DIAZ v. SAUCON VALLEY MANOR, INC. et al
Filing
81
MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE TIMOTHY R. RICE ON 8/27/2013. 8/28/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED. (ems)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIE DIAZ,
CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff,
FILED
V.
SAUCON VALLEY MANOR, INC. , et al.
Defendants.
AUG 2 7 2013
No. 12-0433
MICHAEL E. KUNZ, Clerk
Dep. Clerk
By
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TIMOTHY R. RICE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
August 27, 2013
Following a five-day trial, the jury concluded that Defendants Saucon Valley Manor, Inc.
("Saucon") and Nimita Kapooratiyeh, a/k/a Nemita Atiyeh, a/k/a Nemo Aiyah ("Atiyeh")
(collectively "Defendants") violated the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 , 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. ("FMLA") by interfering with Plaintiff Julie Diaz' right to take a leave of absence, but not
by retaliating against her for seeking a leave of absence, and awarded her $9,296.04 in back-pay
damages. See Verdict Slip (doc. 67). The jury also concluded that Saucon violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA"), and§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 , 29
U.S .C. § 794 ("Rehabilitation Act") by discriminating and retaliating against Diaz because of her
disability, and awarded her $25 ,000 in compensatory damages and $75 ,000 in punitive
damages. 1 See id.
Diaz' Rehabilitation Act claim concerned solely Saucon' s failure to accommodate her
disability. See Am . Comp!. (doc. 6), Count VI. Because this claim involve the same elements as
Diaz' ADA and PHRA failure to accommodate claims, it is referenced with those claims. See
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying ADA
standards to failure to accommodate claims under PHRA and Rehabilitation Act).
The parties agreed I would decide Diaz' ADA and PHRA retaliation claims and the
appropriate amount of wages and benefits to be awarded to Diaz for Saucon's ADA and PHRA
violations. See Sabbrese v. Lowe ' s Home Centers, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 311 , 331 (W.D. Pa.
2004); Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 469 F.3d 311 , 316 (3d Cir. 2006). The parties have
briefed the outstanding issues, as well as whether pre-judgment interest and liquidated damages
are appropriate.
For the following reasons, I deny Defendants ' motion to strike Diaz' arguments
concerning her PHRA retaliation claim, pre-judgment interest, and liquidated damages, award
judgment in favor of Saucon on Diaz' ADA and PHRA retaliation claims, deny Diaz' request for
double recovery of damages under the ADA and PHRA for lost wages and benefits, award Diaz
$1 ,388.58 in pre-judgment interest, and awarded Diaz $10,684.62 in liquidated damages.
A. Defendants' Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike Diaz' arguments concerning her PHRA retaliation claim, prejudgment interest, and liquidated damages, because I did not require briefing on these issues in
the July 31 , 2013 Order concerning briefing from the parties. See 7/31/2013 Order (doc. 71 ).
Because these issues were within the scope of the issues included in the Order, i.e., issues that I
needed to resolve before a final judgment could be entered, and because Defendants have
responded to them, Defendants will not be prejudiced by my resolution of those claims.
Defendants' motion is denied.
B. ADA and PHRA Retaliation Claims
Consistent with the jury's verdict on Diaz' FMLA retaliation claim, I find that Saucon
Valley did not violate the ADA and PHRA by retaliating against Diaz for seeking a leave of
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absence. 2 To prevail on her ADA and PHRA retaliation claims, Diaz needed to establish that:
(1) she engaged in protected activity, such as by seeking a leave of absence ; (2) Saucon took
adverse action against her; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action. See Shellenbergerv. SummitBankcorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183 , 187-88 (3d Cir.
2003); Krouse v. Am . Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). Although Saucon
terminated Diaz at the time she began a 28-day alcohol abuse treatment program, it was not
because she went into that program and needed a leave of absence from work. Saucon
commonly accommodated employees by allowing them to take unpaid leaves of absence for
medical reasons and agreed that it would not have been unduly burdensome for on the company
for Diaz to take a 28-day leave of absence. As the jury properly found, Saucon wrongfully
terminated Diaz because of her alcoholism, not because of her request for a leave of absence.
Thus, I award judgment for Saucon on Diaz' ADA and PHRA retaliation claims. 3
C. ADA and PHRA Wages and Benefits Award
Diaz asserts that the appropriate amount of damages for her lost wages and benefits based
on Saucon' s ADA and PHRA violations is $9,296.04. Defendants do not dispute this amount.
Defendants argue that Diaz has withdrawn and abandoned her PHRA retaliation claim.
Although Diaz withdrew her PHRA retaliation claim, this Court subsequently reinstated it. See
3/15/2013 Praecipe to Withdraw (doc. 27); 415113 Order (doc. 30). Furthermore, contrary to
Defendants' claim, Diaz continued to pursue her PHRA retaliation claim after it was reinstated.
See Diaz' Pre-Trial Memorandum (doc. 50), at 2 (noting PHRA retaliation claim); Diaz'
Proposed Verdict Slip (doc. 51), at 6 (stating PHRA claims mirror ADA claims).
Even ifl entered judgment for Diaz on her ADA and PHRA retaliation claims, it would
not impact her damages award because she would be entitled to the same compensatory damages
found by the jury. Although Diaz argues that she would be entitled to additional damages to
compensate her for humiliation and mental distress under the PHRA, I find that these damages
were included in the jury's compensatory damages award against Saucon based on its violations
of the ADA and PHRA. See Jury Instructions, Part II, Substantive Law at 21-24.
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Nevertheless, because the jury has awarded Diaz these damages for Saucon ' s FMLA violation
and Diaz cannot obtain double recovery for these damages, Diaz is not seeking and cannot
recover additional lost wages and benefits based on Saucon's ADA violations.
D. Pre-judgment Interest
Diaz also seeks pre-judgment interest for her back-pay damages of $9,296.04. Although
she cannot receive double recovery for those damages, she requests double the amount of
interest: (1) interest based on the Pennsylvania statutory rate for Saucon' s PHRA violations, 4 and
(2) interest based on the federal prevailing rate for Defendants' FMLA and ADA violations.
I have the discretion to award pre-judgment interest on back-pay damages under the
PHRA and ADA. See Marra v. Phila. Housing Auth. , 404 F. Supp. 2d 839, 848 (E.D. Pa. 2005);
Herman v. City of Allentown, 985 F. Supp. 569, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The FMLA also requires
the inclusion of such interest. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(iii).
Diaz, however, is not entitled to double pre-judgment interest. Pre-judgment interest
"serves to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of the use of money that [she] otherwise would
have earned had [she] not been unjustly discharged. " Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., Inc. , 64 F.3d
860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995). Moreover, "[t]o fulfill this [make-whole] purpose, prejudgment interest
should be 'given in response to considerations of fairness [and] denied when its exaction would
be inequitable. "' Id. (citing Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 , 1531 n.16 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Although Defendants violated various laws, Diaz can recover only one award of back-pay
Defendants argue that pre-judgment interest is not appropriate based on their violations of
the ADA and PHRA because Diaz did not seek back-pay damages for those violations.
However, the parties agreed that these damages would be decided by me based on federal law
requiring back-pay damages for ADA violations to be decided by the court. See supra at 2. The
jury also was instructed that I would decide the amount of these damages if they found Saucon
violated the ADA and PHRA, which they did .
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damages. She similarly is entitled to only one award of interest. Doubling the interest would be
inequitable because it assumes Diaz can recover double for her lost back-pay and was without
this double amount since her termination. Nevertheless, to properly compensate Diaz for the fact
that she was entitled to back-pay under both state and federal law, I will award interest at the
average of the Internal Revenue Service adjusted prime rate, as provided in 26 U.S.C. § 6621 ,
which equals approximately 3 .5%, and the Pennsylvania rate of 6%, for a blended rate of 4.75%.
See Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1096-97 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (using average of
federal and state interest rates when back-pay damages could have been awarded under federal or
state law). Applying this rate on a yearly basis to Diaz' back-pay damages award , she is entitled
to $1 ,388.58 in interest.
E. FMLA Liquidated Damages
Diaz also seeks liquidated damages for Defendants' FMLA violations. The FMLA
provides that any employer who violates the Act "shall be liable" for "an additional amount as
liquidated damages" equal to the sum of the lost wages and benefits award and any interest on
that award. 28 U.S.C. § 2617(A). A court may, in its discretion, exclude such liquidated
damages only if the employer proves its FMLA violation "was in good faith" and it "had
reasonable grounds" for believing that it was not violating the FMLA. Id. "To satisfy the
subjective good faith requirement, the employer must establish an honest intention to ascertain
and follow the dictates of the [statute]." Bowyer v. Dish Network, No. 08-1496, 2010 WL
629830, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010).
Defendants argue liquidated damages are inappropriate because they acted in good faith
by taking steps to ascertain whether Diaz sought an FMLA leave of absence and granted leaves
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of absence to other employees, including Diaz, in the past. I disagree.
Defendants failed to properly train its directors and supervisors about employees' rights
under the FMLA. As a result, when Diaz informed her supervisor, Cindy Fox, that she would
need a leave of absence to enter a treatment program, Fox was unable to properly advise Diaz of
her FMLA rights and how she could effectively exercise those rights at Saucon. Similarly,
although Carolyn Hirsh, Saucon's Human Resources director, believed that Diaz may have been
entitled to a leave of absence under the FMLA if she had entered a 28-day rehabilitation
program, as suggested in Atiyeh' s June 22, 2010 note, she did nothing. This is not surprising
given Hirsh's lack of meaningful experience and training. 5 Thus, Defendants failed to take the
appropriate "affirmative steps" needed to ascertain and comply with the Act's requirements, and
failed to establish that they acted in good faith when they interfered with Diaz' right to take
FMLA leave. - See id.
Diaz is entitled to liquidated damages of $10,684.62 based on the sum of her back-pay
damages and interest awards.
BY THE COURT:
CJLln:i~&___
United States Magistrate Judge
Hirsh possessed no advanced degree in Human Resources and work part-time at a retail
store.
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