Courser v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 3:2011cv00717 - Document 17 (D. Or. 2012)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's final decision denying benefits to plaintiff is AFFIRMED. This action is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 01/23/2012 by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. (pvh)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION NICOLE COURSER, Case No. 3:11-cv-717-MA Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. MERRILL SCHNEIDER Schneider Caver Law Offices P.O. Box 14490 Portland, Oregon 97293 Attorney for Plaintiff S. AMANDA MARSHALL United States Attorney ADRIAN L. BROWN Assistant United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, Oregon 97204 JEFFREY R. MCCLAIN Special Assistant United States Attorney Office of the General Counsel Social Security Administration 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MiS 901 Seattle, Washington 98104 Attorneys for Defendant 1 - OPINION AND ORDER OPINION AND ORDER MARSH, Judge: Plaintiff Nicole Courser brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ U.S.C. § 1381-1383f. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (3). For the reasons set forth below, I AFFIRM the final decision of the Commissioner. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on March 13, alleging disability due to neck pain as of March 4, application was denied initially and upon 2006. Her reconsideration. hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Montano on April 10, 2009. 2006, ("ALJ") A Donna On August 26, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. After the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ decision, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Born on August 29, 1981, plaintiff was 24 years old on the alleged onset date of disability and 27 years old at the time of the hearing. Plaintiff left high school during the ninth grade because she was pregnant; she never obtained a GED. In March 2006, plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident in which she fractured her cervical spine and left hand. 2 - OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff has no past relevant work, but was briefly employed as a cashier, gas station attendant, and house cleaner. THE ALJ'S DISABILITY ANALYSIS The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. sequential Bowen V. Each step is potentially dispositive. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. See Tackett 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). V. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 416.971 et seq. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the following severe impairments: mood disorder, NOS; status post C6-7 fusion; obesity; fractures. and status post See 20 C.F.R. At step three, § left third and fourth metacarpal 416.920(c). the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 416.967(b), but is limited to simple repetitive tasks consistent with unskilled work. At step four, work. See 20 C.F.R. step 416.927, 416.929. the ALJ found plaintiff has no past relevant See 20 C.F.R. At §§ five, § 416.965. the ALJ found that considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.960(c), 416.966. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ISSUES ON REVIEW Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by: 1) failing to properly assess her credibility; and 2) improperly evaluating the opinions of Drs. Ugolini, Harris, and Eder. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. § 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The court must weigh all the evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. 4 - OPINION AND ORDER Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 upheld, (9th Cir. even if 1986). the The Commissioner's decision must be evidence is susceptible to more one rational interpretation .. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. than If the evidence supports the Commissioner's conclusion, the Commissioner must be affirmed; "the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). DISCUSSION I. Plaintiff's Credibility Rollins contends that the ALJ improperly assessed the credibility of her testimony regarding the severity of her pain and the degree to which it incapacitates her. In deciding whether to accept subjective symptom testimony, such as pain or depression, 20 C.F.R. analysis. § an ALJ must perform two stages of 404.1529. The first stage is a threshold test in which the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 there is no dispute that plaintiff presented objective medical evidence in support of her claims of pain and depression. (Tr.17.) At the second stage of the credibility analysis, there is no affirmative provide clear and 5 - OPINION AND ORDER evidence of malingering, convincing reasons for assuming the ALJ must discrediting the claimant I S testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007); Morgan V. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) . Clear and convincing reasons may include inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony, including those between daily activities and the alleged symptoms. See Burch 400 F.3d 676, 680-1 (9th Cir. 2005); Rollins V. V. Barnhart, Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 n.7. The ALJ also may consider the claimant's history of medical treatment or prior work history in assessing a claimant's credibility. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-9 (9th Cir. 2002) . If an ALJ finds that the claimant's testimony regarding his subjective symptoms is unreliable, the "ALJ must make a credibility determination citing the reasons unpersuasive." Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599. why the testimony is In doing so, the ALJ must identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the claimant's complaints and make "findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. Here, the ALJ identified numerous reasons for discrediting plaintiff. To begin, the ALJ found that inconsistencies between plaintiff's daily activities and her alleged symptoms undermined her credibility. (Tr. 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 15.) Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff's ability to take care of her personal hygiene, cook and clean, leave the house, socialize, enjoy hobbies, and take care of her six year old son "suggest a level of functioning greater than what she alleged in her application and testimony." (Id.) At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she needs assistance dressing and bathing herself. (Tr. 41.) that of her boyfriend laundry. does (Tr. 27-41.) all the Plaintiff also explained cleaning, vacuuming, and In addition, plaintiff testified that she can only cook or do dishes while sitting in a chair. (Tr. 36.) Finally, plaintiff stated that her roommates and neighbors provide help with her son's care when he is not in school. (Tr. 97, 217.) Plaintiff's hearing testimony is commensurate with the activities that she described to her doctors and on disability forms. (Tr. 97-8, 217.) Thus, the ALJ's did not fully consider the record in assessing plaintiff's acti vi ties of daily living. While inconsistencies between a claimant's daily activities and the alleged impairments can serve as a basis for discrediting subjective testimony, the ALJ may not selectively refer to certain activities out of context in making its evaluation. (9th Cir. 1998) See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722-3 (ALJ's "paraphrasing of record material" was "not entirely accurate regarding the content and tone of the record" and, thus, Because, did not support an adverse when viewed in its entirety, 7 - OPINION AND ORDER credibility the finding). record reveals that plaintiff's activities of daily living were very limited, the ALJ's finding was not based on substantial evidence. Further, many of the daily activities that the ALJ cited as vitiating plaintiff's credibility are not allegations of pain, inherently inconsistent with plaintiff's such as cooking while sitting in a chair. Thus, the ALJ's failure to consider plaintiff's entire statements regarding the extent of her daily activities when assessing her credibility was error and, accordingly, cannot be sustained. If this was the only reason that the ALJ provided for finding plaintiff's testimony not credible, she may be entitled to the relief concluding she seeks. However, after that plaintiff's testimony was not credible to the extent that it was inconsistent with her daily activities, the ALJ identified five other reasons, citing specific record evidence, minimal treatment record, for discrediting plaintiff: her her limited work history prior to the alleged onset date, inconsistencies in her testimony, exaggeration, and her criminal history. Notably, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's "use of medications and history of treatment does not suggest the presence of impairments which are more limited than those found in this decision.reason to (Tr. 16.) discredit While a lack of medical treatment is a valid a claimant's testimony, negative inference, the ALJ must consider the individual may provide, 8 - OPINION AND ORDER or other ~any before drawing a explanations that information in the case record, that may explain infrequent or irregular medical visits." See SSR 96-7p, available at 1996 WL 374186, *7; Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Here, plaintiff acknowledged the total lack of medical treatment for her alleged physical disabilities, but stated that her anxiety and trust issues have prevented her from going to the doctor. (Tr. 33-4.) Plaintiff explained that she only takes her prescribed pain medication at night because it interferes with her son's care during the day and because "it doesn't work." (Tr.33.) However, plaintiff also testified she has not received treatment for her psychological issues. (Tr. 35.) Plaintiff offered no explanation for this refusal to seek treatment other than stating that she was scared of the potential side-effects associated with medication. (Id. ) In regard to plaintiff's treatment for her alleged mental impairments, the ALJ acknowledged plaintiff's testimony regarding side-effects, but found it significant that she failed to consider taking newer antidepressants, even after being educated about their lessened side-effects by a medical professional. regard to her alleged physical disabilities, (Tr. 16.) In the ALJ noted that plaintiff did not follow-up with her neurosurgeon, Dr. Adler, after back surgery not because of trust and anxiety issues, but rather because it was merely "not convenient" for her. (Tr. 16, 180.) Finally, the ALJ found it significant that plaintiff had not sought 9 - OPINION AND ORDER any treatment whatsoever for her allegedly disabling physical or mental conditions. (Tr. 16.) As such, the ALJ pointed to specific evidence in the record that undermines plaintiff's claims regarding her impairments. finding is supported by substantial evidence and, as This such, constitutes a clear and convincing reason. Moreover, the ALJ found plaintiff less than credible because of her limited work history: "it is clear that the claimant worked only very sporadically prior to the alleged disability onset date, which raises a question as to whether the claimant's continuing unemployment is actually due to medical impairments." (Tr. 16.) The fact that a claimant has "an 'extremely poor work history' and 'has shown little propensity to work in her lifetime'" is a clear and convincing reason to discredit the claimant's alleged inability to work. 2006 accident, Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. plaintiff's entire work Here, prior to her history consisted of occasionally cleaning houses with her mother when she was fifteen and working for less than a week as a cashier at Dari Mart when she was twenty-two. (Tr. 217.) work history was erratic, As such, as the ALJ noted, plaintiff's at best, with years of unemployment between jobs, even before the alleged onset date. In addition, the ALJ found that plaintiff's regarding why she quit working were inconsistent. statements (Tr. 16-17.) Here, plaintiff told a medical examiner that she quit her job as a 10 - OPINION AND ORDER cashier at the Dollar Tree after two months "to go to Mexico to try to work things out with her boyfriend." (Tr.222.) At the hearing, however, she testified she stopped working at the Dollar Tree because of back pain. these inconsistencies determination. when (Tr. 28.) making The ALJ explicitly noted plaintiff's credibility (Tr. 16.) These facts clearly undermine plaintiff's main argument that pain resulting from her 2006 accident is the reason why she cannot work. As the ALJ found, plaintiff's actual employment history is not consistent with this contention. To be sure, when a claimant's work history undercuts her assertions, the ALJ may rely on that contradiction to discredit the claimant. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting sufficient reasons to disregard subj ecti ve pain testimony included stopping work due reasons other than the alleged disability and failure to seek treatment, despite complaints of severe pain); see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1068 (2008) (inconsistencies between testimony and medical evidence was a clear and convincing reason to discount testimony of pain) . Thus, the foregoing discussion reveals that the ALJ did, fact, identify ample specific evidence in undermines plaintiff's subjective testimony. the record Therefore, I in that find that the ALJ provided at least three clear and convincing reasons to rej ect plaintiff's 11 - OPINION AND ORDER statements regarding the extent of her limitations and, as such, it is unnecessary for further discuss the other reasons provided. this Court to Accordingly, even though it was legal error for the ALJ to use plaintiff's daily activities to discredit her testimony, I find that such an error was harmless since additional, valid reasons support the ultimate credibility determination. See Carmickle v. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008) Comm' r, Soc. Sec. ("[s)o long as there remains 'substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusions on ... credibility' and the error 'does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate [credibility) conclusion,' such is deemed harmless and does not warrant reversal," (citations and internal quotations omitted)) . II. Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by providing legally insufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of Katie Ugolini, Ph.D., James Harris, M.D., and Sharon Eder, M.D. In addition, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by not incorporating all of Dr. Eder's limitations into her RFC, which adversely affected her ultimate disability determination at step five. To reject the examining physician, uncontroverted of a treating or the ALJ must present clear and convincing reasons for doing so. (9th Cir. 2005). opinion Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 If a'treating or examining doctor's opinion is 12 - OPINION AND ORDER contradicted by another doctor's opinion, specific and legitimate reasons. it may be rejected by Id. When evaluating conflicting opinions, an ALJ is not required to accept an opinion that is not supported by clinical findings, or is brief or conclusory. restrictions based on a Id. In claimant's addition, subj ecti ve a doctor's work statements about symptoms are reasonably discounted when the ALJ finds the claimant less than credible. See, e.g., Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (ALJ provided clear and convincing reason to reject a doctor's opinion where it was in the form of a checklist, lacks supporting objective evidence, was contradicted by other statements on the record, and was based on subjective descriptions). A. Dr. Ugolini's Opinion In May 2009, Dr. Ugolini conducted a one-time consultive "neuropsychological screening exam" in conj unction wi th plaintiff's application Ugolini's for is disability the only benefits. opinion (Tr. addressing 20, Dr. 213-27.) plaintiff's mental impairments because, as discussed above, plaintiff has not sought any treatment in conjunction with her alleged disabilities. As such, Dr. Ugolini's opinion is uncontroverted; thus, the ALJ needed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. 13 - OPINION AND ORDER Dr. Ugolini diagnosed plaintiff with a posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic, and a mood disorder, NOS. (Tr. 223.) Dr. Ugolini noted that plaintiff was "cooperative" during the testing and "put forth fairly good effort on memory measures." within the same plaintiff's responded report, "MMPI -2 to the however, profile [test] in Dr. Ugolini was invalid, an extremely (Tr. 233.) concluded indicating that that exaggerated she manner, endorsing a wide variety of rare symptoms and attitudes." (Id.) In addition to making a psychological diagnosis, Dr. Ugolini filled out an RFC form, in which she opined that plaintiff has moderate difficulties with making judgments on simple work-related decisions and instructions. in understanding (Tr. 225-26.) and Dr. carrying Ugolini also out complex opined that plaintiff has marked difficulties with making judgments on complex work-related decisions and in interacting appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers. (Id. ) Beyond checking the box, the doctor made no reference to any objective evidence in the RFC. (Id. ) Here, The ALJ gave Dr. Ugolini's opinion some weight. 20.) Specifically, (Tr. the ALJ credited the doctor's opinion that plaintiff suffers from a mood disorder, NOS, and has "moderate difficulty sustaining concentration and attention and persisting in productive activity." remainder of Dr. (Id. ) However, the ALJ did not find the Ugolini's opinion "entirely persuasive as she 14 - OPINION AND ORDER apparently takes claimant's statements of her symptoms at face value in spite of the fact claimant responded in an that the MMPI-2 profile indicated 'extremely exaggerated manner.'" . (Id.) The ALJ also found it problematic that Dr. Ugolini's report was based on an uncorroborated report of plaintiff's medical history and symptoms. Moreover, (Id. ) the ALJ noted that portions of Dr. Ugolini's assessment were not consistent with "other persuasive evidence of record." (Tr. 19-20.) For example, the ALJ noted that plaintiff testified that she never had a problem with authority figures or coworkers but did have some anxiety dealing with customers. (Tr. 19.) good Plaintiff, however, also remarked relationship with her current boyfriend, Thus, (Id. ) the ALJ found that, that she had neighbors, contrary to a and family. Dr. Ugolini's determination that plaintiff had marked restrictions, plaintiff's own testimony revealed instead that she had only mild difficulties in social functioning. (Id. ) The ALJ is not required to accept a medical opinion that is not supported by clinical findings or is based on an uncredible claimant's subj ecti ve reports. See Bayliss, 427 F. 3d at 1216; Bray, 359 F. 3d at 1195. As discussed 554 F. 3d at 1228; Batson, above, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's finding that plaintiff is not credible. noted, Also, as the ALJ Dr. Ugolini's report is not consistent internally or with 15 - OPINION AND ORDER the administrative record. which portions of her Further, Dr. Ugolini does not specify assessment are based on plaintiff's subjective testimony as opposed to independent clinical findings; thus, it is impossible to decipher which segments of Dr. Ugolini's RFC are supported by objective medical evidence. Ugolini's opinion, even if accepted as true, In addition, Dr. does not support findings of substantially greater functional limitations than those already addressed in the RFC. (Tr. 17-9, 213-27.) As such, I find that the ALJ set forth clear and convincing reasons for not fully crediting Dr. Ugolini's medical opinion. B. In Dr. Eder's and Dr. Harris's Opinions May 2006, Dr. Harris conducted a one-time examination relating to plaintiff's physical abilities. consul ti ve (Tr. 195- 210.) Dr. Harris diagnosed plaintiff with chronic neck and lower back pain, bilateral deconditioning. knee (Tr. 198.) pain, obesity and In making his diagnosis, physical Dr. Harris noted that plaintiff could walk comfortably at a normal pace with a normal gait, and had a natural arm swing and cadence. In addition, hand (Tr. 196.) Dr. Harris reported that x-rays of plaintiff's left revealed no fracture/dislocation. evidence (Tr. 199.) of joint erosion or other Lumbar films of plaintiff's back showed spina bifida but no osteoarthritis; thoracic films exposed no abnormalities and 16 - OPINION AND ORDER cervical films showed evidence of prior surgical fusion with mild degenerative changes. (Tr. 197-8, 201- 2. ) Accordingly, Dr. Harris opined that plaintiff was capable of: frequently lifting up to 10 pounds and occasionally lifting 11 to 20 pounds; sitting for eight hours in an eight-hour workday, standing for four hours in an eight-hour workday, and walking for two hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally pushing, pulling and reaching overhead with her right hand; frequently reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling; occasionally climbing stairs and ramps; occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (Tr. 204-8. ) However, Dr. plaintiff should never climb ladders, Harris ropes, reported or scaffolds, that and should limit her exposure to environmental extremes and hazards, because of her "narcotic usage." (Tr. 207-8.) Dr. Eder also performed a one-time consultive examination of plaintiff in 2006 in conjunction with her application for SSI. (Tr. 185-92.) work. Dr. Eder opined that plaintiff was capable of light (Tr. 186.) Specifically, Dr. Eder reported that plaintiff was capable of: lifting and/or carrying up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally; sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday and standing and/or walking for six hours in an eight-hour handling, workday; fingering, unlimited pushing and pulling; unlimited and feeling; frequently climbing stairs and ramps and occasionally climbing ladders, 17 - OPINION AND ORDER ropes, and scaffolds; occasionally stooping and crawling; frequently balancing, kneeling, and crouching. (Tr. 186-8.) The only other limitation that Dr. Eder included in plaintiff's RFC was "no constant reaching over head." (Tr.188.) In making plaintiff's RFC assessment, the ALJ fully credited Dr. Eder's opinion and found the Dr. Harris's opinion was "essentially in accord with that of Dr. Eder." (Tr. 18.) However, the opinion regarding ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Harris's plaintiff's ability to stand and walk because "this limitation is not supported by the medical evidence and is based solely on plaintiff's subjective complaint's of lower back pain." (Tr. 18.) In addition, the ALJ rejected Dr. Harris's diagnosis of bilateral knee pain supported and by chronic the low medical back pain, evidence and as "they are are claimant's description of her symptoms." (Tr. 18-9.) evidence the supports this conclusion, as not solely based also on Substantial objective findings regarding plaintiff's back and neck pain were minimal and there is no objective medical evidence supporting plaintiff's assertions of knee pain. Thus, (Tr. 196,201-2.) because a medical opinion can appropriately be discredited when it is based largely on a plaintiff's subjective reports, which have been appropriately discounted, I find that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the 18 - OPINION AND ORDER opinion of Dr. Harris to the extent that it is inconsistent with Dr. Eder's opinion. Regardless, See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. the ALJ failed to integrate all of Dr. limitations into plaintiff's RFC. Dr. Eder's opinion, Eder's Because the ALJ did not reject plaintiff is correct that these limitations should have been incorporated. Plaintiff contends that, if these restrictions had been included, the ALJ would have been foreclosed from using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Guidelines") in its step five assessment. The Guidelines consist of a matrix of combinations relating to the four vocational factors used in a disability case: age, work experience, education, and physical ability. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 F.3d U.S. 458, 461-2 (1983); Tackett, 180 at 1101. The Guidelines may be applied, even in the presence of nonexertional limitations, as long as those limitations are not significant. Tackett, 180 inapplicable F.3d when at a Conversely, 1102. claimant's the nonexertional See Guidelines "are limitations are 'sufficiently severe' as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the claimant's exertional limitations." Astrue, 499 nonexertional F.3d 1071, 1075 limitations environmental limitations." are (9th pain, Cir. 2007). postural Hoopai v. "Ex<;lmples of limitations, or Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1102. Here, the ALJ did not expressly include Dr. Eder's limitations that plaintiff could only occasionally climb ladders, 19 - OPINION AND ORDER ropes, and scaffolds or occasionally stoop and crawl. Nevertheless, these restrictions do not significantly erode the occupational base at the light level of exertion. See SSR 83-14, available at 1983 WL 31254, *5 (inability to ascend or descend scaffolding, poles and ropes, or to climb on hands and knees "have very little or no effect on the unskilled light occupational base"). Further, Dr. Eder's limitation that plaintiff could not constantly reach overhead is not severe enough to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the claimant's light level RFC. "[S] ignificant limitations in reaching" may "eliminate a large number of occupations a available at 1985 WL 56857, *7. person could do." SSR 85-15, Dr. Eder, however, did not opine that plaintiff was precluded from reaching overhead altogether; rather, he unceasingly. only stated Thus, that the she could restriction is not not reach overhead significant, as plaintiff remains capable of reaching overhead intermittently and in all other directions frequently. Therefore, does not alter plaintiff's occupational base. these limitations are not significant, expressly incorporate them was harmless. Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 this limitation Accordingly, because the ALJ's failure to See Stout v. Comm'r of (9th Cir. 2006) (mistakes that are "nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ's ultimate disability conclusion" are harmless error). In sum, because these restrictions do not significantly erode plaintiff's 20 - OPINION AND ORDER , ' light level occupational base, the ALJ did not err by applying the Guidelines at step five. Therefore, I find that the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of Drs. Ugolini, Harris, and Eder. To the extent that the ALJ erred in that evaluation, such as error was harmless. Accordingly, the ALJ's interpretation of the medical record does not provide a basis to overturn the decision. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's final decision denying benefits to plaintiff is AFFIRMED. This action is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 1.,$ day of January, 2012. Malcolm F. Marsh United States District Judge 21 - OPINION AND ORDER

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