TROUT v. ASTRUE, No. 2:2010cv00756 - Document 15 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 7 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 13 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/19/11. (kw)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
TROUT v. ASTRUE Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MICHAEL L. TROUT, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-756 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this September, 2011, upon due consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner" ) denying his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 13) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.7) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). substantial 'Aon findings, any evidence if the ALJ explains the Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by evidence, even if it a reviewing would have court decided is bound by the factual those inquiry (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Moreover, Massanari, disability is not 247 F.3d 34, determined 38 (3d Cir. merely by the presence of impairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on September 14, 2006, alleging traumatic migraine disability beginning stress disorder, headaches, January asthma, depression, I, 2006, sleep apnea, arthritis Plaintiff's application was denied. and due to acid joint post- reflux, pain. At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on April 23, 2008, at which plaintiff appeared represented by counsel. During the hearing, plaintiff amended his alleged onset date of disability to September 30, 2006, because he had last worked in September 2006, and he had earned approximately $9,500 that year. On May 15, (R.25). 2008, the ALJ issued a plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on April IS, the final decision of decision finding that the 2010, making the ALJ's decision Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff was 36 years old as of his amended alleged onset date of disability and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(c}. 'A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 Plaintiff earned two Master's Degrees and has past relevant work experience as a mail carrier, clerk and counselor. However, he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since his amended alleged onset date of disability. After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded meaning of the Act. that plaintiff is not disabled wi thin the The ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, asthma, sleep apnea and osteoarthritis of the knees, but those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the 1 ted impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1") . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work with a number of other limitations. gases and Plaintiff must avoid exposure to fumes, temperature and humidity extremes. In dust and addition, plaintiff is limited to work that involves simple instructions and simple decision making, and he cannot perform work at an assembly line pace. Finally, plaintiff is restricted from work that involves intensive supervision, he must avoid interaction with the general public, and he cannot have close interaction with co workers (collectively, the "RFC Finding") . As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 However, based upon the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience and residual functional capacity enable him to make a vocational adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy t such as a sorter t marker or order caller. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d) (1) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy " 42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (2) (A) . The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not t whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix Ii if not, whether the claimant's impairment performing his past relevant work; and (5) prevents if so, him (4) from whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of his age I education, 'A072 (Rev. 8/82) 4 work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a) (4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. In this case, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at step 5 of the sequent Commissioner must evaluation show there process. are other At jobs step that 5, st the in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent with his age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. Residual defined functional capacity is §404.1520(g) (1). as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by his impairments. 40. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (1) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet certain demands of jobs, requirements. such as physical, mental, sensory and other 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a) (4). Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 because he did not give substantial weight to the determination by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") that he is disabled. l 81 83). (R. This argument is without merit. A determination made by another agency regarding disability is not binding on the Commissioner of Soc Security. The Social lDuring plaintiff's military service in the Gulf War, his barracks were destroyed by a missile. Many individuals were killed in the attacked and plaintiff sustained injury to his knees and back. (R. 281-82). According to plaintiff, he has difficulty coping with stress as a result of that ident. (R. 282). "AO 72 (Rev 8/82) - 5 Security Regulations provide that: A decision by any nongovernmental agency or any other governmental agency about whether [the claimant is] disabled or blind is based on its rules and is not our decision about whether [the claimant is] disabled or blind. We must make a disability or blindness determination based on social securi ty law. Therefore a determination made by another agency that [a claimant is] disabled or blind is not binding on us. I 20 C.F.R. §404.1504; see also Gifford v. Barnhart 705 1 707 (3d Cir. 2005) not binding I 129 Fed. Appx. (recognizing that an ALJ is not bound by a determination by the Pennsylvania Workers Al though I "a I Compensation Bureau) . determination by agency is entitled to substantial weight." F.2d 1130, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985). another government Kane v. Heckler l 776 "If the ALJ reaches a contrary conclusion, the ALJ must offer an explanation of why he rejected the other agency's finding." Sell v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22794702, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2003) (citing Lewis v. Califano l 616 F.2d 73,76 (3dCir. 1980)). Here l the ALJ addressed the VA's determination that plaintiff is disabled, noted that he was not bound by that finding explained why he rejected the VA/S disability determination. 14-16). l and (R. In so doing, the ALJ thoroughly considered the opinion of Dr. Barry Fisher, who was plaintiff/s treating psychiatrist at the VA hospital l and who found that plaintiff was disabled because of his post-traumatic stress disorder. that Dr. Fisher's opinion l upon which the VA/S determination of 'IIl.A072 (Rev. 8/82) The ALJ properly determined - 6 disability was based, was not entitled to controlling weight. 2 Dr. Fisher completed two functional capacity assessments indicating that plaintiff was unable to meet competitive standards in numerous categories required for skilled and unskilled work. (R. 412-13, 416-17). However, Dr. Fisher's own treatment notes contradict such serious limitations, as he consistently rated plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score between 55-60, (R. 324, 330, 332, 410, 414, 431, 433, 443), which indicates only moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning. 3 As the ALJ correctly observed, such a rating is inconsistent with Dr. Fisher's opinion that plaintiff is disabled. Further, Dr. Fisher's opinion of disability is contradicted by plaintiff's activities of daily living. Plaintiff volunteers at his church teaching religious classes and helping the homeless, he assists with home-schooling his children, he practices 2A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d} (2). For reasons explained herein, Dr. Fisher's opinion fails to meet this standard. 3The GAF scale, designed by the American Psychiatric Association, is used by clinicians to report an individual's overall level of mental functioning. The GAF scale considers psychological, social and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health to illness. The highest possible score is 100 and the lowest is 1. A score between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or any moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 th Ed. 2000). 'A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 7 Taekwondo, and he assists with household chores such as taking out the trash, cooking, vacuuming, cleaning, mowing the grass and laundry. Finally, Dr. Fisher's opinion that plaintiff is disabled conflicts with the results of Dr. Stanley Nadulek's consultative psychological evaluation of plaintiff. Dr. Nadulek found that plaintiff "seem [edJ normal from the perspective of productivity, relevance and coherence", coherent well I organized (R. and 285), his relevant, thoughts he was were able clear, to form concepts well, had good common sense, did not have any difficulty with recent or past memory, had fair judgment, and had emotional reactions that were relevant to the situation. (R. 285-87). Dr. Nadulek concluded that plaintiff's impairment did not affect his ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions, and he had only moderate limitations in his ability to interact appropriately with others and to respond appropriately to work pressures and changes. 4 (R. 289). 4The ALJ indicated that he gave great weight to Dr. Nadulek's examination findings and functional assessment. (R. 15). Despite Dr. Nadulek's benign examination findings and assessment that plaintiff had only moderate functional limitations in interacting with others and responding appropriately to certain work situations, he inexplicably noted at the end of his report that it would be extremely difficult for plaintiff to be gainfully employed. (R. 288). The ALJ addressed Dr. Nadulek's inconsistent conclusion by stating that plaintiff's moderate limitations were appropriately accounted for in the RFC Finding. (R. 15). The court agrees that the ALJ accounted for plaintiff's moderate limitations in interacting with others and responding appropriately to certain work situations by restricting him to work involving simple decision making and simple instructions and precluding him from intensive supervision, close interaction with co-workers and any interaction with the general public. ~A072 (Rev 8/82) - 8 In sum, the ALJ considered the disability determination by the VA and Dr. Fisher, but properly concluded that determination was not entitled to controlling weight. such The ALJ fully explained why he rejected the VA's disability determination, and this court finds his decision is supported by substantial evidence. After carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. substantial The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~amo~ United States District Judge cc: Kelie C. Schneider, Esq. Robert Peirce & Associates, P.C. 707 Grant Street, 2500 Gulf Tower Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Michael Colville Assistant U.S. Attorney 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 'A072 {Rev. 8/82) - 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
