Eggemeyer v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 6:2012cv01618 - Document 29 (D. Or. 2014)

Court Description: Opinion and Order. The Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed. See formal order. Signed on 4/15/2014 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh)

Download PDF

Eggemeyer v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration Doc. 29 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON KARL W. EGGEMEYER, Case No. 6:12-cv-01618-AA OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. Juliana E. Coons Coons & Coons 440 E. Broadway, Suite 140 Eugene, Oregon 97401 Attorney for plaintiff S. Amanda Marshall United States Attorney Adrian L. Brown Assistant United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, Oregon 97201 Sarah L. Martin Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel 701 5th Ave, Suite 2900 M/S 221A Seattle, Washington 98104 Attorneys for defendant Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER Dockets.Justia.com AIKEN, Chief Judge: Plaintiff Karl Eggemeyer brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act") to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner supplemental denied security plaintiff's income application ("SSI") under the for Title XVI Act. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 30, 2009, plaintiff applied for SSI. Tr. 148-55. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. On July 26, 2011, an administrative hearing was 104-081 112-17. held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), wherein plaintiff was represented by counsel expert ("VE"). and testified, Tr. 33-98, 118, 123-28. as did a vocational On December 20, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff disabled for the closed period of August 26, 2008, through January 14, 2010, but thereafter experienced medical improvement. Tr. 11-32. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. Tr. 1-4. STATEMENT OF FACTS Born on June 1, 1980, plaintiff was 28 years old on the alleged onset date of disability and 31 years old at the time of the hearing. although he Tr. 37, 148. was in Plaintiff graduated from high school, special education classes and received a modified diploma, and attended approximately two years of college. Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER Tr. 26, 44, 62, 169, 171, 205-06, 248. He was previously employed as a fast food worker, sales person, welder, and laborer. 89-93, 165, 172. 2008, due to Tr. 25, Plaintiff alleges disability as of August 26, a traumatic back injury, which resulted in degenerative disc disease ("DDD") and post laminectomy syndrome; he also alleges depression, disability due to diabetes, obesity, and borderline intellectual functioning. asthma, Tr. 47-48, 148, 164; see also Pl.'s Opening Br. 4. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 498, 501 (9th Cir. mere scintilla. Hammock v. Bowen, Substantial evidence is "more than a 1989). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) N.L.R.B., 8 7 9 F. 2d 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Richardson (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." 1986) . Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is rational. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F. 3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). The initial burden establish disability. Cir. 1986). of proof rests upon the claimant to Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . than 12 months." The . to last for a continuous period of not less 42 U.S.C. Commissioner has 423(d) (1) (A). § established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a person is disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. Commissioner evaluates whether a "substantial gainful activity." C.F.R. 416.920(b). § § 416.920. claimant Yuckert, Bowen v. 482 is First, the engaged U.S. at in 140; 20 If so, the claimant is not disabled. At step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § If the 416.920(c). claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. At step three, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant's impairments, either singly or in combination, meet or equal "one of [Commissioner] a number of acknowledges are substantial gainful activity." C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If listed so, so impairments severe Yuckert, the as 482 U.S. claimant is that to the preclude at 140-41; 20 presumptively disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can still perform "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the claimant can work, he is not disabled; if he cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER other work that exists in significant numbers in the national and local economy. & (f). Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e) If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.966. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS At step one of the five step sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Tr. 14. At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: asthma, obesity, DDD, 14, and cannabis use. the ALJ found that, 2010, laminectomy syndrome, borderline intellectual functioning, with a mood disorder, three, post Tr. from August 26, 14, diabetes, depression 16. At step 2008, through January plaintiff's impairments met listing 1. 04 (A) . Tr. 15. Beginning on January 15, 2010, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's impairments had improved as the result of a corrective back surgery, such that he was no longer presumptively disabled at step three. Tr. 16-18. Accordingly, the ALJ continued to evaluate how plaintiff's impairments affected his ability to work. as of January 15, capacity ( "RFC") 2010, to The ALJ resolved that, plaintiff had the perform a limited residual range of functional light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b): [h]e can lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. He can stand two hours in an eight-hour day and sit six hours in an eight-hour day with normal breaks. He may frequently balance and he may occasionally crouch, crawl, stoop, and kneel. He may never climb scaffolds, ladders or ropes. He may have no Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER greater [sic] than occasional exposure to irritants such as fumes, dust, gases, odors, and poorly ventilated areas. He may have no exposure to operational control of moving machinery, unprotected heights, or hazardous machinery. He may perform simple routine repetitive tasks, with no greater than a reasoning level of two. He may have occasional interaction with the public. He must have the option to site or stand while remaining on task. Tr. 19. At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. Tr. 25. At step five, the ALJ determined that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national and local economy that plaintiff could perform despite his impairments, such as small products assembler and electronics assembler. Tr. 26, 94. As such, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act as of January 15, 2010. Id. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: ( 1) rejecting his testimony; (2) not finding him presumptively disabled at step three after January 14, 2010, under listing 1.04 or 12.05C; and (3) failing to account for all of his limitations in the RFC. I. Plaintiff's Credibility Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to articulate a clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting his subjective symptom statements concerning the extent and severity of his impairments. When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of . Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER . symptoms only by offering specific, Smolen v. Chater, clear and convincing reasons 80 F.3d 1273, citation omitted). 1281 (9th Cir. for doing so." 1996) (internal A general assertion that the claimant is not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which . . . testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the discredit the claimant's testimony." 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) ALJ did not arbitrarily Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d (internal citation omitted). If the "ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing." v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) Thomas (internal citation omitted). At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because of his back pain. Tr. 59. Due to the severity of this pain, plaintiff stated that can stand for 15 to 20 minutes, and sit for 20 to 30 minutes, before needing to change position. Tr. 68. He explained further that he sleeps during the day as a result of nocturnal insomnia. contributed "[y] eah, to his Tr 69. day time When asked whether his Oxycontin sleepiness, plaintiff sometimes"; when questioned earlier whether he suffers from any side-effects as a result of this drug, "[m]emory." As responded for girlfriend, he stated only Tr. 58, 70. activities of daily living, plaintiff who also testified at the hearing, Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER or his reported that he walks, stretches, reads, watches television or movies, cooks, and vacuums; he also can do laundry and dishes, although his girlfriend usually completes those tasks. Tr. 65, 7 6, 7 9-8 0, 8 3-8 5. In addition, plaintiff remarked that he performs stand up comedy and travels from Eugene to Portland at least twice a month to visit his mother. Tr. 42-43, 49-52. plaintiff reported that holder [for a] Regarding he has his marijuana usage, been "a medical marijuana little over a year" and smokes "[u]sually card at night to go to sleep"; he initially denied using marijuana prior to being issued a medical card. Tr. 55. Later during the hearing, the ALJ confronted plaintiff with a medical report reflecting that plaintiff did not have a medical marijuana card but was nonetheless smoking a joint each night. "tried it before . . 72. Tr. 72. Plaintiff clarified that he to see if it would help anything out." Tr. The ALJ persisted that daily usage was "more than trying it"; plaintiff responded "well- it was painful . . . it's illegal, I'm on probation." Tr. 72-73. After summarizing plaintiff's hearing testimony, the ALJ found that plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptoms, but that his statements regarding the extent of these symptoms were not fully credible due to his activities of daily living, inconsistent statements, failure to treatments, and lack the Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER seek of and follow corroborating prescribed medical objective medical evidence. 1 Tr. 19-24. Notably, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's credibility was impaired by his activities of daily living. Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony, including those between daily activities and the alleged symptoms, Burch, hours can serve as a basis for discrediting it. 400 F.3d at 680. round-trip to As the ALJ noted, visit his mother plaintiff drove four several times a month, traveled to Chicago, and was capable of sitting through a movie. Tr. 20-23, 42-43, 79-80, 191, 428. In addition, the record reveals that plaintiff attended college, read, cooked, went for walks and to the park, dined out, could lift 30 pounds, performed stand up comedy, engaged in limited throughout the night. 335; see also Tr. 417 Tr. household 20-23, 44, chores, 49-51, and 75-76, slept 79, well 187-91, (plaintiff reporting in September 2010 that he left his college culinary program because "he could not stand for 8-10 hours a day [due to] back pain"). These activities belie plaintiff's hearing statements that he could only stand for 15 to 20 minutes, sit for throughout the day; 20 to 30 minutes, as the ALJ determined, and needed to sleep they also evince an ability to perform a limited range of light work. The ALJ also resolved that plaintiff's inconsistent statements 1 Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in relying on his activities of daily living because they are not transferrable to a work environment is unpersuasive. Daily activities may be used to discredit a claimant where they either "are transferable to a work setting" or "contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, "lack of medical evidence . . is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis." Burch, 400 F.3d at 680-81. Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER rendered him less credible. Tr. can be 22-23. used to As denoted inconsistent statements credibility. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680; see also Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) use is a clear testimony) . the case and convincing undermine a above, claimant's (lack of candor about substance reason to reject a claimant's Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion in at bar. As the ALJ observed, plaintiff's concerning his marijuana usage was contradictory. testimony At the July 2011 hearing, plaintiff expressly stated that he did not use marijuana until obtaining a valid medical card approximately one year ago. Tr. 55. Yet the record demonstrates that plaintiff was using marijuana regularly, without a medical card, as early as January 2009. Tr. 301, 329. opportunity to The ALJ expressly provided plaintiff with an reconcile this inconsistency, response was vague and equivocal. but plaintiff's Tr. 72-73. Additionally, the ALJ found that plaintiff lacked credibility because he failed to seek treatment for his allegedly debilitating depression or follow recommendations. Tr. his 20-22. doctors' dietary and exercise Failure to seek or follow up on medical treatment is a clear and convincing reason to reject a claimant's subjective statements. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; see also SSR 96-7p, available at 1996 WL 374186. Here, there is no evidence in the record reflecting any longitudinal mental health treatment and plaintiff does not now proffer a reason, finance-related or otherwise, for his failure to obtain such treatment. Pl.'s Opening Br. As Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER the ALJ observed, the See generally record also memorializes plaintiff's "poor dietary and exercise compliance." Tr. 375-76. Thus, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, symptom statements. for rejecting plaintiff's subjective As a result, this Court need not discuss all of the reasons provided by the ALJ because at least one legally sufficient reason exists. 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ's credibility finding is affirmed. II. Listings 1.04 and 12.05C Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred at step three in determining that his impairments did not meet or equal listing 1.04 or 12.05C. To establish a listed impairment at step three, the claimant must demonstrate that "all of the specified criteria [are met] . " Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). "An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." A. Listing 1.04 Listing 1.04(A) in Id. compromise " ' [ e] vidence of of 2 a applies to disorders of the spine resulting nerve nerve root root or the compression spinal cord, with: characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the 2 There are two additional sets of criteria that can satisfy listing 1.04. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1. 04 (B), (C). Although he does not specifically identify the criterion pursuant to which his challenge is brought, plaintiff only discusses the requirements of listing 1.04(A). See Pl.'s Opening Br. 11-14. Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER spine, motor loss muscle weakness) there is (atrophy with weakness or accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if involvement of the associated muscle lower back, raising test (sitting and supine).'" positive Swofford v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 2013 WL 3333063, *3 (D.Or. July 1, 2013) Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, As of corrective January 15, back § (quoting 20 C.F.R. 1.04(A)). 2010, surgery, straight-leg approximately one year the ALJ determined that after his plaintiff no longer met listing 1.04(A): "[n]o treating or examining physician has reported clinical findings equivalent criteria of any listed impairment, nor in does severity the to evidence the show medical findings that are the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment." Tr. 16. Specifically, the ALJ denoted that, after plaintiff's back surgery, "[h]e noticed improvement in his pain and incontinence," and "[b]y January of 2010 had a negative straight leg-raising test and only had mild tenderness to palpation in one area in his back." Tr. 18. Further, the ALJ observed that May 2010 MRis revealed medical improvement: "[n]o focal masses or clumping of the nerve roots was seen [and] [p]reviously present severe central canal stenosis was no longer visualized." Here, substantial evidence supports medical improvement after January 14, the 2010. ALJ' s Id. finding Post-surgery, of Todd Kuether, M.D., reported that plaintiff was "certainly up and moving much better and his other symptoms of incontinence have improved although they have not completely resolved." Tr. 319, 321; compare Tr. 257, 302, 411 (medical records reflecting chronic incontinence Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER pre-surgery), with Tr. 56, 59, 378, 411 (evidence indicating that, post-surgery, plaintiff's accident-free periods) . during a January 14, of the Moreover, 2010, straight-leg raise while "sligh[t] incontinence was occasional, M.D., recorded exam that plaintiff had a negative seated, Gail Hacker, with with "good strength" and only [back] tender[ness] to palpation on the superior aspect midline surgical scar." Tr. 378. Another physical examination, performed on February 2, 2010, by DeWayde Perry, M.D., revealed no motor or sensory reflex loss, no muscular atrophy, and normal muscle strength. Tr. 328-332. Lastly, plaintiff's most recent MRis identified "no significant central stenosis" and "no focal masses or clumping of the nerve roots." Tr. 394-95. Accordingly, the ALJ properly determined that, as of January 15, 2010, plaintiff's back impairment no longer met all of listing 1.04(A)'s requisite elements. 3 3 Even assuming, however, that In discussing listing 1.04, plaintiff also asserts the ALJ improperly rejected the evaluation of Hassan Ghandour, M.D. See Pl.'s Opening Br. 12-13. In September 2010, plaintiff began treatment with Dr. Ghandour. Tr. 403. On December 24, 2010, Dr. Ghandour noted in plaintiff's chart that, based on May 2010 imaging studies, he "was not a surgical candidate and in fact there was no appointment necessary [with neurosurgery]." Tr. 411. That same day, the doctor wrote a letter in which he opined plaintiff "has sustained irreversible nerve damage" and "is totally disabled." Tr. 403. The ALJ afforded Dr. Ghandour's opinion "[l]ittle weight" because: (1) he had only been treating plaintiff "for four months when he offered this opinion"; (2) "no EMG study [exists in the record] showing nerve damage"; (3) "more recent MRis show some improvement in [plaintiff's] back following the surgery"; and (4) and "whether or not [plaintiff] is disabled is a decision left up to the discretion of the commissioner." Tr. 25. In so finding, the ALJ accurately represented the contents of the record and assessed other evidence, including medical reports, that conflicted with Dr. Ghandour's evaluation. See Tr. 19-25. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the ALJ provided a legally sufficient reason, based on Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER evidence relating to plaintiff's back impairment was capable of more than one rationale interpretation, because the ALJ's finding concerning listing 1.04(A) was reasonable, it must be upheld. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ's decision is affirmed as to this issue. B. Listing 12.05C To be disabled under listing 12.05C, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating: "(1) subaverage intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested before age 22; (2) an IQ score of 60 to 70; and (3) a physical or other mental impairment causing work-related limitation." an additional and significant Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013). Presuming that the first and third elements are met, plaintiff failed to establish presumptive disability under this listing. record contains one set of IQ test results. Joffe, Tr. The In March 2010, Pamela Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation on plaintiff. 333-40. pursuant to Verbal and performance IQ were no longer calculated the method employed by Dr. full-scale IQ was 74. 4 Tr. 337. Joffe, but plaintiff's The sub-test scores upon which substantial evidence, for discrediting Dr. Ghandour's assessment. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 Plaintiff contends that "upon subsequent testing, it is possible that [his] IQ scores could fall within the rage required by Listing 12.05." Pl.'s Opening Br. 15-16. Aside from being speculative, plaintiff's argument ignores the fact that, even with a subsequent qualifying IQ score, remand for the payment of benefits would not necessarily be warranted. See, e.g., Strong v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5819102. *3 (D.Or. Oct. 27, 2013) (where the record contained two IQ scores, one qualifying and one not, the Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER plaintiff's full-scale IQ was based were: verbal comprehension 81, perceptual reasoning - 81, working memory - 80, and processing speed - 71. Id. The doctor noted, however, that "as [plaintiff's] pain medication began to take effect his responses became more slowed and the later half of the intellectual testing may not fully reflect his level of intellectual functioning." Tr. 336. In particular, Dr. Joffe reported that plaintiff's working memory and processing speed sub-tests, the two lowest scores obtained, "likely . were affected by mild sedation." As such, because neither his Tr. 337. full-scale IQ nor sub-tests resulted in scores between 60 and 70, even in conjunction with his chronic narcotic usage, plaintiff cannot demonstrate equivalence under listing 12.05C. the ALJ Kennedy, appropriately 738 F.3d at 1176-78. concluded Therefore, plaintiff that was not presumptively disabled at step three. III. RFC Assessment and Step Five Finding Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC is erroneous in two respects. First, plaintiff contends that the ALJ neglected to account for his inability to sustain activity: "[p]laintiff does not disagree ability to that [he] may have do activities the equivalent general to the light, exertion level from time to time [but] foregoing capacity it arguments to sustain SGA level is sedentary, even he would lack the Pl.'s Opening ALJ did not err in relying on the non-qualifying score to determine that the claimant did not meet listing 12.05C). Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER or [o]n the basis of the clear that work." residual physical Br. 18. Second, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's RFC is inconsistent with the assessment of state-agency consulting source Martin Lahr, M.D., opined that Mr. sedentary' level RFC." Eggemeyer was limited to an 'overall Id. The RFC is the maximum that a claimant can do despite his limitations. ALJ must See 20 C.F.R. consider § 416.945. restrictions In determining the RFC, the imposed by all of a claimant's impairments, even those that are not severe, and evaluate of the relevant medical and other evidence," including the claimant's testimony. SSR 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184. Only limitations supported by substantial evidence must be incorporated into the RFC and, by extension, question posed to the VE. the dispositive hypothetical Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163- 65 (9th Cir. 2001). Regarding plaintiff's first allegation of error relating to the RFC, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff's testimony and found that he did not meet or equal listing 1. 04 (A) Thus, to the extent plaintiff's argument is or 12. 05C. contingent upon a finding of harmful error in regard to the aforementioned issues, it lacks merit. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175- 76 2008). (9th Cir. Further, court's within this District have routinely rejected general arguments regarding sustained activity because claimant's ability to maintain employment is subsumed in the RFC determination." (D.Or. Mar. 30, 2013) Valvo v. Astrue, 2013 WL 1326588, *9 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Porter v. Astrue, Page 16 - OPINION AND ORDER 2009 WL 2595562, *15 (D.Or. Aug. 19, 2009) (citing SSR 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184). Concerning his second allegation of error surrounding the RFC, plaintiff quotes Dr. explicitly Lahr' s report out of context. identified plaintiff's functional The doctor limitations, in relevant part, as follows: standing and/or walking for a total of at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, total of six hours RFC, in formulating the assessment and therewith. Compare id. an and sitting for a deviate articulated instead workday. ALJ did not the eight-hour restrictions (Dr. Lahr' s opinion), Tr. from 361. Dr. In Lahr' s consistent with Tr. 19 (RFC limiting plaintiff to standing two hours and sitting six hours in an eight-hour workday). The fact that, after summarizing plaintiff's medical records, Dr. Lahr remarked "MSO given partial wt. overall sed, but postures to occ" does not render the ALJ's RFC erroneous. Tr. 367. In other words, the distinction between sedentary and light exertion work is immaterial in this case because the ALJ resolved that plaintiff was limited to standing no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday. See Griffith v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1303102, *4-8 (D.Or. Mar 30, 2014) ("light work requires 'a good deal of standing -the primary difference between sedentary and most light jobs'") (quoting SSR 83-10, available at 1983 WL 31251); see also Alsup v. Astrue, 2012 WL 3817795, *7-9 (D.Or. Sept. 4, 2012) (affirming the ALJ's step five finding where the VE explained that the claimant could perform representative occupations identified as light, despite an RFC limiting him to standing and/or walking two hours Page 17 -OPINION AND ORDER per day, because those jobs were defined as such due to their production pace and there was no indication that the claimant was limited in that Critically, category). the dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE included all of plaintiff's well-supported limitations. Compare Tr. 19 (ALJ's RFC), with Tr. 93-96 (dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217-18. Accordingly, the ALJ's RFC and step five finding are upheld. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED. IT IS SO Dated this /S day of April 2014. Ann Aiken United States District Judge Page 18 - OPINION AND ORDER decision is

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.