Goode v. Quality Correctional Healthcare et al, No. 1:2015cv00080 - Document 5 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 4/29/2015. (CNC, ) Serviced to David Jason Goode, the Sheriff of Bradley County, and the Court's financial deputy.
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Goode v. Quality Correctional Healthcare et al Doc. 5 U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF TEN N ESSEE AT CH ATTAN OOGA DAVID J ASON GOODE, Plaintiff, v. QUALITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.: 1:15-CV-80 -HSM-WBC MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Before the Court is a pro se prisoners’ civil rights com plaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in form a pauperis. It appears from the application that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $ 350 .0 0 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepaym ent of costs or fees or security therefor. For the reasons stated below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be D ISMISSED . Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts m ust screen prisoner com plaints and sua sponte dism iss those that are frivolous or m alicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is im m une. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 10 14 (6th Cir. 1999). Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or "screen" certain com plaints sua sponte and to dism iss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought m onetary relief from a defendant im m une from such relief, or that were frivolous or m alicious. Dockets.Justia.com Id. at 10 15– 16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dism issal standard articulated by the Suprem e Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (20 0 9) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 554 (20 0 7) “governs dism issals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 – 71 (6th Cir. 20 10 ). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a com plaint “m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 570 ). In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff m ust establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 , 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 10 36, 10 42 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 90 6 F.2d 220 , 223 (6th Cir. 1990 ) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”). According to the com plaint, plaintiff began breaking out with a rash and hives all over his body five to six m onths ago, while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff has seen the m edical personnel at the jail num erous tim es for this issue and has been charged for these m edical visits, but has gotten no results. Plaintiff requested “outside medical skin graphs [sic]” and received a skin graft on March 4th. The results of that graft were inconclusive, and no other graft has been taken. Plaintiff alleges that Lynn Roe, an em ployee of the Bradley County Sheriff’s Departm ent, threatens him with solitary confinem ent due to his condition, and that J udge Donahue refused outside treatm ent 2 because plaintiff cannot pay for it. Plaintiff seeks treatm ent by a skin care specialist/ derm atologist, reim bursem ent for his m edical treatm ent at the jail, and “possibly to file a claim for pain and suffering.” Plaintiff has sued the Bradley County Sherriff’s Office, Quality Correctional Healthcare, Dr. Bates (whom plaintiff states is the jail’s attending doctor), and Eric Watson (whom plaintiff alleges is the supervisor of jail lieutenants and staff). 1. Brad le y Co u n ty Sh e riff’s Office Bradley County Sheriff’s Office is not a suable entity within the m eaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Departm ent of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978); see, e.g., Matthew s v. Jones, 35 F.3d 10 46, 10 49 (6th Cir. 1994) (a police departm ent is not an entity which can be sued under § 1983), Sm ith v. Ritter, No. 1:12-CV-417, 20 13 WL 3753984, at *4 (E.D. Tenn., J uly 15, 20 13), Am brose v. Knight, No. 3:13-CV-376, 20 13 WL 3430 840 , at *1 (E.D. Tenn. J uly 8, 20 13), Banner v. Ham blen County Sheriff’s Departm ent, No. 2:0 9-CV-122, 20 12 WL 1565385, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 30 , 20 12; Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:0 7-CV-161, 20 0 8 WL 40 93352, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. August 28, 20 0 8); Vega v. Harville, No. 3:0 7-CV-287, 20 0 8 WL 1840 742, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 23, 20 0 8); Maroney v. W ard, No. 3:0 8-CV-38, 20 0 8 WL 50 9532, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. February 22, 20 0 8). Accordingly, any allegations against Bradley County Sheriff’s Office fail to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted and Bradley County Sheriff’s Office is therefore D ISMISSED from this lawsuit. 2 . D e n ial o f Me d ical Care While the com plaint contains no direct factual assertions involving Quality Correctional Health Care or Dr. Bates, construing the com plaint liberally, plaintiff appears to allege that these defendants have failed to provide him with proper m edical 3 care. A prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inm ate’s serious m edical needs violates the Eighth Am endm ent. Estelle v. Gam ble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison m edical personnel or officials m ay be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious m edical needs “in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatm ent once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10 4– 5. Also, “a prisoner who suffers pain needlessly when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate indifference is the cause of his suffering.” See Berry m an v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Boretti v. W iscom b, 930 F.2d 1150 , 1154– 55 (6th Cir.1991)); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10 3 (“[T]he denial of m edical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose”). Where a prisoner receives som e m edical care and the dispute is over its adequacy, however, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess m edical judgm ents and to constitutionalize claim s which sound in tort law.” W estlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). By the sam e token, a difference of opinion between m edical care providers as to appropriate treatm ent for an inm ate’s ailm ent does not present a constitutional controversy. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10 5– 6; see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 130 9, 1314 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a disagreem ent between prison physician and physician who originally prescribed m edications is not of constitutional m agnitude). Plaintiff does not allege that he has been denied m edical treatm ent at the jail. Rather, plaintiff alleges that, despite m ultiple m edical visits and a skin graft, m edical personnel have not yet cured his rash, and have denied plaintiff’s request for blood work. Based on these allegations, it is clear that plaintiff disagrees with the course of m edical treatm ent provided to him at the jail, for which he attem pts to hold these defendants liable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s disagreem ent with his course of m edical 4 treatm ent does not establish a denial of a federal right. Accordingly, the com plaint fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 as to these defendants and they will be D ISMISSED . 3 . Re s p o n d e at Su p e rio r Plaintiff m akes no allegations as to defendant Watson, but rather appears to assert that he is liable for the acts in the com plaint based upon his position as a jail supervisor. In a suit brought under § 1983, liability cannot be im posed solely on the basis of respondeat superior. Polk Cnty . v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Bellam y v. Bradley , 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). The law is well settled that a plaintiff m ust allege that a defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate in order to state a claim against such a defendant. Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982). “[L]iability cannot be based solely on the right to control em ployees.” Leach v. Shelby Cnty . Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Likewise, a supervisor cannot be held liable for a m ere failure to act. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 20 0 2) (stating that “[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is prem ised on a m ere failure to act; it ‘m ust be based on active unconstitutional behavior’” (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 10 41, 10 48 (6th Cir. 1999))); see also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 30 0 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and a failure to respond or rem edy the com plaint was insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under § 1983). As plaintiff does not allege any active unconstitutional behavior on the part of Eric Watson, the com plaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against him and he will be D ISMISSED . 5 As the com plaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against any defendant, this action will be D ISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because plaintiff is an inm ate in the Bradley County J ustice Center, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $ 350 .0 0 . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to subm it to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 80 0 Market Street, Suite 130 , Knoxville, Tennessee 3790 2, as an initial partial paym ent, whichever is greater of: (a) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly deposits to the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly balance in the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account for the six-m onth period preceding the filing of the com plaint. Thereafter, the custodian shall subm it twenty percent (20 %) of the plaintiff’s preceding m onthly incom e (or incom e credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding m onth), but only when such m onthly incom e exceeds ten dollars ($ 10 .0 0 ), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($ 350 .0 0 ) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is D IRECTED to send a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Sheriff of Bradley County to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account com plies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to paym ent of the filing fee. The Clerk is further D IRECTED to forward a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy. 6 The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A separate judgm ent will enter. SO ORD ERED . / s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 7
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