BELL v. COLVIN, No. 2:2014cv00959 - Document 15 (W.D. Pa. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION granting 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case is remanded to the Acting Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the court's Opinion. See Opinion for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/14/15. (kw)
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BELL v. COLVIN Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYL VANIA JOSEPH PAUL BELL, Plaintiff, v. ) ) ) ) ) ) CAROLYNW. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. Civil Action No. 14-959 ) ) ) ) ) OPINION AND NOW, this ~fSeptember, 2015, upon consideration of the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff s request for review of the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Document No.1 0) be, and the same hereby is granted, and the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, denied. The case will be remanded to the Acting Commissioner pursuant to sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. When the Acting Commissioner determines that a claimant is not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act, the findings leading to such a conclusion must be based upon substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence has been defined as 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. ", Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 'l\laA072 (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com Despite the deference to administrative decisions required by this standard, reviewing courts "'retain a responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the [Acting Commissioner's] decision is not supported by substantial evidence.'" Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310,317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)). In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports an ALl's findings, '" leniency [should] be shown in establishing the claimant's disability, and ... the [Acting Commissioner's] responsibility to rebut it [should] be strictly construed .... m Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376,379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403,407 (3d Cir. 1979)). These well-established principles dictate that the court remand this case to the Acting Commissioner for further proceedings as explained herein. Plaintifffiled his DIB application on January 22,2012, alleging disability beginning on July 20, 2011, due to a heart condition, fatigue, obesity and joint pain. Plaintiffs application was denied. At plaintiffs request, an ALJ held a hearing on March 29,2013, at which plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. On April 5, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiffis not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on June 6, 2014, making the ALl's decision the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 44 years old on his alleged onset date, which is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F .R. §404.1563(c). Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an air conditioning repairman, maintenance supervisor and maintenance worker, but he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since his alleged onset date. ""'Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 2 After reviewing plaintiffs medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of non-sustained ventricular tachycardia, mild restrictive respiratory defect, obesity and syncope, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1"). The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, but he is precluded from bending at the waist to the extremes of the range of motion. In addition, plaintiff is restricted from climbing or working at exposed heights. Finally, he is unable to operate a motor vehicle or other dangerous machinery (collectively, the "RFC Finding"). The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work because it exceeds his residual functional capacity. However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as an information clerk, ticket counter, document preparer or telephone quote clerk. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.c. §423(d)(l)(A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind ofsubstantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.c. §423(d)(2)(A). ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 The Social Security Regulations delineate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must assess: (I) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.1 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ' s decision is not supported by substantial evidence for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of plaintiff s treating physician and the consultative examining physician; (2) as a result, the RFC Finding does not adequately account for all ofpiaintiffs limitations; (3) the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiffs credibility; and (4) the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert was incomplete. The court finds no merit to plaintiff's contentions concerning the ALJ's consideration of plaintiff's treating physician's opinion2 or evaluation of his credibility.3 However, we conclude that the ALJ lResidual functional capacity is that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by his impainnents. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(1). In assessing one's residual functional capacity, the AU must consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(4). 2Plaintiff argues that the AU did not properly consider the opinion of his treating cardiologist, Dr. Dean Wolz, that he needs to lie down for three hours during the work day. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). Under this standard, the AU properly detennined that Dr. Wolz's opinion was entitled to little weight because, as the AU explained, it was inconsistent with plaintiffs benign cardiac workup and his pulmonary function testing which showed only a mild restrictive defect. (R.23). 3The AU evaluated plaintiffs credibility consistent with the Regulation by considering plaintiffs own statements about his symptoms and limitations, his activities of daily living, the medical evidence of record, the extent of plaintiffs treatment and the opinions of physicians who treated and examined him. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c)(l) and (c)(3); Social Security Ruling 96-7p. The AU then considered the ~A072 (Rev, 8/82) - 4 did not explain why he gave the consultative examiner's opinion great weight yet failed to incorporate part of his assessment into the RFC Finding, which also could impact the accuracy of the hypothetical question that was posed to the vocational expert. Accordingly, for reasons which we explain below, the case must be remanded to the Acting Commissioner for additional consideration at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process. In making the RFC Finding, the ALJ relied on the opinion of consultative examining physician Dr. Mohamed Abul-Ela, which the ALJ gave great weight. (R.23). As part ofDr. Abul Ela's opinion, he assessed plaintiffs ability to perform various postural activities and found that plaintiff could never bend, kneel, stoop or crouch. (R. 376). Despite giving Dr. Abul-Ela' s opinion great weight, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC Finding a limitation precluding him from kneeling, stooping and crouching. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the source's opinion as a whole 'significant' weight." Wilkinson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254,256 (3d Cir. 2014). Although an ALJ is not bound to accept all aspects of an opinion he gives significant weight, he nevertheless must provide some explanation for discounting certain evidence. See Burnett v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence when making an extent to which plaintiff's alleged functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1S29(c)(4). The ALJ concluded that the objective evidence is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegation of total disabling limitations, and thus determined that plaintiff's testimony regarding his limitations was not entirely credible. (R. 22). We find that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination, (R. 21-23), and are satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (an ALJ may reject the claimant's subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony). '<loA072 (Rev 8/82) - 5 RFC determination, "he must give some indication of the evidence which he rejects and his reason(s) for discounting such evidence."); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d at 429 ("[t]he ALl must consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects."). While the ALl certainly was not required to adopt all of the postural limitations identified by Dr. Abul~Ela, he was obligated to at least provide some explanation for his decision to do so. Absent any such explanation, this court is unable to discern whether it was appropriate for the ALl to discount plaintiffs inability to kneel, stoop and crouch as found by Dr. As a result of the ALl's failure to explain why he rejected Dr. Abul~Ela. Abul~Ela's finding that plaintiff can never kneel, stoop and crouch, despite otherwise giving his opinion great weight, the court is unable to assess whether the RFC Finding adequately accommodated all of plaintiffs limitations. Consequently, we also are unable to determine whether the ALl's hypothetical question to the vocational expert accounted for all of the his resulting functional limitations supported by the medical evidence. See Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). On remand, the ALl must revisit his findings at step 5 ofthe sequential evaluation process. In particular, the ALl must provide adequate explanation why he accepted the majority of Dr. Abul-Ela's opinion but failed to account for plaintiffs inability to kneel, stoop and crouch. Ifthe ALl is unable to explain why he rejected those findings by Dr. Abul-Ela, or ifhe indicates that he simply overlooked them, he must account for plaintiffs limitation in those areas in making the RFC Finding. In that event, the ALl must pose a hypothetical question to the vocational expert which incorporates his modifications to the RFC Finding for plaintiffs inability to perform those postural activities. ""A072 (Rev 8/82) - 6 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment will be granted, the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment will be denied, and this case will be remanded to the Acting Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. ~~~ ./ Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: Christine M. Nebel, Esq. 220 South Main Street Suite D Butler, PA 16001 Michael Colville Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Post Office & Courthouse 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 ""'A072 (Rev 8/82) 7
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