Kundratic v. Thomas et al
Filing
132
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Conclusion.Like every saga, this one must have an end. This case has evolved from a domestic dispute and has now been aired in three separate courts over a period of almost seven years. While the Court understands Plaintiff Kundratics frustration at the failure of his marriage and the resulting lengthy process to determine the property rights and custody rights of the parties, Kundratics disappointment with the various decisions made in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas is not the stuff of which a federal lawsuit is made. He has not even attempted to provide a plausible explanation of why three different attorneys would prostitute their services to suit the needs of Defendant Th omas. More importantly, Kundratic has produced no evidence that the sordid conspiracy he alleges ever existed. His surmise and belief that it did, standing alone, is not enough to create a material fact in dispute here.See Lexington Insurance Compa ny and Berkely Investment Group, supra. There is simply no evidence that has been brought to this Courts attention from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Kundratic is entitled to relief. Consequently, the motions for summary judgment filed by all remaining Defendants must be granted. An Order consistent with this determination shall be filed contemporaneously herewith.Dated: November 26, 2013Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 11/26/13. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANDREW KUNDRATIC
:
PLAINTIFF,
:
v.
:
CASE NO. 3:12-CV-0017
GARY THOMAS ET AL.
(JUDGE RICHARD P. CONABOY)
:
DEFENDANTS.
:
_________________________________________________________________
Memorandum
We consider here Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Tina Gartley (“Gartley”), Anthony Lumbis (“Lumbis”),
Gary Thomas (“Thomas”), and Arthur Silverblatt
(“Silverblatt”)(Docs. 84, 87, 91, and 96 respectively).
These
motions have been fulled briefed by the parties and are now ripe
for disposition.
I.
Factual Background.
This case stems from a 2006 divorce action filed by Plaintiff
Andrew Kundratic (“Kundratic”) against his former spouse, Sophia
Kundratic, in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.
That
divorce proceeding, as is often the case in such matters, was
highly contentious and protracted.
The parties argued vehemently
over property distribution matters, Mrs. Kundratic’s entitlement to
alimony pendente lite, and custody of their then minor daughter,
Brittany Kundratic.
The contentious nature of the divorce coupled
with the fact that Kundratic changed lawyers in midstream caused
1
the proceeding to be protracted.
During the course of the divorce
proceeding, Mrs. Kundratic sought and obtained a protection from
abuse order that was later extended by the Luzerne County Court of
Common Pleas.
The existence of the protection from abuse order
complicated exchanges of custody on the days appointed for
Kundratic to visit with his daughter and also complicated
Kundratic’s efforts to retrieve personal items from the marital
abode.
While the Kundratic divorce proceeding was ongoing, Kundratic
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit (Middle District of
Pennsylvania No. 3:08-CV-1652)(hereinafter “Kundratic I”) against
his wife and Defendant Thomas who, at that time, were romantically
involved.
Kundratic I was cast as a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983
that alleged that Thomas, a state actor due to his status as a
Pennsylvania State Policeman, abused his official authority to
cause agents of the Rice Township Police Department to prosecute
Kundratic for assault and harassment and to cause the magistrate
who presided over the case to set an unreasonably high cash bail.
1
William J. Nealon (a senior judge in this Court) presided over
Kundratic I and dismissed that case due to his findings that, even
assuming that Thomas had done the things Kundratic attributed to
him, none of Thomas’ actions were performed under color of state
1
Kundratic indicates that he was charged with harassment and assault and that he pled guilty
to harassment due to the advice of counsel. See Kundratic deposition (Doc. 116-2) at 49.
2
law but, rather, were performed for purely personal reasons.
Judge
Nealon’s holding in Kundratic I was subsequently upheld by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
In denying various motions to dismiss the instant case, this
Court ruled (Doc. 64) that it would not revisit facts and issues
decided in Kundratic I due to the doctrine of res judicata.
The
Court ruled further that Kundratic would be given the opportunity
to adduce evidence through discovery that Thomas had abused his
position as a “state actor” to violate his constitutional rights in
some fashion.
Kundratic was pointedly informed in this Court’s
prior Memorandum and Order (Docs. 64 and 65) that to sustain this
lawsuit he would be required to show that Thomas, singly or in
combination with the other Defendants, abused his official
authority to Kundratic’s detriment between July 2,2009 (the date
Judge Nealon dismissed Kundratic I) and January 4, 2012 (the date
when the instant lawsuit was filed).
Numerous depositions have now been taken in this matter, the
time for discovery has run, and it is this Court’s task to review
such evidence as Kundratic has called to our attention in order to
determine whether there are justiciable issues of material fact
sufficient to require submission of this case to a jury.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates
there is no “genuine issue as to any material fact.”
3
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
“[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
“An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary
basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect
the outcome of the suit under governing law.”
Kaucher v. County of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, a
court must resolve all factual doubts and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Conoshenti v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted).
The initial burden is on the moving party to show an absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citations omitted).
The moving party may
meet this burden by “pointing out to the district court [] that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof.”
Id. at 325.
The non-moving party may not rest on the bare
allegations contained in his or her pleadings, but is required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to go beyond the pleadings by
4
way of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the
like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give
rise to a genuine issue.
Id. at 324.
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district
court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any
weighing of evidence.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Therefore, when
evidentiary facts are in dispute, when the credibility of witnesses
may be in issue, or when conflicting evidence must be weighed, a
full trial is usually necessary. Nonetheless, the party opposing
summary judgment must support each essential element of the claim
with concrete evidence in the record.
Celotex, supra at 322-23.
This requirement upholds the underlying purpose of the rule, which
is to avoid a trial “in cases where it is unnecessary and would
only cause delay and expense.”
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976).
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534
Therefore, if, after making all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court
determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment is appropriate.
Celotex, supra, at 322; Wisniewski v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
If the non-
movant’s evidence is merely speculative, conclusory, “or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, supra, at 249-50 (internal citation omitted).
A plaintiff’s mere belief is not enough to create a dispute of
material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.
5
See
Lexington Ins. Co. V. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding that speculation is not sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment).
Our circuit has stated: “...summary
judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving
party; the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the
record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings,
legal memoranda, or oral argument.”
Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. V.
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
III. Legal Analysis.
While Kundratic’s claim alleges a broad conspiracy among
Thomas (his ex-wife’s former paramour), Silverblatt and Lumbis (who
both represented Kundratic at different stages of his divorce
proceeding), and Gartley (who represented his wife in the divorce
proceeding) to violate his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as
“state actors” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claim must rise or
fall at this point by making some demonstration that Thomas, the
only Defendant who could properly be characterized as a “state
actor” due to his status as a Pennsylvania State Policemen, used
his official authority in some fashion to deprive Kundratic of
constitutionally protected rights or property interests.
However,
the mere fact that Thomas is a police officer does not transform
his every action into an exercise of official power.
Rather, to
have acted under color of state law requires that the party so
characterized “had exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state
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law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law.’” Abbott v. Lastsahw, 164 F.3d 141, 146
(3d. Cir. 1998)(citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49)(1998)).
A person not in the employ of the state may still be
appropriately characterized as a “state actor” if “he is a willing
participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”
Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)(citing U.S. v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
An indispensable element of a
conspiracy that is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, as Kundratic purports this case to be, is
that at least one of the participants must be a “state actor”.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982).
The aforementioned precedents establish that, to prove that an
actionable conspiracy existed as alleged in this case, the
Plaintiff must adduce evidence that the pivotal alleged coconspirator, Defendant Thomas, somehow abused his status as a
policeman to deprive Kundratic of some constitutionally protected
right.
To determine whether enough evidence of that type has been
produced, the Court has carefully read all depositions taken in
this case with particularly close scrutiny of the depositions of
Defendant Thomas and Plaintiff Kundratic.
Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendant Thomas’ Summary
Judgment Motion (Doc. 120) points to several events that
purportedly establish that Thomas, in his capacity as a state
7
actor, wrongfully deprived Kundratic of his property or impeded his
access to the Court.
We will discuss these events in turn and in
relation to the relevant case law identified above.
A.
2
The Blog
Kundratic’s first argument is that Thomas “acted under the
badge of state authority” (Doc. 120 at 15), when, in the course of
participating in a “blog” on the Internet, he referred to himself
at one point as “this officer”, (Id.).
The blog in question was
used by Thomas (“New Home Owner”) and Kundratic (“Mountaintop
Resident”) along with numerous unidentified participants, to argue,
inter alia, about whether the Pennsylvania State police habitually
abused their authority in carrying on affairs with married women.
See Doc. 116, Ex. F.
More specifically, Thomas, using the
pseudonym New Home Owner, wrote,
It is obvious that if you own a half a million
dollar home you had an expensive lawyer yet you
claim to be the victim of a false P.F.A.
Sounds
like someone is a wife and child beater.
It seems
that you would be happy if the hit man got to this
officer.
2
It should be noted that in the “Standard of Review” section of Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff
takes the position that certain case law that is applicable only in the context of employment
discrimination cases should hold sway here. Plaintiff is incorrect this regard and the Court will not
apply that case law to the instant case. (See Doc. 120 at 13-15).
8
Kundratic characterizes Thomas’ reference to himself as “this
3
officer”
as “fatal to Gary Thomas’s defense that he is acting in
a private capacity.”
(Doc. 120 at 15-16).
incorrect in this regard.
Kundratic is simply
Thomas’ mere reference to himself as
“this officer” was not made in conjunction with an effort to arrest
Kundratic or otherwise invoke police authority over him.
The
invocation of police authority is the sine qua non necessary to
transform a policeman involved in a purely personal pursuit into a
“state actor” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 818-19 (1994).
Barna v. City of Perth
Thomas and Kundratic were in
completely separate locations when the exchange in question took
place.
Thomas was merely stating a fact with which Kundratic had
long been acquainted - - he worked as a police officer.
Because
Thomas’ comment was not directed to arresting Kundratic or
otherwise exerting police authority over him, it cannot be
sufficient to transform Thomas into a “state actor” here.
B.
The Baseball Cards
Kundratic also points to the alleged theft of his baseball
card collection by Thomas as evidence of state action that violated
his property rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
With
Thomas’ reference came in the context of a heated exchange concerning whether
Kundratic’s P.F.A. was justified in the context of a larger “discussion” about the cost of hiring a hit
man that was initiated by an unidentified third party.
9
regard to the “theft” of the baseball cards, Kundratic admitted at
his deposition that he did not witness Thomas removing the baseball
cards and that he has no evidence that Thomas took the cards.
(Doc. 116-2, Pages 101-02).
In fact, Kundratic admitted that, as
of the date of his deposition, the baseball cards are still in the
marital residence.
(Doc. 116-2, Page 102).
Given these
admissions, Kundratic cannot establish that Thomas ever took his
baseball cards anywhere, much less that he did so while acting
under color of law.
C.
The Combination to the Safe
Kundratic asserts that Thomas also violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by accessing the combination to his personal safe
through the abuse of “his badge of authority”.
(Doc. 116 at 20).
Kundratic further asserts that this was done “at the behest of Tina
Gartley”.
4
(Id.).
In an attempt to prove this, Kundratic directs
the Court to his Exhibits EE and S, respectively.
Ex. EE is a
transcript of an equitable distribution hearing conducted July 9,
2009 at which Sophia Kundratic testified that she did not have the
combination to the safe in the Kundratic’s marital residence.
(Doc. 119-2 at 33-34).
Ex. S is, in pertinent part, an email dated
September 9, 2009 from Thomas to Defendant Gartley in which he
acknowledges:
4
Kundratic acknowledged during his deposition (Doc. 116-2 at 38-54) that he had no direct
knowledge indicating that Gartley had directed Thomas to open the safe.
10
Just want you to know that we were able to open the safe.
There were coins, sports cards, and personal papers of
Andrews.
They are in a box ready for him.
These exhibits taken together do not amount to evidence that
Thomas “used his badge of authority” to learn the combination to
the safe. They only provide proof that, some two months after
Sophia Kundratic testified at the equitable distribution hearing,
the combination to the safe had been in some undefined manner
obtained.
Thomas’ email to Gartley merely indicated that “we” have
been able to open the safe.
It provides no proof that Thomas was
the party that obtained the combination, much less that he did so
while acting under color of state law.
D.
The Hidden Documents
Kundratic also complains that certain documents that had been
secured in his pool house were stolen by Thomas and given to
Defendant Gartley in an attempt to impede his (Kundratic’s)ability
to represent himself in his divorce proceeding in violation of his
First Amendment rights.
(Doc. 120, at 19).
Here, again, he
acknowledges that he did not observe Thomas taking these documents
nor does he have any direct evidence that Thomas did so. (Doc. 1162 at 106-08).
Beyond that, Kundratic seems not to have considered
the possibility that his wife had access to these documents or that
they could have been obtained by Gartley in some other fashion.
In
any event, Kundratic’s allegation that Thomas “stole” his documents
11
is based purely on speculation and belief and is unsupported by
concrete evidence of any kind.
E.
Thomas’ Influence Over Silverblatt and Lumbis
Kundratic alleges that Thomas asserted his influence as a
state policeman to cause his attorneys, Defendants Silverblatt and
Lumbis, to exercise less than their best efforts on his behalf
during his divorce proceeding.
(Doc. 120 at 18).
Yet, he
acknowledged at his deposition that he never saw either of these
men speak to Thomas nor does he have any direct evidence that they
communicated with Thomas in any way.
36).
(Doc. 116-2 at 24-27 and 34-
His only support for his opinion that Silverblatt and Lumbis
succumbed to Thomas’ alleged influence over them is his personal
speculation and suspicion.
He has no proof whatsoever that any
alliance between his attorneys and Thomas ever existed.
F.
Thomas’ Menacing Behavior
Finally, Kundratic contends at several places in his brief
(Doc. 120, at 15, 17, and 18) that Thomas engaged in menacing or
threatening behavior designed to intimidate him and thereby
obstruct his access to the courts.
When questioned about the scope
of Thomas’ alleged menacing behavior, Kundratic described it as
Thomas’ mere presence at the various hearings conducted during his
divorce coupled with the fact that he habitually walked around
Kundratic’s residence clad only in his boxer shorts during the time
that he co-habited with Kundratic’s wife.
12
(Doc. 116-2 at pages 87-
95).
Thomas’ presence at a hearing involving the rights of his
then girlfriend, Sophia Kundratic, cannot be seen as an abuse of
official power.
Kundratic stated specifically that Thomas was not
in uniform on these occasions nor did he testify that Thomas spoke
or took any other action at these hearings.
With respect to Thomas
allegedly walking about the Kundratic home in his boxer shorts
during the time when he resided there, Kundratic acknowledged that
he was never present on these occasions.
Without discussing the
propriety of strolling around one’s residence clad only in boxer
shorts, Kundratic’s testimony on this point, even if accepted as
true, does not establish any abuse of official power.
V.
Conclusion.
Like every saga, this one must have an end.
This case has
evolved from a domestic dispute and has now been aired in three
separate courts over a period of almost seven years.
While the
Court understands Plaintiff Kundratic’s frustration at the failure
of his marriage and the resulting lengthy process to determine the
property rights and custody rights of the parties, Kundratic’s
disappointment with the various decisions made in the Luzerne
County Court of Common Pleas is not the stuff of which a federal
lawsuit is made.
He has not even attempted to provide a plausible
explanation of why three different attorneys would prostitute their
services to suit the needs of Defendant Thomas.
More importantly,
Kundratic has produced no evidence that the sordid conspiracy he
13
alleges ever existed.
His surmise and belief that it did, standing
alone, is not enough to create a material fact in dispute here.
See Lexington Insurance Company and Berkely Investment Group,
supra. There is simply no evidence that has been brought to this
Court’s attention from which a reasonable juror could conclude that
Kundratic is entitled to relief.
Consequently, the motions for
summary judgment filed by all remaining Defendants must be granted.
An Order consistent with this determination shall be filed
contemporaneously herewith.
BY THE COURT
S/Richard P. Conaboy
Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
United States District Court
Dated: November 26, 2013
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