Rodriguez-Ruiz v. Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, L.L.C., No. 3:2018cv01806 - Document 29 (D.P.R. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER finding as moot and granting in part 15 Motion to Compel. Plaintiff's Notice of Compliance Deadline due by 3/19/2020. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 3/5/2020. (PMA)
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Rodriguez-Ruiz v. Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, L.L.C. Doc. 29 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF PU ERTO RICO LU IS N OEL ROD RIGU EZ-RU IZ, Plaintiff, CIVIL NO. 18-180 6 (PG) v. MICROSOFT OPERATION S PU ERTO RICO, L.L.C., Defendant. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER I. Backgro u n d Plaintiff Luis Noel Rodriguez Ruiz (“Plain tiff” or “Rodriguez”) filed the above- captioned claim on October 26, 20 18 . See Docket No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, L.L.C. (“Microsoft” or “Defendant”) discrim inated against him and denied him reasonable accom m odation in violation of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12117 et seq. (“ADA”), and wrongfully term inated him pursuant to Law No. 80 of May 30 , 1976, as am ended, 29 P.R. LAWS ANN ., tit. 29, § 185a et seq. (“Law 8 0 ”). Plaintiff states that he suffers from cerebral palsy, a m ajor disabling m otor disorder that causes him to have a lim p and difficulty walking, am ong other things. Plaintiff also avers that he suffers from severe headaches and back pain after severe and perm anent cervical dam age suffered in a n on-work-related autom obile accident. Pursuant to the allegations in the com plaint, on Decem ber 5, 20 0 5, Plaintiff com m enced his em ploym ent with Microsoft as an engineer. According to Plaintiff, on or about the end of the year 20 11, his new supervisor Hector Baez began a cam paign of discrim ination and harassm ent against him because of his disabilities. Rodriguez alleges Dockets.Justia.com Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 2 of 10 that Baez created a hostile work environm ent, ordered disadvantageous transfers, gave him poor perform ance reviews, denied reasonable accom m odations and m ade disparagin g com m ents about Plaintiff’s im pedim ents. He was eventually discharged on August 19, 20 16. Plaintiff now requests to be indem nified for his wrongful term ination and for the dam ages suffered. He seeks reinstatem ent, dam ages for pain and suffering and econom ic harm , punitive dam ages, front and back pay in lieu of reinstatem ent, as well as attorney fees. Defendant answered the com plaint on Decem ber 21, 20 18 (Docket No. 5) and discovery proceedings ensued. The court held two conferences with parties’ attorneys an d granted an extension of tim e to conduct discovery until Decem ber 31, 20 19. See Dockets No. 10 , 12, 14. On the last possible day, Defendant filed a Motion to Com pel (Docket No. 15) com plaining about Plaintiff’s insufficient responses to both its interrogatories and requests for production. The Plaintiff responded arguing that som e discovery disputes had already been resolved, and were thus m oot, and that som e interrogatories and discovery requests were overly broad, burdensom e, and/ or in violation of Plaintiff’s privacy rights. See Docket No. 25. On February 6, 20 20 , the court held a status conferen ce in this case to discuss the pending m otion. After the conclusion of the conference, the only pending m atter in the m otion to com pel to be adjudged was whether Plaintiff should respond to Interrogatory No. 17 an d Requests for Production of Docum ents Nos. 17 and 18, regarding the production of Plaintiff’s Facebook or social m edia profile(s). As such, the court deem s MOOT all other issues raised in the m otion to com pel and will lim it the discussion infra to Microsoft’s request for the content of Plaintiff’s social m edia account on Facebook. Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) II. Page 3 of 10 D is cu s s io n A. Ge n e ral Le gal Prin cip le s Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that, “[u]nless otherwise lim ited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties m ay obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged m atter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case … Inform ation within this scope of discovery need n ot be adm issible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Rule 26 prom otes fairness both in the discovery process and at trial.” Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1992). That is because “[m ]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” Hickm an v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 50 7 (1947). Rule 26 is to be “construed broadly to encom pass any m atter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other m atter that could bear on, any issue that is or m ay be in the case.” Oppenheim er Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 , 351 (1978 ). Nevertheless, “[t]he proportionality provision was added to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1) in Decem ber 20 15 to em phasize that there are intended to be lim its on the breadth of discovery to which a party is entitled.” Viscito v. Nat’l Planning Corp., No. CV 3:18-30 132-MGM, 20 19 WL 5318228, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 20 19) (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Com m ’n v. Silkm an, No. 1:16-cv0 0 20 5-J AW, 20 17 WL 6597510 , at *6-7 (D. Me. Dec. 26, 20 17)). If a discovery dispute arises, a party seeking discovery m ay file a m otion to com pel discovery pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). “The party seeking inform ation in discovery has the burden of showing its relevance.” Viscito v. Nat’l Planning Corp., No. CV 3:18 -30 132-MGM, 20 19 WL 5318228, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 20 19) (citing Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Opechee Con str. Corp., Civil No. 15cv-0 0 6-J D, 20 16 WL 1642626, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 20 16)). On the other hand, “[w]hen a Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 4 of 10 party resists the production of evidence, it ‘bears the burden of establishing lack of relevan cy or undue burden.’” Autoridad de Carreteras y Transportacion v. Transcore Atl., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 422, 427 (D.P.R. 20 16) (citations om itted). B. Partie s ’ D is co ve ry Mo tio n s Pursuant to the m otion to com pel, Microsoft’s Interrogatory No. 17 requests that Plaintiff identify all social m edia profiles he m anages, and Request for Production of Docum ent No. 17 states as follows: As to any social m edia account you m ay have, produce the following: a. Com plete copy of your profile, in cluding, without lim itation, all m essages, posts, status updates, com m ents on your wall or page, causes and/ or groups to which you have joined, which are in your account and which were published or posted between J anuary 20 10 and the present, related or referring to any em otions, feelings, m ental status, or m ood status. b. Copy of all com m unications from you, whether through private m essages in your profile or m essages on your wall or page, which m ay provide context to the com m unication m entioned in the previous sub-section. c. Any and all photos taken and/ or uploaded to your account between J anuary 20 10 and the present. Docket No. 15 at pages 14-15. On the other hand, Request for Production of Docum ents No. 18 states the following: Regarding any Facebook account you have or m ay have had, the inform ation requested in subsections a - c, m ay be obtained by following these steps: (1) enter your Facebook profile; (2) go to the “account” section; (3) go to “account settings”; (4) select the option of “download your inform ation”; (5) select “download.” Id. at page 15. In its m otion, Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s objections to these requests. Specifically, Plaintiff objected the requests are not “related in any way to the case, are overbroad, burdensom e, offensive and a violation of plaintiff’s right to privacy.” See Docket No. 15-4. Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 5 of 10 C. Ele ctro n ic D is co ve ry o f So cial Me d ia Microsoft m oves the court to order Plaintiff to provide the requested content of Plaintiff’s social m edia profile because it is relevant to its defenses and, therefore, discoverable. See Docket No. 15 at pages 14-18. Microsoft asserts that the inform ation stem m ing from his social m edia profile(a) is also relevant to Plaintiff’s m ental an d em otional state regarding his em otional dam ages. Microsoft cited a string of cases in support of its contentions that Plaintiff has no right of privacy over the eviden ce requested and that Plaintiff is required to produce this eviden ce. See Docket No. 15 at pages 14-18 . In his response, Plaintiff m erely states that he has given Defendant authorizations to access his incom e tax returns, as well as his m edical and psychological records, and “that should be enough … .” Docket No. 25 at page 17. For starters, the court is persuaded that Plaintiff lacks a right to privacy with regards to the content of his social m edia profile(s). Various courts have held that “[i]nform ation posted on a private individual’s social m edia ‘is generally not privileged, nor is it protected by com m on law or civil law notions of privacy.’” T.C on Behalf of S.C. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tennessee, No. 3:17-CV-0 10 98, 20 18 WL 3348728, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. J uly 9, 20 18) (citing Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0 1180 , 20 13 WL 117650 4, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20 , 20 13)). See also Gondola v. USMD PPM, LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 575, 591 (N.D. Tex. 20 16) (“Generally, [social networking site] content is neither privileged nor protected by any right of privacy.”) (citing J ohnson v. PPI Tech. Servs., L.P., No. 11-2773, 20 13 WL 450 8128, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 20 13); Moore v. Wayne Sm ith Trucking Inc., No. Civ. A. 14-1919, 20 15 WL 6438 913, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 20 15) (“It is settled that inform ation on social m edia accounts, including Facebook, is discoverable.”)). Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 6 of 10 Therefore, Plaintiff’s reluctance to produce the content of his social m edia page(s) on account of a claim to a right of privacy is unfounded. Having agreed with our sister courts that the posted or published content in a social networking site, such as a Facebook profile, is devoid of a right of privacy, the court m ust then determ ine whether the request for production is relevant to the claim s being litigated. “Courts have … found social m edia, diaries, and journals generally discoverable provided that they are relevant to a plaintiff’s claim s.” Connolly v. Alderm an , No. 2:17-CV-79, 20 18 WL 4462368, at *5 (D. Vt. Sept. 18, 20 18) (citing Brown v. City of Ferguson, 20 17 WL 38 6544, at *1 (E.D. Mo. J an. 27, 20 17) (observing that “generally, social m edia content is neither privileged nor protected by a right of privacy”); Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 20 13) (observing that “the fact that Defendant is seeking social networking inform ation as opposed to traditional discovery m aterials does not change the [c]ourt’s analysis”); Robinson v. J ones LangLaSalle Am s., Inc., 20 12 WL 3763545, at *1 (D. Ore. Aug. 29, 20 12) (concluding that there is “no principled reason to articulate different standards for the discoverability of com m unications through em ail, text m essage, or social m edia platform s.”)). More specifically, several courts have found that the contents of a plaintiff-em ployee’s social m edia profile, postings, or m essages (including status updates, wall com m ents, causes joined, groups joined, activity stream s, blog entries during a relevant tim e period) are relevant and discoverable in em ploym ent cases which include claim s of em otional distress, when they “reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant em otion, feeling, or m ental state.” E.E.O.C. v. Sim ply Storage Mgm t., LLC (, 270 F.R.D. 430 , 435 (S.D. Ind. 20 10 ). See also Holter v. Wells Fargo & Co., 281 F.R.D. 340 , 344 (D. Minn. 20 11) (inform ation from em ployee’s social m edia sites relating to her em otions, Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 7 of 10 feelings, or m ental state was subject to disclosure); Robinson v. J ones Lang LaSalle Am s., Inc., 20 12 WL 3763545, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 20 12)(ordering plaintiff to produce social m edia content in accordance with principles set forth in Sim ply Storage). In fact, a fellow judge in this district court has already deem ed this type of eviden ce – to wit, a plaintiff’s Facebook profile – discoverable in the context of an em ploym ent litigation. See Mercado Cordova v. Walm art Puerto Rico, Inc., No. CV 16-2195 (ADC), 20 19 WL 3226893, at *2 (D.P.R. J uly 16, 20 19) (im posing sanctions for spoliation against plaintiff for deleting Facebook account after court ordered production of such evidence at defendant’s request in a disability discrim ination claim again st form er em ployer). Though courts have concluded that inform ation posted or published on a party’s social m edia page m ay be relevant, courts generally do not “endorse an extrem ely broad request for all social m edia site content.” Gondola, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (citing Moore, 20 15 WL 6438913 at *2). “[A] party does not have ‘a generalized right to rum m age at will through inform ation that [an opposing party] has lim ited from public view.’” T.C on Behalf of S.C. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tennessee, No. 3:17-CV-0 10 98 , 20 18 WL 3348 728, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. J uly 9, 20 18) (citing Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0 1180 , 20 13 WL 117650 4, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20 , 20 13). See also Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11– CV– 10 14, 20 12 WL 5265170 , at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 20 12) (“The fact that the inform ation defendants seek is in an electronic file as opposed to a file cabin et does not give them the right to rum mage through the entire file.”). Such is the case because “[t]here is a distinction between discovery of social m edia postings that are available to the general public and those that the user has restricted from view.” T.C on Behalf of S.C., 20 18 WL 3348728 at *14. Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 8 of 10 With those principles in m ind, courts have held that “a plaintiff’s entire social networking account is not necessarily relevant sim ply because he or she is seeking em otional distress dam ages.’” Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., No. 0 4-CV-0 80 5S(SR), 20 16 WL 60 95792, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 20 16) (citing Giachetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 20 13)). See also Silva v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 3:14cv580 , 20 15 WL 1275840 , at *2 (D. Conn. March 19, 20 15) (em otional distress claim does not warrant disclosure of all Facebook posts). The fact that a plaintiff’s m ental or em otional state is at issue does not “autom atically justify sweeping discovery of social m edia content.” T.C on Behalf of S.C., 20 18 WL 3348728 at *14. Therefore, “[t]he production of a social m edia account’s contents in full will therefore rarely be appropriate.” T.C on Behalf of S.C., 20 18 WL 3348728 at *14. Here, Defendant has adequately dem onstrated the relevance of the content of Plaintiff’s social m edia account, and Plaintiff’s boilerplate and generalized objections to this request for production are not enough to carry the day. “[G]eneralized objections to an opponent’s discovery requests are insufficient.” Transcore, 319 F.R.D. at 427 (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 20 0 8) (“Boilerplate objection s that a request for discovery is overbroad and unduly burdensom e ... are im proper unless based on particularized facts.”); Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 58 7 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and tantam ount to not m aking any objection at all.”)). Hence, the court finds that som e discovery of Plaintiff’s social m edia profile(s) is appropriate here. The court m ust now define the perm issible scope of this type of discovery in cases like the above-captioned since “[i]t is reasonable to expect severe em otional or m ental injury to m anifest itself in som e [social networking site] content … .” Sim ply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 9 of 10 435. To that effect, the court agrees with other district courts’ conclusion that social m edia content that is reflective of a person’s em otional state is relevant and discoverable when the sam e has been placed at issue. For exam ple: [P]osts specifically referencing the em otional distress plaintiff claim s to have suffered or treatm ent plaintiff received in connection with the incidents alleged in [his] com plaint and posts referencing an alternative potential source of cause of plaintiff’s em otional distress are discoverable. … In addition, posts regarding plaintiff’s social activities m ay be relevant to plaintiff’s claim s of em otional distress and loss of enjoym ent of life. Moll, 20 16 WL 60 95792 at *5 (citing Caputi v. Topper Realty Corp., No. 14-CV-2634, 20 15 WL 8 93663, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 20 15); Reid v. Ingerm an Sm ith LLP, No. CV 20 12-0 30 7, 20 12 WL 6720 752, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 20 12)). Pursuant to the foregoing, Microsoft’s request for production is hereby granted, but only in part. First, the Plaintiff shall respond to Microsoft’s interrogatory requesting he identify all the social m edia platform s in which he has an account or profile. However, the court will not allow Defendant to have unrestricted access to Plaintiff’s social m edia account(s). Instead, Plaintiff’s counsel shall review all of Plaintiff’s social m edia content during the requested period (from J anuary 20 10 to the present) and produce any and all content, posts or com m ents referen cing Plaintiff’s “em otions, feelings, m ental status, or m ood status,”1 (as requested), including any photographs which m ay have accom panied such posts or com m ents. The sam e test shall be applied to the request for Plaintiff’s uploaded photos insofar as “pictures of the claim ant taken during the relevant tim e period and posted on a claim ant’s profile will generally be discoverable because the context of the picture an d the claim ant’s appearance m ay reveal the claim ant’s em otional or m ental status.” Sim ply 1 Microsoft’s Request for Production No. 17. Civ. No. 18-18 0 6 (PG) Page 10 of 10 Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 436. “The Court trusts that plaintiff’s counsel, as an officer of the Court, will review social m edia content and com m unications an d produce any relevant inform ation.” Holter, 281 F.R.D. at 344. Finally, Microsoft m ay “challenge the production if it believes the production falls short of the requirem ents of this order. Nothing in this Order is intended to foreclose such follow-up procedures.” Sim ply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 436. During the course of this exercise, the parties are encouraged to review the cited caselaw for illustration and m ay file a m otion for clarification as to any specific issue of law that arises. III. Co n clu s io n Pursuant to the foregoing, the court hereby GRAN TS IN PART the single pending issue in Microsoft’s m otion to com pel (Docket No. 15) regarding the com plete production of Plaintiff’s social m edia account(s) and/ or profile(s); the rest of the m atters raised in the m otion are found as MOOT per the parties’ discussions during the conference. Plaintiff has te n ( 10 ) d ays from the date of entry of this order to com ply and notify the court thereof. IT IS SO ORD ERED . In San J uan, Puerto Rico, March 5, 20 20 . S/ J UAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ JU AN M. PEREZ-GIMEN EZ SEN IOR U .S. D ISTRICT JU D GE
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