Orange v. Chapman, No. 4:2012cv00071 - Document 29 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION: The Clerk is DIRECTED to change the name of the Respondent to Cherry Lindamood on the Courts CM/ECF docket sheet. The Court finds that none of Petitioners claims warrant the issuance of a writ. Therefore, Pet itioners motion for a writ of habeas corpus 1 will be DENIED. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a COA will not issue.Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 9/17/2015. (aws, ) Mailed to Charles Orange.
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Orange v. Chapman Doc. 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE at CHATTANOOGA CHARLES ORANGE, Petitioner, v. CHERRY LINDAMOOD,1 Warden, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No: 4:12-cv-71 J udge Mattice MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Charles Orange (“Petitioner”), a Tennessee inm ate, acting pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the legality of his confinem ent under a 20 10 Bedford County Circuit Court J udgm ent (Doc. 1). Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of selling one-half gram or m ore of cocaine with intent to sell, four counts of delivering one-half gram or m ore of cocaine, possessing one-half gram or m ore of cocaine with intent to sell, possessing one-half gram or m ore of cocaine with intent to deliver, possessing between one-half ounce and ten pounds of m arijuana with intent to sell, and possessing between one-half ounce and ten pounds of m arijuana with intent to deliver (Doc. 19 p. 3). Petitioner received a sentence of twenty two years. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, which was supported by copies of the state record (Addenda 1, 2). 2 The case is now ripe for disposition. 1 Warden Cherry Lindamood replaced Arvil Chapman as the Warden of the South Central Correctional Center. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to change the name of the Respondent to Cherry Lindamood on the Court’s CM/ECF docket sheet. 2 Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s response seemingly disputing the amount of marijuana mentioned in Respondent’s answer (Doc. 22). However, Petitioner subsequently filed a letter retracting his reply to Respondent’s brief (Doc.25). Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D AN D PROCED U RAL H ISTORY The transcripts from Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentencing hearings from the Bedford County Circuit Court were not m ade part of the state post-conviction record, and Respondent has been unable to determ ine the availability of these transcripts (Doc. 19). The record indicates that Petitioner pled guilty to six drug offenses on February 22, 20 10 , and was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. Orange v. State, No. M20 111168-CCA-R3-PC, 20 12 WL 1417252, at *1 (Tenn. Crim . App. Apr. 20 , 20 12). Following his guilty plea and sentence, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Tennessee Court of Crim inal Appeals (“TCCA”) or the Tennessee Suprem e Court (Doc. 1). On December 10 , 20 10 , Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Bedford County Circuit Court. Id. Petitioner’s m otion alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not tell him that the trial court could not engage in judicial fact-finding during sentencing, and as such his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Id. Petitioner also argued that his trial counsel failed to tell him that he was supposed to be sentenced to the statutory m inim um . Id. The trial court dism issed the petition, concluding that it contained m ere conclusions of law all of which were erroneous, and it failed to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged. Id. Petitioner appealed this decision to the TCCA, and the dism issal was affirm ed. Orange, 20 12 WL 1417252, at *1. The Tennessee Suprem e Court denied perm ission to appeal. Petitioner thereafter filed this tim ely habeas corpus petition. II. STAN D ARD OF REVIEW Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a court considering a habeas claim m ust defer to any decision by a state court concerning the claim , unless the state court’s judgm ent: (1) resulted in a 2 decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determ ined by the Suprem e Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S. § 2254(d)(1)– (2). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law when it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Suprem e Court on a question of law, or resolves a case differently on a set of facts which cannot be distinguished m aterially from those upon which the precedent was decided. W illiam s v. Tay lor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (20 0 0 ). Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), the relevant inquiry is whether the state court decision identifies the legal rule in the Suprem e Court cases which govern the issue, but unreasonably applies the principle to the particular facts of the case. Id. at 40 7. The habeas court is to determ ine only whether the state court’s decision is objectively reasonable, not whether, in the habeas court’s view, it is incorrect or wrong. Id. at 411. This is a high standard to satisfy. Montgom ery v. Bobby , 654 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 20 11) (noting that “§ 2254(d), as am ended by AEDPA is a purposefully dem anding standard . . . ‘because it was m eant to be.’” (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 , 786 (20 11)). III. AN ALYSIS Petitioner’s § 2254 petition raises one m ain ground for relief which appears to present two separate claim s: (1) that the state trial court erred by sum m arily dism issing his petition for post-conviction relief; and (2) that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea proceedings (Doc. 1). 3 In her answer, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his first claim because the claim does not assert a constitutional violation (Doc. 19). Respondent also argues that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied because the state court’s determ ination was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (Id.). The Court agrees with the Respondent concerning Petitioner’s entitlem ent to federal habeas relief, and will D EN Y this petition, for the reasons provided below. A. Trial Co u rt’s Su m m ary D is m is s al o f Po s t-Co n victio n Pe titio n Petitioner first appears to allege that the trial court erred when it sum m arily dism issed his petition for post-conviction relief because he actually presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (Doc. 1 p. 4). Under § 2254(a), a federal court m ay entertain a petition for the writ of habeas corpus only on the grounds that the prisoner is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. It is well established that because there is no constitutional right to postconviction rem edies, the federal “habeas corpus cannot be used to m ount challenges to a state’s schem e of post-conviction relief.” Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 681 (6th Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Pennsy lvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); see also Kirby b. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that habeas corpus is not the proper m eans by which prisoners can challenge errors or deficiencies in state post-conviction proceedings). As such, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in sum m arily dism issing his post-conviction petition is not cognizable on federal habeas. B. In e ffe ctive As s is tan ce o f Co u n s e l Petitioner next asserts that he received ineffective assistance from his attorney in entering his guilty plea (Doc. 1). According to Petitioner, his counsel failed to properly 4 advise him , and as such, he ended up pleading guilty to an offense outside of his possible range of punishm ent (Doc. 1). 1. Ap p licable Law The Sixth Am endm ent provides that “[i]n all crim inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. am end. VI. This right to counsel necessarily im plies a right to “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. See Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant m ust m eet a two-pronged test: (1) that counsel’s perform ance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient perform ance prejudiced the defense. Id. Proving deficient perform ance requires a “showing that counsel m ade errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Am endm ent.” Id. The appropriate m easure of attorney perform ance is “reasonableness under prevailing professional norm s.” Id. at 688. A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel m ust “identify the acts or om issions of counsel that are alleged to not have been the result of reasonable professional judgm ent.” Id. at 690 . The evaluation of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s perform ance m ust be m ade “from counsel’s perspective at the tim e of the alleged error and in light of all the circum stances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.” Kim m elm an v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). It is strongly presum ed that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The second prong, prejudice, “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.” Id. 5 Here, Petitioner m ust dem onstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 20 0 3) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks om itted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to underm ine confidence in the outcom e.” Moss, 323 F.3d 464– 55 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks om itted). Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if a perform ance below professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he “otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow , 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). 2. D is cu s s io n Petitioner argued to the TCCA that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel did not tell him that he was supposed to be sentenced to the statutory m inim um and that the trial court could not engage in judicial fact-finding during sentencing. Orange, 20 12 WL 1417252, at *2. The court of appeals found that Petitioner had failed to show that he was entitled to relief because had trial counsel advised as Petitioner claim s he should have, counsel would have been providing incorrect inform ation. Id. at *3. Strickland affirm s that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel before deciding whether or not to plead guilty. 466 U.S. at 686 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970 )). Here, the TCCA stated that the am ended Tennessee Crim inal Reform Act no longer im posed a statutory m inim um sentence, but rather provided advisory sentencing guidelines for the trial court to follow in selecting a sentence. Orange, 20 12 WL 1417252, at *2. Based on this, the TCCA found that even 6 taking the facts alleged in the petition for post-conviction relief as true, Petitioner was not entitled to relief. Id. at *3. The Court agrees with the TCCA’s determ ination. Petitioner cannot show that his trial counsel’s perform ance was deficient under Strickland. As the TCCA noted, had counsel given Petitioner the advice Petitioner claim s he was entitled to, counsel would have been opening him self up to an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. The Court cannot find that counsel was ineffective for in fact doing what he was supposed to do. To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the state court’s interpretation of the Tennessee sentencing statute, the Court notes that such an allegation does not present a constitutional issue. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 50 2 U.S. 62, 67– 68 (1991) (stating that where state courts have spoken on a state law issue, it is not the role of a federal habeas court ‘to reexam ine state-court determ inations of state-law questions.”). As such, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because the TCCA’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. IV. Co n clu s io n For the above m entioned reasons, the Court finds that none of Petitioner’s claim s warrant the issuance of a writ. Therefore, Petitioner’s m otion for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) will be D EN IED . V. Ce rtificate o f Ap p e alability The Court m ust also consider whether to issue a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), should Petitioner file a notice of appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and (c), a petitioner m ay appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding only if he is issued a COA, and a COA m ay only be issued where a petitioner has m ade a substantial showing of the 7 denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a claim has been dism issed on the m erits, a substantial showing is m ade if reasonable jurists could conclude that the issues raised are adequate to deserve further review. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 336 (20 0 3); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (20 0 0 ). When a claim has been dism issed on procedural grounds, a substantial showing is dem onstrated when it is shown that reasonable jurists would debate whether a valid claim has been stated and whether the court’s procedural ruling is correct. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. After reviewing each of Petitioner’s claim s, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that Petitioner’s claim s are adequate to deserve further review. As such, because Petitioner has failed to m ake a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a COA will not issue. ORDER ACCORDINGLY. /s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______ HARRY S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8
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