NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. GEO. V. HAMILTON, INC., No. 2:2008cv00646 - Document 36 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 15 Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff's petition to compel/complaint is dismissed with prejudice; Clerk directed to mark case closed. Signed by Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 11/8/08. (map)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. GEO. V. HAMILTON, INC. Doc. 36 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 08-646 GEO. V. HAMILTON, INC. Defendant. MEMORANDUM and ORDER Gary L. Lancaster, District Judge. November 2008 This is an action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company 1 et seq. Plaintiff, (Nationwide), seeks a declaration that ongoing litigation in Pennsylvania state court in an insurance coverage dispute between Nationwide, other insurers, and its subject insured, to a defendant binding Geo. V. arbitration Hamilton, clause. Inc. In (GVH) , is response to Nationwide's petition to compel arbitration in this Court, GVH filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment requesting that we abstain from exercising jurisdiction in light of previously filed Pennsylvania state court action. the [Doc. No. 15]. For the reasons set forth below, GVH's motion will be granted and we will dismiss this case. Dockets.Justia.com I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise indicated. We construe all other facts in the light most favorable to Nationwide, the non-moving party. Nationwide provided liability insurance to GVH between January 3D, 1985 and January 3D, 1986. GVH is a corporation that distributed insulation products containing asbestos. In 1992, GVH began receiving claims for asbestos-related injuries and tendered them to its Nationwide. insurers, liability insurers, one of which is plaintiff On June 12, 1992, GVH and certain of its liability specifically Nationwide, American Insurance Company, American States Insurance Company, and Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company (PMA) , entered into an Interim Claim Handling Agreement (Interim Agreement). The Interim Agreement covered the insurers' defense and handling of the asbestos-related claims against GVH. The Interim Agreement included an explicit release and discharge of the insurers' liability upon the exhaustion of their policy limits. provision, The Interim Agreement also contained an arbitration which stated \\ [t] he PARTIES agree that any and all disputes arising out of, or relating to this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be decided by nonjudicial arbitration which shall be binding on the parties in accordance with 42 Pa. C.P.S.A. section 7341 ... . II 2 In 1997, Nationwide had exhausted its limits. Accordingly, as provided for in the Interim Agreement, Nationwide obtained a full release and discharge asbestos-related claims. from coverage of GVH's Nationwide thereafter discontinued its participation in the defense and indemnity of asbestos-related claims against GVH. In 2005, PMA and ACE Property & Casualty Insurance Company (ACE) filed two separate declaratory judgment actions in Pennsylvania state courts seeking to have the state courts declare the rights and obligations of the insurers with respect to asbestos injury claims pending against GVH. On July 25, 2006, these actions were coordinated under Pa.R.Civ.P. 213.1 and are now pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, pennsylvania. On May 30, 2007, GVH sent a notice of withdrawal from the Interim Agreement to Nationwide and all other parties to the Interim Agreement. 1 Accordingly, on October 19, 2007, GVH tendered new asbestos-related claims to Nationwide. Thereafter, GVH asserted a cross-claim against Nationwide in the coordinated civil action pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The cross-claim sought insurance coverage for those 1 The parties specified that "this Agreement shall continue in force until any PARTY notifies the other PARTIES in writing, by Certified Mail, of its election to withdraw from the Agreement. Such withdrawal shall take effect ninety (90) days after the mailing of notice of withdrawal. Upon withdrawal by any PARTY, this Agreement shall terminate as to all parties." 3 new asbestos-related claims. On June 7, 2007, American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Company (American Guaranty) joined Nationwide as a co-defendant. Since that time, Nationwide filed its answer and new matter the in coordinated action and is engaging in discovery. Nationwide has not moved to demand arbitration in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, although it has asserted a demand for However, arbitration as before litigation, Nationwide one was of its brought affirmative into the defenses. state court the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County had already denied PMA's demand for arbitration pursuant to the same arbitration clause in the Interim Agreement. preliminary objections, Specifically, in its PMA asserted that "any dispute regarding the [] policies must be determined through binding arbitration. On June 22, 2007, II the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denied PMA's preliminary objections because it found that Interim Agreement terminated as a result of GVH's May 30, the 2007 withdrawal notice and, accordingly, GVH was no longer required to arbitrate under the Interim Agreement. On April I, 2008, Nationwide the sent GVH a Interim Agreement. letter demanding arbitration pursuant to rejected the arbitration demand. On May 12, 2008, Nationwide filed its petition to compel arbitration/complaint in this court. 4 GVH II. DISCUSSION GVH does not contend that federal court jurisdiction over this action is improper, decline to exercise jurisdiction2 because of court action. principles of rather it urges that this Court the pending state Specifically, GVH suggests that issue preclusion and abstention require that this court entertain Nationwide's petition to compel arbitration. Nationwide argues that decline to Conversely, this court must decide the case on the meri ts because issue preclusion cannot apply and because this court has a "virtual unflagging obligation" to exercise its jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,817 (1976). A. Agreement to Arbitrate Section 4 of the FAA3 directs that after a court finds that an action is covered by a written agreement to arbitrate, "the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." U.S.C. § 4i 9 also Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 770, 780 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 2 This Court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship between Nationwide and GVH under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is not in dispute that the enforcement of this arbitration agreement is subject to the FAA. The FAA applies to any "written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of such contract or transaction." 9 U.S.C. § 2. 3 5 The judge in the coordinated state court action, however, has already ruled that GVH need not participate in arbitration pursuant to the Interim Agreement. or, Principles of issue preclusion, in the alternative, Colorado River abstention, require us to refrain from addressing the same question. B. Issue Preclusion As a general rule, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, precludes a party from relitigating in subsequent suits issues that litigated in an earlier case. 147, 153-54 litigated (1979). and determination is issue is conclusive of essential in a Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 1989) been fully fact to or subsequent Inc., issue decided in the fairly claim. 889 F.2d 41, § prior action was actually judgment, the Electro44 (3d Cir. 27 (1982». issue preclusion applies where presented in the later action; the merits; law, the (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments Specifically, and Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. When an determined, have identical \\ (1) the with the one (2) there was a final judgment on (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action." Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 553-54 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047, 1053 find that issue preclusion applies here. 6 (Pa. Super. 1992». We 1. Identical Issues The issue both here and in state court is identical. instant motion arbitration of Agreement. to compel this arbitration coverage dispute requests that pursuant to we the The compel Interim The state court already reviewed and decided the same issue when it was raised by PMA. rejected the argument Specifically, the state court that arbitration was Interim Agreement because it found that required under the the Interim Agreement terminated as a result of GVH's May 30, 2007 withdrawal notice. Accordingly, it is clear that the issues are identical. 2. Final Judgment on the Merits A final judgment is one that is "sufficiently firm to be accorded preclusive effect." 352, 358 (3d Cir. 1999). judgment is final Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d Factors considered in determining if a include: whether adequately deliberated and firm, the prior decision was whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and whether the prior decision was appealable. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1992)). Id. Here, a review of the Restatement factors and relevant case law shows that the state court's order denying arbitration was "sufficiently firm," and therefore final, for purposes of issue preclusion. First, Pennsylvania law is clear that an order denying preliminary objections to compel appealable. Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc. v. Prof. Transp. and 7 arbitration is immediately Logistics. Inc., 803 A.2d 776, 778 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2002) Lenenberg, 795 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2002) i i Levy v. Henning v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 795 A.2d 994, 995 (Pa. Super. 2002). We note that PMA did not appeal the state court order denying its request for arbitration. Second, the parties who were then involved were fully heard on the issue of arbitration. PMA and GVH briefed their arguments and participated in oral argument in front of the state court. On June 22, 2007, the state court judge issued a written order explaining his reasoning for denying arbitration. 4 Finally, case law holds that an immediately appealable state court order denying or compelling arbitration is considered a final judgment for purposes of issue preclusion. See Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc, v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a California state court order denying arbitration was final for purposes of res judicata because, inter alia, "[t] his is .. , a matter of common sense. There must be a limitation on successive petitions to compel arbitration other than the imagination or willpower of the party seeking arbitration, lest judicial proceedings on the merits be indefinitely delayed") i Moses H. Cone Mem. HOsp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (noting in dicta that a state court determination of arbitration would be res judicata in the federal forum) i Gen. Accident Fire & 4 Despite Nationwide's urging, we will not analyze the state court's legal reasoning here. 8 Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Flamini, 445 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. Super. 1982) (holding that an order allowing arbitration to proceed was a final judgment for purposes of res judicata because "pennsylvania law takes a broad view of what constitutes a 'final judgment' for purposes of res judicata") (citing Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. 1974)). Hence, the state court's June 22, 2007 order denying arbitration is final for purposes of issue preclusion. 3. Privity In general, privity is defined as a "[m] utual successive relationship to the same rights of property. broadest sense, or In its 'privity' is ... an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right. Ammon, 655 A.2d at 554 1979) ) . (citing Black's Law Dictionary In other words, privity occurs where a II (5th ed. "relationship between one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include the other within res judicata. Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan/ 913 F.Supp. 377, /I 383 First Options of (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).5 While "there is no prevailing definition of 'privity' 5 We note that "[s]tate law requirements for res judicata and privity are not inconsistent with the federal law applied by this circuit./I First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan/ 913 F.Supp. 377, 384 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citations omitted) . 9 which can be applied automatically to all cases, see Day v. II volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Pa. Super. 1983), courts typically find privity to exist in circumstances" (1) where the nonparty has succeeded to, or sharers] a concurrent right to the party's interest in, property, (2) where the nonparty controlled the prior litigation, and (3) where the party adequately represented the nonparty's interest in the prior proceeding. Myers v. Kim, 55 Pa. D. & C.4th 93, 100 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2001). II The application of the test for privity requires a careful balancing of the nonparty's interest in receiving his day in court with the judicial interests of fairness, finality, and efficiency. See Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1996). In examining the parties for purpose of privi ty by adequate representation, courts must focus on (1) the relationship between the partiesj and (2) whether there is "such an identity of interests between the first and second party that the second should ever be deemed in privity with the Chicago, Inc., 913 F.Supp. at 25 F.Supp.2d 599, 604 Here, Agreement. the 384j first." First Options of Williams v. City of Allentown, (E.D. Pa. 1998). parties are related through the Interim Both parties were signatories to and were jointly defined as "Insurers" in the Interim Agreement. Nationwide argues that PMA was it was "legally not in privity with PMA because designated representative" 10 in the Allegheny not its County action. 6 We disagree. We do not find that legal representation is required in all circumstances. See First Options of Chicago, Inc., 913 F.Supp. at 385 n.11 (explaining that "the cases are better read as indicating that such a relationship is but one factor that will push mere sharing of parallel interests [] into privity for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes"). Although we recognize the a preference in this jurisdiction for between the named and unnamed parties, privity inquiry should be reali ties of parties' flexible relationships. relationship we understand that "the enough II legal Id. to acknowledge at 384. the Given the unique circumstances of this case, we do not require that PMA have been in a formal legal relationship with Nationwide. There is no question that Nationwide and PMA share an "identity of interest" in enforcing contained in the Interim Agreement. the arbitration agreement Although Nationwide was not yet a named party in the state court action at the time that the state court ruled on PMA's demand for arbitration, PMA and Nationwide's interests in the arbitration agreement are identical. 6 Nationwide spends much time focusing on Sloan v. City of Pittsburgh, 110 Fed. Appx. 207 (3d Cir. 2004) and Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2004) to explain when non-parties may be considered to be in privity with parties in a prior action. We note that these cases are non-precedential opinions which judges are discouraged from relying upon. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains that "[t]he court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority. Such opinions are not regarded as precedents that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing." Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5.7. 11 Their rights as to the arbitration provision in the Agreement were jointly defined by the Interim Agreement. Interim Moreover, GVH terminated both PMA and Nationwide's interests in the Interim Agreement at the same time via the same May 30 1 2007 withdrawal notice, copies of which were sent to both parties. Because principles of collateral estoppel are "issue oriented rather than party oriented," Day, 464 A.2d at 1318, and the facts show that PMA and Nationwide shared a relationship as insurers under the Interim Agreement which included an arbitration agreement, we hold that they are in privity regarding the effect of the arbitration provision located in the Interim Agreement. 4. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate The record is clear that PMA received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of arbitration in the state court action. PMA raised the issue of arbitration in its March, 2005 preliminary objections to GVH. Thereafter l PMA fully briefed the issue in its Memorandum of Law in Support, filed on April 26, 2007. The judge in the coordinated state court action heard oral argument on PMA's preliminary objections, and other related issues, on May 81 2007. Hence, we cannot hold that PMA did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue which is before us now. We further reject Nationwide's argument that the parties were not fully heard because the judge in the coordinated state court action decided the issue on a principle of law that was not proposed by either party. That the judge, after reviewing the 12 arbitration provision and the parties' briefs, and hearing oral argument on arbitration, decided the issue on a point of law that was not anticipated is inconsequential. The parties still briefed the arbitration issue and participated in oral argument before the state court. Accordingly, because the issue of arbitration has been previously litigated in state court to a preclusion applies. Nationwide cannot final judgment, litigate the issue issue of arbitration here and the case will be dismissed on this basis. C. Colorado River Abstention If we could not dismiss this case applying the principles of issue preclusion, we would still defer to the prior state court case via Colorado River abstention. Under the guidance of the Supreme Court in Colorado River, a district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where pending in state court. doctrine only applies a parallel case Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-20. in "exceptional circumstances" is This based on considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation. Id. at 819-20. 1. Parallel Proceedings We find that abstention is proper in the instant case. The threshold question under Colorado River is whether there is a parallel state proceeding. Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int'l 298, 306 13 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases are parallel "when they involve the same parties and claims." Chiropractic Am. v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 1999). We conclude that the pending state court action and the instant case are parallel. GVH is a The parties are substantially the same. defendant in the state action. Nationwide is a counterclaim defendant in the state action, along with numerous other insurers. The differences in the parties' roles, and the presence of additional parties in the state action, make no difference to our analysis. at *3 Perry v. Manor Care, Inc., No. 05-5767, 2006 WL 1997480, (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2006); Peerless Heater Co. Chemical Co., No. 97-3128, 1998 WL 195706, at *3 v. Chevron (E.D. Pa. 1998) (explaining that the "reversal of roles does not alter the parallel nature of the cases") (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never required complete identity of parties for abstention to apply. IFC, 438 F.3d at 306 (citations omitted). As described, supra, the claims in both actions are also substantially the same as they both ask the courts to compel arbi tration of an "Insurer" under the Interim Agreement. Therefore, the proceedings are suffiCiently parallel for Colorado River abstention purposes. 2. Exceptional Circumstances Having determined that the two actions are parallel, we next review whether this case involves exceptional circumstances warranting abstention. The relevant 14 factors for consideration include: (I) which court first assumed jurisdiction over a relevant property, if any; (2) whether the federal court is inconvenient; (3) whether abstention would aid in avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) which court first obtained jurisdiction i (5) whether federal or state law applies; and (6) whether the state action is sufficient to protect the federal plaintiff's rights. Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 890 (3d Cir. 1997). Upon careful consideration, we find that these factors weigh in favor of abstention. The first and second factors are not pertinent. As to the first factor, both parties agree that real property is not in dispute here. The parties also agree that the second factor, the question of inconvenience, is not relevant. With regard to the third factor, abstention would avoid piecemeal litigation. we find that This action and the coordinated state court action involve the same parties, Nationwide and GVH, in a dispute over the same agreement. It is clear that the issue has been addressed in Pennsylvania state court. if this suit and the simul taneously maintained, pre-existing state court In fact, suit were the two courts would be duplicating efforts and risking inconsistent rulings. We recognize, however, that there is a strong federal policy in favor of upholding arbitration agreements. U.S. at 20. Cone, Rather than avoiding piecemeal litigation, 460 the FAA "requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an 15 arbi tration agreement. Supreme Court stated Id. II (emphasis in original). that "[u]nder the In Cone, the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. Id. /I The Supreme Court further explained that the proper forum does not "depend [] at all on which court decides the question of arbitrability. Id. II (emphasis in original) . The facts here, however, are distinguishable from those in Cone because this dispute is not "easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes./I Id. at 21. Specifically, an order compelling arbitration between Nationwide and GVH will not relieve Nationwide from continuing to litigate against insurers in the same coordinated state court proceeding. Moreover, the Philadelphia County and Allegheny County state court actions were coordinated in order to avoid the precise situation here, a "duplication of efforts by the courts and the parties [which] may result in inconsistent rulings and orders. Pa.R.Civ.p. II 213.1, explanatory cmt. While the FAA does not favor abstention, we must apply the Colorado River factors "in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand ... . 21. /1 Cone, 460 U.S. at In light of this procedural history and the fact that the judge in the coordinated state court action already reviewed and ruled on the instant issue, we 16 agree that the complexity and coordination of the state court actions cut in favor of abstention. See Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Reynolds F.Supp.2d 652, 657-58 (M.D. Pa. 2004) I Inc. v. Gekas, 309 (abstaining from exercising federal jurisdiction in action seeking to compel arbitration and enjoin a previously filed state court suit because the dispute was not easily severable) i see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 212 F.Supp.2d 621, 629-30 (N.D.W.V. 2002) (holding that Colorado River abstention was warranted because the state court already reviewed and denied the insurers' motion to compel arbitration) . The fourth Colorado River factor that the Pennsylvania state court obtained jurisdiction over this dispute before this Court obtained jurisdiction -- also weighs in favor of abstention. Insurers filed complaints in Allegheny County and in Philadelphia County in January, 2005 and December, 2005, American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Company respectively. joined Nationwide as a defendant into the Philadelphia action on June 7, 2007. On August 10, 2007, Nationwide filed its answer and new matter which included an assertion that "[c]laims for coverage against Nationwide in this action are barred by an arbitration clause in the 1992 claim handling agreement to which Nationwide and its policyholder, George V. Hamilton, are parties." GVH asserted its cross-claim against Nationwide in the coordinated civil action answered on February 29, asserted that all in February, 2008. claims 2008 In its answer, for 17 coverage were which Nationwide Nationwide again barred by the arbitration provision in the Interim Agreement. May 12, 2008, that Nationwide filed its It was not until petition to compel arbitration/complaint in this court. As the state court actions have been pending for over three years, and Nationwide has been a party in the state court action for over one year, we are not persuaded by Nationwide's argument that there has been more progress in this court. undisputed that there has been coordinated state court action. sUbstantial movement It is in the The coordinated state court action is a complex case with a 24 page docket. Discovery is ongoing. In contrast, this case has only been pending since May, 2008, and no discovery has taken place. Moreover, we disagree with Nationwide's assertion that there has been more progress in federal court on the issue of arbitration and that "there have been no 'substantial proceedings' on the issue of arbitrability in the state court action." To the contrary, the state court has already examined the issue of binding arbitration under the Interim Agreement and rejected it. Here, the parties limited their federal court briefs to the issue of this court's jurisdiction, abstention; they have issue not preclusion, even fully and briefed Colorado the River issue of arbitrability yet. In light of these circumstances, Nationwide's attempt to compel arbitration in this forum raises the possibility of forum 18 shopping. To the extent that this factor has much weight, it weighs in favor of abstention. Pursuant to the fifth factor, we are also instructed to review whether state or federal law applies. A review of the Interim Agreement suggests that state law will provide the rule of the decision. The Interim Agreement states that" [t]his agreement shall be controlled by and interpreted according to the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. general is controlled /I Accordingly, 7 by Pennsylvania the Interim Agreement in contract law, although enforceability of the agreement remains under the control of the FAA. See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2007) ("We recognize that courts including our court look to the law of the forum state or another state related to the circumstances of the dispute in determining as a matter of federal law whether an issue is referable to arbitration/l) . Finally, pursuant to the sixth factor, we review whether the state action is sufficient to protect Nationwide's rights. Based on the complexity of the proceeding already pending in state court, and the fact that the state court has already reviewed and ruled on the applicability of the same arbitration 7 The arbitration provision also specifies that "any and all disputes ... shall be decided by nonjudicial arbitration which shall be binding on the parties in accordance with 42 Pa. C.P.S.A. section 7341./1 Section 7341 deals with review of arbitration awards, however, instead of the enforceability of arbitration provisions. 42 Pa. C.P.S.A. § 7341. For this reason, section 7341 does not apply here. 19 provision at issue here l we find that the Pennsylvania state court is best equipped to address Nationwide/s allegations. Therefore, this final factor also weighs in favor of abstention. Recognizing that "the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist I but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case ll and that "[t] he weight to be given to anyone factor may vary greatly from case to caselli see Cone I 460 U.S. at 16 1 we hold that, if issue preclusion would not first apply to this action l instant the circumstances of the situation would warrant our abstention from exercising jurisdiction. prejudice. We would l therefore I dismiss the action See Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., with 309 F.SUpp.2d at 661 n.14. III. CONCLUSION Because Colorado River issue abstention judgment is granted. preclusion, or applies, GVH's l in the motion alternative for summary This case is dismissed with prejudice. appropriate order follows. 20 l An IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 08-646 GEO. V. HAMILTON, INC. Defendant. Therefore, this ORDER of November, 2008, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss and/or summary judgment [doc. no. 15J is GRANTED. The plaintiff's petition to compel/complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Courts is directed to mark this case closed forthwith. cc: All Counsel of Record 21
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
