Clanton v. Bedford County Jail, No. 4:2015cv00030 - Document 3 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION: This action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Because plaintiff is an inmate in the Bedford County Jail, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The Clerk is DIRECTED to se nd a copy of this Memorandum and Order to theSheriff of Bedford County. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Courts financial deputy. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 7/1/2015. (aws, ) Mailed to Robert Clanton, Sheriff of Bedford County, and Court's financial deputy.
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Clanton v. Bedford County Jail Doc. 3 U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF TEN N ESSEE at W IN CH ESTER ROBERT CARLYLE CLANTON, Plaintiff, v. BEDFORD COUNTY J AIL, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.: 4:15-CV-30 -HSM-SKL MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Before the Court is a pro se prisoner’s civil rights com plaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in form a pauperis. It appears from the application that plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $ 350 .0 0 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepaym ent of costs or fees or security therefor and his m otion for leave to proceed in form a pauperis [Doc. 2] is GRAN TED . For the reasons stated below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be D ISMISSED . Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts m ust screen prisoner com plaints and sua sponte dism iss those that are frivolous or m alicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is im m une. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 10 14 (6th Cir. 1999). Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or "screen" certain com plaints sua sponte and to dism iss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought m onetary relief from a defendant im m une from such relief, or that were frivolous or m alicious. Dockets.Justia.com Id. at 10 15– 16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dism issal standard articulated by the Suprem e Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (20 0 9) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 554 (20 0 7) “governs dism issals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 – 71 (6th Cir. 20 10 ). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a com plaint “m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 570 ). In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff m ust establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 , 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 10 36, 10 42 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 90 6 F.2d 220 , 223 (6th Cir. 1990 ) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”). Plaintiff states in his com plaint that the m edical facility at the Bedford County J ail is inadequate, has neglected his need for m edical care, and has exhibited a “flagrant disregard for hum an life,” resulting in m utilation of his face. Plaintiff also generally alleges “unhealthy living conditions” at the jail, including specifically “unidentifiable dusts, m olds, fungi, rusts, bacteria, and viruses” which plaintiff asserts are detrim ental to health. Plaintiff further states that various unnam ed conditions at the jail are substandard. Plaintiff seeks $ 2,20 0 ,0 0 .0 0 for his injuries, m ental and em otional suffering, and psychological and em otional rehabilitation and therapy. 2 Bedford County J ail is a building, not a suable entity within the m eaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Departm ent of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688– 90 and n. 55 (1978) (for purposes of a § 1983 action, a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”); Marbry v. Correctional Medical Services, 20 0 0 WL 1720 959, at*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 20 0 0 ) (holding that “the Shelby County J ail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991)); Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility nam ed as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”). Accordingly, all allegations against Bedford County J ail fail to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted and it is therefore D ISMISSED from this lawsuit. Moreover, the com plaint would be subject to dism issal for failure to state a claim even if plaintiff had sued a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Specifically, plaintiff’s allegations that the jail m edical facility is “inadequate” and has neglected him assert negligence, rather than deliberate indifference. Negligence, even gross negligence, will not support a § 1983 claim for denial of m edical care. See Farm er v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837; Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992). "Deliberate indifference to serious m edical needs" is distinguishable from an inadvertent failure to provide adequate m edical care. Thus, a com plaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a m edical condition does not state a valid claim of m edical m istreatm ent under the Eighth Am endm ent. Medical m alpractice does not becom e a constitutional violation m erely because the victim is a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10 6. See also Gibson v. Matthew s, 926 F.2d 532, 536-37 (6th Cir. 1991) (negligence of m edical personnel does not state a claim under § 1983 for 3 deliberate indifference to m edical needs); W estlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Where a prisoner has received som e m edical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatm ent, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess m edical judgm ents and to constitutionalize claim s which sound in state tort law."). While plaintiff also alleges that the jail m edical facility has exhibited a “flagrant disregard for hum an life,” this allegation is conclusory and unsupported by any specific facts. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 20 0 8) (holding that “in the context of a civil rights claim , . . . conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegation s fail to state a claim ”) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.,76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)); Nafziger v.McDerm ott Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 20 0 6) (observing that “the court is not required to create a claim for the plaintiff[]”) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 184 (6th Cir.1996) (instructing courts not to suppose a plaintiff would be able to show facts not alleged or that a defendant has violated the law in ways not alleged). Likewise, plaintiff’s allegations that “sub-standard” conditions, including but not lim ited to rust, dust, bacteria, viruses, and m old, exist at the jail fail to dem onstrate an extrem e deprivation which is actionable under the Eighth Am endm ent. “[T]he Constitution does not m andate com fortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapm an 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). In claim s regarding conditions of confinem ent, only extrem e deprivations can be characterized as punishm ent prohibited by the Eighth Am endm ent. Hudson v. McMillan, 50 3 U.S. 1, 8– 9 (1992). An extrem e deprivation is one “so grave that it violates contem porary standards of decency to expose any one unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner m ust show that the risk of which he com plains is not one 4 that today's society chooses to tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney , 50 9 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (em phasis in original); see also Rhodes v. Chapm an, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), Perry m an v. Graves, No. 3:10 -MC-10 9, 20 10 WL 4237921, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20 , 20 10 ) (collecting cases that stand for the assertion that an allegation of mere exposure to black m old, without additional allegations or evidence of injuries to the plaintiff’s health resulting from such exposure, is insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Am endm ent). Accordingly, even if plaintiff had sued a “person” under § 1983, his com plaint would still be subject to dism issal for failure to state a claim . As the com plaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim , this action will be D ISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because plaintiff is an inm ate in the Bedford County J ail, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $ 350 .0 0 . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of plaintiff’s inm ate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to subm it to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 20 0 South J efferson Street, Room 20 1, Winchester, Tennessee 37398, as an initial partial paym ent, whichever is greater of: (a) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly deposits to the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly balance in the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account for the six-m onth period preceding the filing of the com plaint. Thereafter, the custodian shall subm it twenty percent (20 %) of plaintiff’s preceding m onthly incom e (or incom e credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding m onth), but only when such m onthly incom e exceeds ten dollars ($ 10 .0 0 ), 5 until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($ 350 .0 0 ) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is D IRECTED to send a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Sheriff of Bedford County to ensure that the custodian of plaintiff’s inm ate trust account com plies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to paym ent of the filing fee. The Clerk is further D IRECTED to forward a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A separate judgm ent will enter. SO ORD ERED . / s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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