DOE et al v. UPPER ST. CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT et al, No. 2:2008cv00910 - Document 43 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 23 Partial Motion to Dismiss and 26 Motion to Dismiss; Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims, Counts I and II, and state constitution claim, Count III, are dismissed with prejudice; Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is also dismissed; The individual defendants are dismissed from the case; Defendant von Waldow's motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), is GRANTED and all claims against her are dismissed with prejudice; Defendant von Waldow's Motion to Strike is denied. Signed by Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 11/8/08. (map)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
DOE et al v. UPPER ST. CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT et al Doc. 43 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JANE DOE, a minor, by JOHN DOE and SUSAN DOE, her parents and natural guardians, Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 08-0910 UPPER ST. CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT, and DR. PATRICK T. O'TOOLE, in his individual capacity and as Superintendent of Schools, and DR. TERRENCE KUSHNER, in his individual) capacity and as Assistant ) Superintendent and Director of ) Secondary Education, and ) DR. MICHAEL GHILANI, in his ) individual capacity and as ) Principal, and DR. SHARON SURITSKY ) in her individual capacity and as ) Supervisor of Special Education, ) and JACE B. PALMER, in his ) individual capacity and as ) Assistant Principal, and ) LOU ANGELO, in his individual ) capacity and as Assistant ) principal, and ESTHER R. von ) Waldow, f/k/a/ ESTHER R. HAGUEL, ) in her individual capacity as ) Intervention Specialist, and ) JENNIFER WAGNER, in her individual ) capacity as a Teacher, ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM and ORDER Gary L. Lancaster District Judge. November 2008 This is an action in civil rights under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Article I, Section Dockets.Justia.com I of the pennsylvania Constitution [doc. no. 1]. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of their minor daughter, Jane Doe. before the court are the defendants' motions to Pending dismiss the section 1983 claims, the pennsylvania Constitution claim and the claim for punitive damages [doc. nos. 23, 26]. For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be granted. I. BACKGROUND The following material facts are set forth in plaintiffs' complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this opinion. During the 2007-2008 school year, Jane Doe attended Upper St. Clair High School as a special education student. On more than one occasion beginning in the fall of 2007 through February of 2008, another special education student in Jane Doe's class, identified herein as Michael Roe, sexually assaulted Jane Doe both outside of school and on school grounds. Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs allege five counts. this action on June 30, 2008. Count I alleges section 1983 claims against the individual defendants. Plaintiffs contend that the individual defendants failed to follow the school's disciplinary procedures with regard to Michael Roe, thereby violating Jane Doe's right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 2 to the United States Constitution. 1 Count II also alleges section 1983 claims against the individual defendants. that the individual indifference to the defendants rights adopted guaranteed Plaintiffs contend a to policy Jane of Doe reckless under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Count III alleges that the individual defendants adopted a policy of reckless indifference to the rights guaranteed to Jane Doe under Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Count IV alleges that defendant Upper St. Clair School District permitted peer on peer sexual harassment to occur, thereby depriving Jane Doe of educational opportunities in violation of Title IX. Finally, Count V alleges that defendant Upper St. Clair School District failed to remedy a sexually hostile environment, thereby depriving Jane Doe of educational opportunities in violation of Title IX. II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(B) (6) Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts I, II and III as well as plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. We will address each of plaintiffs' claims in turn. Plaintiffs concede that Count I should defendant von Waldow [doc. no 36 at 18] . 3 be dismissed against 1. Counts I and II - Section 1983 Claims Counts I and II of plaintiffs' complaint allege section 1983 claims against the individual defendants. not create substantive rights; but, it Section 1983 does allows a plaintiff to recover damages for violations of rights protected by other federal laws or by the United States Constitution. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985). However, "[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that where a federal statute provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to foreclose a right of action under section 1983." Williams v. The Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, PA, 998 F. 2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981)). section 1983, where a federal comprehensive enforcement scheme, statute This limitation to provides its own is known as the Sea Clammers doctrine. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' section 1983 claims are foreclosed pursuant to the Sea Clammers doctrine because they are based on conduct fully adressed by the comprehensive scheme in Title IX. Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 provides, in part, as follows: No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 4 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) . The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that Congress intended to foreclose a right of action under section 1983 by enacting Title IX. Williams, 998 F.2d at 176 (citing Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990)). Indeed, in Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated, This court recently addressed the applicability of the Sea Clammers doctrine to cases in which plaintiff asserts a claim under ti tIe IX and the federal Constitution. In Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990), we held that the constitutional claims are "subsumed" in title IX, and that the district court, having addressed the title IX claim, properly refused to hear plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Id. Therefore, pursuant to Pfeiffer and Williams, plaintiffs' section 1983 claims are subsumed by Title IX and are dismissed. We recognize that there is a Courts of Appeal on this issue. 2 split among the Circuit There is no dispute, however, that the current law in the Third Circuit is that section 1983 claims are subsumed by Title IX. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. Of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 1996) ("the Third Circuit has 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 504 F.3d 165, 177 (1 st Cir. 2007) cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (U.S. June 9, 2008) (No. 07-1125), a peer-on-peer sexual harassment case. Argument is scheduled for December 2, 2008. 5 held that constitutional claims under section 1983 are 'subsumed' in Title IX" (citing Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789)). Unless and until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, we are bound by controlling precedent which dictates that plaintiffs may not concurrently pursue claims under both Title IX and section 1983 for the same underlying conduct. Should there be a fundamental change in the law, as instructed by the Supreme Court during the pendency of this case, we will be open to reconsideration of this ruling. Counts I and II of plaintiffs' complaint are, therefore, dismissed. 2. Count III - Pennsylvania Constitution Claim In Count plaintiffs 1111 defendants adopted a violations of right the policy of of allege reckless Jane Doe to protected by the Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania, Article I, analysis for this claim l Section I [doc. that the individual indifference bodily to integrity as the Constitution of no 1 at The under the Pennsylvania Constitution the same as the analysis for Count II, the l is wherein plaintiffs claim that defendants adopted a policy of reckless indifference to the violations of the rights of Jane Doe protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [doc. no. 1 at See Doe v. Allentown Sch. Dist., no. 06-1926 1 2007 WL 2814587, *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 241 2007) (citing Pa. Game Comm'n v. Marich, 6 666 A.2d 253, 255 n.6 (Pa. requirements of Article Constitution are not 1995) I, ("As we have held that Section distinguishable I of from the the Pennsylvania those of the 14th Amendment, ... , we may apply the same analysis to both claims.")) Although Count III is based on the Pennsylvania Constitution rather than the United States Constitution, still what is commonly known as a Stoneking claim. Bradford Area plaintiff, a Sch. Dist., 882 F. 2d 720 former high school student, (3d it is In Stoneking v. Cir. 1989), the alleged that she was sexual I y abused by the school's band director. She brought a section 1983 claim against the school district and its officials for adopting and maintaining a policy of reckless indifference to instances of sexual abuse of students by teachers. F.2d 720. Stoneking, 882 The plaintiff alleged that this policy of reckless indifference created a climate which, at a minimum, facilitated the sexual abuse of students by teachers, including the abuse suffered by plaintiff. The Stoneking Id. Court that the of Appeals for plaintiff's the section Third Circuit held 1983 claim was in not foreclosed by DeShaney v. Winnebago County, Dept. Of Social Servs. , 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989), wherein the Supreme Court held that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." The court distinguished DeShaney because in DeShaney the underlying 7 injury was caused by a private actor; in Stoneking the underlying harm was caused by a state actor. The court held: Nothing in DeShaney suggests that state officials may escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates. Stoneking l because 882 F.2d 724-25. The court, therefore, concluded that the underlying harm was school's band director, caused by a state Stoneking had pled a liability under section 1983. actor, the viable claim for Id. at 725. Since then l our Court of Appeals has made clear that the lynchpin of a Stoneking claim is that the underlying harm was caused by a state actor. Technical Sch., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 972 F.2d 1364 1 1376 {3d Cir. 1992}. In D.R., a case factually indistinguishable from this one l the court dismissed the section 1983 claims brought by high school students who claimed they were molested by other students. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a Stoneking claim because, like here, "private actors committed the underlying violative acts./I Here, Id. the underlying conduct which violated Jane Doe/s bodily integrity was caused by Michael Roe l a private actor.3 3 Plaintiffs discovery change the underlying argue that they have not had an opportunity to conduct [doc. no. 34]. However, no amount of discovery will fact that Michael Roe, a private actor, committed the assaults against Jane Doe. 8 Because the underlying violation was not caused by a state actor, plaintiffs have failed to state a valid claim under Stoneking. Count III is, therefore, dismissed. Remaining in the case are Counts IV and V under Title IX. The Title IX claims may be pursued against the Upper St. School District only. See Bougher v. F.Supp. 139/ 143 (W.D. Pa. 1989). Univ. Clair of Pittsburgh/ 713 All of the individual defendants are, therefore, dismissed from the case. 3. Claim for Punitive Damages Defendants move to dismiss punitive damages. the plaintiffs' claim for Defendants assert that such damages are not recoverable against Upper St. Clair School District, a municipal entity. Conceding the point, plaintiffs respond that they only seek punitive damages from the individual defendants pursuant to their section 1983 claims section 1983 claims [doc. no. 35 at 20]. and the individual fail dismissed from the case, plaintiffs' also fails. The claim for As plaintiffs' defendants are claim for punitive damages punitive damages is, therefore, dismissed. III. MOTION TO STRIKE Fed.R.Civ.p. 12 (f) permits the court to strike "an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 9 scandalous matter. II Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters. II McInerney v. Moyer Lumber And Hardware, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402 (B.D. Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). A motion to strike is to be determined on the basis of the pleadings alone. Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus.! Inc., 836 F.Supp. 200, 218 {D.N.J. 1993}. Defendant von Waldow requests that the court strike from plaintiffs' complaint allegations regarding the sexual assaults of other students by Michael Roe [doc. no. 26 at in the proceedings, have no possible ,7J. At this stage the court cannot say that these allegations relation to plaintiffs' remaining claims. Defendant von Waldow's motion to strike will, therefore, be denied. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, Counts I and II, and the state constitution claim, Count III, are dismissed. Remaining are plaintiffs' Title IX claims against the Upper St. Clair School District, asserted in Counts IV and V. the The individual defendants are, therefore, dismissed case. dismissed. Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is Defendant von Waldow's motion to strike is denied. appropriate order follows. 10 from also An IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JANE DOE, a minor, by JOHN DOE and SUSAN DOE, her parents and natural guardians, ) ) ) } Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-0910 ) UPPER ST. CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) and DR. PATRICK T. O'TOOLE, in his) individual capacity and as ) Superintendent of Schools, and DR. ) TERRENCE KUSHNER, in his individual) capacity and as Assistant ) Superintendent and Director of ) Secondary Education, and ) DR. MICHAEL GHILANI, in his ) individual capacity and as ) Principal, and DR. SHARON SURITSKY ) in her individual capacity and as ) Supervisor of Special Education, ) and JACE B. PALMER, in his ) individual capacity and as ) Assistant Principal, and ) LOU ANGELO, in his individual ) capacity and as Assistant ) Principal, and ESTHER R. von ) Waldow, f/k/a/ ESTHER R. HAGUEL, ) in her individual capacity as ) Intervention Specialist, and ) JENNIFER WAGNER, in her individual ) capacity as a Teacher, ) ) Defendants. AND NOW, thi s ) it ORDER day of November, 2008, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b) (6) filed on behalf of defendants Upper St. Clair School District, Dr. Patrick O'Toole, Dr. Terrence Kushner, Dr. Michael Ghilani, Dr. Sharon Suritsky, Mr. Jace Palmer, Mr. Lou Angelo, and Ms. Jennifer Wagner [doc. no. 23J is GRANTED. Plaintiffs l section 1983 claims l counts I and III and state constitution claim l Count IIII are dismissed with prejudice. damages is also dismissed. Plaintiffs l claim for punitive The individual defendants are dismissed from the case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendant von Waldowls motion to dismiss GRANTED. pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) [doc. no 26J is All claims against her are dismissed with prej udice. Defendant von Waldowls motion to strike [doc. no 26J is denied. ...;{; 2
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
