P.W. et al v. Delaware Valley School District et al - Document 24

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA P.W., a minor; J.W. Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of P.W.; and PATRICIA W., Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of P.W., Plaintiffs : No. 3:09cv480 : : (Judge Munley) : : : : : : v. : : DELAWARE VALLEY SCHOOL : DISTRICT; and : PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT : OF EDUCATION, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: M E M O R AN D U M B e fo re the court are defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. (Docs. 14, 19). Having been fully briefed, the matters are ripe for disposition. B a c k g ro u n d T h is case arises out of the provision of education for minor plaintiff P.W . p u rs u a n t to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. �� 1 4 0 0 et seq. That act requires that school districts provide a free appropriate public e d u c a tio n ("FAPE") to qualified disabled children. See 20 U.S.C. � 1415. According to the amended complaint, P.W . is a disabled student diagnosed with mental re ta rd a tio n and autism. (Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) (hereinafter "Complt") at � 1 8 ). He is otherwise eligible to receive services through the Defendant Delaware  Valley Schoool District (the "District"). (Id. at � 19). On July 2, 2008, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Defendant Delaware V a lle y School District and the Office of Dispute Resolution ("ODR"), an independent a g e n c y of the Defendant Department of Education ("the Department" or "PDE"). The c o m p la in t alleged that the district had failed to provide P.W . a free appropriate public e d u c a tio n in violation of federal law. (Id. at � 20). An ODR hearing officer held a s p e c ia l education due process hearing at the school district on November 20-21, 2 0 0 8 . (Id. at � 21). The officer rendered a decision on December 20, 2008, finding th a t the school district failed to provide a FAPE. (Id. at � 22). The officer also found th a t P.W . was entitled to 132 hours of compensatory education because of this fa ilu re . (Id. at � 23). This failure to provide FAPE, plaintiffs allege, meant that p la in tiff was denied a meaningful educational benefit. (Id. at � 24). The Pennsylvania Department of Education had provided direct supervision a n d monitoring of P.W . for the district in the previous school year. (Id. at � 25). The q u a lity of this supervision is in dispute in another lawsuit before the undersigned ju d g e . (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that PDE violated the IDEA by failing to monitor and s u p e rvis e instruction of P.W . during the 2007-2008 school year. (Id. At � 26). Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court on March 16, 2009. (See Doc. 1). After b e in g served with the complaint, both the PDE and the District filed motions to d is m is s the action. (See Docs. 5, 8). Before the parties completed briefing those m o tio n s , plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 4, 2009. (See Doc. 11). The a m e n d e d complaint raises five causes of action. Count I alleges that the school 2  district violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against P.W . b e c a u s e of his disability. Count II raises a discrimination claim pursuant to the A m e ric a n s with Disabilities Act and a 42 U.S.C. � 1983 claim against the District. Count III alleges that the Department violated the IDEA by failing to supervise, m o n ito r and enforce P.W .'s educational rights. Count IV accuses the Department of d is c rim in a tio n in violation of Section 504. Count V is a demand for attorney's fees p u rs u a n t to the IDEA, Section 504 and Section 1983. The defendants filed motions to dismiss that amended complaint and the parties briefed the issues, bringing the c a s e to its present posture. J u r is d ic tio n A s this case is brought pursuant to federal statutes, the court has jurisdiction p u rs u a n t to 28 U.S.C. � 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all c ivil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Legal Standard D e fe n d a n ts have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). W h e n a defendant files such a motion, all well-pleaded a lle g a tio n s of the complaint must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to th e non-movant to determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the p le a d in g s , the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 8 3 8 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of Y o rk , 768 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985), (quoting Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 5 6 4 , 565 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curium)). The court may also consider "matters of 3  public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the re c o rd of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1 3 8 4 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have to accept legal c o n c lu s io n s or unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. o f W ilm in g to n , Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morse v. Lower M e rio n Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). The federal rules require only that plaintiff provide "`a short and plain s ta te m e n t of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,'" a standard w h ic h "does not require `detailed factual allegations,'" but a plaintiff must make "`a s h o w in g , rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief' that rises `above the s p e c u la tiv e level.'" McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (q u o tin g Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). The "c o m p la in t must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (q u o tin g Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Such "facial plausibility" exists "when the p la in tiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference th a t the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged." Id. D is c u s s io n B o th the District and the Department have filed motions to dismiss. The court w ill address each in turn. A. The Statutory Background In itia lly , the court will provide a brief overview of the various statutes invoked 4  by the plaintiff. As noted above, plaintiffs have brought suit pursuant to the IDEA. T h e purpose of the IDEA is to "assure that all handicapped children have available to th e m ... a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. � 1400(c). In order to receive fe d e ra l funding to aid in the education of the disabled, states must provide programs th a t comply with IDEA requirements. 20 U.S.C. � 1412. Included in the requirements is that the state must have in effect "a policy that assures all children with disabilities th e right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. � 1412(1). T h e congressional goal of providing a free appropriate education is im p le m e n te d through the use of an IEP, which is established for each disabled child. 2 0 U.S.C. � 1412(4). The IEP is developed by the parents, representatives of the s c h o o l and where appropriate, the disabled child. 20 U.S.C. � 1414(b). It sets out "th e child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term o b je c tiv e s for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially d e s ig n e d instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." H o n ig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). A yearly review of the IEP is performed to d e te rm in e if any revisions are necessary to provide a free and appropriate education to each child's unique needs. Id. T h e student's action also involves a claim made pursuant to section 504 of the R e h a b ilita tio n Act, 29 U.S.C. � 729 (hereinafter "section 504" or "RA"). This statute p ro h ib its discrimination against the disabled in federally funded programs. S p e c ific a lly , the law provides: N o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 5  United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, s h a ll, solely by reason of her or his disability be e x c lu d e d from the participation in, be denied the b e n e fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any p ro g ra m or activity receiving Federal financial a s s is ta n c e [.] 2 9 U.S.C. � 794(a). T h e IDEA and section 504 provide equivalent requirements. The IDEA p ro vid e s an affirmative duty to provide education, whereas the Section 504 of the R e h a b ilita tio n Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled. W .B . v. Matula, 67 F .3 d 484, 492-93 (3d Cir.1995). T h e third act involved in the claim is the ADA. Like section 504, the ADA p ro h ib its discrimination against the disabled. T h e final statutory claim made by the student is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. � 1 9 8 3 (hereinafter "section 1983"). Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, b u t is rather, a means to redress deprivation by state officials of rights secured by th e United States Constitution or certain federal statutes. Matula, 67 F.3d at 493. S e c tio n 1983 may be used to remedy a violation of the IDEA. Id. at 494. B e a rin g these various statutes in mind, the court will now address the issues ra is e d in defendants' motions. B. The Department's Motion T h e Department seeks to dismiss counts III, IV and V. The Department a rg u e s that plaintiff's complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to support e ith e r of plaintiffs' claims against it. Citing to the Supreme Court's recent decision in 6  Ascroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), defendant argues that p la in tiffs ' claims must fail because they represent mere conclusory allegations that d o little more than state the elements of a claim under the IDEA and Rehabilitation A c t. Such pleading fails to provide factual matter sufficient to "state a claim to relief th a t is plausible on its face," as the Supreme Court's new pleading standards r e q u ir e . i. Rehabilitation Act T h e Department argues that plaintiffs' RA claim must be dismissed because p la in tiffs have not alleged that PDE discriminated against him solely because of his d is a b ility . The allegations against the Department are merely conclusory and "s k e le ta l" and cannot survive the Iqbal standard. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the elements a plaintiff must e s ta b lis h to prove an RA claim in the area of education of individuals with disabilities a re : "(1) he is `disabled' as defined by the Act; (2) he is `otherwise qualified' to p a rtic ip a te in school activities; (3) the school or the board of education re c e ive s federal financial assistance; and (4) he was excluded from p a rtic ip a tio n in, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination at, the s c h o o l." Andrew M. v. Delaware County Office of Mental Health and Mental R e ta rd a tio n , 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir. 2007)(quoting Ridgewood Board of E d u c a tio n v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir.1997)). The court finds defendant's argument unpersuasive. The complaint alleges th a t P.W . "Is a handicapped person who has a mental impairment which s u b s ta n tia lly limits his life activities." (Complt. at � 28). Defendants also allegedly "d e n ie d " P.W . a "meaningful education benefit." (Id.). Thus, even if the claim does 7  not specifically allege "discrimination" solely on the basis of disability, it certainly a ve rs that P.W . was denied his right to an education protected by federal law. This a s s e rtio n meets the requirement that the plaintiff establish that "he was excluded fro m participation in, denied the benefits of. . . the school." Andrew M., 490 F.3d at 3 5 0 . The Third Circuit has explained that: "when a state fails to provide a disabled c h ild with a free and appropriate education, it violates the IDEA. However, it also vio la te s the RA because it is denying a disabled child a guaranteed education m e re ly because of the child's disability." Id. Moreover, the court finds the plaintiff h a s alleged that the district made its decision to deny P.W . a FAPE because of his d is a b ility . W h ile plaintiffs might have offered more facts in their complaint, the court c a n reasonably infer that the decision made by the hearing officer, combined with a lle g a tio n s that represents a plausible inference of illegal discrimination based s o le ly on a disability. As such, the court will deny the motion to dismiss on this point. ii. IDEA The Department also insists that plaintiffs' claims under the IDEA must be d is m is s e d , as plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Department was a party to the u n d e rly in g due process hearing. The Department contends that plaintiffs have also fa ile d to plead with sufficient particularity the allegation that PDE failed to supervise, e n fo rc e or monitor the District. Moreover, since PDE did not participate in the a d m in is tra tiv e proceedings, plaintiffs cannot bring their claims for the first time to this c o u rt. ID E A requires that a State Education Agency ("SEA") such as PDE ensure 8  that the IDEA's regulations are carried out and: That each educational program for children with d is a b ilitie s administered within the State, including each p ro g ra m administered by any other State or local agency . . . (i) Is under the general supervision of the persons re s p o n s ib le for educational programs for children with d is a b ilitie s in the SEA; and (ii) Meets the educational standards of the SEA (in c lu d in g the requirements of this part) . . . (b) The State must have in effect polices and p ro c e d u re s to ensure that it complies with the m o n ito rin g and enforcement requirements [.] 3 4 C.F.R. 300.149. The complaint avers that "PDE provided direct supervision and monitoring to th e school district regarding" P.W . "over the course of the previous . . . school year." (Complt. at � 25) Moreover, "PDE . . . provided no supervision or monitoring to the s c h o o l district regarding [P.W .] over the course of the 2007-2008 school year." (Id. at � 26). Thus, "PDE failed to monitor or supervise the school district regarding the p ro vis io n of FAPE to P.W " and "failed to enforce the provision of the IDEA regarding P .W ." (Id. at �� 39-40). These averments do more than simply recite the elements of a n IDEA claim. Combined with allegations that P.W . did not receive the education to w h ic h he was entitled, they represent an allegation of factual conduct that allows the c o u rt to make a reasonable inference that the PDE had failed to establish "p ro c e d u re s to ensure that it complies with the monitoring and enfrocement re q u ire m e n ts ." The court will thus deny the motion to dismiss on this point. iii. Section 1983 P la in tiffs have also brought their claims pursuant to Section 1983. Defendant 9  argues that both the RA and the IDEA provide comprehensive remedial schemes, a n d plaintiffs cannot use Section 1983 as a substitute for those schemes or as a m e a n s of avoiding exhaustion requirements under the IDEA. The plaintiffs agree that th e ir Section 1983 claim should be dismissed. The court will therefore grant this p o rtio n of the motion as unopposed. iv. Attorney's Fees D e fe n d a n t also contends that plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees and c o s ts . First, they contend, defendant has not stated a claim pursuant either to the R e h a b ilita tio n Act or the IDEA against it, and thus plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fe e s . Plaintiffs have also not brought a Section 1983 action against the Department, a n d thus defendant cannot be liable for fees related to that claim. Further, the law p re ve n ts plaintiffs from recovering attorney's fees for the earlier administrative action. In any case, PDE was not a party to that action and thus not liable for fees related to it. The court will not grant the motion on those grounds as we have concluded th a t it is inappropriate to dismiss the IDEA and RA claims. Alternatively, PDE claims that PW seeks attorneys fees for the administrative h e a rin g s that have been held. PDE asserts that it was not a party to these hearings a n d therefore cannot be held liable for attorneys fees associated with them. The c o u rt finds it premature to dismiss the claim for attorneys fees on this cause and will d e n y the motion to dismiss on this issue without prejudice to PDE raising the issue a g a in in a motion for summary judgment. 10  C. The District's Motion T h e Defendant District also moves to dismiss of plaintiffs' claim. The court will a d d re s s each ground for that motion in turn. i. ADA T h e district argues that the court should dismiss plaintiffs' ADA claim. An ADA d is c rim in a tio n claim proceeds under the same standard as a Rehabilitation Act Claim. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, *32 (3d Cir. 2009).1 T h u s , "[t]o prevail on a violation of either of those statutes, the [plaintiffs] had to d e m o n s tra te that [P.W .] (1) has a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to participate in a school program; and (3) was denied the benefits of the program or was otherwise s u b je c t to discrimination because of her disability." Id. at 32-33. The court has a lre a d y found that plaintiffs have stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. As s u c h , they have stated an ADA claim.2 D e fe n d a n t argues that the ADA claim is unavailable because the claims b ro u g h t in Count IV pertaining to the ADA were not litigated in the state proceeding, The court's electronic database does not yet provide page citations to the official reporter. In its brief, the district argues that there are different requirements for a FAPE under the IDEA and the RA, and that a violation of the IDEA because of a deficient FAPE would not necessarily constitute a violation of the RA. The district points out that "[i]n the case at bar, there is no evidence in the record, nor any decision from the hearing officer regarding whether or not Patrick's program constituted a FAPE under � 504." (District's Brief (Doc. 20) at 6). An argument about the sufficiency of the evidence of record is not appropriate at the motion-to-dismiss stage. At this point, it is enough that plaintiffs have stated a claim. They are not required to produce the evidence that supports their claim before engaging in discovery. 11 2 1  and thus administrative remedies have not been exhausted. Exhaustion is a re q u ire m e n t in suits involving the IDEA. "The IDEA requires, in section 1415(e)(2), th a t an aggrieved party must invoke a state's administrative procedures before b rin in g an IDEA claim in state or federal court." Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mount L e b a n o n Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1996). The IDEA extends this e xh a u s tio n requirement to claims brought under other statutes, such as the ADA, w h e n those claims "`seek relief that is also available under this subchapter.'" Id. (q u o tin g 20 U.S.C. � 1415(f)). The purpose of that provision is to "[bar] plaintiffs from c irc u m ve n tin g IDEA's exhaustion requirement by taking claims that could have been b ro u g h t under IDEA and repackaging them as claims under some other statute�e.g., s e c tio n 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA." Id. Still, "the e xh a u s tio n requirement is limited to actions seeking relief `also available' under ID E A ." Matula, 67 F.3d at 496. Thus, "by its plain terms � 1415(f) does not require e xh a u s tio n where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding." Id. T h e defendant does not contend that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their a d m in is tra tiv e remedies with respect to their IDEA claim. Instead, they argue that p la in tiffs ' ADA claim could have been brought as an IDEA claim and was not. As s u c h , defendant insists, the claim is barred. Here, however, plaintiffs seek c o m p e n s a to ry damages under the ADA and RA for defendant's failure to provide a F A P E . (See Complt., Prayer for Relief at � A). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals h a s recently held that "compensatory and punitive damages are not an available 12  remedy under the IDEA." Chambers, 587 F.3d at *22. Since the law provides that "th e exhaustion requirement is limited to actions seeking relief `also available' under ID E A ," the court finds that exhaustion was not necessary here on plaintiff's ADA and R A claims. Matula, 67 F.3d at 486. The court will deny the motion on these grounds. ii. Rehabilitation Act D e fe n d a n t argues that plaintiffs' RA claim should be dismissed for essentially th e same reasons the Department does. For the reasons stated above, the court will d e n y the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim.3 iv. Section 1983 T h e parties agree that plaintiffs' section 1983 claims against the district should b e dismissed. The court will therefore grant the motion on that point. v. Attorney's Fees T h e District also seeks dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees. The c la im , the district contends, is not ripe. No final decision has been made on any of p la in tiff's claims. Moreover, plaintiffs have not submitted evidence upon which the c o u rt could justify an award of fees and costs. Much of defendant's argument in this in s ta n c e focuses on the amount of fees for which plaintiffs would be eligible and the m e a n s by which they would be calculated. T h e court finds it plausible that plaintiffs could obtain attorney's fees by Much of the District's argument on the Rehabilitation Act claim focuses on the quality and presence of the evidence in the record. The court declines to convert the instant motion into one for summary judgment, since discovery is necessary to examine the motivations of the defendants for their decisions about P.W.'s education. 13 3  prevailing on the claims here in question. The court will therefore reserve judgment o n defendant's arguments about how those fees should be calculated or determined. A t this stage in the litigation, dismissal or reduction of fees would be premature. The c o u rt will deny the motion on this point. 14  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA P.W., a minor; J.W. Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of P.W.; and PATRICIA W., Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of P.W., Plaintiffs : No. 3:09cv480 : : (Judge Munley) : : : : : : v. : : DELAWARE VALLEY SCHOOL : DISTRICT; and : PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT : OF EDUCATION, : Defendants : ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ORDER AN D NOW, to wit, this 29th day of December 2009, the defendants' motions to d is m is s are hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: 1 . The Defendant Department's motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED with re s p e c t to plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. � 1983 and DENIED in all o th e r respects; 2 . The Defendant District's motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED with re s p e c t to plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. � 1983 and DENIED in all o th e r respects. 15  BY THE COURT: s / James M. Munley JUDGE JAMES M. MUNLEY United States District Court 16