KACINKO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, No. 2:2012cv01094 - Document 15 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 11 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 13 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 8/12/13. (kw)
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KACINKO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ROBERTA JACQUELINE KACINKO, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 12-1094 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER 2~ 1 AND NOW, this ___ day of August, 2013, upon consideration of the parties' cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner disability insurance benefits income ("SS1") under Titles lt ) denying her applications for ("DIBIt) and supplemental security II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 13) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 11) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 'Ill.A072 1999). substantial any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains the 186 F.3d 422, (3d 429 Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com findings, even differently. 2001). if it would Fargnoli v. Moreover, it is have decided Massanari, well the factual 247 F.3d 34, settled determined merely by the presence of that inquiry 38 (3d Cir. disability impairments I is not but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d well established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substant evidence to support the ALJ I s findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI in May 2009, alleging disability beginning on June 5, vitamin B12 deficiency, low back pain, disorder and anxiety and panic disorder. were denied. December 16 At plaintiff's request, I 2010. On February 2006, due to asthma, depression, bipolar Plaintiff's applications an ALJ held a hearing on 18, 2011, the ALJ decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. issued a The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on June 28, 2012, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 39 years old on her alleged onset date of disability, and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. §§404 .1563 {c), 416.963 (c) . experience an emergency medical as Plaintiff has past technician, 20 C.F.R. relevant work secretary and ambulance driver, but she has not engaged in substantial gainful 'Aon (Rev, 8/82) - 2 activity at any time since her alleged onset date. After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that meaning of the Act. plaintiff is not disabled within the Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of asthma, vitamin B12 deficiency (anemia), low back pain, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder and generalized anxiety disorder/panic disorder, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C. F. R., Subpart P, Regulation No. 4 ("Appendix 1") . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform light work, but she is restricted by certain non-exertional limitations. In that regard, plaintiff is limited to performing work that involves simple, routine, repetitive tasks and very short, simple related decisions. instructions, as well as simple work- Plaintiff also is limited to working stable environment that involves few changes. a Finally, plaintiff is restricted to work that involves only occasional contact with the general public and co-workers (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. based upon the vocational expert's testimony, that plaintiff's vocational factors ""'A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 and However, the ALJ concluded residual functional capacity enable her to perform other work significant numbers in the national economy, garment sorter and mail clerk. Accordingly, that exists in such as a marker, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§423{d) (1) (A), 1382c(a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant \\ is not only unable considering [her] to age, do [her] previous work but cannot, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A), 1382c(a) (3) (B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. claimant currently The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, education, ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) 4 work experience and residual functional 416.920(a) (4). capacity.l 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a) (4), If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 because: (1) he gave inadequate weight consulting psychologist who examined her; to the and opinion (2) of a he failed to incorporate into the RFC Finding certain aspects of the state agency consultant's opinion which he had given great weight. The court finds that these arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ gave inadequate weight to the opinion of Dr. Linda Rockey, who performed psychological consultative examination of plaintiff. a one-time According to the regulations, the ALJ will give an opinion the weight he deems appropriate based on such factors as whether the physician treated or examined the claimant, whether the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and whether the opinion is consistent with the §§404 .1527 (c) (1) - (4), factors, record as a whole. 416.927 (c) (1) - (4) . See In the ALJ properly determined that Dr. should be given s weight. 20 light C.F.R. of Rockey's opinion (R. 19). Dr. Rockey found that plaintiff could understand, remember and carry out shortt simple instructions t but she was moderately lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do de te the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (1) 416.945(a) (1). In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity the ALJ is required to consider her abil to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a) (4) t 416.945(a) (4). I I ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 5 limited in her instructions. ability (R. 270). to do so with regard to detailed Dr. Rockey also found that plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to interact with the public, co workers and supervisors and in responding appropriately to work pressures and changes. (R. Dr. 270). Rockey concluded that plaintiff would have difficulty maintaining consistent employment on a daily basis. (R.268). The ALJ determined that Dr. Rockey's opinion was entitled to "less weight" plaintiff's because it subjective appeared to complaints, be which based the primarily ALJ found on not entirely credible,2 and because her opinion was inconsistent with other evidence of record. (R. discussed records Dennis Wayne, treating from Dr. psychiatrist, restrictive assessment. which In that regard, 19). did (R. 18). not the ALJ who was plaintiff's support Dr. Rockey's Indeed, Dr. Wayne's more recent progress notes indicate that plaintiff's condition was controlled with her complaints. medications, (R. 310, she 312, was doing well and she had no 328). After reviewing the record, the court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration and weighing of Dr. Rockey's opinion. ff complains that it was inappropriate for the ALJ to ect Dr. Rockey's opinion because it was based on iff's subjective complaints to the doctor. To be clear, the ALJ concluded Dr. Rockey's opinion was entitled to less weight because it was based on plaintiff's subjective complaints, which the ALJ found to be lacking credibil ,and because Dr. Rockey's opinion was inconsistent with the other record evidence. (R. 19). Thus, the ALJ did not simply reject Dr. Rockey's opinion because it was based on plaintiff's ions to her; rather, it was one of the factors which the ALJ took into account when considering and weighing Dr. Rockey's assessment. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 6 Moreover, despite giving Dr. Rockey's opinion less weight, the ALJ nevertheless Finding tasks, by incorporated some of her assessment into the RFC limiting plaintiff simple instructions, work related as well as to dec work simple, ions in and a routine , very stable repetitive short, simple environment that involves few changes and only occasional contact with the general public and co-workers. Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate into the RFC Finding certain aspects of the state agency consultant's opinion which he had given great weight. More specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately account for the consultant's finding that plaintiff has moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. The court finds that this argument is without merit. Dr. Phyllis Brentzel, psychologist, 3 reviewed who is a non-examining state agency plaintiff's records and completed a residual functional capacity assessment of her ability to perform various mental work-related tasks. (R. 272-75). Dr. Brentzel determined that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to understand, remember and carry out short and simple instructions, but she was moderately limited in her ability to do 3 The Regulations specify that state agency psychological consultants, such as Dr. Brentzel, "are highly qualified psychologists . . . who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation. Therefore, administrative law judges must consider findings and other opinions of State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination about whether [a claimant is] disabled." 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(e) (2) (i), 416.927 (el (2l (il . ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 7 - so with respect to detailed instructions and she was moderately limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods. plaintiff was (R. moderately Dr. 272). limited Brentzel in her also ability found to appropriately with the general public and co-workers. that interact (R. 273). The ALJ gave Dr. Brentzel's assessment great weight because he found that is was consistent with the record evidence as a whole, (R. 19), and he relied on that assessment in fashioning the RFC Finding. of Dr. The court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration Brentzel's opinion, and further finds that the ALJ adequately incorporated Dr. Brentzel's assessment of plaintiff's mental functional capacity into the RFC Finding.4 In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. by The substantial Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ Gustave Diamond United States District Judge 4AS previously stated, the ALJ's RFC Finding limited plaintiff to work that involves simple, routine, repetitive tasks and very short, simple instructions, as well as simple work-related decisions and only occasional contact with the general public and co-workers. These limitations reflect Dr. Brentzel's assessment of plaintiff's functional ability to perform various mental work-related requirements. ""-A072 (Rev 8/82) - 8 cc: Lindsay Fulton Osterhout, Esq. 521 Cedar Way Suite 200 Oakmont, PA 15139 Christy Wiegand Assistant U.S. Attorney 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 "'-Aon (Rev. 8/82) 9
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