WATSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, No. 2:2012cv00552 - Document 14 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/18/13. (kw)
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WATSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CHERYL WATSON, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 12-552 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, If~ s of the parties' of September, 2013, upon consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 10) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). substantial 'IlhAOn findings, any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains 186 F.3d 422, 429 the (3d Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, even if it a reviewing would have court decided is the bound by factual those inquiry (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Moreover, it is Massanari, well 247 F.3d 34, settled determined merely by the presence of that 38 (3d Cir. disability impairments, is not but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These Jones v. 8ullivan, 954 F.2d well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ I s findings and conclusions. In November 2004, plaintiff filed applications for both DIB and supplemental security beginning on April 1, 2002. income ("88I") alleging disability Plaintiff's applications were denied. At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on October 31, 2005, at which she appeared represented by counsel. 2005, On December 6, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. On April 6, 2007, the Appeals Council vacated that decision and remanded the matter back to the ALJ for additional proceedings. After several postponements, the administrative hearing on April 16, 2008. ALJ held a second On June 23, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision again finding plaintiff not disabled for both DIB and 881 purposes. Plaintiff submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council and requested review of the ALJ's decision. On April 21, 2009, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff's request for review based on the new evidence she submitted, vacated the ALJ's decision with respect to her 881 claim and remanded the ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 matter to the ALJ for further proceedings. On remand, plaintiff was awarded SSI benefits. With respect to plaintiff's DIB claim, the Appeals Council denied her request for review of the ALJ's June 23, 2008, decision denying her DIB benefits because the new evidence she submitted related to the time period after her insured status expired on June 30, 2005. As a result, the ALJ's June 23/ 2008, decision denying plaintiff's DIB claim became the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. The instant action challenges that decision. 1 For purposes of this court's review of the ALJ's decision denying plaintiff DIB benefits, issue is discrete. the relevant period of time at Plaintiff filed a prior application which was denied on September 15, (R. 2004. 464-71, 525). Plaintiff's request for Appeals Council review of that decision was denied and (R. no further appeal was taken. 472-74, 525). As such, res judicata applies to plaintiff's disability status as of September 15, 2004. 20 C.F.R. §§404.955, 404.957(c) (1). Further, plaintiff was insured for DIB purposes through June 30, 2005, (R. 832-33), thus she must establish that she became disabled on or before that date. 20 C.F.R. §§404.101(a), Bowen, 926 F.2d 240/ 244 (3d 404.131(a) i . 1990) see also Matullo v. (observing that a claimant lAccording to plaintiff's counsel, he became involved in this case in April 2009 and attempted to obtain her file from the Appeals Council on numerous occasions before eventually recelvlng a copy of the requested records in April 2012. As a result, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff an extension of time in which to file a civil action. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 is required to establish that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status). Accordingly, the relevant time period in this case is September 15, 2004, until June 30, 2005 (hereinafter, "the relevant period"). Plaintiff, during the individual who has a relevant under the limited education, period, and is regulations. was 48 years old classified 20 C.F.R. as a younger §404.1563(c). Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a barmaid and stocker, but she did not engage in substantial gainful activity at any time during the relevant period. After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during the relevant period. The ALJ found that plaintiff's severe impairments included degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post lumbar laminectomy and fusion, history of a fractured spine, degenerative disc disease of fibromyalgia, the cervical spine, j oint disease of the right knee, surgery, anxiety mitral valve prolapse, disorder. The ALJ disc bulging and degenerative status post bilateral bunion major depressive disorder and further found that plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 The ALJ determined that plaintiff functional capacity to perform a ~A072 (Rev, 8/82) 4 ("Appendix 1"). retains the residual range of light work but she requires a sit/stand option, she is limited to performing postural movements only occasionally, and she cannot climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, stairs or ramps. In addition, exposure to extremes of heat, dust, cold, plaintiff must avoid wetness, gases and other respiratory irritants, humidity, fumes, and she also must avoid exposure to workplace hazards such as heights or dangerous machinery. pressure Further, and low plaintiff stress work is limited that to does not performing involve low close concentration or attention to detail for extended periods. also She restricted to work that does not involve detailed or complex instructions, making significant workplace decisions or setting workplace goals, fast pace or assembly line work or close interaction with supervisors or the general public. Finally, plaintiff must be able to miss one day of work per month (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. based upon the vocational expert's testimony, that plaintiff's vocational capacity permitted her factors and tender or laundry the ALJ concluded residual to perform other work significant numbers in the national economy, folder. Accordingly, However, that functional exists in such as a machine the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during the relevant period. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 5 impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do age, [her] previous work but cannot, education and work experience, considering [her] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy .... II 42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, residual functional capacity.2 education, work experience and 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4). claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, inquiry is unnecessary. If the further Id. In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 because: (1) he improperly discounted plaintiff's fibromyalgia 2 Res idual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1). In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4). 'Q.AO 72 (Rev 8/82) - 6 based pain; (2) he improperly weighed the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians; RFC Finding a two of (3) he failed to include in the restriction to account for plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace; and (4) his hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not accurately describe plaintiff's impairments and limitations. The court finds that each of these arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her fibromyalgia based pain. almost no time acknowledge According to plaintiff, the ALJ discussing that her [her] doctors fibromyalgia diagnosed other In it." ~spent than to addition, plaintiff claims that the ALJ incorrectly relied on the lack of objective evidence as the fibromyalgia based pain. primary basis for rejecting her She further contends that the ALJ did not evaluate her fibromyalgia consistent with the requirements of Social Security Ruling (USSR") 99-2p, which she claims applies to her case. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ thoroughly discussed her fibromyalgia and other severe impairments before, during and after correctly relevant period. determined that (R. plaintiff's 840-46). severe The ALJ impairments, including fibromyalgia, caused pain and other limitations, which he accounted for in the RFC Finding, but plaintiff's claim of total debilitating pain was not entirely credible. Plaintiff also is incorrect that the ALJ (R. 840, 845). ected her testimony regarding fibromyalgia pain based on a lack of objective \\i>,AO 72 (Rev 8/82) - 7 evidence documenting entirely credible, her symptoms. the ALJ In finding plaintiff referenced the "obj ective not findings detailed above," (R. 845), which referred not only to plaintiff's fibromyalgia, but rather to all of her severe impairments that he discussed and analyzed. Thus, the ALJ did not apply an incorrect legal standard by considering objective medical evidence because plaintiff addition Social suffered to from numerous fibromyalgia. security, 296 Fed. other severe See Trauterman v. Appx. 218, impairments in Commissioner of 220-21 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ did not apply incorrect legal standard by considering objective medical evidence, even though the plaintiff suffered from fibromyalgia, where she also suffered from cervical disc herniation, lumbar degenerative joint disease and carpal tunnel syndrome). Finally, there is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the ALJ was required requirements to evaluate SSR 99-2p, her its title suggests, involving chronic 271569. a is based on the which is entitled "Evaluating Cases Involving Chronic Fatigue Syndrome." as fibromyalgia The purpose of that ruling, to help evaluate disability claims 1999 WL igue syndrome, not fibromyalgia. The only mention of fibromyalgia in SSR 99-2p appears footnote in which it is noted that fibromyalgia shares many symptoms with chronic fatigue syndrome. Id. at *8, n.3. Accordingly, SSR 99-2p is not relevant to the ALJ's evaluation of plaintiff's fibromyalgia. Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly assessed the ~A072 (Rev. 8182) - 8 opinions of Dr. Plat to and Dr. Karpen, who were two of her treating physicians, because he failed to indicate the amount of weight he gave their opinions. Although plaintiff now the ALJ's assessment of the medical evidence, tiques she has failed to identify any specific medical records containing opinions of Dr. Platto and Dr. Karpen that she claims the ALJ failed to consider. Putting aside plaintiff's failure to identify any such medical opinion the ALJ supposedly ignored, her claim is unfounded for two reasons. First, the record does not contain any medical evidence or opinion from Dr. Plat to during the relevant period. Second, while the record includes treatment notes from Dr. Karpen during the relevant period, (R. 361-63, 400-04, 406-08), Dr. Karpen did not offer an opinion identifying any functional workrelated limitations that affected plaintiff during that time. 20 C.F.R. See §404.1527(a) (2) (explaining that medical opinions are statements that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's prognosis, impairment, including symptoms, diagnosis and what a claimant still can do despite the impairment, and physical or mental restrictions). Accordingly, the ALJ could not have improperly weighed the opinion of either Dr. Platto or Dr. Karpen because neither doctor provided one during the relevant period. Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's RFC Finding did not adequately account for her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that a limitation to simple, rout "«.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 9 tasks sufficiently accounts for a claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. 946 (3d Cir. 2008) Cir. 2008) i McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941, Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx. 410, 412 (3d (restriction to simple, routine tasks accounted for the claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace) . Here, the RFC Finding limited plaintiff, , to inter low pressure and low stress work that does not involve any of the following: close concentration or attention to detail for extended periods; detailed or workplace decisions complex or instructions i setting workplace making goals i significant fast pace or assembly line worki or close interaction with supervisors or the general public. Thus, the ALJ crafted a detailed RFC Finding which adequately accommodated plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not accurately describe and account for all of the limitations caused by her impairments. An ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the medical evidence. 1987) . Chrupcala v. Here, the Heckler, ALJ's 829 F.2d 1269, hypothetical 1276 incorporated (3d Cir. all of plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the RFC Finding. vocational Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff perform other work that exists in the national economy. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 10 can In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act during the relevant period. The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~Dia~ United States District Judge cc: Karl E. Osterhout, Esq. 521 Cedar Way Suite 200 Oakmont, PA 15139 Paul Kovac Assistant U.S. Attorney 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 11
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