FISSELLA v. ASTRUE, No. 2:2010cv01075 - Document 17 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 11 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 14 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/19/11. (kw)
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FISSELLA v. ASTRUE Doc. 17 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SHELIA FISSELLA t aintifft v. Civil Action No. 10-1075 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE t COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW t 11 ~ay this of September t upon due consideration of the parties t cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 14) bet and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 11) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder t an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). substantial ~A072 findings, any evidence if the ALJ explains Plummer v. Apfel t 186 F.3d 422, 429 the (3d Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, even if it a reviewing would have court decided is bound by the factual those inquiry (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Moreover, Massanari, disability is not presence of impairments, but by the have upon an individual activity. IS 247 F.3d 34, determined 38 (3d Cir. merely by the fect that those impairments ability to perform substantial gainful Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These well established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her fourth application for SSI on March 14, 2007. That claim initially was denied due to plaintiff's failure to cooperate. Plaintiff filed a subsequent application on January 15, 2008 1 which was assigned a protective filing date of March 14, 2007. Plaintiff alleged she became disabled beginning March 2, 2006, due to a brain aneurysm l headaches and high blood pressure. At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on July 30 which plaintiff appeared represented by counsel. 2009, 1 2009 1 at On August 27, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff' s review on June 151 2010, request making the ALJ's decision the decision of the Commissioner. for final The instant action followed. Plaintiff was 42 years old when the ALJ issued his decision and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §416.963(c). Plaintiff has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a cashier and a cleaner, but she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since she filed her SSI application. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 After reviewing plaintiff / s medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that meaning of the Act. plaintiff is not disabled within the The ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of a history of cerebral aneurysm status post surgery, hypertension, obesity, major depressive disorder and borderline intellectual functioning, but those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P / Regulation No. 4 ("Appendix 1") . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work with a sit/stand option and a number of other limitations. occasional postural maneuvers, ladders, ropes or scaffolds. environment Further / limited to In addition, plaintiff must avoid plaintiff wet· or humid conditions and requires work in a low stress that does not involve a production line type of pace or independent decision making. unskilled is but she cannot balance or climb exposure to temperature extremes / hazards. Plainti ff work that involves Plaintiff also is limited to only rout and repetitive instructions and tasks, no more than occasional interaction with supervisors and co-workers, and no interaction with the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. based upon the vocational expert/s testimony, Iil>AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 However, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience and residual functional capacity enable her to make a vocational adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as an office helper, private mail clerk or sewing machine operator. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. II 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activitYi (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairmentj (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix Ii (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant worki and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, residual functional capacity. education, 20 C.F.R. §416.920{a) (4). ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) work experience and 4 If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. In this case, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at step 5 of the sequential Commissioner must evaluation show there process. are other At jobs step that 5, exist the in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent with her age, education, past work experience and residual Residual functional functional capacity. capacity is 20 C.F.R. defined §416.920 (g) (1). as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 40. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (1) Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at i In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her ability to meet the physical/ mental/ sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a} (4). Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 because: did (1 ) evidencei expert not and did adequately (2) not limitations. explain why he ected certain his hypothetical question to the vocational properly account for all For reasons explained below, of plaintiff's these arguments are without merit. Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ rejected certain findings made by Dr. Lindsey Groves, who performed a consultative psychological examination of plaintiff in March 2008. stated in her written report detailing the Dr. Groves results of her examination that plaintiff's mood was depressed, but she had fair ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 5 concentration ability, r impulse control and no problems with social judgment and comprehension. (R. 216). Although plaintiff had low average intellectual ability and poor memory, she was able to engage in abstract thinking on simple concepts. Groves noted psychiatric treatment. that plaintiff reasons, (R. nor 215). has has Dr. she never ever Groves Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") been (R. 216). Dr. hospitalized for undergone rated psychiatric plaintiff's score at 60, Global (R. 216), which indicates only moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in soc or occupational functioning. 1 Dr. Groves also completed a form entitled "Medical Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (Mental)." Dr. Groves indicated that plaintiff had only slight limitations in understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions, but she had marked limitations in making judgments on simple workrelated decisions. (R. 212). Dr. Groves also found that plaintiff was not limited in her ability to interact with the public, she was only slightly limited in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, but she was markedly limited in <liil.AOn (Rev. 8/82) lThe GAF scale, designed by the American Psychiatric Association, is used by clinicians to report an individual's overall level mental functioning. The GAF scale considers psychological, social and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health to illness. The highest possible score is 100 and the lowest is 1. A score between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms (e. g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or any moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 th Ed. 2000). 6 her ability to interact appropriately with co workers. (R. 212). Plaintiff claims the ALJ did not adequately explain why he gave little weight to Dr. Groves' opinion that plaintiff has marked limitations in the areas of making judgments on simple work-related decisions workers. and To the contrary, interacting appropriately with co the ALJ explained that Dr. Groves' assessment in those functional categories appears to have been based on plaintiff's subjective complaints, which the ALJ found were not entirely credible, as well as the fact that Dr. Groves' opinion was inconsistent with her own examination findings2 and GAF score rating of 60. (R. 12, 15-16). The ALJ fully explained why he gave 1 imi ted weight to certain aspects of Dr. Groves' assessment, and the court finds that his decision in that regard is supported by substantial evidence. The court also notes that the Medical Source Statement form completed by Dr. Groves defines a "marked" limitation as one in which \\ [t] he ability to function precluded." as being (R. 211). markedly is severely limited but not Thus, although Dr. Groves rated plaintiff limited both in her ability to interact appropriately with co-workers and to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) she was not completely precluded from 2By way of example, Dr. Groves stated in her written report explaining her examination findings that plaintiff's "ability to get ong with others is fair. ." and "[h]er interaction with people and authority is fair . " (R. 217). Despite these findings, Dr. Groves inconsistently rated plaintiff as having marked limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with co-workers. (R. 212). - 7 functioning in those areas. Nonetheless, the ALJ gave plaintiff "the maximum benefit of doubt Source Statement, (R. It considering Dr. Groves' and 16) , factored those Medical functional limitations into the RFC Finding by restricting plaintiff to low stress work that does not involve independent decision making and no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and no interaction with the general public. In sum, the ALJ considered Dr. Groves' examination findings and assessment of plaintiff's functional capabilities and adequately explained why he gave certain aspects of her opinion little weight. Despite determining that Dr. Groves' opinion was entitled to little weight, the ALJ nevertheless accounted for Dr. Groves' findings in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Plaintiff next claims the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he rejected the affidavit submitted by plaintiff's father, Harold Angel. Because Mr. Angel could not attend plaintiff's administrative hearing, he submitted an affidavit purporting to explain her alleged inappropriate behavior. (R. 190-93). The ALJ discussed Mr. Angel's affidavit in his decision and explained that it repeated many of plaintiff's subjective complaints, which the ALJ did not find credible. (R. 13). that describing Mr. Angel's affidavit The ALJ also pointed out plaintiff's behavior problems is inconsistent with her lack of mental health treatment and the absence of "treatment records objectively documenting these complaints on an ongoing basis. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 8 11 (R. 13). For these reasons, the ALJ entirely credible. concluded (R. 14). that plaintiff's father was not The ALJ is empowered to evaluate a witness' credibility, see Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983), and the court concludes he properly did so in this case. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not account for all of limitations caused by her impairments. An ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant's impairments Chrupcala v. and limitations supported by the medical evidence. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, hypothet 1276 incorporated (3d Cir. all of 1987). Here, plaintiff's the ALJ's functional limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all of the factors Accordingly, that were the basis of the RFC Finding. the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform work that exists in significant numbers After the national economy.3 carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ~A072 (ReY, 8/82) The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by 3Plaintiff also incorrectly suggests that the reasoning level of 2 associated with the office helper and sewing machine operator positions identified by the vocational expert in response to the ALJ's hypothetical are incompatible with plaintiff's residual functional capacity. The Third Circuit has held that a reasoning level of 2 is consistent with the ability to perform simple, routine, repetitive work. See Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. Appx. 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2004). - 9 - substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ / Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: Robert B. Savoy, Esq. Three Neshaminy Interplex Suite 301 Trevose, PA 19053 Paul Kovac Assistant U.S. Attorney 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 <i!;oAOn (Rev. 8/82) - 10
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