Carrillo Hernandez et al v. Constructora Santiago II, Corp. et al, No. 3:2016cv02600 - Document 36 (D.P.R. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on 2/23/2017. (ml)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Carrillo Hernandez et al v. Constructora Santiago II, Corp. et al Doc. 36 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO J OSE LUIS CARRILLO HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. 16-260 0 (CVR) v. CONSTRUCTORA SANTIAGO II, et al., Defendants. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER IN TROD U CTION Plaintiffs J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández (“Carrillo”), his wife María Cruz Figueroa (“Cruz”) and the legal conjugal partnership com posed between them (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring claim s under the Age Discrim ination in Em ploym ent Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §621 and the Am erican with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §1210 1, as a result of an alleged unjust dism issal and the em ploym ent practices of Defendants Constructora Santiago II (“CS II”) and Lobe Contractors and Equipm ent, Inc. (“Lobe”). Defendants’ alleged m alfeasance includes a hostile work environm ent and harassm ent, retaliation and disability and age discrim ination, which allegedly led to Carrillo’s term ination from his em ploym ent. Plaintiffs also bring forth claim s under the Em ployee Retirem ent Incom e Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §10 0 1, alleging Defendants’ failure to tim ely provide Carrillo with the Consolidated Om nibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) 1 1 COBRA gives workers and their fam ilies who lose their health benefits the right to choose to continue group health benefits provided by their group health plan for lim ited periods of tim e under certain circum stances such as voluntary or involuntary job loss, reduction in the hours worked, transition between jobs, death, divorce, and other life events. Qualified individuals m ay be required to pay the entire prem ium for coverage up to 10 2 percent of the cost to the plan. COBRA generally requires that group health plans sponsored by em ployers with 20 or m ore em ployees in the prior year offer employees and their families the opportunity for a temporary extension of health coverage (called continuation coverage) in certain instances where coverage under the plan would otherwise end. COBRA outlines how em ployees and fam ily m em bers m ay elect continuation coverage. It also requires em ployers and plans to provide notice. See United States Departm ent of Labor website, www.dol.gov/ general/ topic/ health-plans/ cobra. Dockets.Justia.com J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 2 ______________________________ notice which would have allowed him to con tinue with his em ployee group health plan insurance after his dism issal. Finally, Plaintiffs also raise claims under several of the laws of Puerto Rico. Before the Court now is the Motion to Dism iss filed by Defendants CS II and Lobe. (Docket No. 9). Defendants urge the Court to dism iss the claim s herein, insofar as Plaintiffs failed to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies regarding their Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claim s against CS II, and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction. Furtherm ore, they posit that the claim s asserted by Plaintiff Cruz and the conjugal partnership cannot lie against Defendants, because they have no standing to sue under Title VII or any of the other local em ploym ent statutes, insofar as they only apply to Plaintiff Carrillo, who was the em ployee. Lastly, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts that could show plausible entitlem ent to relief from co-Defendant Lobe. For the reasons herein stated, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss. STAN D ARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A “short and plain” statem ent needs only enough detail to provide a defendant with “ ‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (20 0 7); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (20 0 7) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 3 ______________________________ statem ent....’ Specific facts are not necessary.”). Yet, in order to “show” an entitlem ent to relief a com plaint m ust contain enough factual m aterial “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assum ption that all the allegations in the com plaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” See, Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When addressing a m otion to dism iss under Rule 12, the court m ust “accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the com plaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Gargano v. Liberty Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 20 0 9). Under Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555, however, a plaintiff m ust “provide the grounds of his entitlem ent [with] m ore than labels and conclusions.” See also, Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 20 11). Thus, a plaintiff is now required to present allegations that “nudge [his] claim s across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to com ply with the requirem ents of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570 ; see, e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (20 0 9). When considering a m otion to dism iss, the Court’s inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twom bly and Iqbal. First, the Court m ust “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a com plaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statem ents and factually threadbare recitals of the elem ents of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Yet, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions from the com plaint or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancem ent.’” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 20 0 9). J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 4 ______________________________ Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court m ust determ ine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the com plaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 670 . This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and com m on sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted or whether dism issal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id. LEGAL AN ALYSIS A. Failu re to e xh au s t an d jo in t/ s in gle e m p lo ye r. Defendants’ first contention is that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies regarding their Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claim s against CS II, as Plaintiff only filed a discrim ination claim against Lobe and not CS II. The Court analyzes this together with the joint/ single em ployer argum ent, as they are closely intertwined. In 1972, an am endm ent to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 m ade it possible for federal em ployees, as well as applicants to federal em ploym ent, to vindicate claim s of discrim ination in em ploym ent based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” via judicial proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e-16(a). It has long been held that these rem edies are exclusive and m andate that em ployees first exhaust the pertinent adm inistrative steps prior to resorting to the court for relief. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94, 111 S.Ct. 453 (1990 ); Brown v. Gen. Servs. Adm in., 425 U.S. 820 , 829-30 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 (1976). Hence, federal agencies “m ay only be sued in federal court if the aggrieved em ployee ... has exhausted all available adm inistrative rem edies”. Misra J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 5 ______________________________ v. Sm ithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 248 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 20 0 1); see also Lebrón-Ríos v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 341 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 20 0 3) (“[P]laintiffs could not proceed under Title VII without first exhausting adm inistrative rem edies”) and MoralesVallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.20 0 3) (“J udicial recourse under Title VII, however, is not a rem edy of first resort....Plaintiff’s “Title VII cause of action is lim ited to those discrim ination and retaliation allegations in his ... com plaint that were previously the subject of a form al EEO com plaint”). Thus, as Defendants correctly point out, “in a Title VII case, a plaintiff's unexcused failure to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies effectively bars the courthouse door.” J orge v. Rum sfeld, 40 4 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 20 0 5). Unless an exception exists for Plaintiff’s failure to have nam ed CS II in the adm inistrative com plaint, such as substantial identity between the respondent nam ed in the EEOC charges, or that it acted as Defendant’s agent, the filing of the present federal claim would be precluded for failure to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies. Rosario García v. Bd. of Trustees of Royalty Fund & Mechanized Cargo ILA 1575, Civ. No. 0 9-2175, 20 10 WL 50 95481, at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 3, 20 10 ). Without m uch in the way of discussion, Plaintiffs counter with that exact defense, nam ely, that both Defendants are Plaintiff Carrillo’s single-joint em ployer, and therefore notice to Lobe was sufficient notice to CS II. See Miranda v. Deloitte LLP, 922 F. Supp. 2d 210 , 223 (D.P.R. 20 13) (quoting Nieves v. Popular, Inc., 20 13 WL 361163, 20 13 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13523 (D.P.R. 20 13) (finding that “that notice to one will reach the other and J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 6 ______________________________ no prejudice will result from nam ing one party but not the other.”). Defendants posit that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient, and thus Plaintiffs are tendering “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancem ent” that fail to com ply with the Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 pleading standard. They further assert that Plaintiffs are m erely invoking two different and distinct doctrines, single em ployer and joint em ployer, without any m eaningful discussion or application of the law to the facts, to see if any of them allows the claim against CS II to survive. While it is true that Plaintiffs could have m ore fully developed their allegations, it has been well established that a com plaint need not contain exact allegations, but m erely “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ P. 8(a)(2). No m ore is required. Furtherm ore, while Defendants have denied that CS II was Plaintiff Carrillo’s em ployer, Plaintiffs have brought forth evidence that suggests otherwise. See Docket No. 29, Exhibit 1, which is a picture of an identification badge issued to Plaintiff Carrillo by none other than CS II, who denies having been Carrillo’s em ployer, asserting instead that it was Lobe who em ployed him . When faced with this issue, som e courts have opted to allow the parties to conduct som e lim ited and expedited discovery regarding the alleged em ploym ent relationship. See, e.g., Rivera-Torres v. Ruiz-Vale, No. 13-1684 (SEC), 20 16 WL 396290 4, at *2 (D.P.R. J uly 21, 20 16). Here, because no discovery on this m atter has been effected, and where there is at least som e evidence, however m inim al, to substantiate Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court believes the wiser course of action is to deny the request to dism iss without J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 7 ______________________________ prejudice at this tim e and to allow the case to follow its norm al discovery path. Defendants would be free to revisit this m atter at the conclusion (or during) discovery and seek the appropriate relief from the Court if it is deem ed necessary. Defendants also aver that claim s against Lobe should be dism issed because very little factual averm ents have been m ade against it. This m atter, however, is directly linked to the Lobe/ CS II single em ployer issue which will be m ore fully developed during discovery. If it is determ ined that Lobe and CS II are, in fact, a single or joint em ployer, then this issue will becom e m oot and the claim s against CS II and Lobe can m ove forward. Yet, that cannot happen until that determ ination is m ade. Thus, dism issal at this tim e would be prem ature. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss, regarding the exhaustion of adm inistrative rem edies and single/ joint em ployer cause of action, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. B. Plain tiffs Cru z an d th e Co n ju gal Le gal Partn e rs h ip . Defendants posit that the claim s brought by Plaintiffs Cruz and the conjugal partnership com prised between herself and Carrillo should be dism issed, insofar as there is no em ployer-em ployee relationship between Defendants and Cruz and the conjugal partnership. The Court gives short shrift to this argum ent, as Plaintiffs have failed to address this m atter in their opposition, and the sam e is therefore considered waived. In any event, Defendants are correct. Plaintiffs do not allege in this case that Cruz was Defendants’ em ployee. J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 8 ______________________________ Therefore, Cruz’ only connection with this case is the fact that she is m arried to Carrillo. It has been clearly held that “spouses of individuals who have been victim ized by em ploym ent discrim ination cannot be said to fall within the class of persons Title VII was intended to protect.” Patton v. United Parcel Serv., 910 F.Supp. 1250 , 1278 (S.D.Tx.1995) (citing Feng v. Sandrik, 636 F.Supp. 77, 82 (N.D.Ill.1986)); see also Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986). This district has further held that “[t]hough Congress intended Title VII to provide a broad foundation to rem edy em ploym ent discrim ination, it did not intend to provide a rem edy to a spouse of a plaintiff having no em ploym ent connection with the em ployer.” Díaz-Rom ero v. Ashcroft, 472 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D.P.R. 20 0 7) (quoting Ram os v. Roche Prods., 694 F.Supp. 10 18, 10 26 (D.P.R.1988), vacated on other grounds, 880 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1989); Paredes Figueroa v. Int’l Air Servs. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 120 2, 120 4 (D.P.R. 1987) (“We are hard pressed to extend that description to define Mr. Paredes and Mrs. Despradel de Paredes’ conjugal partnership as an “em ployee” under the ADEA since no em ployerem ployee relationship existed between defendant and the conjugal partnership”). This is because Title VII only prohibits discrim ination arising out of an em ploym ent relationship, which is not present here for Cruz or the conjugal partnership. Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Inc., 699 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.1978). The sam e applies to the claim s brought under local discrim ination laws. Flam and v. Am . Int'l Grp., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 356, 372 (D.P.R. 1994) (“A spouse and a conjugal partnership do not have standing under ADEA and Law 10 0 because they do not m eet the J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 9 ______________________________ description of an “em ployee” or of an individual who m ay bring suit under the statutes); Santini Rivera v. Serv Air, Inc., 94 J .T.S. 121 (1994) (fam ily m em bers and third parties m ay not bring suit under Law 10 0 if they were not the em ployees that suffered the discrim ination). Since Plaintiffs Cruz and the conjugal partnership did not m aintain an em ployerem ployee relationship with Defendants, their claim s under Title VII and Law 80 , P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29 § 185(a) (unjust dism issal) and Law No. 10 0 , P.R Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146 (discrim ination) are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss the claim s of Cruz and the conjugal partnership under Title VII, Law 80 and Law 10 0 is GRANTED. C. COBRA claim s . The Court petitioned both parties for briefs on the ERISA causes of action (Docket No. 32) because Plaintiffs had argued against dism issal on an alternate ground. They averred that regardless of whether or not they com plied with the exhaustion requirem ent, the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case because it had original jurisdiction over the COBRA claim , which was not subject to the exhaustion requirem ent. Defendants asserted that, even if the COBRA claim could survive, the Court could not m aintain supplem ental jurisdiction over the state claim s because they did not arise under the “sam e nucleus of operative facts” test outlined in United States Mine Workers of Am . v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966). Because the Court has declined to dism iss the case for failure to exhaust rem edies at this juncture, and in an effort to avoid piecem eal J osé Luis Carrillo Hernández, et al. v. Constructora Santiago II, et al. Civil No. 16-260 0 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 10 ______________________________ litigation, this issue has now becom e m oot. For this reason, the Court therefore does not reach the m erits of COBRA issue at this tim e. CON CLU SION For the aforem entioned reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dism iss (Docket No. 9) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: - DENIED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE regarding the exhaustion of adm inistrative rem edies and single/ joint em ployer cause of action; and - GRANTED as to the Title VII claim s and the claim s brought under Law 80 and Law 10 0 filed by co-Plaintiffs Cruz and the conjugal legal partnership. IT IS SO ORDERED. In San J uan, Puerto Rico, on this 23 rd day of February 20 17. S/ CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE CAMILLE L. VELEZ RIVE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
