JONES v. WETZEL et al
Filing
35
ORDER THAT DEFENDANT R. SETH WILLIAMS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 22) IS GRANTED. DEFENDANTS JOHN E. WETZEL, MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, JAY LANE, THOMAS BOLTON, GERALD KELLY, FRANCIS FEILD, AND ROBIN M. LEWIS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 25) IS G RANTED. JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS ARE DISMISSED. ANY OUTSTANDING MOTIONS ARE DENIED AS MOOT. THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL CLOSE THIS CASE FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 8/30/2013. 8/30/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE AND E-MAILED. (aeg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMON JONES,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-3365
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
Slomsky, J.
I.
August 30, 2013
INTRODUCTION
In May 1983, a jury convicted Plaintiff Damon Jones of first-degree murder in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. It imposed a sentence of death. On or about April 27,
2007, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), Jones filed a collateral
attack on his death sentence. On August 3, 2009, the PCRA Court granted him a resentencing
hearing. While awaiting resentencing, he remained in the Capital Case Unit (“CCU”), or what is
commonly referred to as “death row.”
On June 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant action, requesting injunctive relief that he be
removed from death row, and compensatory relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged
violations of his civil rights.1 (Doc. No. 3.) The Complaint names as Defendants R. Seth
Williams, Philadelphia District Attorney (the “District Attorney”), and John and Jane Doe, who
are alleged to be affiliated with the District Attorney’s office. The Complaint also names as
Defendants John Wetzel, the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Department of Corrections, Michael
1
On December 14, 2012, after Plaintiff commenced this action, the PCRA Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On January 17, 2013, Plaintiff was
removed from death row and transferred to the general prison population.
1
Wenerowicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCIG”), Jay
Lane, SCIG Deputy Superintendent, Thomas Bolton, Unit Manager, Gerald Kelly, Unit
Counselor, Francis Feild, a Major at SCIG, and Robin Lewis, Department of Corrections Chief
Hearing Examiner (collectively “Commonwealth Defendants”).2
On February 6, 2013, the District Attorney and Commonwealth Defendants filed Motions
to Dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 22, 25.) For reasons that follow, the Court will grant both Motions.
II.
BACKGROUND
In May 1983, a jury convicted Plaintiff of two counts of first-degree murder. (Doc. No.
22 at 3.) In 1987, he was sentenced to death on the murder convictions. (Id. at 4.) On May 21,
1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence. (Id.) After exhausting his
appellate remedies, Plaintiff filed a PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 3.) On August 3, 2009,
the PCRA Court vacated Plaintiff’s death sentence and granted him a resentencing hearing.
(Doc. No. 3 at 17.)
After the PCRA Court granted Plaintiff a resentencing hearing, Plaintiff remained in
CCU. (Doc. No. 3 at 17.) Plaintiff alleges that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) characterizes a “capital case inmate” as follows:
A Capital Case inmate is defined as follows: Capital Case — And [sic] inmate
(1) physically committed to the Department of Corrections under a sentence of
Capital Punishment; (2) pending sentencing under a jury recommendation for
Capital Punishment; or (3) whose sentence of Capital Punishment has been
vacated, but is awaiting re-sentencing where a sentence of Capital Punishment
may be re-imposed.
(Id. at 9.)
Inmates held in CCU are placed in solitary confinement and allowed four personal visits
per month. (Id. at 11–13.) During a number of these visits, Plaintiff had the opportunity to meet
2
The Complaint refers to Thomas Bolton and Gerald Kelly by their last names only.
Commonwealth Defendants have supplied the first names in their Motion to Dismiss.
2
with his attorney. (Id.) Due to the layout of the visiting rooms used to meet with defense
counsel, Plaintiff contends that other visitors, prisoners, and guards could overhear his
conversations with counsel. (Id.) Because of the lack of privacy, he was forced to cut short
several sessions with his lawyer. (Doc. No. 33 at 52.)
While awaiting resentencing, Plaintiff filed grievances using the DOC internal grievance
system. (Doc. No. 9 at 2.) Plaintiff filed grievances with the Commonwealth Defendants from
June 2010 to February 2012. (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) Each of Plaintiff’s grievances state, generally,
that because the PCRA Court vacated his death sentence, he should no longer be held in CCU,
but should instead be treated as a pretrial detainee and moved to the general prison population.
(Id.)
On June 8, 2010, Defendant Wenerowicz denied one of Plaintiff’s grievances, stating,
“[Plaintiff ] had been ‘received in DOC custody in 1984 for his current offenses,’ and ‘per DOC
policy’ he is ‘held in single [cell] status.’” (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) On January 17, 2012, Unit
Counselor Gerald Kelly refused Plaintiff’s request for a hearing to contest the disposition of his
previous grievances. (Doc. No. 9 at 3.)
Plaintiff contends that on or about January 18, 2012 through February 29, 2012, Unit
Counselor Gerald Kelly, Unit Manager Thomas Bolton, Deputy Superintendent Jay Lane, and
Major Francis Feild all explained to Plaintiff that “there was [sic] no exceptions” for him to be
released to general population “due to Capital Case Policy.” (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) Defendant
Bolton informed Plaintiff to “consult your lawyer” because “until [the records department]
receives the Court information nothing will happen.” (Id.) Later, Defendants Lane and Feild
reiterated the responses of the other Commonwealth Defendants stating, “there was no exception
for [plaintiff] to be release [sic] in [general population] ‘due to Capital Case policy.’” (Id.)
3
On March 15, 2012, Defendant Wenerowicz denied Plaintiff’s appeal of Defendants Lane
and Feild’s decision. Defendant Wenerowicz’s denial of Plaintiff’s appeal contained an excerpt
from Section 6.5.8 of the DOC Capital Case Procedures Manual, which states:
In the event that an order is received modifying the sentence of a Capital Case
inmate to life imprisonment due to a re-sentencing proceeding held as the result of
an appeal or Post Conviction Relief Act, or as the result of a commutation, the
facility Records Supervisor must determine whether the order is valid and
whether the District Attorney intends to appeal the order. If the District Attorney
intends to appeal, the inmate shall not be moved from the Capital Case unit until
the appeal is resolved.
(Doc. No. 3 at 8–9.)
On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed another grievance, which was denied by Defendant
Lewis. (Doc. No. 9 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Commonwealth Defendants denied all of his
grievances in a perfunctory manner. (Doc. No. 33 at 49.)
As noted above, on June 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against the District
Attorney, John and Jane Doe, and Commonwealth Defendants. (Doc. No. 3.) On August 1,
2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) The Complaint and Amended
Complaint do not allege clear, organized claims against Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 33) alleges additional facts that
supplement the allegations initially plead in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Despite
the imprecision of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, the Court is obligated to discern the
facts alleged in the Complaint, the Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and to consider them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.3
3
The Court will consider all facts alleged in the Complaint, the Amended Complaint, and
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, which sets
forth facts Plaintiff apparently seeks to have incorporated into the Amended Complaint. Because
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, he is entitled to deference in his filings and is held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings by lawyers.” United States v. Bradley, 505 F. App’x 220, 221
n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
4
Considering these filings in this light, Plaintiff appears to allege five Counts4: Counts I–
IV, civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 and in Count V, a conspiracy to violate
Plaintiff’s civil rights under § 1985.6
In Count I, alleging a claim under § 1983 against the District Attorney, Plaintiff argues he
was denied a speedy resentencing in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 3 at
17.) He contends the District Attorney “was and is the sole cause for the unreasonable delay in
[P]laintiff’s sentencing trial.”7 (Id.)
In Count II, alleging a claim under § 1983 against Commonwealth Defendants, Plaintiff
asserts he was denied the attorney-client privilege in violation of his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 3 at 13.) He contends that the lack of privacy in the visitation
rooms permitted other people to overhear his private conversations with counsel in violation of
his civil rights. (Id.)
4
Plaintiff does not organize his claims into counts, but the Court will do so in this Opinion for
the sake of clarity.
5
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”
6
42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides: “If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”
7
It appears that Plaintiff also alleges in Count I claims against John and Jane Doe Defendants.
5
In Count III, alleging a claim under § 1983 against Commonwealth Defendants, Plaintiff
argues his confinement on death row pending a resentencing hearing is a form of excessive
punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 3 at 16.)
In Count IV, alleging a claim under § 1983 against Commonwealth Defendants, Plaintiff
asserts he was denied substantive and procedural due process in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. He contends the Commonwealth Defendants denied his grievances
regarding his confinement in CCU in a perfunctory manner, which denied him a liberty interest.
(Doc. No. 9 at 3.)
In Count V, a claim under § 1985 against all Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
conspired to “willfully and maliciously . . . subject [P]laintiff to the harsh conditions and/or
disabilities of solitary confinement and death row . . . .” (Doc. No. 3 at 16, 19.)
Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him the following relief: (1) vacate his conviction,
or remove him from death row to the general prison population; (2) award compensatory
damages in excess of $75,000, plus punitive damages and attorney fees; and (3) rule on the
constitutionality of the DOC’s policy of holding him on death row while awaiting resentencing,
after his initial death sentence was vacated. (Doc. No. 33 at 23–24.)
On December 14, 2012, after the Complaint was filed, the PCRA Court resentenced
Plaintiff to life in prison. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 49.) At the resentencing hearing, the court ordered
that Plaintiff “was to be taken off death row.” (Doc. No. 22 at 4.) On January 17, 2013, Plaintiff
was moved from CCU to the general prison population. (Doc. No. 33 at 15.)
On February 6, 2013, the District Attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 22), and the Commonwealth Defendants filed a
6
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)8 and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 25.) On May 13, 2013,
Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No 33.)
The Court has considered the Complaint (Doc. No. 3), Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 9),
District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22), Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 25), and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No.
33). For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 22) and Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set
forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal it is clear that “threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice” to
defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 663; see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). Applying the principles of Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit in Santiago v.
Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010), set forth a three-part analysis that a district
court in this Circuit must conduct in evaluating whether allegations in a complaint survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally,
“where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.”
8
Commonwealth Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss that because official capacity
claims against state employees cannot be brought in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). In Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, he withdraws his official
capacity claims against Commonwealth Defendants. (Doc. No. 33 at 35.) Plaintiff’s withdrawal
of the official capacity claims renders a ruling on the Commonwealth Defendants’ arguments
under Rule 12(b)(1) moot.
7
Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). “This means that our inquiry is normally broken
into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint
and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently
alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
A complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, it must “show”
such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (citing
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2008)). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged — but it has not ‘shown’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. The “plausibility” determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A.
Count I: Claims Against The District Attorney
1.
Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment Claim Lacks Merit
To the extent Plaintiff alleges the District Attorney and unnamed John and Jane Doe were
responsible for delaying his resentencing, the claim lacks merit. A review of the docket sheet of
Plaintiff’s state criminal case, and specifically the entries concerning the resentencing,9 reveals
9
The Court may consider the docket sheet because “under certain circumstances . . . it is
permissible for a court to consider matters of ‘public record’ in ruling on a motion to dismiss. A
prerequisite to consideration of an admittedly authentic public document as a part of a motion to
dismiss is that the plaintiff’s claim relies on that document.” Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 200 F.
App’x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196–
97 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that a document must be integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint
to be subject to consideration at the motion to dismiss stage).
8
that Plaintiff’s counsel, either in conjunction with the prosecution or individually, requested each
of the continuances that delayed the proceedings. (Doc. No. 25-1.) Additionally, the District
Attorney’s name does not appear on the Docket Sheet, suggesting he was not personally involved
in any of the requested or stipulated continuances. For a defendant to be held liable under
§ 1983, he must have personal involvement in the incident.
Even if the District Attorney requested or was involved in the requests for continuances,
Plaintiff’s claim still fails. In Slaughter v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-2329, 1995 WL 12060, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995), the court stated, “it is not a request but the granting of a continuance
by a judge which causes delay.” Under this persuasive reasoning, the cause of the delay was not
the District Attorney but the judge ruling on the continuance requests. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Sixth Amendment claim against the District Attorney and John and Jane Doe lacks merit.
2.
The District Attorney Is Entitled To Absolute Immunity
Count I also must be dismissed against the District Attorney because he has absolute
immunity from suit. Certain officials preform special functions which “deserve absolute
protection from damages liability.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). State
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity in their role as advocates in actions preliminary to
the initiation of a prosecution, in the preparation for the initiation of a prosecution, and during
judicial proceedings. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–73.
Here, Plaintiff alleges the District Attorney caused the resentencing hearing delay
because of a failure to “file any further papers.” (Doc. No. 3 at 17.) Filing papers falls within
the District Attorney’s role as an advocate for the state and as an act done in preparation of a
prosecution or an act made during a judicial proceeding. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
129 (1997) (holding that activities in connection with the preparation and filing documents with
9
the court are protected by absolute immunity). Therefore, since the District Attorney is entitled
to absolute immunity from suit, he will be dismissed as a defendant in Count I.
B.
Claims Against Commonwealth Defendants
1.
Plaintiff’s Claim For Injunctive Relief Is Moot
Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, requesting that he be transferred from CCU to the
general prison population. On January 17, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to the general
population. (Doc. No. 33 at 13.) Therefore, his request for injunctive relief is now moot and
will be dismissed. See Mollett v. Leicth, 511 F. App’x 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that a
request for injunctive relief is moot if the Court is unable to give meaningful relief).
2.
Count II: Violation Of The Right To Private Communications With
Counsel
Count II asserts another claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts that he was
denied his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Commonwealth Defendants
because he did not have access to a confidential space to meet with counsel while preparing for
his resentencing.10 (Doc. No. 33 at 52.) Plaintiff alleges he was forced to visit with his attorneys
and their aids in locations where other prisoners were able to overhear his discussions. (Id.) In
this situation, Plaintiff had to end his visits, because he did not know the inmates and did not
want unknown people to overhear his discussions with counsel. (Id.) This claim is barred,
however, for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Second, Commonwealth Defendants have qualified immunity.
10
The original Complaint, in a cursory manner, mentions the allegation regarding a lack of
privacy while meeting with counsel. (Doc. No. 3 at 13–14.) Although Commonwealth
Defendants did not address this allegation in their Motion to Dismiss, they seek dismissal of the
“entirety” of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No. 25 at 16.) In Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the
Motion, he expanded upon his allegation pertaining to the lack of privacy with counsel. (Doc.
No. 33 at 52.)
10
a.
Plaintiff Has Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies
With Regard To Count II
Although Plaintiff filed grievances with prison officials complaining about his
confinement in CCU while awaiting resentencing, he does not allege that he filed grievances
complaining about his alleged lack of private communications with counsel. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Here,
because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to the alleged lack of
private communications with counsel, this claim is barred.
b.
Plaintiff’s Claims Under Count II Lack Merit Because He Did
Not Suffer An “Injury In Fact” And Commonwealth
Defendants Have Qualified Immunity
Notwithstanding the administrative bar on this claim, the claim also lacks merit. In
Telepo v. Martin, No. 08-2132, 2009 WL 2476498 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2009) aff’d, 359 F. App’x
278 (3d Cir. 2009), the court analyzed a claim similar to the instant one. In that case, the plaintiff
advanced two arguments. First, he argued that he was denied his right of access to the courts, as
required under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) and Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
The court in Telepo found that the right of access claim lacked merit because the plaintiff had not
shown that “his inability to meet in private with the public defender . . . prevented him or
frustrated his efforts in filing a direct or collateral challenge to his conviction or sentence, a
habeas petition, or a claim under Section 1983,” and therefore he had not demonstrated an
“injury in fact.” Telepo, 2009 WL 2476498, at *6.
In this case, to the extent Plaintiff makes a claim that he was denied the right of access to
the courts, that claim fails because, as in Telepo, Plaintiff has not demonstrated an “injury in
11
fact.” Plaintiff, through his counsel, prevailed in his efforts before the PCRA court to vacate his
death sentence. Therefore, his alleged inability to have private conversations with counsel was
not an “injury in fact.” The meetings with counsel resulted in a successful overturning of his
death sentence and Plaintiff’s placement in the general prison population.
The second argument advanced by the plaintiff in Telepo is that he was denied the right to
confidential communications with his attorney. The court in Telepo recognized that in Williams
v. Price, 25 F. Supp. 2d 623 (W.D. Pa. 1998), the court held that prisoners have a right to
confidential communications with their attorney. In Telepo, however, the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity for this privacy claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” MFS, Inc. v. Dilazaro, 771 F. Supp. 2d 382, 448–49 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A court uses a two-prong test to determine if a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. First, a court considers “whether the facts that a
plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first prong, the court must decide
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007).
As the court in Telepo stated:
A prisoner’s right to confidential communication with his attorney is clearly
established and, for the purposes of analysis under Rule 12(b)(6), this court will
assume that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s right. Even assuming a
violation by the defendants, the defendants are shielded by qualified immunity. In
the absence of any authority supporting the proposition that failure to provide
private consultation facilities to prisoners temporarily awaiting a hearing in a
courthouse holding area [is a violation of a constitutional right,] this court cannot
12
say that a “reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right” under the circumstances present in this case. . . .
Telepo, 2009 WL 2476498, at *8 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
There is nothing here to support the notion that it would be clear to a reasonable prison
guard or prison official that permitting other prisoners to use the visiting area while Plaintiff was
meeting with counsel would result in an unlawful violation of his constitutional right to private
communications with his attorney. See Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. Plaintiff was provided with a
space to meet with his attorney and his aids, and their efforts on his behalf were successful. No
facts are alleged to even suggest that counsel was hindered in representing Plaintiff. Moreover,
there is no allegation that Commonwealth Defendants chilled alternative lines of communication
with his counsel — for instance, by opening and reading Plaintiff’s mail to and from his attorney.
See Williams, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (“[I]t is noted that the policy [of denying prisoners a private
room to speak with counsel] is content neutral, and that an argument could be made that there are
alternative means of exercising the right — prisoners can write confidential letters to their
counsel.”) Therefore, on these facts, Commonwealth Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on Count II, which will be dismissed.11
3.
Count III: Plaintiff Fails To State An Eighth Amendment Claim
Count III asserts a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights are “based upon the Commonwealth [D]efendants’ decision to
continue to confine him on Death Row after his death sentences were vacated . . . .” (Doc. No.
33 at 45.) Plaintiff contends that his confinement was excessive punishment.
“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed
. . . when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.” Atkins v.
11
Qualified immunity also bars Plaintiff’s claims under Counts III, IV, and V. The Court will
address the merits of each of these claims, infra.
13
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). “The ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” Id. (quoting Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303 provides:
Upon receipt of the [execution] warrant [from the Governor], the secretary [of
corrections] shall, until infliction of the death penalty or until lawful discharge
from custody, keep the inmate in solitary confinement. During the confinement,
no person shall be allowed to have access to the inmate without an order of the
sentencing court, except the following:
(1) The staff of the department.
(2) The inmate’s counsel of record or other attorney requested by the inmate.
(3) A spiritual adviser selected by the inmate or the members of the immediate
family of the inmate.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly also vests authority with DOC to determine how and where
to hold inmates. DOC regulations state: “An inmate does not have a right to be housed in a
particular facility or in a particular area within a facility.” 37 Pa. Code § 93.11(a). The
Complaint quotes DOC provisions defining a Capital Case inmate as any inmate “whose
sentence of Capital Punishment has been vacated, but is awaiting re-sentencing where a sentence
of Capital Punishment may be re-imposed.” (Doc. No. 3 at 9.) The DOC Capital Case
Procedure Manual12 section regarding sentence modifications provides:
1.
2.
3.
In the event that an order is received modifying the sentence of a Capital
Case inmate to life imprisonment due to a resentencing proceeding held as
the result of an appeal or Post Conviction Relief Act, or as the result of a
commutation, the facility Records Supervisor must determine whether the
order is valid and whether the District Attorney intends to appeal the order.
If the District Attorney intends to appeal, the inmate shall not be moved
from the Capital Case unit until the appeal is resolved. However, the
inmate may be moved from the Capital Case unit, if the District Attorney
does not file an appeal within 30 days.
If the District Attorney does not intend to appeal and if the inmate does not
remain subject to an execution sentence as the result of a prosecution other
12
The Capital Case Procedures Manual is a public document that Plaintiff relied upon in the
Complaint. (See Doc. No. 3 at 8–9.) Therefore, the Court may consider it on a Motion to
Dismiss.
14
than the sentence modified in the order, the inmate may be moved from
the Capital Case housing unit.
(Doc. No. 25-3.)
On August 3, 2009, Plaintiff’s death sentence was vacated and he remained a Capital
Case inmate consistent with DOC policy. On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff’s death sentence was
modified to a life sentence. Thereafter, on January 17, 2013, he was transferred to general
population. This timeline is consistent with current DOC regulations and Pennsylvania law.
Moreover, the policies at issue here are consistent with current contemporary standards as
embodied in Pennsylvania legislation and grounded in well-reasoned policy. Thus, Plaintiff was
not subjected to excessive punishment, and does not allege a plausible violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. Count III will be dismissed.
4.
Count IV: Plaintiff Was Not Denied Due Process
Plaintiff alleges both procedural and substantive due process violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment. His substantive due process claim relates to his belief that he was
denied a protected liberty interest when he was detained in CCU during his resentencing hearing.
His procedural due process claim pertains to Commonwealth Defendants’ review of his
grievances. Viewing the allegations in the Complaint most favorably to Plaintiff, neither due
process claim has merit.
a.
Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff was not denied a liberty interest when he remained in CCU pending his
resentencing hearing. “In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of
law . . . the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial
15
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not . . . amount to
punishment.” Contant v. Sabol, 431 F. App’x 177, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Commonwealth
Defendants had a legitimate interest in housing Plaintiff in the CCU. At the time, he was a
Capital Case inmate. Defendants followed Pennsylvania law and DOC regulations, as well as
the DOC Capital Case Procedures Manual. Thus, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim lacks
merit.
b.
Procedural Due Process
When a plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure of a state agency to provide
procedural due process, the court must analyze: “(1) whether the asserted individual interests are
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property; and (2)
whether the procedures available provided the plaintiff with due process of law.” Alvin v.
Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff does not contend that the grievance system is
inadequate,13 but that his grievance was denied in a “perfunctory manner, paying no regard to the
actual circumstances of his case.” (Doc. No. 33 at 49).
The facts alleged do not support Plaintiff’s assertion that his grievances were denied in a
perfunctory manner. Plaintiff and Commonwealth Defendants agree that Plaintiff had access to
the grievance system, used the grievance system, appealed his grievance, and his grievances
were considered and were denied on appeal. (Doc. No. 3 at 26; Doc. No. 25 at 11.) The
responses to his grievances state that Plaintiff, as a Capital Case inmate, was not entitled to be
transferred to general population unless his sentence was overturned in court. (Doc. No. 9 at 3.)
13
The Third Circuit has held that the DOC’s grievance procedure provides an adequate remedy
to inmates who allege deprivation of a constitutional right, and comports with due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Durham v. Dep’t of Corr., 173 F. App’x 154, 157 (3d Cir.
2006).
16
The responses are well reasoned, give due regard to Plaintiff’s case, and provided Plaintiff with
alternative avenues to pursue a challenge to his conditions of confinement. (Doc. No. 3 at 8–9.)
In sum, Plaintiff had access to the DOC grievance system, he used the DOC grievance
system in its entirety, and he received accurate, reasoned, and prompt responses from the
Commonwealth Defendants. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim that Commonwealth
Defendants denied his grievances in a perfunctory manner or deprived him of due process of law.
Count IV will be dismissed.
5.
Count V: Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Lacks Merit
Count V alleges Commonwealth Defendants and the District Attorney conspired to
violate Plaintiff’s civil rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in
violation of 42 U.S.C § 1985. In order to state a valid conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege
an underlying constitutional injury. Durham v. Dep’t of Corr., 173 F. App’x 154, 157 (3d Cir.
2006). Plaintiff has not shown an underlying constitutional injury. Therefore, Count V must be
dismissed. See Dykes v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1570 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining to
address the merits of a conspiracy claim because the court concluded the complaint “fails to
allege a cognizable violation of [the plaintiff’s] due process rights”).
C.
Claims Against John And Jane Doe
Plaintiff has also named John and Jane Doe as Defendants. Plaintiff mentions these
Defendants in the Complaint (Doc. No. 3) only by stating: “Defendants [the District Attorney
and], John and Jane Doe was and is the sole cause for the unreasonable delay in [P]laintiff’s
sentencing trial [sic].” (Doc. No. 3 at 17.) Plaintiff appears to allege “John and Jane Doe” are
affiliated with the District Attorney’s office. Id.
17
The claim that John and Jane Doe were partly responsible for delaying the resentencing
hearing lacks merit for the same reasons the claims in Count I lack merit. Moreover, when a
motion to dismiss is granted for all named parties, it too must be granted for all unnamed parties.
Johnson v. United States, 469 F. App’x 79, 81 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012). Therefore, all claims will be
dismissed against John and Jane Doe.
V.
CONCLUSION
The District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22) and Commonwealth
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25) will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.
18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMON JONES,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-3365
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of August 2013, upon consideration of Defendant R. Seth
Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22), Defendants John E. Wetzel, Michael Wenerowicz,
Jay Lane, Bolton, Kelly, Francis Feild, and Robin M. Lewis’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25),
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 33), and in
accordance with the Opinion of the Court issued this day, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.
Defendant R. Seth Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED.
2.
Defendants John E. Wetzel, Michael Wenerowicz, Jay Lane, Thomas Bolton,
Gerald Kelly, Francis Feild, and Robin M. Lewis’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.
25) is GRANTED.
3.
John and Jane Doe Defendants are DISMISSED.
4.
Any outstanding motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
5.
The Clerk of Court shall close this case for statistical purposes.
BY THE COURT:
/ s/ J oel H. S l om sk y
JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.
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