Delgado-Sanchez et al v. Toledo-Davila et al, No. 3:2007cv01709 - Document 114 (D.P.R. 2009)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 84 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Pedro Toledo-Davila. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 12/8/2009.(LB)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 WENDEL DELGADO SANCHEZ, et al 4 Plaintiffs v. 5 6 Civil No. 07-1709 (SEC) PEDRO TOLEDO DAVILA, et al Defendants 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 OPINION AND ORDER Pending before this Court is Co-Defendant Pedro Toledo-Dávila s ( Toledo ) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dockets ## 84 & 85), and Plaintiffs opposition thereto (Dockets ## 96 & 97). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Toledo s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Procedural Background Plaintiffs seek relief for the damages suffered by Wendel Delgado Sánchez (hereinafter Wendel ), and Dwight Delgado Sánchez ( Dwight ) (collectively Plaintiffs ) as a result of the alleged illegal seizure, false arrest, imprisonment, and beating undertaken by members of the Puerto Rico Police Department. Plaintiffs complaint is premised on Title 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and several state laws.1 Plaintiffs brought this suit against Toledo, the Police Department Superintendent; Francisco Carbó Marti, the Director of the drug and addictions control of Puerto Rico; Coriano, Lieutenant of the Carolina Tactics Operation; Carlos Carrión Rodríguez, Lieutenant of the Carolina Drug Division; Sanchez Ofaril, Supervisor of the Carolina Drug Division; agents José L. López Pagán, Endel Meléndez, Toledo Reyes, and 24 25 26 1 The initial complaint was filed on August 8, 2007 (Docket # 1), and a first amended complaint was filed on August 15, 2007. Docket # 2. On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12. 1 CIVIL NO. 07-1709 (SEC) Page 2 2 Ernesto Santiago; Diego Figueroa, President of the Frente Unido de Policías Organizados 3 (hereinafter FUPO); and several unnamed defendants. 4 On December 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Docket # 12. 5 Defendants moved this Court to strike Plaintiffs second amended complaint, however, their 6 request was denied. Docket # 26. On January 28, 2008, Defendants moved for dismissal of the 7 complaint. In its prior Opinion & Order, this Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs 8 claims federal claims against Toledo, as well as Plaintiffs Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Amendment 9 claims against all Defendants. Docket # 40. On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff a motion requesting 10 that this Court reconsider its prior holding, and reinstate all claims against Toledo. Docket # 42. 11 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the allegations in the second amended complaint were 12 sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 13 granted. This Court granted Plaintiffs request, and their Section 1983 claims against Toledo 14 were reinstated. Docket # 72. 15 On May 26, 2009, Toledo filed the instant motion. Docket # 84. Plaintiffs filed an 16 opposition. Docket # 96. 17 Standard of Review 18 F ED. R. C IV. P. 56 19 The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, 20 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 21 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 22 as a matter of law. F ED.R.C IV.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 23 242, 248(1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2005). 24 In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., 25 Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994). At this stage, the court examines 26 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and indulges all reasonable 3 inferences in that party s favor. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1 st 4 Cir. 1994). 3 5 Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the 6 nonmoving party s case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least 7 one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). A factual issue is genuine if it may reasonably be 9 resolved in favor of either party and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make a choice 10 between the parties differing versions of the truth at trial. DePoutout v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 11 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2005)(quoting Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also SEC v. Ficken, 12 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2008). 13 In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory 14 allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 15 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 16 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Nor will effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise suffice to establish 17 a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1 st Cir. 1997). Once 18 the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, 19 and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the party opposing summary 20 judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Méndez-Laboy v. 21 Abbot Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting from Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo 22 Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The non-movant must produce specific facts, in 23 suitable evidentiary form sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue. . . .Failure to do so allows the 24 summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle. Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 25 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991) (warning that the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary 26 judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence ); 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 3 (1st Cir. 1989)) (holding that [t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be 4 conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions 5 of the truth which a factfinder must resolve. ). 4 6 When filing for summary judgment, both parties must comply with the requirements of 7 Local Rule 56, and file a statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, and supported 8 by record citations. See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when confronted with a motion for summary 9 judgment, the opposing party must: 10 13 [s]ubmit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposition shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party s statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation...Local Rule 56(c). 14 Local Rule 56(e) further provides that [a]n assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material 15 facts shall be followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record 16 material supporting the assertion. Moreover, a court may disregard any statement of material 17 fact not supported by a specific record citation to record material properly considered on 18 summary judgment. Local Rule 56(e). Local Rule 56(e)(2) further states that, if the opposing 19 party does not respond to a motion for summary judgment, summary judgment should, if 20 appropriate, be entered against that party. When a party opposing summary judgment fails to 21 act in accordance with the rigors that such a rule imposes, a district court is free, in the exercise 22 of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party s facts as stated. Cabán-Hernández v. Philip 23 Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). These rules are meant to ease the district 24 court s operose task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the 25 court. Id. at 8. The First Circuit has held that when the parties ignore the Local Rule, they do 26 so at their own peril. See Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F. 3d 24, 28 (1 st Cir. 2000). 11 12 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 5 2 Applicable Law and Analysis 3 In the present case, Defendant complied with Rule 56, and submitted a Statement of 4 Uncontested Facts (Docket # 85) (hereinafter Toledo s SUMF ), numbered, and supported by 5 record citations. In opposition, Plaintiffs filed a Motion Submitting Uncontested Material 6 Facts in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ( Plaintiffs SUMF ). 7 Docket # 97. Upon reviewing the record, however, this Court notes that Plaintiffs did not admit, 8 deny or qualify Toledo s SUMF by reference to each numbered paragraph. Instead, Plaintiffs 9 provided additional facts which are not related to Toledo s SUMF. Since Plaintiffs did not 10 oppose Toledo s SUMF in compliance with Rule 56, this Court will deem uncontested those 11 facts that are properly supported by the record. As a result, the facts set forth at Toledo s SUMF 12 ¶¶ 1-4, and 6-10 are deemed unopposed.2 13 Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to provide specific record citations in support of any of 14 their assertions of fact, and SUMF ¶¶ 13 and 12 do not have record citations. Also, Exhibits # 15 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 are not properly authenticated. The First Circuit has held that [t]o be 16 admissible at the summary judgment stage, documents must be authenticated by and attached 17 to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e). Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 18 131 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993)). In Carmona, the 19 Court refused to give credence to a purported copy of the investigation file -- unsworn, 20 uncertified, and, at first, untranslated -- to the motion. Id. 21 Translation of Exhibit # 8, provided in support of SUMF ¶9, is missing pages 2-12. As a result, 22 SUMF ¶ 9 will be disregarded when ruling on the instant motion. Notwithstanding, since Additionally, the English 23 24 2 SUMF ¶5 is a conclusion of law which is better left for this Court to decide. 25 3 26 Notwithstanding, this statement of fact has been admitted by the parties, and as such, will be considered by this Court. 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 Plaintiffs SUMF ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, and 10, which are supported by Exhibits ## 1, 3 and 4, coincide 3 with Toledo s SUMF, said exhibits validity is deemed admitted by Toledo. Accordingly, 4 Plaintiffs SUMF ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, and 10 will be considered by this Court. Lastly, portions of 5 Plaintiffs SUMF ¶¶ 5, 8, and 10, set forth conclusions of law regarding alleged violations to 6 the Puerto Rico Police Department s regulations, to Plaintiff s rights, and local laws, which are 7 matters for this Court to decide. 6 8 Based on the foregoing, the uncontested facts are as follows. A search warrant was 9 issued authorizing the search of Block # 23 House # 21, located at Sabana Gardens Street # 16.4 10 Plaintiffs SUMF ¶2. On August 9, 2006, Wendel and Dwight were standing in the street at 11 Sabana Gardens. Id. at ¶3.5 On even date, Plaintiffs were subject of a police intervention that 12 culminated in their arrest, and imprisonment for approximately 12 hours. Toledo s SUMF ¶2. 13 At that time, Toledo was the Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department. Id. at ¶1. On 14 the same day, Toledo suspended Wendel without pay. Id. at ¶6. One day later, on August 10, 15 2006, Wendel received the suspension letter from Toledo, informing him that he was suspended 16 without pay. Id. at ¶7; Plaintiffs SUMF ¶4. Wendel appealed the letter of suspension on 17 August 17, 2006. Toledo s SUMF ¶8. A hearing was held on January 16, 2007, and Wendel was 18 present. Id. at ¶¶9 & 10; Plaintiffs SUMF ¶6. Therefore, Wendel was suspended for 8 months, 19 and afterwards, he was expelled. Plaintiffs SUMF ¶8. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 4 Plaintiffs proposed statement of fact ¶2 provides that they were standing in front of houses 21 and 22 of Jardines de Carolina. However, the deposition cited in support thereof does not mention the name Jardines de Carolina. Moreover, Exhibit # 6 states that the search warrant was directed at residences located in Sabana Gardens. 5 Although Plaintiffs SUMF ¶ 3 states that Wendell and Dwight Delgado were standing in front of houses 21 and 22 of Jardines de Carolina, as previously stated, the facts took place in Sabana Gardens. Furthermore, Wendel s deposition testimony, provided in support of said assertion of fact, does not clearly state that Plaintiffs were standing in front of residences 21 and 22. Instead, Wendel stated that they were standing on the street in a corner. Docket # 97-7. 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 7 2 Plaintiffs only evidence regarding Toledo s failure to train the police force is his own 3 perception and allegation that you are not taught to beat on people at the Academy, and you 4 are not taught to libel persons at the Academy. Toledo s SUMF ¶3. Plaintiffs have no evidence 5 of lack of training other than the allegation in the previous statement. Id. at ¶4. 6 Although Plaintiffs contend that Toledo did not conduct an investigation before 7 suspending Wendel, the suspension letter states that there was a preliminary investigation 8 regarding Wendel s conduct. See Plaintiffs SUMF ¶5; Exhibit # 1, Docket # 108-5. Toledo 9 issued statements to the press and the T.V. news. Id. at ¶10.6 10 In his motion for summary judgment, Toledo contends that Plaintiffs failed to establish 11 a Section 1983 claims against him. Specifically, Toledo avers that there is no causal connection 12 between his actions, and the alleged illegal arrest. Toledo further argues that Wendel s 13 procedural due process rights were not violated, insofar as he was granted a hearing regarding 14 his suspension, and was duly advised about his right to appeal the same. In opposition, Plaintiffs 15 argue that Toledo suspended Wendel the day after he was arrested and beaten, without due 16 process of law and in violation of the Police Department s rules and regulations. Moreover, 17 Plaintiffs contend that Toledo defamed Wendel when he appeared on TV, and commented on 18 Wendel s suspension. 19 complaints filed against the arresting officers, and failed to adequately supervise, train, monitor 20 and evaluate them. As such, they argue that Toledo tacitly encouraged and condoned their 21 behavior, and is responsible under the respondeat supervisor doctrine. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo was aware of the administrative 22 23 24 6 25 26 At Plaintiffs SUMF ¶11, they posit that Toledo did not provide adequate training to the Carolina drug division police officers regarding the penetration of houses. However, considering that Plaintiffs arrest took place on the street, not inside a house or structure, said statement of fact is irrelevant to the case at bar. 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 8 2 The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive 3 rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. 4 M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). There are two essential elements of a Section 1983 5 claim: (1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; 6 and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 7 United States. Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145 , 151-152 (2 nd Cir. 2006); Johnson 8 v. Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2005); Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1 st Cir. 1995) 9 (citing Chrongis v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1 st Cir. 1987)). This second prong has 10 two aspects: (1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff s federally protected 11 rights; and (2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant s conduct and 12 the deprivation of the plaintiff s federal rights. See Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1 st 13 Cir. 1989); Mahoney, 424 F.3d at 89. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires 14 that the plaintiff establish that each defendant s own actions deprived the plaintiff of his/her 15 protected rights, see Monell v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978); Gutiérrez- 16 Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562; Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1 st Cir. 1989). 17 Furthermore, the defendant s conduct must be shown to be intentional, grossly negligent, or 18 amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff s constitutional rights. See 19 Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir. 1986); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. 20 As for supervisory liability in §1983 actions, the rule is that supervisors may only be 21 found liable on the basis of their own acts or omissions. Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562. 22 In order for a supervisor to be found liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that 23 the supervisor s own acts or omissions deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right; 24 (2) that his conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the 25 constitutional rights of others; and (3) that there was an affirmative link between the street 26 level misconduct and the action or inaction of supervisory officials. Id. 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 9 2 In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs aver that Toledo knew or should have 3 known and identified the dangerous tendencies of (the arresting) police officers... Docket # 12 4 at ¶ 29. They further allege that Toledo knew that said officers had received inadequate and 5 deficient training. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Toledo failed to properly train, monitor, supervise, 6 and evaluate the arresting police officers. Id. Moreover, they contend that Toledo knew or 7 should have known the many administrative complaints filed against (the arresting officers) 8 for civil rights violations, and he failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or correct the 9 officers improper conduct. Docket # 12 at ¶ ¶ 29 & 30. As such, Plaintiffs argue that Toledo 10 was grossly negligent in exercising his responsibilities and, as such, is responsible for the 11 violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. 12 Notwithstanding, pursuant to the above mentioned uncontested facts, Plaintiffs only 13 evidence regarding Toledo s failure to train the police force is his own perception and allegation 14 that you are not taught to beat on people at the Academy, and you are not taught to libel 15 persons at the Academy. Toledo s SUMF ¶3. Furthermore, in his deposition testimony, Wendel 16 admits he has no evidence of lack of training other than the allegation in the previous statement. 17 18 Id. at ¶4. Also, Plaintiffs admit that Toledo was not present during the arrest. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between Toledo s conduct and the alleged deprivation of their federal rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims 19 against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. 20 21 Due Process Claims This Court first notes that Dwight Delgado is not a police officer. Therefore, he lacks 22 standing to set forth due process claims against Toledo. As such, Dwight s due process claims 23 against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. 24 Additionally, although Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985), 25 mandates pre-termination hearings, the Hudson-Parratt doctrine bars Wendel s due process 26 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 claims. Pursuant to the same, due process violation claims, based on the unauthorized denial of 3 pre-termination rights, fail when adequate post-deprivation remedies are provided to plaintiffs. 4 In order to establish a procedural due process claims under Section 1983, a plaintiff 5 must allege that he was deprived of a property interest by defendants acting under color of state 6 law and without the availability of a constitutionally adequate process. Maymi, 515 F.3d at 29. 7 Property interests are not created by the Constitution; they are created and their dimensions 8 are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 9 state law. De Vélez v. Zayas, 328 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing Bd. of Regents 10 10 v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).7 11 This Court notes that, in invoking his procedural due process claims, Wendel argues that 12 Toledo deprived him of the established pre-termination procedures. According to Wendel, he 13 was summarily suspended, without an investigation into the facts of the case, or an 14 administrative hearing pursuant to the Police Department s Personnel Regulations. He further 15 notes that the hearing was held 5 months after his suspension. After reviewing the record, this 16 Court finds that it is uncontested that Wendel was summarily suspended. Notwithstanding, the 17 Police Department s Personnel Regulations allow the Superintendent to summarily suspend a 18 member of the Force from employment and wages, prior to the administrative hearing, when 19 there is misuse of public funds, lack of competence, misconduct or crime charged, or whenever 20 there is a reasonable belief that the public s health or safety may be endangered. Article 21 22 23 24 25 26 7 Employees classified as career or permanent have vested property rights, and cannot be deprived of that right without due process of law. Borges-Colon v. De Jesus-Flores, 483 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). At a minimum, career employees are entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond prior to termination. Figueroa, 221 F.3d at 5-6 (citations omitted); Monfort-Rodriguez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 168. At the pre-termination stage, due process requires that [t]he tenured public employee [receive] oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 546. 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 14.3(2)(b)(1)(b), Personnel Regulation #4216, May 11, 1990. Therefore, Toledo complied with 3 the Personnel Regulations. Moreover, although Plaintiffs contend that Toledo did not conduct 4 an investigation before suspending Wendel, the suspension letter states that there was a 5 preliminary investigation regarding Wendel s conduct. See Plaintiffs SUMF ¶5; Exhibit # 1, 6 Docket # 108-5. Thereafter, a thorough investigation was conducted. Also, Wendel appealed 7 the letter of suspension on August 17, 2006, and a hearing was held on January 16, 2007. 8 Toledo s SUMF ¶8; Plaintiffs SUMF ¶¶ 6, 9 & 10. As such, Wendel s rights were properly 9 safeguarded. 11 10 Additionally, as previously mentioned, even if Toledo failed to provide Wendel the 11 procedure due prior to making the decision to terminate them, he cannot succeed on his 12 procedural due process claim unless he can show that the state failed to provide him with an 13 adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. (citing Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 340-41 (1 st Cir. 14 1992) (holding that [i]f a state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies -- either by statute 15 or through the common-law tort remedies available in its courts -- no claim of a violation of 16 procedural due process can be brought under § 1983 against the state officials whose random 17 and unauthorized conduct caused the deprivation. ). 18 Under the Hudson/Parratt doctrine, when a deprivation of a property interest is 19 occasioned by random and unauthorized conduct by state officials, the Supreme Court has 20 repeatedly emphasized that the due process inquiry is limited to the issue of the adequacy of the 21 postdeprivation remedies provided by the state. Hadfield v. Mc Donough, 407 F.3d 11, 19 (1 st 22 Cir. 2005); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 23 As a result, public entities are protected from federal due process claims where the denial of 24 process was caused by the negligent or intentional misapplication of state law by a government 25 official. Id. In interpreting said doctrine, this Circuit has held that a government official has 26 committed a random and unauthorized act when he or she misapplies state law to deny an 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 2 individual the process due under a correct application of state law. Hadfield, 407 F.3d at 20. 3 The underlying rationale behind this doctrine rests on the fact that a state cannot anticipate and 4 control the random and unauthorized negligent or intentional conduct of its employees. Hudson, 5 468 U.S. at 533. More so considering that one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his 6 property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signaling his intent. Id. 12 7 The Hudson-Parratt doctrine has been applied in the public employment context. 8 Specifically, the First Circuit stated that a plaintiffs procedural due process claims fail when 9 state law clearly provided for adequate notice and there was no suggestion that either by formal 10 or informal means the state had authorized the giving of inadequate notice to persons who may 11 be terminated, or that this was any form of regular practice, and proper post-deprivation 12 remedies were provided. Hadfield v. Mc Donough, 407 F.3d 1 at 20. 13 Wendel does not contest that he was informed about his right to appeal to the 14 Investigation, Processing and Appeal Committee (CIPA, for its Spanish acronym) in both the 15 suspension, and the dismissal letters. Instead he argues that Toledo summarily suspended him 16 in violation of the Personnel Regulations, intentionally deprived him of his right to a pre- 17 termination hearing. As noted by this Circuit, [i]n such situations, additional pre-deprivation 18 safeguards would have little value in preventing an erroneous deprivation of the protected 19 interest. Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 193 (1st Cir. 2003). That is, in all likelihood, 20 a pre-termination hearing would not have afforded Wendel the relief he sought. Thus 21 considering the above-cited case law, and that adequate post-deprivation remedies were 22 afforded to Wendel, his procedural due process claims fail. 23 24 25 26 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. Supplemental State Law Claims 1 Civil No. 08-1607 (SEC) 13 2 Having dismissed Plaintiffs federal law claims against Toledo, their state law claims 3 against said co-defendant are also dismissed. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st 4 Cir. 1991) (holding that [t]he power of a federal court to hear and to determine sate-law claims 5 in non-diversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial' federal claim in 6 the lawsuit. ) 7 Conclusion 8 For the reasons stated above, Toledo s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, 9 and Plaintiffs claims against Toledo are DISMISSED with prejudice. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th day of December, 2009. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 S/Salvador E. Casellas Salvador E. Casellas U.S. District Judge

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