Rosario Ramos et al. v. Municipality of Rio Grande et al., No. 3:2018cv01050 - Document 31 (D.P.R. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Amended Pleadings due by 3/8/2019. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 2/22/2019. (PMA)
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Rosario Ramos et al. v. Municipality of Rio Grande et al. Doc. 31 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF PU ERTO RICO Ca rlo s L. Ro s ario Ram o s , e t a l., Plaintiffs CIVIL NO. 18-10 50 (PG) v. Th e Mu n icip ality o f Río Gran d e , e t a l., Defendants. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER Before the court is the m otion to dism iss filed by the defen dants Municipality of Río Grande (henceforth “Municipality”), Hon. Angel B. González Dam udt (henceforth “GonzálezDam udt”), Rey O. Caraballo Rodríguez (henceforth “Caraballo-Rodríguez”); Leysla Ortiz Sánchez (hen ceforth “Ortiz-Sánchez”), J ose A. Adorno Aponte (hen ceforth “Adorno-Aponte”), and Evelyn González Robles (henceforth “González-Robles”) (collectively as “Defendants”). See Docket No. 18. In their m otion, Defendants request the dism issal of this case arguing that plaintiffs Carlos L. Rosario Ram os (henceforth “Rosario-Ram os”), Ivelisse Rosario Mén dez (henceforth “Rosario-Méndez”), and Ricardo Torrens Osorio (henceforth “Torrens-Osorio”) (collectively as “Plaintiffs”) failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs filed a tim ely response to said m otion (Docket No. 27), to which Defendants have not replied. After considering the parties’ pleadings and the applicable law, Defendants’ m otion to dism iss is GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART. I. BACKGROU N D On J anuary 31, 20 18, Plaintiffs filed the present com plaint against the Municipality and the other individual Defen dants in their official and personal capacities pursuant to the Civil Rights Dockets.Justia.com Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 2 of 15 Act of 18 66, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations to their rights under the First Am endm ent to the United States Constitution. The com plaint also includes claim s for dam ages under Article 18 0 2 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 31, § 5141. In sum , plaintiffs Rosario-Ram os and Rosario-Mén dez allege that Defendants violated their First Am en dm ent rights by retaliating against them after having m ade constitutionally-protected public expressions. Specifically, on August 3, 20 0 9, Rosario-Ram os started work as a heavy equipm ent driver under a tem porary contract with the Public Works Departm ent of the Municipality of Río Grande. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. On Septem ber 25, 20 16, Rosario-Ram os wrote a Facebook m essage stating: “Populares de Río Grande with Davis [sic] Acosta, (Popular Party Mem bers with David Acosta).” Id. Through this m essage, Rosario-Ram os changed his political affiliation from the Popular Dem ocratic Party (henceforth “PDP”) to the New Progressive Party (henceforth “NPP”). See id. The next day, Mayor González-Dam udt purportedly ordered the PDP adm inistration of Río Grande to com m ence a program of persecution and discrim in ation against Rosario-Ram os. Said pattern of discrim ination by co-defendants Mayor GonzálezDam udt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, and Ortiz-Sánchez culm inated with Rosario-Ram os’ term ination on J anuary 31, 20 17, even though he allegedly had a perfect perform ance an d track record, an d Mayor González-Dam udt had prom ised him on J uly 20 16 that he would be reclassified as a regular perm anent em ployee. See id. On the other hand, on J uly 19, 20 13, Rosario-Méndez began to work as a tem porary em ployee in the Purchasing Office of the Municipality of Río Grande. During her tenure as a purchasing officer, Rosario-Méndez dealt with several irregularities perpetrated by Mayor González-Dam udt and the special assistant to the m ayor, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte. Specifically, they purportedly ordered Rosario-Méndez to purchase m aterials using public Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 3 of 15 funds for the private hom e of Attorney Noem í Caraballo López and a tire for a private truck. See id. at 3-4. At an undisclosed date, Rosario-Méndez received a telephone call from a radio com m entator, J osé Cruz J im énez (henceforth “Cruz-J im énez”), requesting inform ation about the use of public m unicipal funds for private use and she felt com pelled to tell the truth. See id. at 4. Cruz-J im énez m ade the inform ation public, and he subsequently filed several stillpending com plaints against the Municipality of Río Grande, Mayor González-Dam udt and other m unicipal officers for the use of public m unicipal funds for private use. At som e point on Septem ber 20 16, Adorno-Aponte allegedly told another purchasing agent, Elizabeth Sánchez, “that by orders from the top (referring to Mayor González-Dam udt), Ivelisse Rosario Mén dez would not perform any work, and no telephone calls could be received by her at work.” Id. Subsequently, on Septem ber 29, 20 16, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte dem oted Rosario-Mén dez within the Purchasing Office by elim inating som e of her duties. See id. Additionally, on October and Decem ber 20 16, Rosario-Méndez provided, under oath, inform ation on the illegal use of private funds to J ustice Departm ent investigators. As a result of these events, Rosario-Méndez was not assigned any work from Septem ber 20 16 until Decem ber 31, 20 16, when Adorno-Aponte resigned and was replaced by co-defen dant González-Robles, who began to assign Rosario-Méndez “irrelevant jobs” once every one or two weeks. This situation continued until she was term inated on August 31, 20 17. See id. at 5-6. Additionally, Torrens-Osorio, conjugal partner of Rosario-Méndez, claim s dam ages under Puerto Rico’s Torts statute for the persecution and discrim ination that he purportedly suffered in his workplace at the Public Works Department of the Municipality of Rio Grande due to his wife’s public interest expressions. See Docket No. 27 at pages 7-8. Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 4 of 15 Because of the events outlined above, Plain tiffs filed the present com plaint requesting com pensatory and punitive dam ages of no less than $ 30 0 ,0 0 0 for Rosario-Ram os, $ 30 0 ,0 0 0 for Rosario-Méndez, $ 50 ,0 0 0 for Torrens-Osorio, and a final $ 50 ,0 0 0 for their con jugal partnership. See id. at 9. Furtherm ore, Plaintiffs request equitable relief in the form of a perm anent injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate plaintiffs Rosario-Ram os and RosarioMéndez at their previous positions, as well as any attorney’s fees, costs and expen ses incurred in connection to the present action. See id. at 9-10 . II. STAN D ARD OF REVIEW When ruling on a m otion to dism iss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court m ust “accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the com plaint, draw all reason able inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, and determ ine whether the com plaint, so read, lim ns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10 , 15 (1st Cir. 20 0 9) (citing LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 50 7, 50 8 (1st Cir. 1998)). Even though detailed factual allegations are not necessary for a com plaint to survive a m otion to dism iss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlem ent to relief’ requires m ore than labels and conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7). Those nonconclusory factual allegations that the court accepts as true m ust be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. See Quiros v. Muñoz, 670 F.Supp.2d 130 , 132 (D.P.R. 20 0 9). “Determ ining whether a com plaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and com m on sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (20 0 9). Furtherm ore, “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirem ent,’ but it asks for m ore than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 5 of 15 III. D ISCU SSION On August 23, 20 18, Defendants filed a m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 1 Each of Defendants’ argum ents for dism issal will be discussed in turn. A. Defendants’ Argum ent that Plaintiffs’ Claim s are Duplicative Plaintiffs Rosario-Ram os and Rosario-Méndez request injunctive and m onetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 conten ding that they have been deprived of their First Am endm ent rights. In their m otion to dism iss, Defendants request the dism issal of all claim s brought against co-defendants Mayor González-Dam udt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, AdornoAponte, and González-Robles in their official capacities. In sum , they contend that “suing the m ayor of the Municipality of Río Grande or any other official in their official capacity while the Municipality of Río Grande is being included as a defendant is redundant and unnecessary.” Docket No. 18 at page 14. Defendants’ argum ent is correct, as “[w]hen a m unicipality is sued directly, claim s against m unicipal em ployees in their official capacities are redundant and m ay be dism issed.” DiazGarcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, 13-cv-1473-FAB, 20 14 WL 440 3363 at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 8, 20 14). See Trafford v. City of Westbrook, 256 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.Me. 20 0 9) (explaining how “an official capacity claim is not n ecessary when a Section 1983 claim is brought against a m unicipality ”); Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (explaining that “[t]here is no longer a need 1 Rule 12(b)(6) enables a party to present as a defense that the other party has failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2 Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation , custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedin g for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 6 of 15 to bring official-capacity actions against local governm ent officials, for under Monell, local governm ent units can be sued directly for dam ages and injunctive or declaratory relief”) (referencing Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Plaintiffs failed to distinguish how the relief that they m ay obtain from their official capacity claim s again st the individual defendants is any different from that which they m ay obtain through their § 198 3 claim s again st the Municipality of Río Grande. Thus, this court finds those claim s are in deed duplicative an d the m otion to dism iss all claim s against co-defendants Mayor GonzálezDam udt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their official capacities is hereby GRAN TED . B. Defendants’ Claim that the Municipality of Rio Grande is Im m une to Punitive Dam ages Defendants also contend that m unicipalities are im m une from punitive dam ages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1) 3 and applicable case law, therefore Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive dam ages against the Municipality m ust be dism issed with prejudice. See Docket No. 18 at page 23. The Suprem e Court held in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (198 1), that “considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a m unicipality to punitive dam ages for the bad-faith actions of its officials.” Id. at 271. However, as adm itted by the Defendants them selves, “[p]unitive dam ages m ay be awarded under § 1983 against a state or m unicipal officer in h e r in d ivid u al cap acity.” Docket No. 18 at page 23 (em phasis added). See Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 20 0 4) (stating that “[p]unitive dam ages m ay be 3 Section 1981(a)(b)(1) states that “[a] com plaining party m ay recover pun itive dam ages under this section again st a respondent (o th e r th a n a go ve rn m e n t, go ve rn m e n t age n cy o r p o litical s u bd ivis io n ) if the com plaining party dem onstrates that the respondent en gaged in a discrim inatory practice or discrim inatory practices with m alice or with reckless in difference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1) (em phasis added). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 7 of 15 awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where ‘the defendant’s conduct is shown to be m otivated by evil m otive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous in difference to the federally protected rights of others.’”) (quoting Sm ith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 , 56 (1983)). Thus, Plaintiffs cannot claim punitive dam ages against the Municipality, and Defendants’ m otion to dism iss those claim s for punitive dam ages against the Municipality of Río Grande is hereby GRAN TED . C. Rosario-Ram os’ Claim of Political Discrim ination To m ake a prim a facie case of political discrim ination, Plaintiffs m ust show that “(1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plain tiff’s affiliation; (3) a challenged em ploym ent action occurred; and (4) political affiliation was a substantial or m otivating factor behind the challenged em ploym ent action.” Lopez-Rosado v. Molina-Rodriguez, No. 11-cv-2198-J AG, 20 12 WL 4681956 at *4 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 20 12) (quoting J uarbe-Velez v. Soto-Santiago, 558 F.Supp.2d 187, 199 (D.P.R. 20 0 8)). Although Plaintiffs, at the m otion to dism iss stage, do not need to present sufficient facts to establish a prim a facie case of political discrim ination, “the elem ents of a prim a facie case m ay be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim .” Rodriguez-Reyes v. MolinaRodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 20 13). Furtherm ore, “[t]here need not be a one-to-one relationship between any single allegation and a necessary elem ent of the cause of action. What counts is the ‘cum ulative effect of the [com plaint’s] factual allegations.’” Id. at 55 (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 20 11)). When applying the above test to the totality of the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ com plaint, it can be inferred that Rosario-Ram os has presented a plausible claim of political discrim in ation. Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 8 of 15 In his com plaint, Rosario-Ram os presented three non-conclusory factual allegations, to wit: 1) that on Septem ber 25, 20 16 he wrote a Facebook m essage im plying that he was a form er PDP affiliate who now supported the NPP party; 2) on Septem ber 26, 20 16 the PDP adm inistration of Río Grande was ordered by Mayor González-Dam udt to persecute him , and 3) that his contract was not renewed by the PDP adm inistration of the Municipality of Río Gran de on J anuary 31, 20 17, subsequent to that Facebook post. Based on these non-conclusory facts, the court can construe that Rosario-Ram os and the Defendants are plausibly affiliated with opposing political parties, as the form er prefers the NPP whereas the latter belong to the PDP. Additionally, the facts contained in Plaintiffs’ com plaint, when taken as true, point to the conclusion that Rosario-Ram os was subject to an adverse em ploym ent action when his tem porary contract was not renewed by the Defendants on J anuary 31, 20 17. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. See also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990 ) (explaining how the governm ent m ay not rely on certain reasons to deny a person a valuable governm ent benefit, even if he has no right to it, for exam ple: “[i]t m ay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially , his interest in freedom of speech”) (quoting Perry v. Sinderm ann, 40 8 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972)). Rosario-Ram os does not allege any “discrete factual events” showing that the individual Defendants were aware of his political beliefs. See Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14-15. 4 However, “[t]he relevant question for a district court in assessing plausibility is not whether the com plaint m akes any particular factual allegations but, rather, whether ‘the com plaint warrant[s] dism issal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlem ent to relief 4 Exam ples of such “discrete factual events” include: “(1) that a plaintiff was asked by defendants about the circum stances relating to how the plaintiff obtained his or her job; (2) that the clerical staff directly asked about a plaintiff’s political affiliations; and (3) that em ployees kn ew about and frequently discussed the political affiliations of their co-workers.” Aguiar-Serrano v. Puerto Rico Highways and Transp. Authority, 916 F.Supp.2d 223, 230 (D.P.R. 20 13). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 9 of 15 plausible.’” Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 20 13). This court finds that it is certainly plausible that the Defendants knew of Rosario-Ram os’ Facebook m essage announcing his support of the NPP party, taking into account that Facebook is a widely used social m edia platform , the speed at which inform ation can spread across the relatively sm all population of the Municipality of Río Grande, 5 as well as Rosario-Ram os’ contention that Mayor González-Dam udt ordered a cam paign of discrim ination against him the very next day after the announcem ent was m ade. Rosario-Ram os does not provide any particular facts hinting at what the Defendants’ continuous acts of persecution, harassm ent and discrim in ation consisted of, other than the fact that he was term inated on J anuary 31, 20 17. See Docket No. 1 at page 2. Nonetheless, this court can infer the plausible existen ce of a causal link between the Defendants’ knowledge of RosarioRam os’ political affiliation and their subsequent decision to term inate him . See RodriguezReyes, 711 F.3d at 56 (rem inding that at the m otion to dism iss stage “plaintiffs, for pleading purposes, need not establish this elem ent; the facts contain ed in the com plaint need only show that the claim of causation is plausible”). The alleged tim eline of events is once again instructive here, as the Facebook m essage was published on Septem ber 25, 20 16 and Rosario-Ram os was term inated on J anuary 31, 20 17, shortly after the general elections in Novem ber. As such, it is plausible that Rosario-Ram os’ political affiliation was a substantial or m otivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to term inate his contract. 5 It has been previously held that “[w]here there exists a relatively sm all com m un ity where m ost everyone kn ew who everyon e else was and political affiliations were com m on knowledge . . . a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s political affiliations.” Davila-Torres v. Feliciano-Torres, 924 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (D.P.R. 20 13) (quotin g Torres-Santiago v. Mun icipality of Adjuntas, 693 F.3d 230 , 237 (1st Cir. 20 12)); See also Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, 113 F.Supp.3d 494, 517 (D.P.R. 20 15). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 10 of 15 Here, Rosario-Ram os has alleged sufficient facts which, if taken in their entirety and in the light m ost favorable to his argum ent, renders his claim of political discrim ination plausible. Consequently, Rosario-Ram os stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, an d the court hereby D EN IES the Defendants’ m otion to dism iss his claim s for equitable relief and com pensatory dam ages against the Municipality and Mayor González-Dam udt, CaraballoRodríguez, and Ortiz-Sánchez in their personal capacities. D. Ivelisse Rosario Méndez’ Claim of Free-Speech Retaliation Public em ployees retain their First Am endm ent right to speak on m atters of public con cern. See Curran v. Cousins, 50 9 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 20 0 7). Nevertheless, “[g]overnm ent em ployers, like private em ployers, need a significant degree of control over their em ployees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 , 418 (20 0 6). In order to establish a claim of free-speech retaliation, “a plaintiff m ust show that [s]he spoke as a citizen on a m atter of public concern, that [her] interest in speaking outweighed the governm ent’s interest, as [her] em ployer, in prom oting the efficiency of the public services it provides . . . and that [her] speech was a substantial or m otivating factor in [her] firing.” Cruz v. Puerto Rico Power Authority, 8 78 F.Supp.2d 316, 324 (D.P.R. 20 12) (quoting Rodríguez v. Municipality of San J uan, 659 F.3d 168 , 18 0 (1st Cir. 20 11)). Furtherm ore, “[i]f all three parts of the inquiry are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the em ployer m ay still escape liability if it can show that ‘it would have reached the sam e decision even absent the protected conduct.’” Decotiis v. Whitterm ore, 635 F.3d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir. 20 11) (quoting Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756, 765-66 (1st Cir. 20 10 )). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 11 of 15 Defendants’ m otion to dism iss solely attacks the plausibility of Rosario-Mendez’ claim with respect to the first elem ent. See Docket No. 18 at pages 21-22. Specifically, Defendants claim that, upon Rosario-Méndez’ own adm ission, it was the radio com m entator, J osé Cruz J im énez, who m ade the public com m ents that allegedly provoked the Defendants’ retaliatory conduct. Additionally, regardin g Rosario-Mén dez’ declarations under oath before the Departm en t of J ustice, Defendants contend that she “m akes no factual allegations regarding defen dant’s knowledge of it anytim e before the Municipality took affirm ative action to prevent further disclosure of Municipality’s sensitive and confidential inform ation.” Id. at 22. In sum , Defendants contend that Rosario-Méndez failed to allege enough facts that would allow this court to infer that they knew that she was the source of the inform ation revealed by CruzJ im énez. This court rejects Defendants’ argum ent, as it can be reasonably inferred from the nonconclusory facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ com plaint that Defendants could have plausibly known that Rosario-Méndez was the source of the inform ation revealed by the radio host. In their origin al com plaint, Plaintiffs established that it was co-defendant Mayor GonzálezDam udt’s special assistant and Rosario-Mén dez’ superior, co-defendant Adorno-Aponte, who ordered her to engage in the allegedly illegal conduct that she subsequently revealed to CruzJ im énez. See Docket No. 1 at pages 3-4. Furtherm ore, Plaintiffs allege that after the radio broadcast, Adorno-Aponte “told another purchasing agent, Elizabeth Sánchez, that by orders from the top (referring to the Mayor González-Dam udt), Ivelisse Rosario Méndez would not perform any work, and no telephone calls could be received by her at work.” Id. at 4. The fin al nail in Defendants’ claim of ignorance was placed by the Defen dants them selves, upon adm itting in their m otion to dism iss that the conduct that Rosario-Méndez com plains of was Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 12 of 15 an “a ffirm a tive actio n to p re ve n t fu rth e r d is clo s u re o f Mu n icip ality’s s e n s itive a n d co n fid e n tia l in fo rm atio n .” Docket No. 18 at page 22 (em phasis added). Based on the above, it can be reasonably inferred that Adorno-Aponte knew that RosarioMéndez was the source of the inform ation revealed by Cruz-J im énez because Adorno-Aponte him self ordered her to engage in the acts that were revealed by the radio broadcast. Furtherm ore, the fact that Adorno-Aponte and Mayor González-Dam udt ordered that RosarioMéndez not be assigned work, coupled with the Defendants’ adm ission that the Municipality took steps to prevent further disclosure of confidential inform ation, leads to the plausible conclusion that they sought to prevent Rosario-Méndez from leaking even m ore inform ation in the future. As a result, this court finds that Rosario-Méndez presented enough facts to establish the first elem ent of a free-speech retaliation claim at this stage. The second elem ent, that Rosario-Méndez’ interest in speaking outweighs the governm ent’s interest in preserving the efficiency of the workplace, is m ore than adequately m et as the conduct that she revealed to Cruz-J im énez, if true, consists of an illegal act that the governm ent should have little to no interest in concealing. See Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F.Supp.2d 78 , 91 (D.Mass. 20 0 3) (pointing out that “[a]s the Suprem e Court has noted, speech on public issues is ‘the essen ce of self-governm ent’ and ‘occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Am endm ent values’”) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)); see also O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 90 5, 915 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that official m isconduct is “a topic of inherent con cern to the com m unity”). The third elem ent, that Rosario-Méndez’ speech was a substantial m otivation or factor in the term ination of her contract, was also m et as she presented a series of facts that renders her claim s of discrim ination and retaliation plausible. Specifically, Rosario-Méndez claim s Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 13 of 15 Adorno-Aponte stripped her of som e of her functions shortly after the radio broadcast. She was then assigned insignificant tasks after co-defendant González-Robles replaced Adorno-Apon te, culm inating with her term ination on August 31, 20 17. These claim s enable this court to infer that a causal relation could plausibly exist between Rosario-Méndez’ statem ents to CruzJ im énez an d Defendants’ subsequent decision to term inate her contract. As a result, this court hereby D EN IES Defendants’ m otion to dism iss Rosario-Méndez’ claim s for equitable relief and com pensatory dam ages against the Municipality and Mayor González-Dam udt, AdornoAponte, and González-Robles in their personal capacities. E. Torrens-Osorio’s local Torts claim s Plaintiffs claim ed that Torrens-Osorio, conjugal partner to co-plaintiff Rosario-Méndez, “has also been persecuted and discrim inated because his wife m ade public interest expressions. He is treated as an en em y, given the worst jobs at the Municipality of Rio Grande where he works at the Public Works Departm ent.” Docket No. 1 at page 5. In light of this allegation, it is unclear whether Torrens-Osorio brings claim s pursuant to § 1983 or Art. 180 2 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code. This lack of clarity is dem onstrated by the fact that the Defendants interpreted Torrens-Osorio’s claim as one of political discrim ination under § 1983 (Docket No. 18 at pages 11-12), while the Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Defendants’ m otion to dism iss clarifies that Torrens-Osorio is actually claim ing dam ages under Article 180 2 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code. See Docket No. 27 at pages 7-8. As such, the Plaintiffs failed to clearly articulate the statutory basis pursuant to which Torrens-Osorio is claim ing relief, and as a result the Defendants could not adequately defen d them selves via their m otion to dism iss. In order to give Plaintiffs a chance to am end their com plaint and clarify Torrens-Osorio’s argum ent, this court will em ploy its sua sponte authority to convert Defendants’ m otion to Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 14 of 15 dism iss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) into a m otion for a m ore definite statem ent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 6 See Carter v. Newland, 441 F.Supp.2d 20 8, 214 (D.Mass. 20 0 6) (stating that when a com plaint presents a plausible legal theory but “is so unclear that the opposing party cannot respond to the com plaint or fram e an answer, a court has the option of converting, sua sponte, a m otion m ade pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to a m otion for a m ore defin ite statem ent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)”). The Plaintiffs should take this opportunity to clarify Torrens-Osorio’s claim s for dam ages pursuant to Article 18 0 2 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code. 7 This court believes that a m ore definite statem ent as to Torrens-Osorio’s claim s will grant Defendants the opportunity to adequately respond. In sum , this court hereby converts the present m otion to dism iss Torrens-Osorio’s claim s into a m otion for a m ore definite statem ent pursuant to Rule 12(e) and will allow the converted m otion. The Plaintiffs have fourteen (14) days after notice of this order to file their am ended com plaint in accordan ce with this ruling. Failure to com ply will result in the dism issal of Torrens-Osorio’s claim s. IV. CON CLU SION Based on the above, the court GRAN TS Defendants’ m otion to dism iss W ITH PREJU D ICE as to co-plaintiffs Rosario-Ram os and Rosario-Méndez’ claim s for punitive dam ages against the Municipality and all claim s against defendants Mayor González-Dam udt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their official 6 Rule 12(e) provides in relevant part that “[a] party m ay m ove for a m ore definite statem ent of a pleadin g to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or am biguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 7 In order to recover dam ages under Article 180 2 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, Plain tiff m ust show: “first, proof of the reality of the dam age suffered; second, a causal relation between the dam age and the action or om ission of another person ; and third, said act or om ission is negligent or wron gful.” Sociedad Gananciales v. Gonzalez Padin Co., Inc., 17 P.R. Offic. Tran s. 111, 125 (1986) (quoting Hernandez v. Fourn ier, 80 P.R.R. 94, 97 (1957)). Civ. No. 18-10 50 (PG) Page 15 of 15 capacities. Additionally, the court D EN IES Defendants’ m otion to dism iss as to co-plaintiffs Rosario-Ram os and Rosario-Mén dez’ claim s for equitable relief and com pen satory dam ages against the Municipality and Mayor González-Dam udt, Caraballo-Rodríguez, Ortiz-Sánchez, Adorno-Aponte, and González-Robles in their personal capacities. Finally, Defendants’ m otion to dism iss Torrens-Osorio’s claim s is converted into a m otion for a m ore definite statem ent and is ALLOW ED . The court thus orders Plaintiffs to file a m ore definite statem ent of TorrensOsorio’s claim s in com pliance with this order within fourteen (14) days upon receiving notice of the sam e. IT IS SO ORD ERED . In San J uan, Puerto Rico, February 22, 20 19. S/ J UAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ JU AN M. PEREZ-GIMEN EZ SEN IOR U .S. D ISTRICT JU D GE
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