ALBRIGHT v. COLVIN, No. 2:2013cv00785 - Document 9 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 5 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 7 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/15/14. (kw)
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ALBRIGHT v. COLVIN Doc. 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SHELLEY L. ALBRIGHT, iff, v. Civil Action No. 13-785 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this /S~ay of September, 2014, upon due consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.7) be, and the same hereby is, summary judgment granted and plaintiff's motion for (Document No.5) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge (\\ALJ") has an obligation to weigh may reject or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. ~A072 1999). substantial 1 of the facts and evidence of record and any evidence the ALJ explains the 186 F.3d 422, (3d if Plummer v. Apfel, 429 Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com findings, even differently. 2001). if it would have Fargnoli v. Moreover, it is decided Massanari, well sett the 247 F.3d 34, that determined merely by the presence factual 38 inquiry (3d disability impairments, not but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d preclude a reve Cir. 1991). These Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d well established princip or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her DIB application on September 9, alleging disability beginning on June 1, disorder, borderline personality Plaintiff's application was denied. ALJ held a hearing on January 17, 2006, disorder and 2010, due to bipolar spina bi 1 At plaintiff's request, an 2012. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April 16, 2013, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 36 years old on her date last insured and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(c). Plaintiff has lPlaintiff remained insured for DIB purposes through December 31, 2009. Thus, the relevant period of review in this case is June 1, 2006, which was plaintiff's alleged onset date of disability, through December 31, 2009, which was the date she was last insured. See 20 C. F. R. §404 . 131 i , 926 F. 2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990) (a claimant is required to establish that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status) . ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 past relevant work experience as a meat wrapper, but she did not engage in substant gainful activity at any time during the relevant period. After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that meaning of the Act. that plaintiff bifida, is not disabled within the Although the medical evidence established suf obesity, plaintiff from bipolar the severe disorder, impairments personality of spina disorder and cannabis abuse, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the teria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1") . The ALJ found that during the relevant period, plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with a number of non-exertional limited to simple, with regular restrictions. Plaintiff was routine and repetitive work which was paced activity at regular intervals. In addition, plaintiff was precluded from decision making outside of fixed parameters and she could not work as part of a team. Further, she was restricted from contact with the public, she was limited to no more than occasional contact with supervisors and she required access to written instructions. Finally, plaintiff was restricted to tasks work involving discrete (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . Based upon the vocational 'l<t.Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 3 expert's testimony, the ALJ concluded that through her date last insured, plaintiff's vocational factors and residual functional capacity enabled her to perform her past relevant work as a meat wrapper. In addition, based on testimony by a vocational expert, the ALJ also found that plaintiff was capable of performing other work that significant numbers in the national economy, sorter, marker or electronic worker. sts in such as a garment Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during the relevant period. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy 42 U.S.C. §423(d) (2) (A). /I The Social Security Regulations delineate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must assess: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether whether her she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, if not, impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant s I impairment performing her past relevant worki ~A072 (Rev. 8182) 4 and (5) prevents if SOl her from whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, residual functional capacity.2 education, work experience and 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4). claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, inquiry is unnecessary. the further Id. In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding her not disabled because: opinion of one of (1) she gave inadequate weight to the plaintiff's treating physicians and to the opinion of a one time consultative examiner; (2) she gave too much weight to the opinion of a non examining state agency psychologist who reviewed plaintiff's records; and (3) she improperly considered plaintiff's ability to perform daily activities evaluating whether she was capable of working. in The court finds that each of these arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ gave inadequate weight to the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. which Functional he set forth on a Mental Residual Questionnaire dated December 30, 2011. Ronald Garbutt, (R. 670-76). Capacity On that form report, Dr. Garbutt rated plaintiff as having moderate or marked limitations in almost all areas of mental health functioning. A treating physic , s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical 2Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1). In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant I s ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4). ~A072 (Rev.8i82) 5 - and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial §404.1527(c) (2). If evidence a treating entitled to controlling weight, she deems appropriate of based record. physician's 20 opinion C.F.R. is not the ALJ will give it the weight on such factors as whether the physician treated or examined the claimant, whether the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. §§404.1527(C) (1)-(4). determined that Dr. Under these standards, 20 C.F.R. the ALJ properly Garbutt's assessment should be given some weight, but not controlling weight. As an initial matter, 25). (R. the court notes that Dr. Garbutt's assessment of plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity was issued on December 30, 2011, which post dated the relevant period in this case by two years. Although the ALJ was not obliged to consider of evidence outside the relevant period, the ALJ thoroughly evaluated Dr. Garbutt's assessment and explained that she gave it only some weight because it was contradicted by s own treatment records which reflected examinations findings that were within normal limits. 491, 494). (R. 25, 364, 374-75, 470, 481, 486, The ALJ also explained that Dr. Garbutt's restrictive assessment of plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity was contradicted by additional and treatment Psychiatric Institute Clinic observations indicating plaintiff was records that from contained fully oriented, Western clinical she had intact thought process and improved focus and concentration. ~A072 (Rev. 8182) - 6 (R. 25). After reviewing the record, the court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration and weighing of Dr. Garbutt's opinion for the reasons the ALJ explained in her decision. The court likewise finds that the ALJ properly considered the opinion issued by Dr. Sadie Strick, consultative examination of plaintiff. who performed a one-time Dr. Strick indicated on a form report that plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting. (R. 430). The court agrees with the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Strick's assessment in that regard was entitled to I Ie weight, given the absence of greatly abnormal findings on mental status examination contained in the doctor's written report. 425 28). Nevertheless, to the extent Dr. Strick (R. found 24, that plaintiff would have difficulty responding to work pressures, the ALJ accounted for that to simple, deficiency by limiting routine and repetitive work that is paced with regular activity at regular intervals, parameters as well as decision making within fixed work that involves discrete tasks, no contact with the I and only occasional contact with supervisors. publ Finally, the court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of, and reliance upon, examining records state and assessment the opinion of Dr. agency completed finding that psychologist a mental plaintiff who residual Richard Heil, a nonreviewed plaintiff's functional had no worse than moderate limitations in any area of mental health functioning. 83). (R. 382 The ALJ did not give Dr. Heills opinion controlling weight, 'Aon {Rev. 8182) capacity - 7 but she gave some weight to his conclusion that plaintiff "is able to meet the basic demands of competitive work on a sustained basis despite the limitations resulting from her impairments." (R. 26, 384) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly relied on Dr. Heil's opinion because he did not treat or examine her. Contrary to plaintiff's position, the regulations specify that state agency psychological consultants, such as Dr. Heil, "are highly qualified psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation. Therefore, administrative law judges must consider findings and other opinions of State agency medical and psychological consultants ... as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination about whether [a claimant is] disabled." 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(e) (2) (i). Consistent with the regulations, the Third Circuit has recognized that the opinions of state agency consultants merit significant consideration. Security, 667 F.3d 356 In Chandler v. Commissioner of Social (3d determined the ALJ in that agency medical consultant's Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit case properly relied on the RFC assessment in support state of his decision to deny the claimant's application for benefits, noting that the ALJ did not merely rubber stamp the medical consultant's RFC determination, but rather considered the evidence as a whole. Id. at 361-62. Likewise, here, the ALJ properly relied on, and accorded some weight to, Dr. Heil's mental RFC assessment of plaintiff. "4AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 8 As in Chandler, the ALJ did not simply rubber stamp Dr. Heil's opinion. Rather, the ALJ incorporated Dr. Heil' s opinion into the RFC Finding to an extent, but also included additional restrictions to accommodate plaintiff's mental functional limitations that were supported by the medical evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in her consideration and weighing of Dr. Heil's opinion. Plaintiff's final argument that the ALJ improperly considered her ability to perform daily activities in evaluating whether she was capable of working also is without merit. Contrary to plaintiff's position, the ALJ is permitted to consider a claimant's credibili ty activities of her §404 .1529 (c) (3) (i) claimant's of daily claimed (stating daily activities alleged impairments) . living in limitations. that the See ALJ in assessing assessing 20 will the the C.F.R. consider severity of a her In this case, although the ALJ found that plaintiff's daily activities were not indicative of a person who is totally disabled, the ALJ also concluded that plaintiff's emotional problems limited her ability to perform all but the simplest Finding. tasks, (R. Consistent 27), with which was the accounted Regulations, for the in ALJ the RFC properly considered plaintiff's activities of daily living as one factor among many in making the RFC Finding in this case. In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ALJ's findings and conclusions are ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 9 supported by The substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Therefore, the decision of the Acting Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: James R. Burn, Esq. Abes-Baumann, P.C. 810 Penn Avenue Fifth Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Colin Callahan Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Post Office & Courthouse 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 10
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