Santos-Diaz et al v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al, No. 3:2011cv01957 - Document 18 (D.P.R. 2012)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER re 1 Complaint, filed by Ernesto Santos-Diaz, 14 Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed by KSO, Ernesto Santos-Diaz. Defendants will be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the amount of $6,233.70, plus any interest accrued. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 5/16/2012.(mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 ERNESTO SANTOS-DIAZ, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 v. 6 7 8 9 Civil No. 11-1957 (JAF) COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants. 10 OPINION AND ORDER 11 12 Plaintiffs bring the present action seeking attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing 13 parties in an action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( IDEA ), 14 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 1487 (1997).1 (Docket No. 1 at 1.) The IDEA obligates school 15 districts to furnish a free appropriate public education . . . to children with disabilities. Me. 16 Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. R., 321 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). Under the IDEA, . . . the 17 aggrieved child s parents . . . . may seek attorneys fees as prevailing parties through its 18 fee-shifting provision. Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Sch., 401 F.3d 16, 18 n.1 (1st Cir. 2005) 19 (citing § 1415(i)(3)(C)). The fees awarded shall be based on rates prevailing in the 20 community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services 21 furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating the fees awarded under this 22 subsection. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The First Circuit has explained that the IDEA s fee-shifting 23 provision should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the fee-shifting statute of the 1 Plaintiffs refer to administrative case number 2010-004-035 with the Puerto Rico Department of Education, which ended with a favorable resolution issued by Administrative Official Elizabeth Ortiz-Irizarry after an administrative hearing on February 15, 2011. (Docket No. 1 at 4.) Civil No. 11-1957 (JAF) -2- 1 Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1988(b), and other similar fee-shifting statutes. Doe v. Boston 2 Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2004). 3 Because Defendants have stipulated that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties and merit 4 fees under § 1415(i)(3)(C), (Docket Nos. 8 at 2; 10 at 2), we begin our analysis by 5 examining the reasonableness of the requested fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 6 433 (1983). Fees are presumptively reasonable where the requesting party has multiplied a 7 reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably spent on litigation. See Gay 8 Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Hensley, 9 461 U.S. at 433). The First Circuit has adopted the lodestar approach, in which the trial 10 judge must determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 11 by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). In the lodestar method, 12 the judge calculates the time counsel spent on the case, subtracts duplicative, unproductive, 13 or excessive hours, and then applies prevailing rates in the community (taking into account 14 the qualifications, experience, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved). Id. 15 (citing Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992)). 16 reasonably spent on litigation unless duplicative, unproductive, or excessive. Id. In 17 addition, after calculation of the initial amount of the award, attorney s fees may be 18 reduced because of (1) the overstaffing of a case, (2) the excessiveness of the hours 19 expended on the legal research or the discovery proceedings, (3) the redundancy of the work 20 exercised, or (4) the time spent on needless or unessential matters. Serrano v. Ritz-Carlton 21 San Juan Hotel Spa & Casino, 808 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398 (D.P.R. 2011) (quoting Ramos v. 22 Davis & Geck, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 765, 775 (D.P.R. 1997)) (internal quotation marks 23 omitted)). The logged hours are Civil No. 11-1957 (JAF) -3- 1 Defendants make no arguments regarding the reasonableness of attorney Francisco J. 2 Vizcarrondo-Torres ( Vizcarrondo ) hourly rate or general billing practice and, instead, 3 levy three specific challenges to the requested fees and costs.2 Specifically, Defendants 4 argue that this court should deduct 1) two hours from the four billed for Vizcarrando s 5 appearance at the administrative hearing; 2) two hours of legal research; and 3) the sum of 6 costs for insufficient documentation. As an initial matter, we find the hourly rate requested 7 of $135 per hour which Defendants do not oppose to be reasonable. Plaintiffs have 8 satisfactorily shown Vizcarrondo s qualifications and past court approval of his rate in 9 IDEA cases in this district. See Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (D.P.R. 10 2011) ( Thus, based on Attorney Francisco J. Vizcarrondo-Torres expertise and experience 11 . . . the rate of $135.00 per hour is found to be appropriate. ). 12 In response to Defendants request to reduce the hours billed for attending the 13 administrative hearing from four to two, Vizcarrondo counters that it took him two hours in 14 traffic to travel to the two-hour administrative hearing in Caguas. Costs for attorney travel 15 may be recovered where appropriate as part of attorneys fees under the typical federal fee- 16 shifting statute. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing 17 InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2004)). Travel is often a 18 necessary incident of litigation, and an attorney s travel time may be reimbursed in a fee 2 We note that even though the motion for attorney fees is, in many ways, unopposed, the Court is not relieved of its duty of making sure that the amount requested by Plaintiff[s are] reasonable. MichelRamos v. Arroyo-Santiago, 493 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253 (D.P.R. 2007). However, when a fee target has failed to offer either countervailing evidence or persuasive argumentation in support of its position, we do not think it is the court s job either to do the target s homework or to take heroic measures aimed at salvaging the target from the predictable consequences of self-indulgent lassitude. As we have written before, courts, like the Deity, are most frequently moved to help those who help themselves. Foley v. Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 989 (1st Cir. 1988)). Civil No. 11-1957 (JAF) -4- 1 award. Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Maceira v. Pagan, 698 2 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983)). There is no hard-and-fast rule establishing what percentage of 3 an attorney s standard billing rate is appropriate for travel time. Id. However, the 4 common past practice is for an award to reflect an attorney s travel time at half of his hourly 5 rate. DeSena v. LePage, No. 1:11-cv-117, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38360, at *11 12 (D. 6 Me. Mar. 21, 2012); see also Maceira, 698 F.2d at 39 (awarding half of attorney s requested 7 rate for travel). Therefore, we will discount the fee by half for the two hours of travel time, 8 reducing the award by $135. 9 Next, we reject Defendants argument that legal research constitutes an out-of- 10 pocket expense that is not recoverable. (Docket No. 8 at 3.) Fees for legal research 11 (including computer research) are properly part of an attorneys fees award. Attrezzi, 436 12 F.3d at 43; InvesSys, Inc., 369 F.3d at 22 23. We find nothing unreasonable about the two 13 hours of legal research billed in preparation for his client s administrative hearing. 14 Finally, we reject Defendants argument that Plaintiffs failed to provide clear 15 documentation of the costs incurred. (Docket No. 8 at 4.) In fact, Plaintiffs do provide 16 descriptions and/or receipts for various individual expenditures incurred. Pan Am. Grain 17 Mfg. Co. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 193 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D.P.R. 2000). Plaintiffs have submitted an 18 invoice of costs, totaling $464.70, which include documentation for the payment of the $350 19 filing fee, the $100 process server fee, and an itemized list of the $14.70 expended on 20 photocopies (at $.15 per copy). We further reject Defendants argument that Plaintiffs 21 documentation runs afoul of the Taxation of Costs Guideline, as the District of Puerto Rico 22 Taxation of Costs Guideline, as amended in 2009, clearly states that charges of $.15 per 23 copy are permissible. Rodriguez, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 347. Plaintiffs documentation has -5- Civil No. 11-1957 (JAF) 1 proved sufficient, and reasonable costs and expenses for travel, printing, and photocopying 2 can be recovered in a fee-shifting proceeding . . . . Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 17. 3 Finally, we grant Plaintiffs request for additional attorneys fees for the present fee 4 application. As a general rule, the time reasonably devoted by attorneys to successful fee 5 applications can be reimbursed under fee-shifting statutes, such as section 1988. 6 McDonald v. Sec y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1480 (1st Cir. 1989) 7 (citations omitted); see also Prandini v. Nat l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 54 (3d Cir. 1978) 8 ( Indeed, courts have consistently held that attorneys may be awarded, under statutory fee 9 authorizations, compensation for the expenses of and time spent litigating the issue of a 10 reasonable fee. ). We have reviewed the submitted time sheets and find the hourly rate and 11 entries to be reasonable. 12 Reducing the request by $135 (by halving the two hours of travel time) and adding 13 $464.70 in costs leaves a sum of $5,257.20 for the initial fees and costs request. (Docket 14 Nos. 1; 1-1.) Added to the additional $972.00 in fees and $4.50 in costs assessed for this fee 15 application, (Docket No. 14 at 3), the fee award totals $6,233.70, plus interest. 16 Therefore, we hereby GRANT Plaintiffs request for attorney fees, as well as their 17 motion for supplemental attorneys fees and costs. (Docket Nos. 1; 14.) Based on the 18 foregoing, Defendants will be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the amount of 19 $6,233.70, plus any interest accrued. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of May, 2012. 22 23 24 s/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE United States District Judge

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