Dominguez et al v. Figueroa-Sancha et al, No. 3:2012cv01707 - Document 173 (D.P.R. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying 93 motion for summary judgment; denying 98 motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 02/07/2019. (NNR)
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Dominguez et al v. Figueroa-Sancha et al Doc. 173 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF PU ERTO RICO D AN N Y D OMIN GU EZ, e t al., Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. 12-170 7 (PG) v. JOSE FIGU EROA SAN CH A, e t al., Defendants. OMN IBU S OPIN ION AN D ORD ER Plaintiffs Danny Dom inguez and Elionai Fernandez sued Defendants Minerva Ram os (“ADA Ram os”) and Dennis Morales Rodriguez (“Officer Morales”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged violations of their rights under the Fourth Am endm ent.1 Docket No. 1. They specifically claim that Defendants launched a civil rights conspiracy to detain and prosecute Plaintiffs without warrants or probable cause. Plaintiffs now seek com pensatory and punitive dam ages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 20 . They also invoke the court’s supplem ental jurisdiction over their Puerto Rico law claim s under the Com m onwealth’s Constitution and Article 180 2 of the Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 31, § 5141. Id. at 21. Before the court are Defendants’ m otions for sum m ary judgm ent (Docket Nos. 93 and 98) and Plaintiffs’ oppositions (Docket Nos. 122 and 135). Defendants filed supplem ental 1 Plaintiffs’ com plaint included other claim s that have since been dism issed. See Docket No. 40 (Opinion and Order dism issing official capacity claim s against som e of the defendants and substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment); Docket No. 56 (Partial J udgm ent dism issing claim s against Angelica Tirado and Ricardo Rodriguez); Docket No. 10 1 (Opinion and Order dism issing claim s against Guillerm o Som oza-Colom bani, J ose Figueroa-Sancha and Em ilio Diaz-Colon). Only Dom inguez’s and Fernandez’s Section 1983 claim s against ADA Ram os and Officer Morales rem ain. Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 2 of 25 m otions (Docket Nos. 144 and 145) and Plaintiffs replied (Docket Nos. 150 and 151). After a careful review of the m otions, the evidence on record and the applicable law, the court D EN IES Defendants’ m otions. I. STAN D ARD OF REVIEW Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the court m ust grant a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the nonm oving party. A fact is m aterial if it has the potential of determ ining the outcom e of the litigation.” Dunn v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 761 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 20 14) (internal citation om itted). The m ovant has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact with definite and com petent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)) (identifying record and other supporting m aterials available at the sum m ary judgm ent stage). If the m ovant presents a properly supported m otion, the burden then shifts to the nonm ovant to show the existence of a genuine factual dispute. Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 20 14) (citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 60 5 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 20 10 )). The non-m ovant m ust thus “identify[] com petent evidence in the record sufficient to create a jury question.” Tobin v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 450 -51 (1st Cir. 20 14). At the sum m ary judgm ent juncture, the court m ust exam ine the record as a whole, view the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m ovant and indulge that party with all reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts. McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20 , 25 (1st Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 3 of 25 Cir. 20 14); Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 20 0 2). Unsupported and conclusory allegations, on the other hand, should be disregarded. See McGrath, 757 F.3d at 25. The court “m ay not m ake credibility determ inations or weigh the evidence[,]” as those are jury functions—not those of a judge. Reeves v. Sanderson Plum bing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (20 0 0 ). II. FACTU AL BACKGROU N D The court gleaned the following facts from the parties’ sum m ary judgm ent subm issions and, when necessary, from the allegations in the com plaint (Docket No. 1). In the interest of thoroughness, the court also adopts and incorporates by reference the factual and procedural background set forth in Section I of the Opinion and Order from Septem ber 30 , 20 14 (Docket No, 40 ). Dom inguez v. Sancha, 50 F. Supp. 3d 117, 121-124 (D.P.R. 20 14). When Mr. Ricardo Rodriguez Tirado skipped bail in New J ersey and fled to Puerto Rico, the bail bond com pany, Speedy Bailbonds, hired two bounty-hunting Plaintiffs, Dom inguez and Fernandez, to locate and bring the fugitive back to New J ersey. AD A Ram o s ’ State m e n t o f U n co n te s te d Mate rial Fa cts ( “SU MF I”) ( D o cke t N o . 9 4 ) ¶¶ 1-2 , 6 7, 9 -11. On May 4, 20 11, Plaintiffs arrived in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, “registered” their firearm s at the airport and headed out on their m ission. SU MF I ¶¶ 12 & 14 . They rented a car, a hotel room and, at som e point, m et with Angel Diaz, an off-duty PRPD officer who would help them locate the fugitive. SU MF I ¶¶ 2 0 & 2 4 . On May 5, 20 11, Dom inguez, Fernandez and Diaz drove by the house where they hoped to find Mr. Rodriguez and, lo and behold, saw him there. SU MF I ¶ 52 Rodriguez’s m other, Angelica Tirado (“Ms. Tirado”), was also present. SU MF I ¶¶ 2 0 & 2 2 . Plaintiffs apprehended the fugitive. SU MF I ¶ 2 6 . As they were leaving, Mr. Rodriguez asked Ms. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 4 of 25 Tirado to contact his attorney, J ose Fernandez Irizarry (“attorney Irizarry”). SU MF I ¶ 2 3 . Plaintiffs left with Mr. Rodriguez and took him back to their hotel room . SU MF I ¶ 2 6 . Ms. Tirado followed through and called attorney Irizarry, who procured the help of his prosecutor friend, ADA Ram os. D o cke t N o . 1 at ¶ 57. Plaintiffs m aintain that ADA Ram os then took a series of actions that led to their arrest. First, she advised Ms. Tirado to file a com plaint against the bounty hunters. Then, she called the San Sebastian Police Station and instructed officers to stop the bounty hunters from flying out of the jurisdiction that day. Id . at ¶¶ 58 -6 2 . The evidence suggests that ADA Ram os also spoke with PRPD Officer J esus A. Morales,2 apprised him of Ms. Tirado’s im pending visit and asked him to draft a crim inal com plaint. D o cke t N o . 10 5-1; D o cke t N o . 13 6 -3 at 2 4 . Later that day, Ms. Tirado arrived at the San Sebastian police station and signed the com plaint. After the com plaint was processed, Defendant – and PRPD Officer – Dennis Morales took over. At the tim e, Officer Morales was assigned to the Hom icide Division and stationed in Aguadilla, near the airport from where Plaintiffs would leave. D e n n is Mo rale s ’ State m e n t o f U n co n te s te d Mate rial Fa cts ( “SU MF II”) ( D o cke t N o . 9 9 ) ¶¶ 6 0 -6 2 . While Plaintiffs waited for their outbound flight, they received a phone call from Officer Morales warning that crim inal charges would be filed against them . SU MF I ¶ 3 4 ; SU MF II ¶¶ 4 0 -4 4 . The bounty hunters went to the local Police Station in Aguadilla to sort m atters out, but instead, they were arrested and charged with kidnapping, aggravated 2 To avoid confusion, the court will refer to him as “Officer J esus Morales.” Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 5 of 25 assault and possession of firearm s. SU MF I ¶ 3 6 ; SU MF II ¶ 4 6 . See also D o cke t N o . 1 at ¶ 74 (alleging that they were charged with four felonies: kidnapping, aggravated illegal trespassing, illegal possession of a firearm and illegal use of a firearm ). Plaintiffs were held overnight. SU MF II ¶ 4 9 . Throughout his dealings with Plaintiffs, Officer Morales m aintained that the instructions were com ing from “above.”3 See, e.g., OSU MF I ¶ 57. On May 6, Plaintiffs were taken before a m agistrate judge for a Rule 6 hearing. The m agistrate found probable cause for Plaintiffs’ arrest and ordered them to stay under house arrest in Puerto Rico until conclusion of crim inal proceedings. SU MF II ¶¶ 50 -52 & 57; D o cke t N o . 1 ¶¶ 73 -74 , 79 . The prelim inary hearing was held 45 days later, from J une 20 to J une 21, 20 11, at which tim e the court found no probable cause on any of the charges against Dom inguez and Fernandez. SU MF I ¶ 72 ; SU MF II ¶¶ 58 . The prosecution “appealed” that determ ination, a m ove Plaintiffs steadfastly attribute to ADA Ram os. On August 26, 20 11, the reviewing court reached the sam e no probable cause determ ination.4 SU MF I ¶¶ 73 -74 ; SU MF II ¶ 59 . The court notified its final judgm ent dism issing all charges against Dom inguez and Fernandez one m onth later, on Septem ber 27, 20 11 to be exact. III. D ISCU SSION A. Co m p lian ce w ith Lo cal Ru le 56 Local Rule 56(c) states that a non-m ovant’s opposing statem ent of m aterial facts “shall adm it, deny or qualify the facts supporting the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent,” and 3 Puerto Ricans use this expression when referring to som eone with m ore authority. 4 The Puerto Rico Rules of Crim inal Procedure allow the prosecuting attorney to seek review of the initial “no probable cause” determ ination. See P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 34 Ap. II, § 24. In Spanish, this second proceeding is known as a prelim inary hearing “en alzada,” which roughly translates to “on appeal.” Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 6 of 25 in so doing, shall support each denial or qualification by particularized record citations. L. CV. R. 56(c) (D.P.R. 20 0 9). If a party im properly controverts the facts, the district court “is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the m oving party's facts as stated.” Advanced Flexible Circuits, Inc. v. GE Sensing & Inspection Techs. Gm bH, 781 F.3d 510 , 521 (1st Cir. 20 15) (quoting Caban-Hernandez v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8) (1st Cir. 20 0 7)). Local Rule 56 does allow an opposing party to provide additional facts, but in a separate section. L. CV. R. 56(c) (em phasis added). The case law on this is clear: “a party m ay not include num erous additional facts within its opposition to the m oving party’s statem ents of uncontested facts.” Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F. Supp. 2d 198, 20 7 (D.P.R. 20 13). See also Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 20 10 ) (upholding the district court’s decision to disregard additional facts not included in a separate section). Repeatedly, the First Circuit has held that litigants ignore Local Rule 56 at their peril. CabanHernandez, 486 F.3d at 7. Here, Plaintiffs’ opposing statem ents of fact do not strictly com ply with the requirem ents of Local Rule 56(c) because m any of their qualifications and denials border on “additional facts” that, per the sum m ary judgm ent rules, should have been included in a separate section. Dockets No. 123 & 136. Withal, their opposing statem ents facts are supported with com petent evidence on record, generate uncertainty as to Defendants’ factual version, and are crucial to their claims. At this crossroad, the expressions of Chief J udge Gustavo A. Gelpí regarding a plaintiff’s noncom pliance with our anti-ferret rules are especially fitting: Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 7 of 25 The Court could ignore [these im properly provided facts] because it does not have to ferret through the parties' exhibits under Local Rule 56. See L. CV. R. 56(e) (“The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statem ent of facts.”). But the Court firm ly believes in access to justice, the lack of which is a serious problem in Puerto Rico, and feels uncom fortable com pletely disregarding these additional facts. Natal Perez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 291 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221 (D.P.R. 20 18) (citations om itted). Like J udge Gelpí, having balanced the interests of efficiency and access to justice, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs opposing statem ents should be considered when determ ining whether they have created or identified genuine issues of fact. Withal, “[n]ot every factual conflict necessitates a trial.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of J ustice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 20 0 4) (alteration in original). Therefore, the court will identify the disputed facts which clear the m ateriality hurdle, i.e. those that can potentially affect the outcom e of the case. See id. (quoting Parilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 10 8 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir. 1997)). B. Is s u e s o f Mate rial Fact 5 It is undisputed that Plaintiffs traveled with their firearm s to Puerto Rico. See, e.g., SU MF I ¶¶ 12 -13 ; OSU MF I ¶¶ 12 -13 . However, there are different versions with respect to when and how Dom inguez and Fernandez registered their firearm s at the airport. For exam ple, ADA Ram os states that “[b]oth plaintiffs had firearm s when they arrived to Puerto Rico and they checked both of their firearm s with the ID used by plaintiff Dominguez and in 5 The m aterial facts in dispute sum m arized below are by no means exhaustive. Genuine disputes as to other m aterial facts abound in the record. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 8 of 25 his bag, doing only one declaration under Dom inguez’[s], who, as a retired policem an, is allowed to carry a firearm across the U.S.A.” SU MF I ¶ 13 . On the other hand, Plaintiffs subm it that they arrived at the Aguadilla airport on May 4 and registered their firearm s with a PRPD Officer before heading out. In so doing, Plaintiffs showed the officer their identifications and the bail bond docum ents “because he wanted to know why we [had] the guns….” D o cke t N o . 12 3 -1 at 52 :2 1-2 5. The officer gave his phone num ber to Plaintiffs and allowed them to carry on. Id . at 52 -53 . According to Officer Morales, retired law enforcem ent officers like Plaintiff Dom inguez can transport his firearm across state lines. Oddly enough, and despite the clearance obtained at the Aguadilla airport, Officer Morales later searched Plaintiffs’ vehicle and seized both their firearm s. D o cke t N o . 9 9 -4 . Thereafter, Plaintiffs were charged with inter alia violations to Puerto Rico’s Weapons Act. W h o a n s w e r e d a t t o r n e y Ir iz a r r y ’s p h o n e ca ll? ADA Ram os m aintains that Plaintiffs “have m istaken her” for Olga Martinez, then a PRPD em ployee assigned to the Extraditions Division of the Departm ent of J ustice of Puerto Rico (“DOJ -PR”). SU MF I ¶¶ 6 1-6 2 , 6 7. According to ADA Ram os, Martinez answered attorney Irizarry’s phone call on May 5, 20 11, and inform ed him that “no extradition’s [sic] proceedings had been initiated with regards to [Mr. Rodriguez].” SU MF I ¶¶ 6 1-6 2 . 6 Defendant reiterates that “[a]t no tim e whatsoever [ADA] Ram os spoke or com m unicate with any agent or attorney regarding this m atter….” SU MF I ¶ 6 8 . 6 ADA Ram os also states that Martinez found an entry in the National Crim e Inform ation Center (or “NCIC”) for an outstanding warrant from New J ersey against Rodriguez and so inform ed the caller. But she clarifies that the State of New J ersey “was lim iting its intent to extradite from the surrounding states.” SU MF I ¶ 6 7. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 9 of 25 Plaintiffs rebut the proposed facts with portions of Olga Martinez’s deposition testim ony, in which she explains that ADA Ram os answered attorney Irizarry’s call and later transferred it to her. OSU MF I ¶¶ 6 1-6 2 ; D o cke t N o . 12 3 -6 at 14 :17-2 1. Officer J esus Morales’ sworn statem ent not only corroborates this version of the facts, but also shows that after Irizarry talked to Ram os, she called the San Sebastian Police Station and gave a series of directives, which culm inated in the arrest and charges against Plaintiffs. OSU MF II ¶ 6 1; D o cke t N o . 10 5-1. W h o “o r d e r e d ” Pla in t iffs ’ a r r e s t ? W h o m a d e t h e d e cis io n t o file cr im in a l ch a r g e s ? ADA Ram os states that “[a]t som e point during the evening of May 5 th , Plaintiff Fernandez had a telephone conversation with agent and co-defendant Dennis Morales who told him that the police wanted to talk to them because there was a kidnapping charge m ade against them .” SU MF I ¶ 3 4 . Plaintiffs “qualify” the proposed fact with an additional fact: Officer Morales told them that “they were being charged…per the instructions of D.A. Minerva Ram os.” OSU MF I ¶ 3 4 . According to Plaintiffs, when Officer Morales arrested them later that day, he reiterated that he was following ADA Ram os’ orders. OSU MF I ¶ 3 5. ADA Ram os contends that “[i]t was not until the follow ing day that ADA Belinda Brignoni contacted [her] at the Extradition Office to inquire into that office’s position regarding…arrests m ade by bounty hunters within the Com m onwealth of Puerto Rico.” SU MF I ¶ 6 9 (em phasis added). She insists that she cam e into the picture after “ADA Brignoni had already ordered the filing of crim inal charges…against Plaintiffs.” SU MF I ¶ 70 . Plaintiffs, again, deny ADA Ram os’ narrative. OSU MF I ¶ 70 . In support, they point to Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 10 of 25 portions of Olga Martinez’s deposition testim ony, where she expressly states that ADA Ram os m ade the decision. D o cke t N o . 12 3 -5 at 2 4 :2 2 -2 4 . Plaintiffs further point out that, per Officer J esus Morales’ Sworn Statem ent, ADA Ram os instructed him to file a com plaint for kidnapping because Plaintiffs arrested Mr. Rodriguez without first following the extradition process. In fact, according to that statem ent, ADA Ram os said that the police had to surveil the airport and arrest Plaintiffs. During their 40 -m inute conversation, ADA Ram os m entioned that Mr. Rodriguez had a crim inal record and there was a warrant for his arrest. D o cke t N o . 10 5-1 at 1. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs have shown the existence of triable issues of fact with respect to ADA Ram os’ involvem ent. W h a t a b o u t Pr o s e cu t o r Br ig n o n i? On the night of May 5, 20 11, Officer Morales called Prosecutor Belinda Brignoni and inform ed her about what transpired earlier that day. D o cke t N o . 12 3 -5. Per Brignoni’s version, ADA Ram os called the San Sebastian Police Station and told law enforcem ent officers that Plaintiffs’ actions were illegal. Id . at 2 4 . She instructed the officers to prepare a report in anticipation of Ms. Tirado’s arrival at the station. Id . at 18 :17-2 5; 19 :18 -2 5 ; 2 0 :2 0 -2 5. Brignoni has also stated that ADA Ram os also m ade, or at least participated in, the decision to form ally charge Plaintiffs with, inter alia, kidnapping and possession or use of a firearm . Id . at 2 4 :2 3 -2 5; 2 5-2 6 ; 3 7:1-14 ; 3 8 :1-5. Notably, Brignoni explained that although other prosecutors intervened in the case, she was tasked with court appearances. Id . at 2 8 . Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 11 of 25 Office r M o r a le s ’ In v o lv e m e n t On May 5, 20 11, Officer Morales was working his 5:0 0 pm – 1:0 0 am shift in the Hom icide Division in Aguadilla when he received Officer J esus Morales’ call regarding the kidnapping com plaint. Defendant then took over the investigation and, as part thereof, interviewed Officer J esus Morales, Ms. Tirado, attorney Irizarry, Olga Martinez, Mr. Rodriguez and Plaintiffs. See, e.g., SU MF II ¶¶ 6 0 -6 4 . But Plaintiffs have pointed to evidence on the record that contradict Officer Morales’ proposed facts. Prosecutor Brignoni’s deposition testim ony, for exam ple, calls into question the investigative steps taken by Officer Morales to ensure the existence of probable cause. Com pare D o cke t N o . 14 4 -1 with D o cke t N o . 12 3 -5. Indeed, that testim ony discredits Officer Morales’ assertion that he consulted the case with Prosecutor Brignoni before placing Plaintiffs in a “holding cell” overnight. See, e.g., D o cke t N o . 9 9 -4 at 5. Th e U p s h o t A careful review of the convoluted record shows that the parties’ versions of the relevant facts, as subm itted to the court by each, are in stark contrast with each other. Those identified above sufficiently controvert the legality of Defendants’ conduct and cast shade on inform ation available to the officers involved, the investigation carried out before any arrests were m ade, and the existence of probable cause not only to conduct the warrantless arrests, but also to institute the crim inal process. Viewed in the light m ost favorable to the nonm ovants, the court further concludes that the record indeed supports reasonable inferences regarding the alleged conspiratorial agreem ent between the rem aining Defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Am endm ent. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 12 of 25 C. Th e Le gal Lan d s cap e S ect ion 19 8 3 Plaintiffs ground their claim s on Section 1983, which “provides a rem edy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory.’” Lugar v. Edm ondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To prevail in a § 1983 claim , plaintiffs m ust establish three elem ents, to wit, the deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and state action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Sanchez v. Pereira– Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 20 0 9); Concepcion v. Municipality of Gurabo, 558 F. Supp. 2d 149, 162 (D.P.R. 20 0 7) (identifying the subset of elem ents necessary to establish causation). Furtherm ore, plaintiffs m ust show the link between each defendant and the federal right violation. González– Piña v. Rodríguez, 40 7 F.3d 425, 432 (1st Cir. 20 0 5). Furtherm ore, plaintiffs alleging a civil rights conspiracy under § 1983 m ust show “a com bination of two or m ore persons acting in concert to com m it an unlawful act, or to com m it a lawful act by unlawful m eans, the principal elem ent of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in dam ages.” Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 178 (1st Cir. 20 0 8) (quoting Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs “m ust prove not only a conspiratorial agreem ent but also an actual abridgment of som e federally-secured right.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Earle, 850 F.3d at 844). Dom inguez and Fernandez claim violations of their Fourth Am endm ent right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. am end. IV. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 13 of 25 10 2-10 4. They m aintain that Defendants provoked their detention and instituted the crim inal prosecution against them without the requisite probable cause. At an earlier stage, the court determ ined that this was the unusual case in which allegations for both false arrest or false im prisonm ent and m alicious prosecution gave rise to a third cause of action: conspiracy to m aliciously prosecute. Dom inguez, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 125-126. The three causes of action at play are discussed below. Fa ls e A r r es t / Fa ls e I m p r is o n m en t 7 Sim ply put, false im prisonm ent rem edies a detention executed without legal process (e.g. an arrest without a warrant or probable cause). Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (20 0 7). Under Puerto Rico law, a claim for false im prisonm ent arises “when ‘[a] person, whether or not a law enforcem ent officer,’ tortiously or negligently ‘detain[s] or cause[s] the unlawful detention of another person.’” Soto-Cintron on behalf of A.S.M. v. United States, 90 1 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 20 18) (quoting Ayala v. San J uan Racing Corp., 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 10 12, 10 21 (P.R. 1982)) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 31, § 5141). Moreover, Rule 11 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Crim inal Procedure allows warrantless arrests based on “reasonable cause.” P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 34a, Ap. II, § 11(c)). So, for a false im prisonm ent claim to go forward, “it is essential that the individual perform ing the arrest lacked reasonable cause for believing that the arrestee comm itted a felony.” Soto-Cintron, 90 1 F.3d at 33 (quoting Diaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at 684). 7 The Supreme Court has noted that the torts of “[f]alse arrest and false im prisonm ent overlap; the form er is a species of the latter.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (20 0 7), Like the Suprem e Court, this court will “refer to the two torts together as false im prisonm ent.” Id. at 389. See also Diaz-Nieves v. United States, 858 F.3d 678, 684 (1st Cir. 20 17) (citing Abreu-Guzman v. Ford, 241 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 20 0 1)) (noting that under Puerto Rico law, false arrest and false im prisonm ent claim s share the sam e elem ents and are thus treated as identical causes of action). Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 14 of 25 In assessing the m erits of such a claim , courts also evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions. This inquiry, although case-specific, usually entails weighing together several factors and circum stances. Am ong them are the defendant’s age, education, experience and the knowledge or inform ation available at the tim e of the arrest; the plaintiff’s or detained person’s age, appearance and conduct; and the seriousness of the crim e. See id. at 33-34 (citing Ayala, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 10 24). Ultim ately, liability will be im posed “where, considering all the circum stances, the arresting officer not only m akes a m istake but also incurs in negligence.” Id. at 34 (quoting Valle v. Com m onwealth of Puerto Rico, 157 P.R. Dec. 1, 24 (P.R. 20 0 2)). M a liciou s p r os ecu t ion This court previously explained that “when the period of false im prisonm ent ends, any unlawful detention thereafter ‘form s part of the dam ages for the entirely distinct tort of m alicious prosecution.’” Dom inguez, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (quoting Harrington v. Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 20 10 )). Malicious prosecution hem s in the assertion that the arrest and detention was the result of the wrongful institution of legal process. Harrington, 610 F.3d at 29. To prevail on a m alicious prosecution claim under Puerto Rico law, a plaintiff m ust show “(1) that a crim inal action was initiated or instigated by the defendants; (2) that the crim inal action term inated in the favor of plaintiff; (3) that defendants acted with m alice and without probable cause; and (4) that plaintiff suffered dam ages.” Calderon-Lopez v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 3d 99, 10 3 (D.P.R. 20 18) (quoting Diaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at 688). As to the third elem ent, the plaintiff m ust show both that the defendants acted with m alice and that they lacked probable cause. Id. “For purposes of m alicious prosecution, Puerto Rico Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 15 of 25 courts equate m alice with bad faith.” Paret– Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 178 (1st Cir. 20 16) (quoting Barros– Villaherm osa v. United States, 642 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 20 11)). T h e Un u s u a l Con s p ir a cy T r if ect a Finally, a §1983 conspiracy to m aliciously prosecute under § 1983 is another cause of action, which “begins before the victim ’s arrest and ecom passe[s] it.” Dom inguez, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (quoting Nieves v. McSweeny, 241 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 20 0 1)) (additional citations om itted). As the court found in its previous Opinion and Order, an alleged conspiracy that involves the fabrication of evidence, false im prisonm ent and the ensuing m alicious prosecution is a viable claim under § 1983. Id. (citing Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10 th Cir. 1990 )). D . Mo tio n s fo r Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t 8 In support of their sum m ary judgm ent m otions, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to com e forth with evidence showing the existence of a conspiratorial agreem ent to arrest and prosecute the bounty hunters. For the reasons that follow, the court disagrees. Pr ob a b le Ca u s e Officer Morales’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent rests on the alleged existence of probable cause. See Docket No. 98. He argues that Plaintiffs’ claim s fail because probable cause supported their arrest, seizure and prosecution. Plaintiffs counter that Officer Morales placed them under arrest without probable cause. Moreover, they point to the fact that their 8 The court will go through the grounds asserted by Defendants in support of their sum m ary judgm ent m otions in no particular order. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 16 of 25 arrest resulted not only in im m ediate im prisonm ent, but also, a prolonged placem ent under house arrest pending the crim inal proceedings initiated against them . Docket No. 135. The concurrence of probable cause to support the charges against Plaintiffs would indeed deal a fatal blow to their § 1983 claim s. Cf. Hartm an v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 , 258 (20 0 6). In the § 1983 context, a finding of probable cause turns on whether the “facts and circum stances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circum stances shown, that the suspect has com m itted, is com m itting, or is about to com m it an offense.” Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 50 0 , 50 4 (1st Cir. 20 0 9) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). “This is an objective test, and the circum stances should be viewed through the eyes of ‘a reasonable person in the position of the officer.’” Petro v. Town of W. Warwick ex rel. Moore, 889 F. Supp. 2d 292, 325 (D.R.I. 20 12) (quoting Holder, 585 F.3d at 50 4). It is objectively reasonable for officers to seek an arrest warrant “so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable.” Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991). However, the facts in controversy in the present case preclude a determ ination that probable cause was even arguable. The facts sum m arized in Section III-B pertaining to the people and considerations involved in deciding to arrest, charge and prosecute Plaintiffs (i.e. the instructions that m ay have been given by ADA Ram os and Prosecutor Brignoni or Olga Martinez’s alleged assertion that the bounty hunters were not acting on an outstanding or extraditable warrant), cast m uch doubt on any reasonable determ ination of probable cause that could have been m ade by Officer Morales or any law enforcem ent officer at the tim e of the arrests. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 17 of 25 It is undisputed that Plaintiffs were both charged with illegal possession of a firearm . Officer Morales concedes that, as a form er law enforcem ent officer, Plaintiff Dom inguez could legally carry a firearm at the tim e of the events in question. See Docket Nos. 136-3 at 60 -61; 99-4 at 4-5. Like Dom inguez, Plaintiff Fernandez also “checked in” and “registered” his firearm at the airport. See Dockets No. 136-1 at 46-52; 136-2 at 39-40 ; 136-3 at 36-38, 61. The record nonetheless suggests that Officer Morales neglected to even inquire whether Fernandez had followed the procedures that would allow him to legally carry a firearm in Puerto Rico or consider the fact that he was led to believe so by an on-duty PRPD Officer at the Aguadilla airport. See Docket No. 136-3 at 72-74. Taking the foregoing into account and viewing the record in the light m ost favorable to Plaintiffs, the court finds that Officer Morales lacked probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) to arrest Plaintiffs on the firearm charges. The absence of probable cause for this specific charge is enough for Plaintiffs to survive sum m ary judgm ent, as their claim s against Officer Morales subsist even if probable cause was absent for a charge, but present for another. Mendonca v. City of Providence, 170 F. Supp. 3d 290 , 30 2-0 3 (D.R.I. 20 16) ("In contrast to false-arrest claim s, probable cause as to one charge will not bar a m alicious prosecution claim based on a second, distinct charge as to which probable cause was lacking."); Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F. Supp. 2d 115, 130 (D. Mass. 20 0 9) (“Where the suspect is prosecuted for m ultiple offenses, a claim of m alicious prosecution can succeed for one or m ore of the offenses, even if it fails … for the other offenses.”). See also Elm ore v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 60 5 F. App'x 90 6, 915 (11th Cir. 20 15); Holm es v. Vill. of Hoffm an Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 20 0 7); J ohnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 20 0 7); Posr Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 18 of 25 v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 10 0 (2d Cir. 1991); Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F. Supp. 2d 10 91, 110 4 (D. Ariz. 20 13); J ernigan v. Richard, 90 7 F. Supp. 2d 998, 10 41 (D. Ariz. 20 12).9 As such, Officer Morales argum ent that the arrests and prosecutions of plaintiffs were based on findings of probable cause fails to defeat the claim s against him at this stage. His request for sum m ary judgm ent on this ground is, therefore, D EN IED . 10 M a lice or B a d Fa it h In her m otion, ADA Ram os specifically avers that Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a m alicious intent or bad faith, and therefore, the claim s against her should be dism issed. Docket No. 95 at 17. Her perfunctory argum ent is unavailing, not least because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim s cover Defendants’ actions before the arrest, yet m alice (or bad faith) is an elem ent of the tort of m alicious prosecution . See Section III-C, supra (quoting CalderonLopez, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 10 3). In this context, m alice has been defined as “any wrong or unjustifiable m otive[,]” and “m ay be inferred from a lack of probable cause.” Cam pbell v. Casey, 166 F. Supp. 3d 144, 153 (D. Mass. 20 16) (quoting Lim one v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 20 0 9)). See also Gouin v. Gouin, 249 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71 (D. Mass. 20 0 3) (citation om itted) ("The m alice elem ent of m alicious prosecution requires that the accuser knew there was no probable cause for the com m encem ent of the action, and that the accuser acted with an im proper m otive."). For the reasons previously discussed, Plaintiffs’ factual version supports the 9 While the cited cases refer to m alicious prosecution claim s, this court finds their holdings applicable to the § 1983 conspiracy trifecta alleged by Plaintiffs. If the parties disagree, they m ay request leave to submit further briefing on the m atter. But “[t]he court will not do counsel’s work.” Gonzalez-Berm udez v. Abbott Labs. PR Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 130 , 156 (D.P.R. 20 16) (citation omitted). 10 To the extent that any of ADA Ram os’ sum m ary judgm ent argum ents are grounded on the existence of probable cause, the court rejects them for the reasons already explained. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 19 of 25 inference that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them . They have thus generated factual uncertainty as to the elem ents of m alicious prosecution. See Hernandez v. Colon, Civil No. 16-30 0 89-KAR, 20 18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88775, at *33 (D. Mass. May 25, 20 18) (citing cases) (denying sum m ary judgm ent as to m alicious prosecution claim upon finding that plaintiff’s version of events supported the view that the officers lacked probable cause for her arrest). Consequently, ADA Ram os’ request for the dism issal of the claim s against her on this ground is D EN IED . E. Im m u n itie s 1. Pro s e cu to rial Im m u n ity Absolute im m unity shields “prosecutors perform ing acts intim ately associated with the judicial phase of the crim inal process.” Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 20 13) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). For exam ple, “[p]rosecutors … are absolutely im m une for actions, taken as advocates for the State, which are closely associated with the judicial process such as initiating and pursuing a crim inal prosecution.” Knowlton v. Shaw, 70 4 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 20 13) (citing Burns v. Reed, 50 0 U.S. 478, 479 (1991)). The protection afforded by this kind of im m unity withstands even m alicious or corrupt acts taken by officials in the exercise of their prosecutorial functions. See Goldstein, 719 F.3d at 24 (quoting Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 70 2 (1st Cir. 1995)). Actions taken by prosecutors as investigators, on the other hand, are only protected by qualified im m unity. Diaz-Morales v. Rubio-Paredes, 170 F. Supp. 3d 276, 287 (D.P.R. 20 16) (citing Diaz-Colon v. Toledo-Davila, 922 F. Supp. 2d 189, 20 7 (D.P.R. 20 13). Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 20 of 25 ADA Ram os claim s she is “absolutely im m une from suit because her actions were intim ately associated with the judicial phase of the crim inal process.” Docket No. 95 at 16. Incredibly, ADA Ram os also argues that “at all tim es relevant to this case, [she] was not acting as a prosecutor[.]” Id. at 9-10 . In this regard, her argum ent is untenable (to say the least). At any rate, Plaintiffs are not seeking dam ages for actions taken by ADA Ram os in the perform ance of her prosecutorial duties. Accordingly, ADA Ram os’ request for the dism issal of the claim s against her on absolute im m unity grounds is D EN IED . See Diaz-Morales, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 287. 2 . Qu alifie d Im m u n ity [A] public actor’s liability under [§] 1983 is not absolute: the doctrine of qualified im m unity provides a safe harbor for a w ide range of m istaken judgm ents. Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 20 0 4) (quoting Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Fam ilies, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 20 0 1)). Or as the Suprem e Court says, “[q]ualified im m unity ‘gives governm ent officials breathing room to m ake reasonable but m istaken judgm ents about open legal questions.’” Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (20 14) (em phasis added) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (20 11)). Although Defendants raised the qualified im m unity doctrine at the pleading stage, the lack of factual developm ent prevented the court determ ining the objective reasonableness of Defendants’ actions. Dom inguez, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 127-128. The court therefore denied qualified im m unity but left the door open for Defendants to press their claim at a later juncture. Predictably, they now m ove for sum m ary judgm ent on qualified im m unity grounds, so the court will give it a second go. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 21 of 25 The qualified im m unity inquiry “entails a two-step pavane.” Alfano v. Lynch, 847 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 20 17). First, the court considers “whether the facts, taken m ost favorably to the party opposing sum m ary judgm ent, m ake out a constitutional violation,” and second, “whether the violated right was clearly established at the tim e that the offending conduct occurred.” Ford v. Bender, 786 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 20 14). The First Circuit second step is itself divisible in two subparts: First, the plaintiff m ust identify either “controlling authority” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority” sufficient to signal to a reasonable officer that particular conduct would violate a constitutional right. This inquiry “m ust be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” The aim is to ensure that the state of the law is sufficiently specific to give fair and clear warning to governm ent officials. The second sub-part asks whether a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would have known that his conduct violated the established rule. Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 20 17) (citations om itted). Here, the record suggests that the first prong of the inquiry is satisfied. The facts, exam ined in the light m ost favorable to Plaintiffs, could support a finding that both Defendants deprived the bounty hunters of their Fourth Am endm ent rights. The court thus turns to the second step of the inquiry. Officer Morales’ m ain argum ent in support of his claim for qualified im m unity is that no constitutional violation took place because Plaintiffs’ warrantless arrests were supported by probable cause. Plaintiffs counter that there is a dispute of relevant facts regarding the determ ination or existence of probable cause, which also precludes the court from concluding that Defendant’s actions were objective reasonable. To wit, Plaintiffs point out that there are m aterial inconsistencies in the version of the facts provided by the individuals interviewed by Officer Morales after he took over the investigation. They also stress Officer Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 22 of 25 Morales knew that Plaintiffs had reported their firearms with a PRPD Officer and given him their nam es, contact inform ation and purpose of their visit, yet eschewed this lead from his investigation. Finally, Plaintiffs m aintain that Officer Morales exhibited an obstinate conduct throughout his dealings with Plaintiffs and told them that he was following the instructions of ADA Ram os. The court notes that none of the parties have m entioned the different reasonableness standards that underlie the probable cause and qualified im m unity analyses. See Section IIID, supra (discussing probable cause). The court refuses to do counsel’s work. GonzalezBerm udez, 214 F. Supp. 3d at 156. Suffice it to m ention that the standards are not coterm inous, as “qualified im m unity requires a ‘som ewhat lesser showing.’” Nolan v. Krajcik, 384 F. Supp. 2d 447, 467 (D. Mass. 20 0 5) (quoting Cox, 391 F.3d at 31). The lack of proper briefing is enough to cut the analysis short. See Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharm aceutical LP, 856 F.3d 119, 139 (1st Cir. 20 17) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990 )) (noting litigants’ obligation “to spell out [their] argum ents squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold [their] peace”). Alternatively, Plaintiffs have controverted sufficient relevant facts regarding this Defendant’s involvem ent, and therefore, the probable cause question should be subm itted to a jury. See Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha, 790 F.3d 312, 326 (1st Cir. 20 15) (concluding that Fourth Am endm ent unconstitutional arrest claim against law enforcem ent officer survived sum m ary judgm ent because genuine dispute of m aterial facts existed as to the probable cause determ ination, which also prevented adjudication of the qualified im m unity inquiry); Acosta v. Am es Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir. 20 0 4) (quoting Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 8 n. 2 (1st Cir. 20 0 4)) (stating that “it is pointless to Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 23 of 25 subm it ... [a] probable cause question to the jury at all unless the facts are disputed.”); Hernandez, 20 18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88775, at *21 (accepting plaintiff’s account of the events at the sum m ary judgm ent stage, concluding that facts where insufficient to establish probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, and denying qualified im m unity as to plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim s). Next, ADA Ram os claim s she is entitled to qualified imm unity because, in her view, the undisputed facts show she was neither involved in Plaintiffs’ arrest nor the prosecutor who decided to pursue charges against them . She m aintains that her only job was to give an official opinion as to the local law regarding bounty hunters, “a m atter that was not clearly established[.]” Docket No. 95 at 12. Officer Morales echoes this argum ent. See Docket No. 98 at 17 (stating that “the case law as to the authority of bounty hunters in Puerto Rico is not clearly established….”). Defendants m iss the point, for the issue here is whether Plaintiffs had a Fourth Am endm ent right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures--as opposed to whether they had a right, in their capacities as bounty hunters, to carry on the acts that led to their arrest. The form er right – i.e., the Fourth Am endm ent rights to be seized only on probable cause and to not be subjected to arrest or crim inal proceedings based on false evidence or statem ents m ade with reckless disregard for the truth—were clearly established at the tim e that the offending conduct occurred. See, e.g., Fernandez-Salicrup, 790 F.3d at 326; VargasBadillo v. Diaz-Torres, 114 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (noting that at the tim e of plaintiff’s arrest, “clearly established Fourth Am endm ent law required that the defendants have probable cause to support Vargas’ warrantless arrest”); Hernandez-Lopez v. Pereira, 380 F. Supp. 2d 30 , 34 (D.P.R. 20 0 5) (quoting Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 24 of 25 Cam ilo– Robles v. Toledo– Davila, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998)) (stating that the Fourth Am endm ent “right to be free from unreasonable seizure (and, by extension, unjustified arrest and detention) is clearly established”).11 On this basis, the court finds that Defendants’ argum ent inapposite in the context of the case. Moreover, taking the facts m ost favorably to Plaintiffs, as is proper at this juncture, the court already found that the facts on which they ground their claim s m ake a constitutional violation for purposes of qualified im m unity. Thus, Defendants’ request that sum m ary judgm ent be entered on this ground m ust be D EN IED . 12 F. Su p p le m e n tal State Law Claim s Defendants seek sum m ary judgm ent on Plaintiffs’ Article 180 2 and Puerto Rico constitutional. Defendants assum e that the federal claim s will be dism issed, and therefore, request the court to decline exercising supplem ental jurisdiction. However, because Plaintiffs’ federal claim s survive sum m ary judgm ent, their claim s under Puerto Rico law survive as well. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for sum m ary judgm ent on the supplem ental state law claim s is D EN IED . 11 Under the clearly established prong of the test, courts cannot define the law or right at issue too generally, but rather, we m ust pay particularized attention to the facts and circum stances of each case. See Belsito Comm c'ns, Inc. v. Decker, 845 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 20 16) (quoting Ashcroft v. al– Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (20 11)) (“The general proposition, for exam ple, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Am endm ent is of little help in determ ining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”) Here, none of the parties identified a m ore specific right. Plaintiffs did not present a m ore controlling or persuasive authority applicable to the specific facts and circumstances of this case. These are im portant components of the analysis and it is incumbent upon the parties to guide the court on the standards governing their claim s and defenses. 12 The denial of the qualified im m unity determ ination is without prejudice. In m oving forward, the parties should becom e fam iliar with the First Circuit’s decision in the case of Rodriguez-Tirado v. Speedy Bail Bonds, 891 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 20 18), and the Court’s expressions with respect to the authority of bounty hunters. Civil No. 12-170 7 (PG) Page 25 of 25 IV. CON CLU SION Granting sum m ary judgm ent where, as here, m aterial facts at the very core of the legal issues are so hotly contested, would run afoul of the court’s discretion in em ploying the dispositive tool. Indeed, courts m ay grant sum m ary judgm ent only when the pleadings and the evidence dem onstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a). Consequently, and for the m yriad of reasons explained above, Defendants’ m otions for sum m ary judgm ent are D EN IED . IT IS SO ORD ERED . In San J uan, Puerto Rico, February 7, 20 19. S/ J UAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ JU AN M. PEREZ-GIMEN EZ SEN IOR U .S. D ISTRICT JU D GE
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