Jones v. Doe et al, No. 2:2007cv02263 - Document 91 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on February 17, 2010. (Mays, Samuel)
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Jones v. Doe et al Doc. 91 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION JOHN JONES, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER EDWARD YANCY, individually and as an Officer of the Memphis Police Department; OFFICER JERRY WALKER, individually and as an Officer of the Memphis Police Department; LARRY A. GODWIN, individually and in his capacity as Police Director for the City of Memphis; and THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 07-2263 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Before the Court is Defendant City of Memphis’ (the “City”) March 6, 2009, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.1 R. Civ. P. 12(c). See Fed. The City argues that Plaintiff 1) cannot receive punitive damages in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2) cannot assert a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, and 3) has improperly pled his state-law claims against the City by failing to plead a cause of action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101 – 408 (“TGTLA”). 1 Plaintiff responded in opposition on The other named Defendants did not join the City in its Motion. Dockets.Justia.com May 18, 2009. Because the City’s arguments are meritorious, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff John Jones is resides in Memphis, Tennessee. an African-American (Compl. ¶ 3.) male who According to his Amended Complaint, on April 8, 2006, Jones was driving a 1995 Ford Ranger north on Prescott Road, toward its intersection with Christine Road, in Memphis. Jones alleges that “an unknown driver” turned into Jones’ lane of travel, causing him to swerve in an attempt to avoid a collision. (Amended Compl. ¶ 7.) Jones crashed and struck a utility pole. fled the scene. the accident, (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) but later returned The unknown driver Jones also left the scene of to find Defendants Memphis Police Officers Edward Yancy and Jerry Walker arriving. officers are learning that Caucasian. Jones was (Amended the Compl. driver of ¶¶ the 5-6, wrecked Both 9.) On vehicle, officers asked for his driver’s license and proof of insurance. (Id.) When Jones was slow to produce the documentation, the officers became verbally abusive and ordered him to get on his knees. (Id. ¶ 11.) Jones asserts that he attempted to explain that he was unable to get on his knees because of a prior surgery. Yancy and Walker allegedly responded to Jones’ (Id.) inability to kneel down by “punch[ing him] in the ribs, face, and chest” and 2 forcing him to his knees with pepper spray. (Id.) Jones asserts that he at no time physically resisted the officers in any way, making unreasonable, and the officers’ excessive.” actions (Id. ¶ “unnecessary, 12.) Following his arrest, officers charged Jones with reckless driving, resisting arrest, driving license. without insurance, (Compl. ¶ 18.) June 6, 2006. and driving without a Authorities dismissed the charges on (Id. ¶ 23.) Despite their efforts, Jones and his family were unable to obtain an official copy of the arrest or accident reports. (Id. ¶ 22.) Jones filed the present lawsuit on April 3, 2007, against Defendants Walker and Yancy, individually and in their official capacities as officers with the Memphis Police Department; Larry A. Godwin, individually and as director of the Memphis Police Department; the Memphis Police Department; and the City. at 1.) This Court dismissed the Memphis Police Department as a Defendant by order dated December 23, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the 2009, because City of Memphis Department as a Defendant, Dkt. No. 83, at 2-3.) Yancy, Jones asserts Jones’ (See Order Granting the claims properly lay against the City. and (Id. state-law claims Police Against Walker of assault and battery, negligence, false arrest, and false imprisonment, along with federal Amendment claims rights and of violating conspiring 3 to his Fourth interfere and with Fourteenth his civil rights. 1985(3). (Amended Compl. ¶¶ 21-33); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, Jones also asserts claims against the City and Godwin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a common law negligence theory. He alleges that their policy of improperly investigating citizen complaints of police misconduct and failure to train officers properly combined to make (Amended Compl. ¶¶ 34-41.) compensatory and punitive the alleged assault possible. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seeks damages, an injunction to (Id. ¶ 42.) future violations, and attorneys’ fees. prevent The City has contested the validity of those portions of the Complaint against it through the present Motion. II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims under the general federal question jurisdiction provided provided by 28 U.S.C. § by 28 U.S.C. conspiracies to violate 1331 § and 1343(a) civil the to specific redress rights. The jurisdiction claims of supplemental jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 permits this Court to hear Plaintiff’s related state-law claims. No party has asserted that it is inappropriate for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. “The standard of review for a judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, 4 N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). the Court favorable must to the construe In addressing a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff allegations as true. complaint and accept in all the light well-pled most factual League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can support a claim “by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, This standard requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand Cir. 2001). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 is entitled to relief.” (2007) (per curiam). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) Id. Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible Ashcroft v. on its Iqbal, face’” 129 S. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). to Ct. survive 1937, a motion 1949 to dismiss. (2009) (quoting “This plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 5 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory Id. at 1949 (citation omitted). statements, do not suffice.” plaintiff with no facts and “armed with nothing more conclusions” cannot “unlock the doors of discovery.” A than Id. at 1950. III. ANALYSIS A. Punitive Damages The City first argues that Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages for his claims that the City violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Memorandum in Support of Its Pleadings at 5.) (“Def.’s Memo”) Motion for (Defendant’s Judgment on The City is correct. the The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Newport The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages against the City under § 1983. B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim The City next argues that, because Jones’ complaint alleges excessive force used by police to effect an arrest, his claim is properly characterized solely under the Fourth Amendment, rather 6 than the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of substantive due process. (Def.’s Memo at 1-2.) The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that “no State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, has long been understood to “guarantee[] more than fair process.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citation omitted). These additional guarantees, known as substantive due process, protect those “fundamental rights and liberties which are [so] deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they quotation marks were sacrificed.” and citations Id. at omitted); 720-721 see, (internal e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to have children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right upbringing of one’s children). to direct the education and The government may not deprive a person of these aspects of personal liberty “regardless of the fairness of the procedures” employed. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation touchstone omitted). of due These protections process”: emanate protecting 7 from “the individuals from “arbitrary action[s] of government.” Id. at 846 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). Nonetheless, “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Supreme Court substantive particular has due been process, amendment constitutional reluctant it has provides protection an to expand explained explicit against a Id. Because the the that, textual scope of “where a source of sort of particular governmental behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process” applies. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). at Id. 842 Jones’ claims are based on the officers’ alleged use of excessive force in his arrest. (See Amended Compl. ¶ 12 (describing the officers’ actions as “unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive”).) allegations textual are covered protections seizures.” See constitutional U.S. by the against Const. provision Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable amend applies, IV. explicit searches Because Jones These cannot a and specific state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 842. GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the The Court, therefore, Pleadings Fourteenth Amendment claims against the City. on Jones’ See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (“A free citizen’s claim that 8 law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person . . Amendment’s . .[is] properly ‘objective analyzed reasonableness’ under the standard Fourth rather than under a substantive due process standard.”) C. Common Law Tort Claims The City’s final argument is that Jones has failed to state a claim for common law negligence against it because he has failed to plead a cause of action under the TGTLA properly. (Def.’s Memo at 5.); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101 – 313. Jones responds that no specific pleading formalities apply to his claims. (Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2-3.) The City is correct. Jones must affirmatively plead waiver of immunity. He has not done so. Jones’ Amended negligence against Complaint the “negligently failed practices adequately officers.” to states City. to He develop supervise (Amended Compl. ¶ 41.) and a cause alleges of action for that the City maintain and/or train policies their police Jones brings this state-law claim “under [the] common law of the State of Tennessee.” at 1.) or (Id. Tennessee recognizes the doctrine of sovereign immunity, protecting the State and its municipalities from citizens’ damage claims unless a statute expressly waives that immunity. 9 Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 (“Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.”); see Doe v. Goodwin, 254 S.W. 3d 428, 430-31 (Tenn. Ct. removed App. 2007). immunity for Tennessee, injuries through the “proximately TGTLA, caused by has the negligent act or omission of any employee [of a governmental entity] within the scope of his employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. Sovereign immunity bars any claim not brought under the TGTLA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a) (“Except as may be otherwise provided [by the TGTLA], all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any injury . . . .”). Because Jones has pled a “common law” action against the City, the TGTLA bars his suit. statutory See id. § 29-20-303 (failure to comply with notice requirements is a “valid and complete defense”); Alexander v. Beale Street Blues Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 934, 948 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (noting that the TGTLA requires one to affirmatively plead the waiver of immunity). therefore, GRANTS the Motion on Count VII of The Court, the Amended Complaint alleging that the City’s actions were negligent. See id.; Moss v. Shelby County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 850, 857 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (dismissing intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims where plaintiff did not properly plead under the TGTLA). 10 The Court also agrees with the City that Jones’ claims arise out of violations. a false-arrest (Def’s. Memo at allegation 4-5; see and civil Complaint rights ¶¶ 20-21 (alleging that officers had “no probable cause” to arrest Jones and that Jones “had not committed any criminal offenses”).) The TGTLA specifically claims. retains sovereign immunity for all such See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2) (retaining immunity for injuries caused by “false arrest . . . or civil rights” violations). Because Jones cannot plead a claim that the TGTLA would permit to proceed, the Court DECLINES to allow Jones to amend his pleadings against the City to conform to the statutory pleading requirements. See Moss, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (declining to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint where TGTLA does not waive the state’s immunity). IV. For CONCLUSION the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint because the City is punitive damages Fourteenth Plaintiff’s claims against the City for under Amendment from See Tenn. Code Plaintiff’s state-law claims under the TGTLA. Ann. § 29-20-205(2). immune 42 U.S.C. substantive § 1983, due violation process negligence are DISMISSED. So ordered this 17th day of February, 2010. 11 of rights, his and s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12
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