STRINGER v. THE PITTSBURGH POLICE et al, No. 2:2008cv01051 - Document 40 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's federal claims; Plaintiff's state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are dismissed with prejudice; 39 Motion to Amend Complaint denied as untimely and futile. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 2/25/10. (map)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
STRINGER v. THE PITTSBURGH POLICE et al Doc. 40 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JAMES S. STRINGER, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 08-1051 THE PITTSBURGH POLICE, OFFICER DAVID M. SISAK, and JOHN DOE OFFICERS, Defendants. MEMORANDUM and ORDER Gary L. Lancaster, Chief Judge. This is a civil rights case. 2010 Plaintiff, James S. Stringer, acting pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") against defendants, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (the "Pittsburgh Police"), Officer David M. Sisak, and John Doe Police Officers, stemming from an arrest that took place on November 2, 2006. [Doc. No.1]. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Officer Sisak and John Doe Police Officers arrested plaintiff and searched his vehicle on the basis of his race, violating his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1 Plaintiff alleges that defendant We note that neither plaintiff nor defendants mention a First Amendment claim in their summary judgment briefs. However, in one sentence of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants "deprived Plaintiff of his First (1st) Amendment right [sic] and retaliated against his exercise of free speech." [Id. at p. 2, 4]. Nowhere else in plaintiff's complaint is a First Amendment claim mentioned or alluded to, and plaintiff has made no allegations regarding how his First Amendment rights were violated. Plaintiff has also failed to Dockets.Justia.com Pittsburgh Police was responsible for Officer Sisak's and Joe Doe Police Officers' actions because of its customs and policies in racial profiling. Plaintiff also asserts claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution pursuant to Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Defendants deny the allegations and have filed a joint motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed federal claims [Doc. No. 23]. to establish any constitutional violation, and even if he had, that Officer Sisak is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Pittsburgh Police, as a department, is not a proper defendant in this lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion will be granted, and plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed. I. JURISDICTION Because plaintiff brings his complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, we have district jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. courts shall have original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Constitution, United States."). § § 1331 ("The all civil laws, or treaties of the We have jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law provide any evidence regarding those violations. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff ever raised a First Amendment claim and has not already abandoned it, we dismiss that claim with prejudice. 2 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367 (a) ("In any civil action of § which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that the form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the United States Constitution.") . II. BACKGROUND In this case, as with all cases, especially where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court put plaintiff on notice of the briefing and other litigation responsibilities that commonly arise during the course of a lawsuit. Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to admit or deny each fact set forth in defendants' concise statement of material facts as required by the local rules and this court's practices. own statement of See LCvR 56.C.1. material facts Instead, plaintiff filed his without evidence to substantiate his claims. citing to [See Doc. No. 31] any record For these reasons, the court will treat the facts as set forth in defendants' concise statement of material facts and supported by the evidence of record as if they are unopposed. A. The Traffic Stop & Arrest The undisputed evidence of record reveals the following facts. On November 2, 2006, Officer Sisak was on duty in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle 3 performing routine patrol duties for the Pittsburgh Police. At approximately 8:30 p.m., while on patrol on Friendship Avenue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Officer Sisak ran the license plate of plaintiff's Mercury Sable through an index system, accessing the pennsylvania Department of Transportation. From this, Officer Sisak learned that the license plate on the Mercury Sable was a "dead plate," a license plate that belonged to a Ford vehicle and that had a May of 2007 sticker on it. Based on this information, lights and siren intersection of and pulled Edmonds the Street Officer Sisak activated his Mercury and Sable over at Friendship Avenue. the Then, Officer Sisak asked plaintiff, the driver, to produce the temporary registration or "pink slip" for the Mercury Sable. Plaintiff failed to do so and informed Officer Sisak that he had recently purchased the Mercury Sable and was using the license plate from a Ford vehicle on the Mercury Sable. Officer Sisak arrested and charged of plaintiff with violation section 7122 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code for altered l forged, or counterfeit documents and plates. Officer Sisak then had plaintiff's Mercury Sable towed, confiscated the license plate, and returned the plate to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Plaintiff was transported to the Allegheny County Jail and eventually, plaintiff was released. On February 14, 2007, plaintiff presented his formal registration for the Mercury Sable 4 at a hearing, and the charges against plaintiff were dismissed. B. The Lawsui t Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 28, 2008. 1]. Defendants denied all allegations and asserted [Doc. No. qualified immunity and improper party identification as affirmative defenses. [Doc. Nos. 3 & 7] . The case proceeded to discovery. Plaintiff initially failed to respond to defendants' interrogatories and requests for production of documents. On June 4, 2009, defendants filed a motion to compel plaintiff's responses to their discovery. No. 17]. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. we granted defendants' motion to compel. [Doc. On June 22, 2009, [Doc. No. 18]. Pursuant to the court's order, plaintiff responded to defendants' discovery. However, plaintiff produced no evidence in support of his claims. Instead, he simply re-asserted the allegations he made in his complaint. As to his claims against Officer Sisak and the John Doe Police Officers, plaintif f' s discovery responses failed to set forth any evidence to show that he was stopped on the basis of his race. Interrogatory NO.7: With regard to your allegation in your complaint that defendant police officers took specific actions because of your race, state: A. Each and every fact upon which you base this conclusion. Answer: Plaintiff further contends that all of the officers present at least 10, of which all were white, if 5 just one who was not in someway racially prejudice [sic], he would have pulled Officer Sisak to the side and spoke to him about not arresting the plaintiff. The outcome would have been different. [Doc. No. 25, at Ex. 2]. In fact, plaintiff admitted that Officer Sisak had the "legal authority" to arrest him. Interrogatory NO.6: with regard to the allegations in the complaint that the customs and policies of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department directly and irreparably injured the Plaintiff, state the following: A. Each and every fact upon which you base these conclusions. Answer: The Plaintiff contends that Officer Sisak, according to the law had a reasonable amount of leeway [sic] in which to handle the situation from giving the plaintiff a ticket to appear in court and I will accept that he had the legal authority to arrest as he did, but the arrest would be at the extreme. Therefore I contend that Officer Sisak and the one officer he conferred with most chose the extreme measure because Plaintiff is black. [Id.] (emphasis added). Furthermore, as evidenced by plaintiff's response to the interrogatory above, plaintiff failed to provide evidence for his claim that the Pittsburgh Police Department's customs and policies injured him in any way. Fact discovery has closed, and as plaintiff admits, he failed to conduct any discovery whatsoever. 32, at pp. 1-2]. readily [Doc. No. On September 30, 2009, defendants jointly moved for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 23]. In that motion, defendants asked this court to grant summary judgment on plaintiff's section 6 1983 claims, or in the alternative, grant Officer Sisak qualified immunity and find that the Pittsburgh Police Department is not a proper defendant in this lawsuit. that genuine issues of material Plaintiff contends, however, fact preclude this court from granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We again note that plaintiff is proceeding pro se. he is held to a less stringent standard than trained counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 'district courts are pleadings, 519, counseled all parties must Procedure. '" Thus, 520 to (1972). However, liberally follow the construe "[w]hile pro se Federal Rules of Civil Riley v. Shinseki, No. 07-233, 2009 WL 2957793, at *4 {W.O. Pa. Sept. 10, 2009} {quoting Thomas v. Norris, No. 02-1854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006)). "still has before him the formidable Thus, plaintiff task of avoiding summary judgment by producing evidence 'such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [him] .'" (3d Cir. 1992) Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 696 {quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 {1986}}. Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, "the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, depositions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 7 any material fact and that judgment as a matter of law." the moving party is entitled to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment [.] original). If Anderson, 477 U. S. at 247-48 (emphasis in Similarly, summary judgment is improper so long as the dispute over the material facts is genuine. whether the dispute is genuine, In determining Id. the court's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49. The United States Supreme Court has "emphasized, [w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56 (c), opponent must do more than simply show that metaphysical doubt as to the material facts there is its some Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. (2007) Indust. (internal quotations Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial" and requires entry of summary judgment. 8 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In other words, in defending against summary judgment, a party cannot simply re-assert the facts alleged in the complaint; instead, he must "go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted) . It is on this standard that the court has reviewed the instant motion for summary judgment and briefs filed in support of and opposition thereto. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the motion. IV. DISCUSSION A. Federal Claims Plaintiff's complaint alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that (1) plaintiff was the victim of racial profiling in the enforcement of motor vehicle laws, which violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; illegally searched his vehicle in (2) Officer Sisak violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) that the Pittsburgh Police was responsible for the racial profiling due to its customs and policies. 1. Defendants' Proper Party Claim As an initial matter, the law is clear that a police department is not a proper defendant to a lawsuit. 9 Manolovich v. Park, No. 08-1746, 2009 WL 1444396, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2009). A police department has no separate corporate identity apart from the municipality and, thus, is not a separate entity able to be sued. See Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1993) ("The numerous courts that have considered the question of whether a municipal police department is a proper defendant in a section 1983 action have unanimously reached the conclusion that it is not.") (citation omitted) . However, we note that plaintiff brought this suit against Officer Sisak in both his individual and official capacity. No.1, at 3]. [Doc. By suing Officer Sisak in his official capacity, plaintiff in essence named the City of Pittsburgh as a defendant in this lawsuit. Ctr., A.M. ex reI. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. 327 F.3d 572, 581 (3d Cir. 2002). In accordance with our obligation to liberally construe plaintiff's pro complaint, we will assume that plaintiff named the City of Pittsburgh, rather than the Pittsburgh Police, as a defendant in this lawsuit. 2. Substantive Federal Claims We now turn to the merits of defendants' motion. We will grant summary judgment on all claims because there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute because of plaintiff's failure to go beyond his pleadings in this case. Although attached various documents to his opposition brief, plaintiff [see Doc. No. 32], these attachments do not create any genuine issue of material 10 fact. The attachments include documents that were already part of the record photocopied pages of portions of the Pennsylvania Motor l Vehicle Code this case the criminal complaint filed against plaintiff in I and l plaintiff s purchase I order and registration or "pink slipll for the Mercury Sable. temporary These documents fail to support plaintiff/s legal claims against defendants and in facti they even refute his claims in some ways. Officer Sisak/s affidavit opposition brief [him] I which l plaintiff For example attached to in I his Officer Sisak stated that plaintiff "informed that he recently purchased the vehicle and was using the license plate from [another] vehicle that had been salvaged had placed that license plate on [his vehicle].11 further stated that plaintiff "did not have I and Officer Sisak a pink temporary registration slip or any other documentation to indicate a legal transfer. II [Doc. Nos. 25 & 32 1 at Ex. 1]. Where I as in this case judgment motion allege the the moving defendants in a summary I absence of evidence I the nonmoving plaintiff must come forward with evidence in support of his claim. Foley v. Pension Int/l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 98 Fundi 91 F. Supp. 2d 797 1 813-14 Plaintiff did not submit any affidavits answers to interrogatories to refute undisputed any of concise the I I (E.D. statement of 11 l or other evidence contained within material 2000). deposition testimonYI admissions on file statements Pa. facts. defendants Instead l I the unsubstantiated "facts" contained within plaintiff's concise statement of material facts are nothing more than a re-assertion of the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint. [Doc. No. 31] . Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to engage in discovery and has chosen not to do so. Instead, plaintiff has set forth absolutely no evidence to substantiate his claims. Without any such evidence, plaintiff's claims simply cannot survive defendants' motion for summary judgment. Rather than granting summary judgment solely because the instant briefings contain no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in plaintiff's favor, we have carefully reviewed in the entire record plaintiff's pro se status. filed with this court: (1) for evidence, deference to We considered the following documents the pleadings; affidavit [Doc. Nos. 25 & 32, at Ex. 1]; (2) Officer Sisak's (3) the information that Officer Sisak received indicating that plaintiff's plate was "dead" [Id.]; (4) plaintiff's answers to defendants' discovery [Doc. No. 25, at Ex. 2] i (5) plaintiff's proof of purchase of the vehicle [Doc. No. 33, at Ex. 1] the vehicle registration [Doc. for (6) plaintiff's temporary registration for i No. the 33, at vehicle Ex. [Doc. 2] i No. (7) 33, plaintiff's at Ex. 3]; formal (8) photocopied sections of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Code [Doc. No. 33, at Ex. 4 & 5] i and (9) the criminal complaint against plaintiff [Doc. No. 33, at Ex. 6]. 12 Despite construing the record broadly as supporting any possible violations covered by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, we find that none of these documents provide support for any of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has failed to show even "[t] he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which he bears the burden of production. plaintiffs, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. even if acting pro se, The law is clear that cannot rely on unsupported, unexplained assertions and conclusory allegations in an attempt to survive defendants' summary judgment motion. of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 Williams v. Borough (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 477 U.S. at 325) . Accordingly, we find that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to plaintiff's federal claims, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 B. State Law Claims Having dismissed the federal claims in the lawsuit must decide whether to exercise supplemental plaintiff's state law claims. district court has original t we jurisdiction over Where all claims over which the jurisdiction are dismissed before trial, "the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and 2 Because we granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on other grounds, we need not consider whether Officer Sisak is entitled to qualified immunity in this case. 13 fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." {1995} Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (citations omitted). Here, considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties weigh in favor of the district court exercising its discretion to hear the state law claims. Due to the complete lack of evidence in support of plaintiff's state law claims, no purpose would be served by sending these claims to state court at this stage in the proceedings. While we recognize that defendants failed to move for summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims, a district court may grant summary judgment, own its own initiative, so long as the party against whom summary judgment will be entered had notice of possible summary judgment and an opportunity to come forward with relevant evidence to prevent entry of summary judgment. Powell v. Beard, No. 07-2618, 2008 WL 2805663, at *2 (3d Cir. July 22, 2008). Plaintiff clearly had notice of possible summary judgment on his state law claims and had the opportunity to come forward with relevant evidence as to those claims. He specifically addressed his state law claims in his opposition brief. No. 32 at pp. 7-8]. [See Doc. However, in doing so, plaintiff failed to set forth any evidence in support of his state law claims. Because of the lack of evidence in support of plaintiff's state law claims, we will dismiss them with prejudice. 14 V. CONCLUSION Although plaintiff has set forth general allegations for violation of his Amendments, rights pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth he has failed to set forth any factual evidence in support of his federal claims. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims will be granted.) Because the court has exercised supplemental plaintiff's state law claims, suffer from the same failures jurisdiction over and plaintiff's state law claims as plaintiff's federal claims, plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order follows. 3 To date, plaintiff has failed to identify the John Doe Police Officers referenced in his complaint. [Doc. No. I, at 15] . This entry of judgment applies to all defendants in this case, including John Doe Police Officers. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JAMES S. STRINGER, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 08-1051 THE PITTSBURGH POLICE, OFFICER DAVID M. SISAK, and Joe Doe Police Officers, Defendants. ORDER AND NOW, this of February, 2010, ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's federal claims is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY [Doc. No. 23J Plaintiff's state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are dismissed with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint [Doc. No. 39J is DENIED as untimely and futile. The Clerk of Court is directed to mark this case closed. cc: All counsel of record
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
