Bell v. Pension Plan for Bargaining Unit Employees of Tri-Met et al
Filing
40
ORDER: The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion 32 to Dismiss. The Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's First Claim under § 301 of LMRA and dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's Second Claim for common-law breach of contract. Signed on 07/31/2012 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
RICHARD BELL,
3: ll-CV-935-BR
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
PENSION PLAN FOR BARGAINING
UNIT EMPLOYEES OF TRI-MET,
BETH DEHAMEL, LYNN LEHRBACK,
JANNA TORAN, JOHN HUNT, SAM
SCHWARZ, YVETTE FARRA, and
TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF
OREGON,
Defendants.
STEPHEN L. BRISCHETTO
621 S.W. Morrison Street, Suite 1025
Portland, OR 97205
(503) 223-5814
Attorney for Plaintiff
1
- OPINION AND ORDER
ARUNA A. MASIH
GREGORY A. HARTMAN
Bennett Hartman Morris & Kaplan LLP
210 S.W. Morrison Street, Suite 500
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 227-4600
WILLIAM T. PATTON
Lane Powell, PC
601 S.W. Second Avenue, Suite 2100
Portland, OR 97204-3158
(503) 778-2100
Attorneys for Defendants Pension Plan for Bargaining
Unit Employees of Tri-Met, Beth DeHamel, Yvette Farra,
Jon Hunt, Lynn Lehrback, Sam Schwarz, and Janna Toran
KIMBERLY A. SEWELL
4012 S.E. 17th Avenue, LS3
Portland, OR 97202
(503) 962-5656
Attorney for Defendant Tri-Metropolitan Transportation
District of Oregon
BROWN, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion
(#32) to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
For the reasons
that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion and DISMISSES
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (#31) in its entirety as
follows: Plaintiff's First Claim under § 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§
185 (LMRA) , is dismissed
with prejudice; Plaintiff's Second Claim for common-law breach of
contract is dismissed without prejudice.
2
- OPINION AND ORDER
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint:
Plaintiff Richard Bell is a current employee of TriMetropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (Tri-Met) and
works in Tri-Met's tire-service department (Tire Shop) on its
busses.
Plaintiff has worked in the Tire Shop since November
1975, which was originally managed by Firestone pursuant to an
agreement between Firestone and Tri-Met.
Plaintiff's employment
with Firestone was subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between Plaintiff's Union, Division 757 of the Amalgamated
Transit Union, and Firestone that provided for certain pension
benefits for employees of the Union.
In 1981 Tri-Met ended its relationship with Firestone and
contracted with Goodyear to manage its Tire Shop.
Plaintiff's
employment with Goodyear was also subject to a CBA between the
Union and Goodyear, which provided pension benefits for Tire Shop
employees.
Plaintiff's benefits with Firestone, however, were
not vested at that time, and he lost seven years of service
credit with Firestone when he changed employers from Firestone to
Goodyear.
In the same month that the Union negotiated its 1982 CBA
with Goodyear, Plaintiff alleges the Union also negotiated a CBA
with Tri-Met.
3
That CBA and the subsequent CBAs between Tri-Met
- OPINION AND ORDER
and the Union in 1985 and 1988 contained the following provision
on behalf of the Goodyear employees in the Tire Shop:
In the event [Tri-Met] discontinues its use
of the Goodyear Company as its contractor for
tire service, the employees of Goodyear
working on [Tri-Met] properties as of
April 27, 1982 shall be deemed to have a
[Tri-Met] seniority date the same as each
employee's most recent date of hire at [TriMet] by Goodyear or its predecessor company.
They shall be entitled to employment by [TriMet] to the extent required by their
seniority date and the terms and provisions
of the labor agreement.
Plaintiff does not allege the Goodyear-Union CBA contained
such a provision.
Plaintiff, however, alleges
~[t]he
promise set
forth in the 1982 Agreement between Tri-Met and the [Union] arose
from plaintiff's employment under the Agreement between Goodyear
and the [Union], were linked to that agreement and became part of
the Goodyear-[Union CBA].ff
In late 1991 Tri-Met cancelled its contract with Goodyear
and assumed management of the Tire Shop and its employees,
including Plaintiff.
In 1992 Tri-Met and the Union negotiated a
new CBA that did not preserve the seniority rules for Tire Shop
employees for pension benefits that had been part of the 1982,
1985, and 1988 CBAs.
Plaintiff alleges these changes were made
without the knowledge or consent of the Tire Shop employees.
In 2007 Plaintiff asked Tri-Met about his seniority date for
pension benefits, and Tri-Met advised Plaintiff that his
seniority date was 1991.
4
- OPINION AND ORDER
In May 2010 Plaintiff sought pension benefits from Tri-Met
and specifically requeste9 pension credits dating back to 1975
for work that he performed for both Firestone and Goodyear.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the applicable labor
agreements when they concluded Plaintiff's pension-accrual date
was in 1991, the date when Plaintiff began to work in the Tire
Shop as a Tri-Met employee.
Plaintiff also alleges Tri-Met
violated its claims procedures during the dispute-resolution
process.
Ultimately Tri-Met issued its final decision denying
Plaintiff's claim on February 14, 2011.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on August 5, 2011,
against Defendants Tri-Met; Pension Plan for Bargaining Unit
Employees of Tri-Met (Pension Plan); and Beth DeHamel, Yvette
Farra, Jon Hunt, Lynn Lehrback, Sam Schwarz, and Janna Toran,'
Trustees for the Pension Plan (Trustees).
On October 4, 2011,
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and,
in the alternative, for failure to state a claim under Rule
12 (b) (6).
On December 5, 2011, Magistrate Judge Janice M.
Stewart issued Findings and Recommendation (#17) in which she
, The Court notes the correct spelling of Defendant Toran's
name is "Jana Toran." See Oregon State Bar Member Directory.
5
- OPINION AND ORDER
recommended the Court deny Defendants' Motion for lack of
jurisdiction but recommended granting the Motion for failure to
state a claim.
On January 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed Objections (#23) to the
Findings and Recommendation.
On March 16, 2012, the Court heard
oral argument on the Objections.
At the hearing the Court
expressed its inclination to adopt the Findings and
Recommendation but gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint and Defendants leave to renew their motion against the
amended pleading.
On April 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended
Complaint (#31) in which he asserted two claims:
of promises made as a part of a CBA under
§
(1) enforcement
301 of the LMRA and
(2) a common-law claim for breach of contract.
On April 30, 2012, the Pension Plan and Trustees filed their
Motion (#32) to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for
Failure to Join a Necessary Party under Rules 12(b) (6) and
12(b) (7).
That same day Tri-Met filed its Notice (#34) to join
the Motion filed by the other Defendants.
Plaintiff filed his
Response on May 11, 2012, and Defendants filed their Reply on May
23, 2012.
Tri-Met again filed a Notice (#38) of Joinder in
Defendants' Reply.
On May 31, 2012, the Court heard oral argument on
Defendants' Motion.
6
- OPINION AND ORDER
STANDARDS
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."
[Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,] 570, 127
S. Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.
Id. at 556 . . . .
The plausibility standard is not akin to a
"probability requirement," but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.
Ibid.
Where
a complaint pleads facts that are "merely
consistent with" a defendant's liability, it
"stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"
Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets
omitted) .
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
See also Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555-56 (2007).
The Supreme Court further clarified in Iqbal the
requirements for a pleading to survive a motion to dismiss:
As the Court held in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, the
pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require "detailed factual allegations," but
it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. ct.
2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). A pleading
that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." 550 U.S., at
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]"
devoid of "further factual enhancement."
7
- OPINION AND ORDER
Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
"[AJ complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if,
taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains
enough facts to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.
Til
Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th eire
2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009), and Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint in its entirety.
I.
Plaintiff's LMRA Claim.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under § 301 of
the LMRA in which he seeks to enforce the seniority rules in the
Tri-Met-Union CBAs of 1982, 1985, and 1988 on the following
grounds:
(1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted under Rule 12 (b) (6),
(2) Plaintiff fails to join
necessary parties under Rule 12(b) (7),
(3) Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his contractual remedies, and (4) Plaintiff's claim is
untimely.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry
8
- OPINION AND ORDER
affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added).
As they argued in their original Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to state a claim under
§
301
because he is not seeking to enforce a contract between an
employer and a labor organization.
Specifically, Defendants
contend Plaintiff seeks to enforce an agreement between his Union
and Tri-Met, which is considered a public body under the statute
and is exempted from the definition of an "employer" as a
subdivision of the State of Oregon.
See 29 U.S.C.
152(2).
§
Plaintiff does not dispute that Tri-Met is not an "employer" for
purposes of the LMRA.
At the March 16, 2012, oral argument on Plaintiff's
Objections to the Findings and Recommendation, the Court
emphasized the apparent failure of Plaintiff's claim under § 301
and pressed Plaintiff to provide the Court with the specific
contract provision "between an employer and a labor organization"
that he seeks to enforce.
Although Plaintiff's counsel conceded
the Tri-Met-Union contract was not actionable under
§
301, he
instead asserted Plaintiff sought to enforce the CBA between
Goodyear, an employer within the meaning under the LMRA, and the
9
- OPINION AND ORDER
Union.
Accordingly, Plaintiff argued the Goodyear-Union CBA
incorporated the Tri-Met promise to maintain seniority for
Goodyear employees in the Tire Shop.
Because the Court concluded
that theory was not explicit in Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court
permitted Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint to
clarify his
§
301 claim and to state a claim adequately.
The Court concludes, and the parties agree, Plaintiff
cannot, without more, bring an action under
§
301 against Tri-Met
to enforce a contract between Tri-Met and the Union because TriMet is not an employer within the meaning of the statute.
Although Plaintiff
may have other means to enforce such an
agreement between his Union and Tri-Met such as his common-law
breach-of-contract claim, he cannot enforce under
§
301 the
express provision cited in his First Amended Complaint in which
Tri-Met allegedly promised to maintain the seniority of Goodyear
employees in the event that Tri-Met discontinued its relationship
with Goodyear.
Although Plaintiff contends in his Amended Complaint that
the asserted promise by Tri-Met in the 1982 Tri-Met-Union CBA was
"linked to" and "became part of" the Goodyear-Union CBA, the
Court notes Plaintiff neither cites to nor provides any provision
of the Goodyear-Union CBA in his Amended Complaint.
In his
Response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff cites to Garvey v.
Roberts and Alvares v. Erickson in which the Ninth Circuit
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
recognized the term "contract" in
§
301 may include documents
beyond the CBA itself under certain circumstances.
203 F.3d 580, 587 (9 th Cir. 2000).
156, 161-62 (9 th Cir. 1975).
See Garvey,
See also Alvares, 514 F.2d
The Ninth Circuit concluded in
Alvares and echoed in Garvey that a trust agreement specifically
referred to, expressly incorporated, and provided as a supplement
to the CBA at issue was "part and parcel" of that agreement.
F.2d at 161.
514
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded the parties
intended to include the trust agreement as a part of the CBA
despite the fact that it was a separate agreement.
Id.
Here Plaintiff's assertions in paragraph 16 of his First
Amended Complaint that the Tri-Met-Union CBA and the GoodyearUnion CBA were "linked" and that Tri-Met's alleged promise to
maintain the seniority of former Goodyear employees in the Tire
Shop "became a part of" the Goodyear-Union CBA are "naked" legal
conclusions.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
Even though
Plaintiff vaguely contends the Tri-Met promise to Plaintiff's
Union was incorporated into the Goodyear-Union CBA by contract or
by some other unidentified operation of law, Plaintiff does not
provide any facts such as those discussed by the court in Alvares
or cite to any provision of the Goodyear-Union CBA to support the
plausibility of the pleaded conclusion that the Goodyear-Union
CBA expressly referred to or incorporated in whole or in part the
Tri-Met-Union CBA.
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
In addition to permitting Plaintiff to replead, the Court
gave Plaintiff two opportunities at oral argument to explain the
nature of his "incorporation" theory in response to the Court's
direct questioning.
Plaintiff, however, merely repeated his
reliance on Alvares and maintained without explanation that the
CBA negotiations in June 1982 were essentially a three-party
negotiation between the Union, Tri-Met, and Goodyear.
At the
Court's offer of an additional opportunity to replead,
Plaintiff's counsel stated he did not wish to replead and was
satisfied with the Amended Complaint.
The Court reads Plaintiff's allegations to be sufficient to
establish the possibility that the drafters of the Goodyear-Union
CBA intended to incorporate the Tri-Met-union CBA generally or
Tri-Met's specific promise to maintain seniority for the Tire
Shop employees, but Plaintiff's allegations that the Tri-MetUnion CBA was "linked to" or otherwise incorporated into the
Goodyear-Union CBA are no more than legal "labels and
conclusions" that lack the sort of "factual enhancement"
necessary under Twombly and Iqbal to constitute "plausible
allegations" sufficient to state a
the Goodyear-Union CBA.
§
301 claim for enforcement of
Ultimately the Court concludes the
contract that Plaintiff seeks to enforce is not "between"
Goodyear and the Union but is instead a contract "between" TriMet and the Union.
Because Tri-Met is not an employer within the
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
meaning of the LMRA, the latter form of contract is not
enforceable under § 301.
prejudice Plaintiff's
II.
§
Accordingly, the Court dismisses with
301 LMRA claim.
Plaintiff's Breach-of-Contract Claim.
As noted, Plaintiff also alleges a breach-of-contract claim
against Defendants for breach of the Tri-Met-union CBA.
Among
other things, Defendants contend in their Motion that if the
Court dismisses Plaintiff's
§
301 LMRA claim, the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
breach-of-contract claim because the LMRA claim was the sole
basis for federal jurisdiction and would no longer be a part of
this action.
28 U.S.C.
§
1367(a) provides when a district court has
original jurisdiction over any civil action, it "shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy."
Nonetheless, 28 U.S.C.
§
1367(c) (3) provides the district court
has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state-law claims if the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it had original jurisdiction.
District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental state-law claims in the interest of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Mendoza v. Zirkle
Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163,
Chicago v.
Int'l Coll.
1174 (9 th Cir. 2002) (citing City of
of Surgeons, 522 U.S.
156, 172-73 (1997)).
H' [I)n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors .
.
. will point
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims. ' H
Sa tey v. JPMorgan Chase
& Co.,
521 F. 3d
1087, 1091 (9 th Cir. 2008) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon univ. v.
Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
Workers of Am.
v.
Gibbs,
(1988)).
See also United Mine
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (HNeedless
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring
for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.").
Having now dismissed Plaintiff's § 301 LMRA claim over which
the Court had original jurisdiction, the Court also notes this
case remains at a very early stage in the proceedings,
Defendants have not yet filed an answer, and it does not appear
the parties have engaged in any significant discovery.
The
Court, therefore, concludes the balance of factors in this matter
favors declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's remaining state-law claim.
At the hearing on May 31, 2012, Plaintiff requested the
Court to dismiss Plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim without
prejudice if the Court dismissed Plaintiff's LMRA claim and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
state-law claim.
The Court concludes, in the exercise of its
discretion, that Plaintiff should have the opportunity to pursue
his state-law claim in state court and, accordingly, dismisses
without prejudice Plaintiff's Second Claim for breach of
contract.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion (#32)
to Dismiss.
Claim under
The Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's First
§
301 of LMRA and dismisses without prejudice
Plaintiff's Second Claim for common-law breach of contract.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 31"t day of July, 2012.
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
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