GORZELSKY v. ASTRUE, No. 3:2009cv00120 - Document 15 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/27/10. (gpr)
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GORZELSKY v. ASTRUE Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA THOMAS GORZELSKY, Plaintiff l ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 09-120J v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ) ) I ) Defendant. ) ) MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW I this ;< Zf'Lctay of September, 2010, upon due consideration of the parties l cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social ("Commissioner Security ll denying ) plaintiff/s applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II respectivelYI of the Social Security Act ("Act") I and XVI, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissionerls motion for summary judgment (Document No. 12) bel and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 10) bel and the same hereby iS I denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge (IIALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999) . Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by <l!t.Aon (Rev 8/82) substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those Dockets.Justia.com findings, even differently. 2001). if it would have Fargnoli v. decided Massanari, the factual 247 F.3d 34, 38 inquiry (3d Cir. These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ I substantial S decision here because the record contains evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff protectively filed his pending applications 1 for benefits on December I, 2005, alleging a disability onset date of June 30, 2003, due to a knee impairment and several mental impairments including depression, anxiety and attention deficit disorder. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially. At plaintiff's request an ALJ held a hearing on April 10, 2007, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. On June 29, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. review making On February 27, 2009, the Appeals Council denied the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed prior applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on March 25, 2004, alleging an onset date of January I, 2003, which were denied in an ALJ's decision dated August 26, 2005. The Appeals Council later denied a request for review of that decision and plaintiff appealed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. By decision dated February 20, 2007, the Honorable Kim R. Gibson affirmed the decision of the Commissioner and plaintiff sought no further review. Accordingly, the finding of not disabled for the time period prior to August 26, 2005, is final and binding. 20 C.F.R. §404.987(a) and 416.1487 (a) . The relevant time frame for plaintiff's pending applications therefore is August 27, 2005, thru the date of the ALJ's decision, and plaintiff was required to show that he became disabled during that relevant time period. 1 'll>.AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 2 - Plaintiff was 44 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision and is classified as a younger person under the regulations. C. F. R. §§404 .1563 (c) school education. 20 He has at least a high and §416. 963 (c) . Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a clerical teller/data entry clerk, salesperson and technician/ business machine repairer, but he has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period at issue. After testimony reviewing from plaintiff's plaintiff and a medical records vocational and expert, hearing the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of a history of left knee depressive injury, status disorder, post-arthroscopic anxiety, an adjustment surgery, disorder major and an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P. The ALJ also found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity for work at the light exertional level but with certain restrictions recognizing the limiting effects of his impairments. effects, (R. 20). Taking into account those limiting a vocational expert identified numerous categories of jobs which plaintiff can perform based upon his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, including small (Rev, 8/82) - 3 - parts assembler, racker (bakery) and bagger (dry cleaner). Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that, although plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work, he is capable of making an adjustment to work signif icant numbers in the national economy. which exists in Accordingly I the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 1382c(a) (3) (A). twelve 42 months. U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A) and The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy " 42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A) and 1382c (a) (3) (B) . The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a (Rev 8/82) claimant is under a disability.;: 20 C. F . R. § § 4 04 . 152 0 and ; : The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents - 4 - 416.920. If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, findings: plaintiff raises three challenges to the ALJ's (1) the ALJ improperly analyzed the medical evidence by failing to give appropriate weight to opinions from plaintiff's treating sources; (2) the ALJ failed to consider the impact of all of plaintiff's medical conditions, severe and not severe, in combination in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, in particular a sleep disturbance condition and osteoarthritis; and, (3) the ALJ failed plaintiff's medications. to account for the side effects of Upon a review of the record, the court finds that all of the ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's first argument is that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence by erroneously failing to give controlling weight to certain opinions of his treating sources. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not adopting the "functional capacity conclusion" of Dr. Millward of the treatment team at Nulton Diagnostic and Treatment Center, who concluded on a medical assessment form that plaintiff had no ability to perform a significant number of work-related activities due to his mental impairments. (R. 216). a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a. (Rev. 8/82) - 5 - Plaintiff corroborated also argues by Dr. that Palmer, Dr. who Millward's performed assessment a is psychological examination of plaintiff and concluded that he "possessed serious questions regarding [plaintiff's] capacity to accurately process, retain, and implement directives, to sustain attention to tasks, to relate appropriately to others, and to tolerate stressors in (R. 207). the environment." court is satisfied that Upon a review of the record, the ALJ's evaluation of the the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. Under the Social Security Regulations and the law of this circuit, opinions of treating physicians are entitled substantial, and at times even controlling, weight. to 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) (2) and 416.927(d); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 33. Where a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of an impairment is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not other substantial evidence controlling weight. Id. in the record, inconsistent with it will be given When a treating source's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it is evaluated and weighed under the same standards applied to all other medical opinions, taking into account supportability, numerous factors consistency and including the specialization. opinion's 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). Here, the ALJ adhered to the foregoing standards in evaluating the medical evidence and the court finds no error in the ALJ's conclusions. The ALJ expressly addressed the opinions (Rev. 8/82) - 6 - from both Dr. Millward and Dr. Palmer and explained why he did not give those opinions significant weight. (R. 23-24), In particular, the ALJ noted that Dr. Millward's assessment is: (1) not supported by his own treatment notes, which "contain very little in the way of obj ective findings;" (2) is inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record, including the opinions of Dr. Turko and Dr, Haslett; (3) is not supported by plaintiff's conservative course of treatment for his mental impairments; and, (4) is inconsistent activities, with plaintiff's wide range of daily which include being the primary care-giver for his disabled wife and four children, two of whom also are disabled. (R. 23-24) ,3 Likewise, the ALJ adequately explained his rationale for giving little weight to Dr. Palmer's conclusions are Palmer's opinion, noting that Dr. inconsistent with his own objective findings, which included a finding that plaintiff is only mildly impaired in concentration and processing skills, and also inconsistent with the findings and opinions of Dr. Haslett and Dr. Turko as well as with plaintiff's activities of daily living. (R. 24) . The record clearly supports foregoing medical evidence. evaluation of the First, the opinion of a physician, The court notes that Dr. Millward's assessment is dated August 3, 2005, which is outside the relevant time period at issue in this case. In fact, Judge Gibson's opinion affirming the denial of plaintiff's original applications for benefits discusses the ALJ's evaluation of this same August 3, 2005, assessment. 3 (Rev. 8/82) the ALJ's - 7 - treating or otherwise, on the issue of what an individual's residual functional capacity is or on the ultimate determination of disability never is entitled to special significance. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(e) and 416.927{e) i SSR 96-5p. Here, based upon his review of the entire record, concluded that plaintiff's impairments, while the ALJ severe, do not result in the debilitating limitations set forth by Dr. Millward or Dr. Palmer. objective Because their opinions are not supported by the medical evidence and are inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, including their own findings, the ALJ did not err in not giving those opinions controlling, or even significant, weight. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927{d) i SSR 96 2p. To the extent plaintiff suggests that the ALJ improperly relied on the opinions of the non-examining state agency reviewing psychologist, Dr. Haslett, at the expense of her treating sources, that argument is not well-taken. Pursuant to the Regulations, state agency psychological consultants are "highly qualified ... psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation. II 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527{f) (2) (i) and 416.927(f) (2) (i). Accordingly, psychologists, while not bound by findings made by reviewing the ALJ is to consider those findings as opinion evidence, and is to evaluate them under the same standards as all other medical opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. and 416.927 (f) (2) (ii) i SSR 96-6p. '4:o.A072 (Rev 8/82) - 8 - §§404.1527(f) (2) (ii) Here, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Haslett's findings as well as Dr. Millward's and Dr. Palmer's and found that Dr. Haslett's were enti tIed to greater weight as being more consistent with the objective medical findings and with the overall record as a whole. The ALJ adequately explained his reasons for doing so and set forth the finding. evaluation objective (R. of evidence which he believed supported his 22). Dr. The court Haslett's is satisfied report also that is the ALJ's supported by substantial evidence. 4 In sum, the ALJ did a thorough job in his decision in setting forth the relevant medical evidence and explaining why he rejected or discounted any evidence. (R. 20-25). The court has reviewed the ALJ's decision and the record as a whole and is convinced that the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's second argument is that the ALJ failed to consider the impact of all of plaintiff's medical conditions, severe and not severe, in combination in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Specifically, he contends that the ALJ failed to consider plaintiff's sleep disorder/insomnia and osteoarthritis. Plaintiff's argument is belied by the record. 4 To the extent plaintiff argues that Dr. Haslett "failed to evaluate plaintiff regarding all of his severe impairments," and specifically, failed to consider attention deficit disorder in her evaluation of plaintiff, the record establishes that Dr. Haslett in fact considered all of plaintiff's mental impairments, and she expressly stated that plaintiff reported that he is treated for "Depression , ADHD and Anxiety. (R. 161). II (Rev. 8/82) - 9 - Initially, the ALJ specifically noted in his decision that he considered all of plaintiff's impairments in combination and his residual limitations functional arising capacity from all finding, of demonstrates that he did just that. court is satisfied that in which plaintiff's (R. 20-25). assessing incorporates impairments, Upon review, the plaintiff's residual functional capacity the ALJ took into consideration all of the medically supportable limitations arising from all of plaintiff's impairments, both severe and not severe, in combination, and that the ALJ's assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, considered the record plaintiff's shows allegations plaintiff had reported to Dr. trouble sleeping. (R. 22). that of the ALJ insomnia, specifically noting that Haslett that he had been having However, the record contains no evidence that plaintiff was ever diagnosed with a sleep disorder, or that any medical source recommended further evaluation for his sleeping difficulties, such as a sleep study. To the contrary, Dr. Koban simply discussed with plaintiff proper sleep techniques to improve his sleep. (R.213). Finally, even if plaintiff's insomnia could be construed to be an "impairment," it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the presence of an impairment, but by the effect that an impairment has upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d Here, plaintiff has failed to allege, either to the Commissioner or to this court, (Rev. 8/82) - 10 - a single limitation arising from a sleep disorder which would impair his ability to perform substantial gainful activity. As to plaintiff t s allegation that the ALJ failed to consider the effects of osteoarthritis t plaintiff failed to mention that condition as a basis for administrative proceeding. disability during the entire Under the regulations t the ALJ is to consider only the impairments a plaintiff alleges to have or about 20 C.F.R. which the ALJ receives evidence. §§ 404.1S12(a) and 416.912 (a) . Here t plaintiff did not allege osteoarthritis as a disabling impairment at the administrative level t nor was he ever definitively diagnosed with osteoarthritis by any treating source. Al though Dr. Massoud osteoarthritis, diagnostic (R. suggested 172), evidence the that plaintiff record that plaintiff contains in fact may have no suffers some objective from that impairment t and t even more significantlYt the record is bereft of any evidence that plaintiff has any functional limitations arising from any arthritic condition. AccordinglYt the court finds no error in the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff's remaining argument consider weight the gain, side effects of is that the ALJ failed to plaintiff's dizziness/shakiness and fatigue, plaintiff's residual functional capacity. contention simply is not supported by medications, in namely assessing However, plaintiff's the record. specifically noted in his decision that plaintiff's The ALJ treatment notes from Dr. Millward "show no significant adverse side effects (Rev. 8/82) - 11 - to [plaintiff's] impairments. n use of multiple medications for his mental (R. 23). Moreover, the record shows that at an appointment for a medications check on January 9, 2007, plaintiff reported that he was tolerating his medication regimen "well" and experiencing any side effects from medications. he (R. denied 238). In assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity the ALJ found no side effects of medications resul ting in any serious functional limitations. Substantial evidence in the record supports this determination. 2002) (ALJ' s supported See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 112, 131 (3d Cir. decision to discount by substantial allegations evidence where of record side effects contained no medical evidence as to any serious functional limitations arising from any side effects) . After carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. . GUStaVE; Diamond United States District Judge (Rev. 8/82) - 12 - cc: John D. Gibson, Esq. 131 Market Street Suite 200 Johnstown, PA 15901 John J. Valkovci, Jr. Assistant U.S. Attorney 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901 "AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 13 -
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