (Assistant Operator Responsibilities, Dkt. No. 18-4, Exh. 6, at 1-2.) A party cannot create a genuine, disputed issue of material fact by contradicting his own prior sworn testimony with an affidavit filed after the opposing party has moved for summary judgment. 1004 (6th Cir. 2003). Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, Because Valero followed the uncontradicted advice of two physicians in refusing to reinstate Jackson until perceptions; October and disability claim. 8, Jackson 2007, cannot it was not succeed on mistaken his in its regarded-as See Gruener, 510 F.3d at 665; Mahon, 295 F.3d at 592; Cannon, 29 F. App’x at 336. Valero is entitled to summary judgment on Jackson’s ADA claim. 5 It is also undisputed that Jackson complained to Feild at the time of his initial examination of “neck and shoulder pain [from] lifting objects of 20 to 25 pounds plus over his head.” (Def’s SOF ¶ 1.) Jackson told Feild that he was “not able to climb tall structures 20 to 40 feet in height,” demonstrating that climbing ladders was an integral part of Jackson’s job. (Id.) 14 B. Valero Did Not Regard Jackson as Ineligible to Perform a Broad Range or Class of Jobs Jackson also cannot succeed on his ADA claim because he cannot demonstrate that Valero regarded him as disabled from a broad class of jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Sutton, In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that twin 527 U.S. at 491. sisters who were disqualified from serving as global airline pilots because of their “severe myopia” could not succeed on their regarded-as claims. Although the sisters could not serve as global pilots, they had not shown that United regarded them as unable to work as regional pilots or pilot instructors, both of which were included in the broad class of jobs encompassing global airline pilot. 527 U.S. at 493. Here, Jackson inquired if he could return as a maintenance helper, carpenter, or in a warehouse or lab position. ¶ 27.) (Pl’s SOF These positions are in the broad category of maintenance and operator jobs that include Jackson’s original position of assistant operator - hyrdroplex. (Id.) Valero did not reject Jackson’s request because it believed he could not perform any of the suggested jobs. It rejected Jackson’s request because it had in no open positions those fields. (Def’s SOF ¶ 25.) Jackson has failed to produce evidence suggesting that Valero considered him disqualified from a broad range or class of jobs. Therefore, even if Jackson could 15 establish that Valero held mistaken perceptions about his abilities, Valero would be entitled to summary judgment on Jackson’s claim because it did not believe his limitations precluded him from working in a broad range of positions. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. IV. For See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Valero’s Motion is GRANTED. CONCLUSION the foregoing reasons, Valero’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jackson’s regarded-as-disabled discrimination claim is GRANTED. So ordered this 9th day of June, 2010. s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
