GLASS v. ASTRUE, No. 3:2010cv00073 - Document 23 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 20 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/23/11. (gpr)
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GLASS v. ASTRUE Doc. 23 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA KATHLEEN GLASS, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 10-73J v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE I COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ) ) I ) ) Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this of the parties I 2.i Marchi 2011 1 upon due consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff/s request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Security Social ("Commissioner ll ) plaintiff/s denying applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security' income under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 20) be, and the same hereby iS I granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 16) be, and the same hereby iS I denied. As factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an . to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and or discount may reject any evidence if , reasons for doing so. Cir. Plummer v. AQfel, : . ImportantlYI the ALJ explains the 429 (3d 186 F.3d 4221 where the ALJ's findings of fact are (Rev, 8/82) supported ,by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by Dockets.Justia.com those findings, even if it would have decided the factual inquiry differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ IS decis'ion here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ I s findings and conclusions. Pla'l;ntiff protectively filed her pending applications for disability benefits and supplemental security income on April 30, 2002, alleging a disability onset date of January 21, 2002, due to a variety including anxiety, of mental physical impairments, depression and back problems. 1 Plaintiff's applicat10ns were denied initially. and Following a hearing held on May 5, 2003, an ALJ issued a decision on March 4, 2004, finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review and plaintiff appealed to this court. 29, 2006, By decision dated August this court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further .administrative proceedings due to the ALJ's failure to specify whether plaintiff's impairments in combination meet or . equal a impairment. 'b..AOn (Rev, 8/82) 1 The record shows that after the ALJ's original denial of the pendlng applications on March 4, 2004, plaintiff filed new applications for benefits on June 28, 2004, alleging an onset date of March 5, 2004.' In a decision dated December 29, 2005, an ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and plaintiff did not seek review of that decision. The ALJ found no basis to reopen the finding that plaintiff is not disabled for the period beginning March 5, 2004. Accordingly, the relevant time period at issue in this case is from plaintiff's alleged onset date of January 21, 2002, through March 4,2004. (R.373). - 2 - On remand, a new hearing was held before the ALJ on May 11, 2007, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. On August 28, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. Plaintiff did not file to that decision and, on January 13, 2010, the Appeals Council issued a notice stating that the ALJ's decision was the ., final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff was 50-52 years old during the relevant time period at issue in this approacqing case and is advanced age classified as under §§404 .1563 (d) and 416.963 (d). the work experience personal care aid, person closely regulations. 20 C.F.R. She has a high school education and one year of education at the collegiate level. relevant a as a cashier, Plaintiff has past donut decorator and but she has not engaged in any substantial gainful 'activity since her alleged onset date. After testimony reviewing from plaintiff's plaintiff and medical a records vocational and expert, hearing the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes that plaintiff suffers including obesitYI dysthymic disorder, from right a number lumbar attention of severe impairments 1 radiculopathy and neuropathYI deficit/hyperactivity disorder, borderline intellectual functioning and developmental arithmetic disorders 1 those impairments 1 alone or in combination l do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404 1 Subpart P. OI\t.AOn (Rev, 8/82) - 3 - (R. 374-76). The. ALJ also found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform work at the light exertional level but with no more than simple, occasional mathematical calculations, no more than simple, repetitive, routine, low stress tasks, no interaction with the public and no more than occasional interaction with co-workers. identified numerous categories perform her based upon age, (R. of A vocational expert 475). jobs which plaintiff education, work could experience and residual functional capacity, including chemical fertilizer mixer, dryer operator, embossing machine operator and hole puncher. . Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that while plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, capable of making an adjustment to work significant numbers in the national economy. which she is exists in Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled. The Act defines IIdisabilityll as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve 1382c (a) (3) (A) . months. 42 U.S.C. §§423(d) (1) (A) and The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant lIis not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any pther kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy " 42 U.S.C. 1382c (aY (3) (B) . (Rev. 8/82) 4 - §§423 (d) (I) (B) and The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five step sequential evaluation process 2 for determining whether a claimant is under a disability. 20 C. F . R . § § 4 04 . 1520 and 416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). disabled at any step, If the claimant is found disabled or not the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, findings: plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ's (1) the ALJ erred at step 3 by finding that plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet the criteria of any of the listed impairments; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidencei (3) the ALJ improperly assessed plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Upon review, the court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence and that all of the ALJ's findings,are supported by substantial evidence . .. First, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence. At step 3, the ALJ must 2 The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairmenti (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404., Subpart P, Appendix 1 i (4) if not, whether the claimant I s impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920. In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a. 'Ilt.AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 5 - determine whether equivalent to, the one of claimant's the impairment listed matches, is Burnett impairments. or v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). The listings describe impairments that prevent an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity. (3d Cir .. 2000) impairment is claimant] necessary. is 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). equivalent per se to a disabled listed and no impairment further "If the then analysis [the is Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. II Here, j Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 as required, impairments that the ALJ identified the relevant listed compare with plaintiff's mental impairments (Listings 12.04 and 12.06) and physical impairments adequately explained why plaintiff's impairments, (1.03) and alone or in combination do not meet or equal the severity of those listed impairments. (R. 374-76) ; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n.2. In particular, as to plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ found that plaintiff failed to meet either the "B" or the "C" criteria of Listing 12.04 and 12.06, explaining that the state agency medical consultants who had reviewed the medical evidence had .'. reached the same conclusion and further noting that no treating or examining source had found that plaintiff meets the requisite criteria. when the (Id.). As the required level of severity is met only requirements in both A and B of the listings are satisfied, or when the "C" criteria of those listings are met, the ALJ correctly concluded that plaintiff does not meet any of those 'Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 6 - listings. The ALJ likewise considered the medical evidence relating to plaintiff's physical impairments in concluding that plaintiff does not meet or equal any of the listings in 1.00 for musculoskeletal system disorders or in 11.00 for neurological disorders and the record likewise is clear that plaintiff's physical impairments do not meet the criteria of any listing. Moreover, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of presenting any medical findings to either the ALJ or to this court showing that any of her impairments, physical or mental, alone or in combination, meet or equal Listings 1.03, 12.04, 12.06, or any other listed impairment.) Sullivan, medical 970 F.2d 1178, evidence of 1186 record (3d Cir. does not plaintiff meets or equals any listing. See Williams v. 1992). support In fact, a finding the that The court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 analysis conforms with this court's remand order and is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's remaining arguments relate to the ALJ's finding of not disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process. At that step, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing in 'IlhA072 (Rev. 8/82) numbers in the national economy which the claimant ) Plaintiff also argues before this court that her impairments meet or equal Listing 12.05 for mental retardation. This argument is frivolous. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff is dependent on others for personal needs or is unable to follow directions as required under 12.05 (A). Moreover, 'the B, C, and D criteria all require IQ scores of 70 or below and plaintiff's IQ scores as set forth in the record are 81 verbal, 76 full-scale and 74 performance. Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of the criteria of Listing 12.05. - 7 - can perform consistent with her medical impairments/ age/ education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C . F . R. § § 404 . 1520 (f ) and 416. 920 ( f) . Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. §§404.1545(a) and 416.945(a) Here, the ALJ found functional capacity to i 20 C.F.R. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40. that plaintiff retains perform work light the residual with restrictions accommodating her mental impairments. Although plaintiff disputes this finding, numerous (R. 380). it is clear from the record that the ALJ adequately considered all of the relevant medical evidence, as well as plaintiff's reported activities, in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and that he incorporated into his finding all of the limitations that reasonably could be supported by the medical and other relevant evidence. (R. 374-78). In addition, the ALJ specifically noted in his decision that he considered all of plaintiff's impairments in combination and his residual demonstrates that he did just that. functional capacity finding The court is satisfied that the ALJ took into consideration all of the medically supportable limitations arising from all of plaintiff's impairments, severe and not severe, in combination, and that the both ALJ's assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence in assessing plaintiff's residual In particular, she alleges that the ALJ erred in not 'Aon (Rev. 8182) functional - 8 - giving appropriate weight the opinion of Dr. SheedYI her primary care physician, who reported in a number public welfare assistance forms that plaintiff was disabled due to depression. 301) . (R. 292- The court finds no error in the ALJ/s evaluation of the medical evidence. 4 The ALJ expressly addressed in his decision Dr. Sheedy s I opinion and sufficiently explained why he gave that opinion little weight. (R. 378). In particular l the ALJ noted that Dr. Sheedy is not a psychiatrist or specialist in mental health disorders; that plaintiff/s only treatment was an anti-depressant medication and that Dr. treatment i Sheedy reported that she responded well to that that Dr. Sheedyl s opinion is not supported by any specific objective findings and do not contain any functional restrictions; and that plaintiff never was referred to mental health counseling by Dr. Sheedy and, in facti stopped formal (Id. ) . counseling when she began treating with him. The ALJI s assessment of Dr. Sheedy s report is well-supported I by the evidence in the record. First l the opinion of a physician l Under the Social Security Regulations and the law of this circuit l opinions of treating physicians are entitled to substantial and at times even controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) (2) and 416.927(d) (2) i Fargnoli 247 F.3d at 33. Where a treating physician/s opinion on the nature and severity of an impairment is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record l it will be given controlling weight. Id. However when a treating source IS opinion is not entitled to controlling weightl it is evaluated and weighed under the same standards applied to all other medical opinions taking into account numerous factors including the opinion's supportability consistency and specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). 4 I I I I I I 'A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 9 - treating or otherwise, on the issue of what an individual's residual functional capacity is or on the ultimate determination of disability never is entitled to special significance. C.F.R. §404.1527(e) i 20 SSR 96-5p. In addition, Dr. Sheedy rendered his opinions of disability on state welfare employability forms. However, the Commissioner is to make disability determinations based on social security law and therefore an opinion from a treating source that an individual is disabled based on state welfare rules is not binding on the issue of disability under different social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1504. The ALJ thoroughly and exhaustively addressed the relevant medical evidence in his decision and adequately explained his reasons for the weight he accorded to all of the medical reports and opinions, including those from Dr. Sheedy. The court has reviewed the ALJ's decision and the record as a whole and is convinced that the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. The court also finds no error in the ALJ's failure to incorporate any additional limitations in his residual functional capacity findings for lifting, standing and walking. However, the ALJ rejected any additional limitations as inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record and supported only by plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, which the ALJ found to be only partially credible. (R. 377; 379). (Rev. 8/82) - 10 - The court plaintiff's satisfied subjective accordance with 416. 929!l:>i is see the that complaints regulations. also SSR the of ALJ pain 20 96-7p. properly evaluated and C.F.R. In limitations in §§404.1529!l:> and assessing plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ considered plaintiff's subjective complaints, but also considered those complaints evidence, plaintiff's evidence of record, in light of treatment history and all the medical of the other and concluded that plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain and limitations were inconsistent with the totality of the evidence. (R. 377). This finding is supported by substantial evidence. After carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. substantial The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. Gustave Diamond united States District Judge (Rev. 8/82) - 11 - cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq. 630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard Suite B Altoona, PA 16602 John J. Valkovci, Jr. Assistant u.S. Attorney 200 Penn Traffic Building 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901 'A072 (Rev, 8/82) - 12 -
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