Davis v. Sircy et al, No. 4:2015cv00036 - Document 3 (E.D. Tenn. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION.Plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 1 will be GRANTED. For the reasons stated in this Order, process shall not issue and this action will be DISMISSED.Because plaintiff is an inmate in theB edford County Workhouse, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00.A separate judgment will enter.Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 5/24/2016. (SAC, )Copy sent to plaintiff Davis, Sheriff of Bedford County and US District Court Financial Deputy.
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Davis v. Sircy et al Doc. 3 U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF TEN N ESSEE at W IN CH ESTER WILLIAM THOMAS DAVIS III, Plaintiff, v. BEDFORD COUNTY J AIL, BEDFORD COUNTY WORKHOUSE, J ERRY SIRCY, TIM LOKEY, and EUGENE RAY, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.: 4:15-CV-36-HSM-SKL MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Before the Court is a pro se prisoners’ civil rights com plaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in form a pauperis. It appears from the application that plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $ 350 .0 0 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepaym ent of costs or fees or security therefor and plaintiff’s m otion for leave to proceed in form a pauperis [Doc. 1] will be GRAN TED . For the reasons stated below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be D ISMISSED . Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts m ust screen prisoner com plaints and sua sponte dism iss those that are frivolous or m alicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is im m une. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 10 14 (6th Cir. 1999). Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or "screen" certain com plaints sua sponte and to dism iss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought m onetary relief from a defendant im m une from such relief, or that were frivolous or m alicious. Dockets.Justia.com Id. at 10 15– 16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dism issal standard articulated by the Suprem e Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (20 0 9) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 554 (20 0 7) “governs dism issals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 – 71 (6th Cir. 20 10 ). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a com plaint “m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 570 ). In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff m ust establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 , 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 10 36, 10 42 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 90 6 F.2d 220 , 223 (6th Cir. 1990 ) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”). According to the com plaint, plaintiff was charged for an old jail m edical bill without proof that plaintiff owed that debt. Plaintiff also appears to allege that on April 30 , 20 15, he incurred a $ 30 charge for com m issary that he disputes because the com m issary was passed out to several inm ates. Plaintiff further states that Bedford County J ail has an inadequate law library that has books with pages m issing, that he does not get to go to the law library when he wants or needs to go, and that he has no tim e or way to view the books. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Bedford County J ail, Bedford County Workhouse, J erry Sircy, and Tim Lokey will not give him copies of 2 his filed grievances, but also appears to allege that Bedford County J ail and Bedford County Workhouse have no grievance procedure. As to Bedford County Workhouse, plaintiff alleges that the food is kept at the wrong tem perature. Plaintiff also alleges that Bedford County Workhouse has inm ates supervising inm ates, and that this can cause an inm ate to lose his job and com m issary. Plaintiff further asserts that Bedford County Workhouse retaliates against inm ates for seeking m edical attention, specifically stating that “when you seek m edical attention they take your job and put you in lockdown. They have no way to help you when [you are] in [there], no button to push or intercom to get help.” Plaintiff also asserts that Bedford County Workhouse failed state inspection and has m ade no im provem ents, despite bleach and m old on the ceiling and insulation hanging from the ceiling. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants Lokey and Sircy im properly classify inm ates because state and county inm ates are together. Plaintiff further alleges that Bedford County J ail houses inm ates on the floor. Lastly, plaintiff asserts that defendant Lokey is a supervisor at Bedford County Workhouse, where som eone opened his legal m ail outside of his presence. As relief, plaintiff seeks to “get [his] m oney back and then som e.” 1. Be d fo rd Co u n ty Jail an d Be d fo rd Co u n ty W o rkh o u s e Bedford County J ail and Bedford County Workhouse are buildings, not suable entities within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688– 90 and n. 55 (1978) (for purposes of a § 1983 action, a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”); Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., 20 0 0 WL 1720 959, at*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 20 0 0 ) (holding that “the Shelby County J ail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th 3 Cir. 1991)); Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility nam ed as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”). Accordingly, all allegations against Bedford County J ail and Bedford County Workhouse fail to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted and they are therefore D ISMISSED from this lawsuit. 2 . Su p e rvis o ry Liability Plaintiff has also sued Eugene Ray,1 the Mayor of Bedford County, J erry Sircy, whom plaintiff alleges is the Captain of the Bedford County J ail, and Tim Lokey, whom plaintiff alleges is the Captain of the Bedford County Workhouse. Plaintiff m akes no allegations as to Mayor Ray, and while plaintiff labels various allegations in his com plaint with defendant Sircy’s nam e or defendant Lokey’s nam e, the only allegation of active behavior against them is that they have not provided plaintiff with copies of grievances. Accordingly, plaintiff appears to allege that defendant Ray is liable for all claim s due to his supervisory position as Mayor, and that defendants Sircy, and Lokey are liable for all claim s except the grievance claim due to their supervisory positions. In a suit brought under § 1983, liability cannot be im posed solely on the basis of respondeat superior. Polk Cnty . v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Bellam y v. Bradley , 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). The law is well settled that a plaintiff m ust allege that a defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate in order to state a claim against such a defendant. Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982). “[L]iability cannot be based solely on the right to control em ployees.” Leach v. Shelby Cnty . Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. Plaintiff misspelled Mayor Eugene Ray’s name on his complaint. DIRECTED to correct his name in the Court file. 1 4 Accordingly, the Clerk is 1989). Likewise, a supervisor cannot be held liable for a m ere failure to act. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 20 0 2) (stating that “[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is prem ised on a m ere failure to act; it ‘m ust be based on active unconstitutional behavior’” (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 10 41, 10 48 (6th Cir. 1999))); see also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 30 0 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and a failure to respond or rem edy the com plaint was insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under § 1983). As plaintiff has not alleged any active behavior on the part of defendant Ray, he will be D ISMISSED . Likewise, plaintiff does not allege that defendant Lokey personally opened plaintiff’s legal m ail outside of his presence or had any knowledge of this alleged act, but rather only alleges that this occurred at the Bedford County Workhouse and that defendant Lokey is a supervisor there. This assertion is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against defendant Lokey and it will therefore be D ISMISSED . Further, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that defendants Sircy and Lokey are liable for other acts in the com plaint based on respondeat superior, any such assertions fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 and will be D ISMISSED . To the extent plaintiff has asserted that defendants Sircy and Lokey were actively involved in the other acts alleged in the com plaint by labelling the allegations with their nam es, however, those allegations fail to state a claim for the reasons set forth below. 3 . Mo n e tary Claim s Plaintiff alleges that m oney was im properly transferred out of his account to pay a m edical bill without proof plaintiff owes that m oney and also disputes a com m issary charge on his account. A plaintiff m ay not m aintain an action under § 1983 for a random and unauthorized deprivation of personal property, whether negligent, Parratt 5 v. Tay lor, 451 U.S. 527, 543– 44 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. W illiam s, 474 U.S. 327, 330 – 31 (1986), or intentional, Hudson v. Palm er, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), where an adequate post-deprivation state rem edy exists to address the claim and there is no allegation that the procedures are inadequate. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543—44. The statutes governing the Tennessee Claim s Com m ission, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-830 1 et seq., provide plaintiff with a state rem edy for his alleged m onetary claim s. Plaintiff has not alleged that this state rem edy is inadequate. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the disputed charges to his inm ate trust account therefore fail to state a claim which would entitle him to relief under § 1983 and they will be D ISMISSED . 4 . Grie van ce Pro ce d u re s Plaintiff’s claim s regarding the lack of grievance procedures and defendants’ denial of his request for copies of his grievances are contradictory and fail to state a claim for a constitutional violation. “[T]here is no constitutionally protected due process right to unfettered access to prison grievance procedures.” W alker v. Mich. Dept. of Corrs., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 20 0 5). Accordingly, these allegations fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 and they will be D ISMISSED . 5. Law Library Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the law library at the jail attem pt to state a claim for denial of access to courts. An inm ate has a right of access to the courts under the First Am endm ent. Bounds v. Sm ith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). In order to establish a claim for violation of this right, a prisoner plaintiff m ust show that defendant obstructed his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim regarding his conviction or conditions of confinem ent. Lew is v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Accordingly, a plaintiff m ust plead and prove that his m eritorious claim s have been prejudiced by the alleged denial 6 of access to the courts. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). As plaintiff has not alleged prejudice to any claim , these allegations will be D ISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted. 6 . Fo o d Te m p e ratu re Plaintiff’s assertion that food was served at the wrong tem perature relates to the quality of the m eals served at the jail. Allegations about the quality of prison food are far rem oved from Eighth Am endm ent concerns because they do not constitute the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain upon an inm ate. Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659– 60 (6th Cir. 1977). These allegations are therefore D ISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 7. In m ate Su p e rvis io n Plaintiff alleges that Bedford County Workhouse has inm ates supervising inm ates, which can cause an inm ate to lose his job and com m issary. Plaintiff does not allege that he has experienced any such loss, however. As such, these allegations therefore are purely speculative and do not present an actual "case or controversy" under Article III of the Constitution and cannot be considered by this Court. North Am erican Natural Resources, Inc. v. Strand, 252 F.3d 80 8, 812-13 (6th Cir. 20 0 1); W hitm ore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (holding that “[a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirem ents of Art. III [standing]”). Accordingly, these allegations are D ISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 8 . Me d ical Re taliatio n Plaintiff alleges that, at Bedford County Workhouse, “when you seek m edical attention they take your job and put you in lockdown. They have no way to help you when [you are] in [there], no button to push or intercom to get help.” Plaintiff does not 7 assert that he has experienced any such retaliation, however, and he cannot assert the rights of other prisoners. New som v. Norris, 88 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a “a prisoner who initiates a civil action challenging certain conditions at a prison facility in his individual capacity is lim ited to asserting alleged violations of his own constitutional rights and . . . lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners”). Accordingly, this claim is D ISMISSED for failure to state a claim under § 1983. 9. In m ate Clas s ificatio n Plaintiff asserts that defendants Lokey and Sircy improperly classify inm ates because state inm ates are housed with county inm ates. Plaintiff does not state how, if at all, this allegedly im proper classification has affected him . Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that inm ates do not have “a constitutional right to a particular security level or classification.” Ford v. Harvey , 10 6 F.App’x 397, 399 (6th Cir. 20 0 4). Thus, this allegation fails to state claim upon which relief m ay be granted under § 1983 and it is D ISMISSED . 10 . Co n d itio n s o f Co n fin e m e n t Plaintiff alleges that the jail failed an inspection and has not m ade any changes, despite having bleach and m old on the ceiling and insulation on the ceiling. Plaintiff also alleges that the jail houses inm ates on the floor. “[T]he Constitution does not m andate com fortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapm an 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). In claim s regarding conditions of confinem ent, only extrem e deprivations can be characterized as punishm ent prohibited by the Eighth Am endm ent. Hudson v. McMillan, 50 3 U.S. 1, 8– 9 (1992). An extrem e deprivation is one “so grave that it violates contem porary standards of decency to expose any one unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the 8 prisoner m ust show that the risk of which he com plains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney , 50 9 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (em phasis in original); see also Rhodes v. Chapm an, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The m ere existence of m old is insufficient to state a cognizable claim . Perry m an v. Graves, No. 3:10 -MC-10 9, 20 10 WL 4237921, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20 , 20 10 )(collecting cases that stand for the assertion that an allegation of m ere exposure to black m old, without additional allegations or evidence of injuries to the plaintiff’s health resulting from such exposure, is insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Am endm ent). Further, prisoners sleeping on the floor has been held constitutional under varying circumstances. Mann v. Sm ith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Hubbard v. Tay lor, 538 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (forcing pretrial detainees to sleep on a floor m attress for three to seven m onths due to overcrowding is not a constitutional violation); Grissom v. Davis, 55 F.App’x 756, 758, 20 0 3 WL 343248, *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 20 0 3) (seven-day deprivation of a m attress and bedding did not violate the Eighth Am endm ent); Jones v. Toom bs, 77 F.3d 482, 1996 WL 67750 , at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (two-week deprivation of a m attress is not a constitutional violation). Plaintiff’s allegations of the existence of bleach, m old, and insulation fail to state a claim . Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged that he is housed on the floor at the jail. As set forth above, plaintiff cannot assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners. New som v. Norris, 88 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989). Even if the Court assum es that plaintiff is housed on the floor, however, plaintiff has not provided any inform ation to support finding that this is an extrem e deprivation such that it represents punishm ent prohibited by the Eighth Am endm ent. Accordingly, all of these allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted and are therefore D ISMISSED . 9 Although this Court is m indful that a pro se com plaint is to be liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 40 4 U.S. 519, 520 – 21 (1972), it concludes the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of any constitutionally protected right, privilege or im m unity, and, therefore, the Court finds that the com plaint fails to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted. Accordingly, this action will be D ISMISSED sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Because plaintiff is an inm ate in the Bedford County Workhouse, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $ 350 .0 0 . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to subm it to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 90 0 Georgia Avenue, Room 30 9, Chattanooga, Tennessee 3740 2, as an initial partial paym ent, whichever is greater of: (a) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly deposits to the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly balance in the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account for the six-m onth period preceding the filing of the com plaint. Thereafter, the custodian shall subm it twenty percent (20 %) of the plaintiff’s preceding m onthly incom e (or incom e credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding m onth), but only when such m onthly incom e exceeds ten dollars ($ 10 .0 0 ), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($ 350 .0 0 ) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is D IRECTED to send a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Sheriff of Bedford County to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account com plies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to 10 paym ent of the filing fee. The Clerk is further D IRECTED to forward a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A separate judgm ent will enter. SO ORD ERED . / s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 11
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