EDWARDS v. WALSH et al
Filing
12
ORDER THAT THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARACAPPA (DOC. NO. 10) IS APPROVED AND ADOPTED; THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. NO. 1) IS DENIED; A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY WILL NOT BE ISSUED; THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL CLOSE THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASE.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 8/21/13. 8/21/13 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PETITIONER, E-MAILED TO COUNSEL.(pr, )
<![CDATA[
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK ANTHONY EDWARDS,
Petitioner,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-1010
v.
SUPERINTENDENT
JEROME WALSH, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of August 2013, upon consideration of Petitioner Mark
Anthony Edwards’ pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1), Respondents’
Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 8), Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. No. 9), the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa (Doc. No. 10), and Petitioner’s
Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 11), it is ORDERED that:
1.
The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Caracappa (Doc. No. 10) is
APPROVED and ADOPTED.1
1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and local rules of court, a district judge may
designate a magistrate judge to file proposed findings and recommendations in regard to a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “Within fourteen days after
being served with a copy [of the magistrate’s report], any party may serve and file written
objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). E.D. Pa. Local Civil Rule 72.1.IV(b) requires an objecting party to
“specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections.” With respect to pro se litigants, however,
this rule may be relaxed. See McCabe v. Pennsylvania, 419 F. Supp. 2d 692, 695 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (treating pro se litigant’s letter to court as objection).
The district judge “shall [then] make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. [The]
judge . . . may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1989). “Although [the] review is de novo, [a district judge] [is] permitted, by statute, to rely
upon the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations to the extent [the judge], in
1
the exercise of sound discretion, deem[s] proper.” Owens v. Beard, 829 F. Supp. 736, 738 (M.D.
Pa. 1993) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)). The Third Circuit has
“assumed that the normal practice of the district judge is to give some reasoned consideration to
the magistrate’s report before adopting it as the decision of the court.” Henderson v. Carlson,
812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987).
In this case, Petitioner Mark Anthony Edwards pled guilty in the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas to charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person less
than sixteen years of age, aggravated indecent assault, and endangering the welfare of a minor.
(Doc. No. 10 at 1.) He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eleven and a half to twentyseven years. (Id.) Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence on appeal and pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).
Petitioner was appointed counsel at the direct appeal and PCRA stages. (Doc. No. 10 at
1-2.) In both instances, counsel filed a brief with the state court requesting to withdraw
representation because there were no meritorious issues in the case, not even certain ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. (Id.) The State court agreed and court-appointed counsel was
permitted to withdraw. (Id.) Petitioner then proceeded pro se and raised ineffective assistance
claims, among others. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.) He was unsuccessful at all stages. (Id. at 1-3.)
On March 22, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.
No. 1.) The Petition, liberally construed, sets forth the following claims for relief:
1) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel for failure to raise the issue that
Petitioner was denied an attorney at his preliminary hearing.
2) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel for abandoning Petitioner on
direct appeal by refusing to represent Petitioner or answer any phone calls or
correspondence from Petitioner himself or Petitioner’s family.
(Doc. No. 10 at 3.) On July 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Caracappa issued a Report
recommending that the Petition be denied because both of Petitioner’s claims were procedurally
defaulted because of his failure to properly exhaust the claims in state court. (Id. at 3, 5-7.)
Exhaustion requires that “a habeas applicant . . . show that the federal claim he asserts in federal
court has been ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts.” Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir.
1982) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). For his first ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Judge Caracappa noted that “the first time [P]etitioner raised this claim was on
[PCRA] appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court,” and therefore the claims were not “fairly
presented” to state court. (Doc. No. 10 at 6-7.) For the second ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Judge Caracappa found that “Petitioner failed to present this claim at any state court
level.” (Id. at 7.) Moreover, Petitioner had failed to show any reason to excuse the state
procedural default. (Id. at 7-9.)
In his timely objection to the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner references
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and contends that he “can show cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result,” and therefore Judge Caracappa should have reviewed the merits
of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Doc. No. 11 at 1-2.) For reasons that follow, the
Court will deny Petitioner’s objections and adopt Judge Caracappa’s Report and
Recommendation.
2
2.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED.
3.
A certificate of appealability will not be issued because, based on the analysis
contained in Magistrate Judge Caracappa’s Report and Recommendation, as
In Martinez, the Court set forth specific instances where procedural default could be
excused:
[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a
default of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The first is where
the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding
for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. The second is where appointed
counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have
been raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington. To
overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say
that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.
132 S. Ct. at 1318-19 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner does not fulfill the requirements in Martinez that would overcome his
procedural default. Petitioner does not fit into either narrow circumstance for establishing cause
for a default of an ineffective-assistance claim. First, he was appointed counsel in the initialreview collateral proceeding, which nullifies option one. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.)
Second, Petitioner cannot satisfy the Strickland standard as it relates to his courtappointed counsel at the PCRA stage. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a
petitioner must show the following to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687. In this case, Petitioner’s court-appointed PCRA counsel filed a letter with the state
court requesting to withdraw from the case because there were no meritorious issues. The state
court agreed to allow withdrawal, but only after conducting the requisite inquires, that is, the
state court was required to “conduct an independent review of the record and must agree with
counsel that the petition is meritless before dismissing the petition.” (Doc. No. 10 at 2 n.1.)
Such conduct on the part of Petitioner’s PCRA counsel does not indicate deficient performance
under Strickland. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish cause for the procedural default of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Martinez. Therefore, the Court will adopt Judge
Caracappa’s Report and Recommendation and deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
3
approved and adopted by this Court, a reasonable jurist could not conclude that
the Court is incorrect in denying and dismissing the habeas petition.
4.
The Clerk of Court shall close the above-captioned case.
BY THE COURT:
/ s/ J oel H. S l om sk y
JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.
4
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
