Burgos-Yantin et al v. Municipality of Juana Diaz et al, No. 3:2007cv01146 - Document 337 (D.P.R. 2013)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying re 336 MOTION for Reconsideration re 335 Order on Motion for Execution of Judgment MOTION for Reconsideration re 335 Order on Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by Municipality of Juana Diaz Signed by U.S. Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas on 1/23/2013.(Arenas, Justo)

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1 N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 4 CARMEN BURGOS-YANTIN, et al., 5 6 Plaintiffs 7 v. 8 MUNICIPALITY OF JUANA DIAZ, et al., 9 10 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) Defendants 11 12 13 14 OPINION AND ORDER As the result of a routine traffic stop by Juana Diaz municipal police officers gone awry, Miguel Angel Burgos, the son of the prevailing plaintiff Carmen 15 16 Burgos-Yantin, died shortly after being shot, the cause of death having been 17 described as severe cranial cerebral trauma due to bullet wound. 18 Yantin v. Municipality of Juana Diaz, 751 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348 (D.P.R. 2010); 19 See Burgos- Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality of Diaz, 709 F. Supp. 2d 118, 119 (D.P.R. 2010). 20 21 A jury verdict absolved the police officers of responsibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 22 the Civil Rights Act of 1971, but found officers Gary Conde-Gonzalez and Miguel 23 Torres-Santiago liable for damages under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil 24 Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141, Puerto Rico s general tort statute. See 25 26 Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality of Juana Diaz, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48. A third 27 municipal law enforcement officer, Lieutenant Angel Colon-Gonzalez, was found 28 not liable under either statute. (Docket No. 306). I recently denied a motion 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 2 2 3 related to the execution of the judgment issued as a result of the jury verdict 4 5 against officers Conde-Gonzalez and Torres-Santiago. (Docket No. 335). 6 This matter is before the court on a thoughtfully penned and unopposed1 7 Motion for Reconsideration of my order dated January 2, 2013 denying the 8 prevailing plaintiff s motion for Execution of Judgment. (Docket No. 336). In that 9 10 opinion and order, I denied plaintiff s motion as to two non-consenting non- 11 parties, the Municipality of Juana Diaz, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 12 The Commonwealth s opposition clearly noted its protection from execution of 13 14 15 judgment under the plenary cloak of sovereign immunity. See Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 53-55 (1st Cir. 2003); Ortiz-Feliciano v. Toledo-Davila, 16 175 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1999). The Municipality s opposition focused on its denial 17 of any indemnification responsibility toward its municipal police officers who are 18 judgment debtors.2 See Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 564 F.3d 40, 46 (1st 19 Cir. 2009) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Local Rule 7(b), District of Puerto Rico states that by failing to file a timely opposition to a motion within fourteen days of service, the opposing party shall be deemed to have waived objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). 2 While this district court has authorized writs of attachment against municipalities for judgments against impecunious police officers, the court of appeals has not decided whether such indemnification proceedings fall within enforcement jurisdiction in an analogous situation. See U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Const. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 497 n.6 (1st Cir. 2000); also see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355-59 (1996); cf. Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237, 24445 (1st Cir. 2007). 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 3 2 3 I. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: STANDARD 4 5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing 6 of motions for reconsideration. Alberti v. University of Puerto Rico, 869 F. Supp. 7 2d 231, 233 (D.P.R. 2012); Sanchez-Medina v. UNICCO Service Co., 265 F.R.D. 8 29, 32 (D.P.R. 2010)(citations omitted). Notwithstanding, any motion seeking 9 10 the reconsideration of a judgment or order is considered as a motion to alter or 11 amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) if it seeks to change the order or 12 judgment issued. Alberti v. University of Puerto Rico, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 233; 13 Sanchez-Medina v. UNICCO Service Co., 265 F.R.D. at 32. (citations omitted). 14 15 Parties aggrieved by a ruling are generally the ones that seek redress anew. In 16 this case, however, the ruling s conclusion did not disfavor movant, the 17 Municipality of Juana Diaz, as much as did the ruling s analysis. The motion for 18 execution of judgment in relation to the Municipality having been denied, there is 19 basically no additional operational remedy I can award to the town of Juana Diaz. 20 21 Plaintiff sought a hearing and the request for such a hearing was denied. Docket 22 No. 335; see Colon v. Blades, 734 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247 (D.P.R. 2010). 23 plaintiff s motion been treated as a motion for execution of judgment, and had the 24 Had corresponding writ of execution been issued against the Municipality, a motion for 25 26 27 28 reconsideration would be viable. In this case, that order is a denial of the request which the Municipality opposed, whether treated as a request for hearing or for 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 4 2 3 execution of judgment. Reconsideration would again lead to a denial, which, 4 5 again, would be a ruling in favor of the Municipality. II. POST TRIAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-CONSENTING PARTY 6 7 8 The Municipality clearly raises the matter of my jurisdiction to issue an order against it as a non-consenting party to my trial jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 9 10 636(c). (Docket No. 336 at 1, n.1). The validity of this precise argument can 11 hardly be ignored or denied. The Municipality was dismissed as a party on 12 November 9, 2009 by the Honorable Gustavo A. Gelpi, United States District 13 Judge. (Docket No. 237). The remaining parties consented to trial before a United 14 15 States magistrate judge on November 18, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; (Docket No. 241). Knowledge that I would rule on the post- 17 trial motions cannot be imputed to the Municipality since I retired on April 10, 18 2011 and have had three ad hoc recall appointments since then.3 It is not 19 common knowledge that I am authorized to perform a full range of duties on recall 20 status, or for that matter, that I am back at work at all.4 Therefore, as reflected 21 22 in its motion for reconsideration, the Municipality did not expect me to rule on the 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 See Baez-Cruz v. Municipality of Dorado, 780 F. Supp.2d 149, 151 n. 2 (D.P.R. 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 636(h). The second Order of Recall was issued by the Judicial Council of the First Circuit on December 27, 2011. My second recall appointment commenced on January 3, 2012 and ended on January 3, 2013, the date after my opinion and order was issued. See Docket No. 336. 4 The district court web-site makes no mention of my recall appointment, and it is not vox populi. 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 5 2 3 motion for execution of judgment, thus the present argument which could not have 4 5 been raised previous to this motion for reconsideration. See Amira-Jabbar v. 6 Travel Services, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77, 91 (D.P.R. 2010). 7 8 My jurisdiction over the Municipality was not considered in the previous opinion and order, the focus having been the post-trial application of Law 9, which 9 10 application I describe in the previous opinion and order. (Docket No. 335). 11 Because United States Magistrate Judges are not Article III judges, they may enter 12 judgment only when the parties have consented to have a Magistrate Judge hear 13 their case. See e.g. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585-86 (2003); Salud Para 14 15 El Pueblo v. Department of Health of the Com. Of Puerto Rico, 959 F. Supp. 83, 85 16 (D.P.R. 1997). The Magistrate Judge is thus authorized to conduct all proceedings 17 following the consent of the parties, including trial and ordering the entry of final 18 judgment. As an Article I federal judge exercising powers under 28 U.S.C. § 636 19 (c), I have no jurisdiction over a non-consenting party, pre or post-judgment. See 20 PowerShare, Inc. V. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010); Colorado Bldg. 21 22 And Const. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Const. Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 809, 811 23 (10th Cir. 1989). 24 Nor may I find, under the circumstances, that the Municipality of Juana Diaz has impliedly consented to my jurisdiction. See e.g. Roell v. 25 26 27 28 Withrow, 538 U.S. at 588-90. I will continue to exercise jurisdiction over 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 6 2 3 consenting parties. Motions as to which I have no jurisdiction will be referred to 4 5 the Article III judge who approved the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). III. REMEDY 6 7 8 Had I issued an order enabling the use of a method other than execution of judgment to enforce the civil money judgment against the Municipality under Rule 9 10 69(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I would have cause to pause. See e.g. 11 Board of Com rs of Stark County, OH v. Cape Stone Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp.2d 12 100, 102-03 (D.Mass. 2002). 13 As the controversy vel non stands, however, the last ruling favors the Municipality. There is nothing to reconsider and no remedy 14 15 16 to fashion in favor of the Municipality. There are four basic grounds upon which the extraordinary remedy of a Rule 17 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest 18 errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the moving party will 19 present newly discovered evidence or previously unavailable evidence; 3) there is 20 a necessity to prevent manifest injustice; 4) the motion is justified by an 21 22 intervening change in controlling law. 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 23 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed.)(2012); see Fabrica de Muebles 24 J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 25 26 2012); Markel American Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2012). 27 The motion does not fit in any of these categories. 28 Comity and federalism 1 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 7 2 3 governed my prior ruling favoring the Municipality. See e.g. Watchtower Bible 4 5 Tract Soc. of New York, Inc. v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 869 F. Supp. 2d 515, 6 219-20 (D.P.R. 2012). Thus, the Municipality was not rendered remediless at the 7 time. Anomalous as this ruling may appear in view of my lack of jurisdiction over 8 the non-consenting party seeking reconsideration, the Motion for Reconsideration 9 10 is DENIED. 11 SO ORDERED. 12 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23d day of January, 2013. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S/JUSTO ARENAS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CIVIL 07-1146 (JA) 11

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