STUFFT v. ASTRUE, No. 3:2010cv00190 - Document 19 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 15 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 17 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 6/27/11. (kw)
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STUFFT v. ASTRUE Doc. 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SUSAN C. STUFFT, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-190J MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this of the parties' ~y of June, 2011, upon due consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title II and Title XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment hereby is, (Document No. 17) be, and the same granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 15) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factf inder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may reject reasons for doing so. Cir. '<loA072 1999) . substantial any evidence or discount the ALJ explains if Plummer v. Apfel, the 429 ( 3d 186 F.3d 422, Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those (Rev 8/&2) Dockets.Justia.com findings, even differently. 2001). if it would have Fargnoli v. Moreover, decided Massanari, disability is not the factual 247 F.3d 34, 38 inquiry (3d Cir. determined merely by the presence of impairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her DIB and SSI applications on November 6, 2006, alleging disability beginning October I, overactive bladder, cholesterol, sclerosis and leg problems. At plaintiff's request, 2007. that On December 20, plaintiff is not thyroid 2004, problems, due to an multiple Plaintiff's applications were denied. an ALJ held a hearing on November 14, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision finding disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on March 22, 2010, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 62 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision and is classified as a person of advanced age under the regulations. 416.963(e). 20 C.F.R. §§404 .1563 (e), Although plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an office clerk, data entry clerk, telephone operator and cashier, she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since her alleged onset date of disability. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that meaning of the Act. plaintiff is not disabled within the Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of urinary incontinence and degenerative disc disease, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 111) . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a additional stooping, range limitations. kneeling, of light Plaintiff crouching, is work with a limited crawling and to number of occasional climbing. In addition, plaintiff requires work that allows her brief access to a restroom every 45 to 60 minutes during the workday, and that can be performed while Further, plaintiff wearing is an limited incontinence to occasional protection pad. interaction with supervisors, co-workers and the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . Based concluded upon that the vocational plaintiff's expert's vocational testimony, factors and the ALJ residual functional capacity enable her to perform her past work as an office clerk.l Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not lEven though the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled at step 4 of the sequential evaluation process, she noted in her decision that the vocational expert testified plaintiff's vocational factors and residual functional capacity also would (continued ... ) ""A072 (Rev, 8/82) - 3 disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines ftdisability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 1382c(a) (3) (A). twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A) I The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant ftis not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot I considering [her] agel education and work experience I engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A) I 1382c(a) (3) (B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (I) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not whether she has a severe impairment; l (3) if SOl whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix Ii (4) if not l whether the claimant/s impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if SOl whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy I residual in light of her age functional education I capacity. 20 l work experience and C.F.R. §§404.1520(a) (4), enable her to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy such as a mail sorter marker or file clerk. (R. 20). Therefore even if the ALJ had proceeded to consider this case at step 51 she still would have found plaintiff not disabled. I l I ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 4 416.920(a) (4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. In this case, Id. plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at steps 2, 3 and 4 of the sequential evaluation process. argues at step 2 that Plaintiff the ALJ erred in failing to find that certain of her claimed impairments are "severe. II At step 3, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that her severe impairments do not meet or equal any listing in Appendix 1. Further, plaintiff claims the ALJ's step 4 finding that she retains the residual functional capacity to perform work her past relevant work as an office clerk is not supported by substantial evidence. The court finds that these arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding that her hypothyroidism, cholesterol, multiple sclerosis and leg problems are not severe impairments. The "severity regulation" applied at step 2 requires that the claimant have a severe impairment, or combination of impairments, which significantly limits physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. 2 C.F.R. §§404.1520(c), 416.920(c). her 20 The Social Security Regulations and Rulings, as well as case law applying them, discuss the step 2Basic work activities include: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgmenti (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co workers and usual work situationsi and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1521(b) (1)-(6); 416.921(b) (1) (6). ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 5 2 severity determination in terms of what is "not severe." v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2003) (citing Smolen v. 1996)) . severe Chater, 80 347 F.3d 541, F.3d 1273, According to the Regulations, if it does not significantly 546 1290 (3d Cir. (9th Cir. an impairment limit [the Newell "is not claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§404.1521(a), 416.921(a). Although the principles discussed above indicate that the burden on an applicant at step 2 is not an exacting one, plaintiff nonetheless bears the burden to prove that her claimed impairments are severe. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(c), Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987) 416.912(c); Bowen v. (stating that the claimant bears the burden of proof at step 2 of the sequential evaluation process). Plaintiff has not met that burden in this case, as she has not proffered evidence to establish that her hypothyroidism, cholesterol, multiple sclerosis and leg problems present more than a minimal impact on her ability to perform basic work activities. In particular, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, and none of her treating physicians identified any functional limitations as a result of Accordingly, hypothyroidism, cholesterol or leg problems. the court finds the ALJ did not err in making her step 2 finding. Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ's findings at step 3 of the sequential evaluation process. At step 3, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the listed ~A072 (Rev 8/82) 6 impairments. Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). describe impairments that prevent an adult, work experience, The listings regardless of age, education or activity. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1525(a), 416.925(a) 204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000). from Security performing i any gainful Knepp v. Apfel, \lIf the impairment is equivalent to a listed impairment, then [the claimant] is per se disabled and no further analysis is necessary." It is the ALJ's burden to Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. identify the relevant listed impairment in the regulations that compares with the claimant's impairment. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2. claimant's burden to present impairment matches or is Williams v. Sullivan, medical findings equivalent to a 970 F.2d 1178, However, 1186 it that the show her listed impairment. (3d Cir. 1992). In determining whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, decision. the ALJ must set forth the reasons for her Burnett, 220 F.2d at 119. According to plaintiff, the ALJ erred in failing to find that she meets or impairments) equals or 6.00 a listing under 1.00 (musculoskeletal (genitourinary impairments). Contrary to plaintiff's position, a review of the record establishes that the ALJ employed the appropriate analysis in arriving at her step 3 finding. found that The ALJ analyzed the medical evidence of record and plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments urinary incontinence and degenerative disc disease. of However, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments, even when considered ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 7 in combination, do not meet or equal any listed impairment. The ALJ's decision indicates that she considered listings under 1.00 and 6.00, but she found that plaintiff's conditions do not satisfy all the criteria of any listing. (R. 14). The ALJ then discussed and analyzed the medical evidence and explained that it failed to establish plaintiff's impairments meet or equal any listing. (R. 16-19) . The ALJ satisfied her burden; however, plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of showing that her impairments meet, or are equal to, a listing. or equals a demonstrate argument. Other than broadly asserting that she meets listing that under the 1.00 evidence or of 6.00, record plaintiff did not substantiates her Furthermore, the court notes that no medical source of record found that plaintiff's impairments meet or equal a listing. For these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence. The court likewise finds that the ALJ's step 4 finding is supported by substantial evidence. At step 4, the issue is whether plaintiff's residual functional capacity permits her to perform her 416.920 (f). past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(f), Residual functional capacity is def ined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. Fargnoli, functional 20 C.F.R. 247 F. 3d at 40. capacity, the §§404.1545{a) (I), 416.945(a) (1) i In assessing a claimant's residual ALJ is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other 'IllhAon (Rev. 8/82) 8 ---------------- requirements of work. -- ----------- 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (4), 416.945(a) (4). Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 4 because she incorrectly assessed plaintiff's residual functional capacity and also posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert that did not account for all of plaintiff's limitations. These arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first contends that supported by substantial evidence. plaintif f' s residual functional detail the medical evidence of activities of daily living, impairments. (R. 15 19). the RFC Finding is not To the contrary, in assessing capacity, record, the ALJ analyzed in along with plaintiff's and her own statements about her The ALJ then made an RFC Finding which fully accommodates plaintiff's limitations that are supported by the evidence. The RFC Finding limits plaintiff to light work and restricts her to occasional postural maneuvers to account for the effects of her degenerative disc disease, as well as a restriction to work that can be performed wearing an incontinence protection pad and a restroom requirement every incontinence. this court 45 that to 60 (R. 20). she be allowed brief access minutes to accommodate her to a urinary After reviewing the record as a whole, is satisfied that the RFC Finding is supported by substantial evidence, and plaintiff's argument to the contrary lacks merit. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not account for all of the limitations caused by her impairments. <!IloAOn (Rev 8(82) - 9 An ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the medical evidence. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, hypothetical 1276 incorporated (3d Cir. all of 1987). Chrupcala v. Here, plaintiff's the ALJ' s functional limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all of the factors Accordingly, that were the basis of the RFC Finding.) the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform her past work as an office clerk, as well as other work that exists in the national economy. After carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) 3Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, there was no basis for the ALJ to include in the hypothetical question any limitations related to her claimed left ankle and leg pain or her esophageal impairment. After undergoing an esophageal dilation, plaintiff's physician, Dr. Bilofsky, reported that she was doing well and subsequent physical examinations were unremarkable. (R. 310, 312) . Significantly, Dr. Bilofsky did not identify any limitations related to plaintiff's claimed esophageal impairment. Likewise, plaintiff's claimed left ankle and leg problem did not cause any limitations that warranted inclusion in the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert. X-rays of plaintiff's ankle did not demonstrate any fracture or dislocation, and there were no soft tissue abnormalities. (R. 324). Moreover, no treating physician assessed any functional limitations as a result of any left leg or ankle pain that plaintiff experienced. - 10 otherwise erroneous. Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~~ / Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq. 630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard Suite B Altoona, PA 16602 Stephanie L. Haines Assistant U.S. Attorney 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901 'Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 11
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