IRACA v. ASTRUE, No. 3:2011cv00087 - Document 23 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 17 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 19 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/10/12. (kw)
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IRACA v. ASTRUE Doc. 23 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CINDY L. IRACA, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 11-87J MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER , AND NOW, !O~ay this of September, 2012, upon due consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 19) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 17) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). substantial ~A072 findings, any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains the 186 F.3d 422, (3d 429 Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, even if it a reviewing would have court decided is bound by the factual those inquiry (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Moreover, it is Massanari, well 247 F.3d 34, settled determined merely by the presence that of 38 (3d Cir. disability impairments, is not but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support his findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her application for SSI on February I, 2008, alleging disability beginning on June problems, 2004, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, pain, carpal tunnel syndrome and anxiety. was denied. At plaintiff's request, February 3, 2010. finding 2, due to heart back and knee Plaintiff's application an ALJ held a hearing on On March 19, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on March 22, 2011, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 44 years old when she filed her SSI application and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §416.963(c). Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work experience, and she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since filing her application. After reviewing plaintiff's <1l!>.AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 2 medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that meaning of the Act. plaintiff is not disabled within the Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of sacroiliac joint dysfunction, left ulnar neuropathy, lumbar degenerative disc disease with chronic lower back pain, coronary artery disease, arthritis of the thumbs, hypertension, Prinzmetal angina, asthma/chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, anxiety/depressive disorder and combination, panic attacks, those impairments, alone or in do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix I") . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform light work with additional non-exertional limitations. occasional Plaintiff is limited to work that requires only postural maneuvers, stooping and crawling. such as balancing, bending, In addition, she requires work that does not involve any exposure to temperature extremes or concentrated noxious fumes and gases. Finally, plaintiff is limited to working in a low stress environment, which involves few changes in work processes and no fast-paced or quota production standards (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . Based on testimony by a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's vocational factors and residual functional capacity allow her to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, "Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 3 such as a labeler, a laundry folder or a hostess/greeter. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy " 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, residual functional capacity.l education, work experience 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a) (4). and If the lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (1) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40. In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (4). 'l:i>.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 4 claimant found disabled or not disabled at any stepi further inquiry is unnecessary. In this case of the l plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 sequential inadequate weight physician and l Id. evaluation to thus functional capacity; the did process opinion not because: of (1) he gave plaintiff/s properly treating assess residual her (2) he did not properly consider plaintiff/s problems with her hands; (3) he improperly evaluated plaintiff's credibilitYi and (4) he posed an inadequate hypothetical question to the vocational expert. The court finds that these arguments lack merit. First plaintiff l argues that the ALJ failed to appropriate weight to the opinion of her treating physician James Hall. A treating physician s l opinion is give l entitled Dr. to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. C.P.R. §416.927(c) (2). determined that Dr. weight. Under this standard, not 20 the ALJ properly Hall's opinion should be given diminished (R. 23-24). Dr. Hall indicated on a report entitled "Medical Evaluation that plaintiff has normal use of her hands and arms decreased walking 92). l left grip strength l but she has I except for problems bending and kneeling and she is unable to work. As the ALJ explained in his decision l ll standing, (R. 390 Dr. Hall's opinion that plaintiff is unable to work is contradicted by other medical ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 5 evidence, and complaints, appears which to the have ALJ been based properly found on to credible as explained in more detail below. her be subj ective not entirely As the ALJ pointed out, contrary to Dr. Hall's assessment, a consultative examination performed by Dr. Christopher Begley showed that plaintiff had full range of cervical, motion in all joints, full range of motion in her thoracic and lumbosacral spine and a normal motor and sensory examination. (R. In addition, 357). the ALJ correctly observed that Dr. Hall's opinion that plaintiff is unable to work is undermined by her activities of daily living. The court notes that despi te giving Dr. Hall's opinion diminished weight, the ALJ did not wholly disregard it in making the RFC Finding. Consistent with Dr. Hall's plaintiff has problems standing, walking, assessment that bending and kneeling, the ALJ's RFC Finding restricted her to light work that involves only occasional postural maneuvers. discussed evaluated above, and the court weighed For this reason, and those concludes that Hall's opinion, Dr. the ALJ and properly correctly incorporated into the RFC Finding that portion of his assessment which was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff next argues that the RFC Finding did not contain any limitation for her plaintiff's assertion, alleged hand problems. Contrary to the medical evidence indicates that she does not experience any functional limitations associated with her hands. Dr. Alexander Krot, who was plaintiff's treating orthopedic surgeon, indicated in his treatment notes that despite ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 6 having an enchondroma (benign cartilage tumor) on her left thumb, she had good range of motion and no real pain on palpation. 269-70). (R. After plaintiff subsequently had surgery on her right thumb, Dr. Krot stated that she was doing satisfactory, and she had very little discomfort or pain. (R. 422). Accordingly, there was no basis for the ALJ to find that plaintiff had any hand limitations which should have been included in the RFC Finding. Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred because he improperly evaluated and rej ected her subj ective complaints of pain, an argument which the court finds to be without merit. As an initial matter, a subjective symptoms must evidence. 20 C.F.R. §416.929(c)i 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). be claimant's supported complaints by and other objective medical Hartranft v. Apfel, However, an ALJ may 181 F.3d reject the claimant's subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 1999) . Here, Schaudeck 433 (3d Cir. the ALJ properly analyzed plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, and he explained why he found her testimony not entirely credible. In evaluating plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ complied with the appropriate regulations and considered all of the relevant evidence in plaintiff's the record, activities of including daily the living, medical the evidence, extent of her treatment, plaintiff's own statements about her symptoms and the opinions of physicians who treated and examined her. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 7 See 20 C.F.R. §§416.929(c) (l)-(c) (3) ALJ then considered the i Social Security Ruling 96-7p. extent to which plaintiff's The alleged functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect her ability to work. that the 20 C.F.R. obj ective The ALJ determined §416.929(c) (4). evidence is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegation of total disability, and further found that plaintiff's testimony regarding her pain and resulting limitations was not entirely credible. (R. This 21). court finds that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination, (R. 21-24), and is satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not properly account for her moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence and pace. To the contrary, the ALJ accounted for her difficulties in those areas by limiting her to working in a low stress environment that involves few changes in work processes and no fast-paced or quota production standards. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a restriction to simple, routine tasks sufficiently accounted for a claimant's moderate limitation in concentration, persistence and pace, thus the ALJ's more detailed restriction here adequately accommodates plaintiff's moderate limitation in those areas. McDonald v. Astrue, also Menkes v. 293 Fed. Appx. Astrue, 262 Fed. 941, Appx. 946 410, See (3d Cir. 2008) i 412 2008) (3d Cir. see (restriction to simple, routine tasks accounted for the claimant's ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 8 moderate limitation in concentration In addition to adequately limitation with concentration l l persistence and pace) . accounting for plaintiff/s persistence and pace l the ALJ/s hypothetical question otherwise incorporated all of her functional limitations that the evidence of record supported of the factors that were the basis of Chrupcala v. Heckler hypothetical to a l l including all the RFC Finding. 829 F.2d 1269 1 1276 (3d Cir. 1987) (an ALJ/s vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant/s impairments and limitations supported by the medical evidence) . vocational Accordingly expert s 1 1 the ALJ did not err in relying on the testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform work that exists in the national economy. In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ALJ/s findings and conclusions are supported evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. by substantial Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. / Gustave Diamond United States District Judge ~A072 (Rev.8/82) - 9 The cc: David M. Axinn, Esq. P.O. Box 597 Hollidaysburg, PA 16648 John J. Valkovci, Jr. Assistant U.S. Attorney 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901 ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 10
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