SHAHID v. BOROUGH OF EDDYSTONE
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE ON 10/3/11. 10/4/11 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE, E-MAILED.(rf, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ABDUS SHAHID
v.
BOROUGH OF EDDYSTONE
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 11-2501
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Savage, J.
October 3, 2011
In this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Abdus Shahid
asserts that the Borough of Eddystone violated his civil rights by discriminating against him
on account of his race and national origin. Specifically, he alleges Eddystone officials
engaged in various actions to prevent him from renting out an apartment he owns in the
borough because they did not want a person of Bangladeshi origin to own property in a
“white” area. Although Shahid did not specify in his complaint which of his constitutional
rights were violated, it is clear from his pleadings that he accuses Eddystone of violating
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint. It argues that: 1) Shahid’s
claim is barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations; and 2) Shahid has failed
to plead the elements of municipal liability under § 1983.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575
F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d
Cir. 2008)). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), giving the defendant “fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
quotations omitted)). Although this standard “does not require detailed factual allegations,
. . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (internal quotations omitted)).
A complaint may be dismissed where the plaintiff fails to plead “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plaintiff must allege facts
that indicate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Pleading “facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” is insufficient. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations
omitted)). The plaintiff’s pro se pleadings must be considered deferentially, affording him
the benefit of the doubt where one exists. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d
Cir. 2009)(citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). With these standards
in mind, we shall accept as true the facts as they appear in Shahid’s complaint and draw
all possible inferences from these facts in his favor.
Statute of Limitations
State personal injury tort law provides the appropriate statute of limitations for
claims brought under § 1983. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In
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Pennsylvania, a personal injury claim must be filed within two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5524(2) (2004). Thus, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is
two years. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Because “[a] statute of
limitations defense is an affirmative one,” Eddystone must show that it is clear from the
face of the complaint that Shahid’s action is time-barred to justify dismissal at this
stage. Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435
F.3d 396, 400, n. 14 (3d Cir. 2006). The complaint is vague concerning the duration of
Eddystone’s alleged actions against Shahid. It alleges a series of specific actions taken
against him from September to November 2008. However, concerning the events after
November, the complaint only alleges that Eddystone inspectors arrived at his property
repeatedly and, in his presence, discouraged potential lessees from renting the property
because Eddystone did not want a landlord of Bangladeshi origin to own property in the
area. The complaint does not specify when or how frequently Eddystone inspectors did
so. The complaint also contains a general statement that Shahid suffered harm
because of the Eddystone’s actions from September 7, 2008 to April 8, 2011. Because
the complaint does not explicitly allege any acts that occurred after November 29, 2008,
Eddystone argues that the statute of limitations began to run on that date and expired
on November 29, 2010. The plaintiff filed his complaint on April 11, 2011.
Although the complaint is not definite on this point, the plaintiff’s pleadings, when
viewed in the light most favorable to him, allege that Eddystone engaged in a
continuous course of action between approximately September 7, 2008 and April 8,
2011. “The continuing violations doctrine is an equitable exception to the timely filing
requirement.”
Soppick v. Borough of W. Conshohocken, 118 F. App’x 631, 635 (3d
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Cir. 2004)(quoting Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001)(internal
quotations omitted)). To plead that the alleged actions against Shahid occurred within
the statute of limitations period as part of a continuing violation, the complaint must
allege that: 1) at least one act occurred within the statutory period; and 2) the prior
conduct was not isolated or sporadic, but was part of a continuing, ongoing pattern.
Soppick, 118 F. App’x at 635 (quoting West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754-55 (3d
Cir. 1995)). The complaint alleges that some part of the Eddystone’s course of conduct
occurred regularly until April 8, 2011–three days before he filed his complaint. The
complaint alleges further that all of Eddystone’s actions against the plaintiff were part of
the Borough’s continuous efforts to prevent Shahid from renting his apartment because
of his race. Thus, on the face of the complaint, the action is not barred by the statute of
limitations.
Municipal Liability
A plaintiff may hold a municipality liable under § 1983 where the plaintiff’s injury
is attributable to either an official municipal policy or established custom. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)(citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A “policy” is an explicit decision of the
municipality’s “duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may
fairly be said to be those of the municipality.” Id. at 403-04 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
694). A “custom” is a “widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law
or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom
or usage with the force of law.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127
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(1988)(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)(internal
quotations omitted)); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. Viewing the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that Shahid is pleading municipal
liability under the “custom” theory. He alleges that various Eddystone officials informed
him repeatedly that the Borough did not want a landlord of Bangladeshi origin to own
property in what they considered to be a white area. Although this statement is short on
details, it pleads sufficiently that Shahid was harmed by an informal but pervasive
Borough policy of discouraging non-white people from living in or owning rental property
in a white area.
Because Eddystone has failed to show that Shahid is not entitled to relief as a
matter of law, we shall deny Eddystone’s motion to dismiss.
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