Coultas v. Payne et al, No. 3:2011cv00045 - Document 44 (D. Or. 2011)
Court Description: OPINION and ORDER - For the reasons stated, DOJ Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 is GRANTED. Dated this 12th day of December, 2011, by U.S. Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION LYLE MARK COULTAS, Civ. No.3: ll-cv-4S-AC OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, v. STEVEN PAYNE, individually and in his Official Capacity as Oregon State Crime Laboratory Detective; CARROLL TICHENOR, Yamhill County Judge; DEPARTMENT OF THE OREGON STATE POLICE; YAMHILL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; CURT GILBERT, individually and in his Official Capacity as Yamhill County Jail Commander; YAMHILL COUNTY JAIL; RUSSEL LUDWIG, individually and in his Official capacity as a Yamhill County Sheriff Detective; YAMHILL COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; THE STATE OF OREGON, Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER 1 {KPR} ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: Introduction Plaintiff Lyle Mark Coultas ("Coultas") alleges due process claims against Defendants Steven Payne ("Payne"), Carroll Tichenor ("Tichenor"), Department of the Oregon State Police ("OSP"), Yamhill County District Attorney's Office ("the District Attorney's Office"), and the State of Oregon ("the State") (collectively "DOJ Defendants").! DOJ Defendants move to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim, untimeliness, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and improper service. Background Coultas's complaint alleges the following, which the court assumes true for purposes ofthis motion. In the context of a custody dispute, Coultas's ex -wife framed him for crimes involving child pornography, based on events allegedly taking place on February 4, 2001. Coultas was arrested on March 21, 2001. Upon learning of the particulars of the charges against him, Coultas realized that he could produce exculpatOlY evidence that would clear him with respect to certain allegations. While in custody he attempted to produce this evidence to the court -appointed investigator assigned to his case, at which point the evidence was intercepted by two guards who subsequently removed the investigator from the premises and forwarded the evidence to the prosecuting attorney, Tichenor. Upon receiving this exculpatOlY evidence, Tichenor altered the underlying allegations to strengthen the case against Coultas, changing the dates that the alleged conduct took place. Tichenor also removed exculpatory evidence from Coultas's residence and did not produce the evidence at trial. Payne, a state criminal investigator, and Tichenor lied to the cOUlt about the available evidence and ! Coultas also named Curt Gilbert, Russel Ludwig, Yamhill County Jail, and the Yamhill County Sheriff s Department as defendants, none of which is a party to this motion. OPINION AND ORDER 2 {KPR} misrepresented facts to the jury with the intent to mislead the jury into believing that Coultas's computer contained illegal pornographic content. The misrepresentations continued on November 15,2002, at which time the court ordered production of the concealed evidence, a forensic report about Coultas's computer. Defendants Payne and Tichenor represented to the court that they had reviewed the report and had identified activity on the dates in question. When Coultas was later provided the report and reviewed it, it did not evidence any activity on those dates, contrary to the in-court representations made by Payne and Tichenor. The trial court sentenced Coultas to 540 months injail. Approximately seven years later, at a subsequent court proceeding, Peter Constantine ("Constantine"), a forensic specialist, testified that Coultas's computer had never contained the pornography in question. The state responded with a report setting fOlih two theories to undermine Constantine's testimony. At this point, the State changed from its initial position - that Coultas had pornography on his computer - to a new position, that Coultas was able to erase the pornography and avoid forensic detection of said pornography on his computer. Coultas contends that these positions are irreconcilable. As a result of this evidence, Coultas was granted a new trial. During preparation for the new trial, Coultas discovered that his confiscated property had been largely destroyed. There was testimony by Detective Russel Ludwig that Tichenor had instructed him not to take notes of witness interviews, and that the witnesses' stories had changed overtime. Two doctors who testified against Coultas in the first trial admitted that, before trial, they had been provided the questions they would be asked and the answers they should give at trial. They were also instructed to destroy these instructions after trial. Before the second trial commenced, Coultas chose to take a "no contest" plea rather than go OPINION AND ORDER 3 {KPR} to trial. Coultas did so because he knew that Payne was prepared to petjure himself and present false evidence against Coultas and defense counsel advised him that he would be unable to get a fair trial. Coultas alleges that his rights to a fail' trial and to effective assistance of counsel were violated under the Due Process Clause of the FOUlieenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Leg(ll St(lnd(lrd Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8(a) governs pleadings and calls for "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A defendant may bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, either because it (I) lacks a cognizable legal theory; or (2) provides insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theoty. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-534 (9th Cit'. 1984). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court addressed the pleading standard to appropriately state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Twombly emphasized the need to include sufficient facts in the pleading to give propel' notice of the claim and its basis: "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." fd. at 555 (brackets and internal citations omitted). Even so, the court noted that "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof ofthose facts is improbable, and 'that a recovety is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheller v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,236 (1974». In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding pro se, the court construes the pleadings liberally OPINION AND ORDER 4 {KPR} and affords the plaintiff the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,623 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[F]ederal coutls [are] liberally to construe the 'inatlful pleading' of pro se litigants."). In other words, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, this COUll supplies the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant will be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623. Also, where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the coutl shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action: "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2). Discussion L Eleventh Amendment Immunity Section 1983 applies to the actions of persons acting under color of law. See 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2011) (extending its protections against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia" who deprives another of rights under the law). The Eleventh Amendment confers immunity on the state from liability under section 1983 for damages or other retroactive relief. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,472 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). This immunity extends to state agencies. See Choka OPINION AND ORDER 5 {KPR} 2010) ("The Eleventh v. McClellan, No. CV-l0 -702-S T, 2010 WL 5825522, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 28, of relief, absent unequivocal Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types not be sued in their official consent by the state." (citation omitted)). Similarly, state officials may t a state officia capacities for damages or other retrospective relief, because "a suit agains her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit l in his or against the officia l's office." v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, Will v. Michigan Dept. ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon ty, however, the official 471 (1985)).2 Where a state official is sued in his or her individual capaci qualifies as a "perso n" for purposes of section 1983 and the state is not substituted in his or her stead. Hq(er v. Melo, 502 Centerfor Legal Studies v. Lindley, 64 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (D. Or. 1999) (citing ual capacities under section U.S. 21, 27-29 (1991 )). Thus, state officials may be sued in their individ 1983. DOJ Defendants argue that Coultas may not state a claim under section of Oregon, the OSP, and the District Attorn ey's Office because they are 1983 against the state not persons under the statute court agrees that the state, its and there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. The e from suit under Eleventh agencies, and its officials working in their official capacities are immun t the individual employees Amendment immunity. However, Coultas also asserts claims agains in sectio n 1983 claims against their individual capacities. The court agrees that Coultas may asseli individual defendants in their individual capacities, which for purposes of this motion includes only Tichenor and Payne. where the suit is for A state official may be sued, however, in his or her official capacity are not treated as actions injunctive relief, because "'official-capacity actions for prospective relief 159, 167 n.14 (1985)). against the state.'" ld. at n.l0 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 2 OPINION AND ORDE R 6 {KPR} II. Failure to State a Claim sOlY statements that DO] Defendants argue that Coultas has presented only vague and conciu he has alleged sufficient facts are insufficient to state a cognizable legal claim. Coultas responds that 1983, in particular the right to state claims for violations of his civil rights, enforceable via section upon the court. to a fair trial, to effective assistance of counsel, and a claim for fraud n 1983. Notably, Coultas asserts that he is not alleging any claims under sectio its effort to construe Coulta s's pro se complaint liberally, the court choose However, in s to provisionally disregard e of claims premised on Coulta s's statement as something other than he intended. In the absenc in federal couti. Section section 1983, Coultas lacks a jurisdictional basis for bringing his claims ing inmates, who suffer 1983 provides a civil enforc ement mechanism for persons, includ state law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. constitutional injuries caused by "[alny person acting under color of Coultas has not asserted an independent basis upon which to enforce his federal constitutional claims diversity and without a claim against state actors. Furthermore, in the absence of jurisdi ction in claims lack ajurisd posses ssing federal subject matter jurisdiction, allY remaining state law ictiona l nt desire to receive a basis in federal comi. For these reasons, and in light of Coulta s's appare federal ent that he is not alleging remed y as eviden ced by his choice of forum, the court disregards his statem claims under section 1983. : Coulta s's ex-wife The compl aint describes in detail the events giving rise to these claims made threats associated with custody of their daughter; within weeks Coulta s was accused of various and incarcerated; Coultas illegal actions; shortly thereafter he was arrested for said criminal acts attempted to comm unicat e information regarding an alibi to the court -appoi inform ation was intercepted by guards at the jail who then forwarded OPINI ON AND ORDE R 7 nted investigator but this the information to Tichen or; {KPR} hout Coulta s's trial and and Tichen or concealed that and other exculpatory information throug basis of forensic evidence; sentencing. Seven years later, Coultas was granted a new trial on the additional evidence of prosecutorial misconduct was revealed in prepar ation for the second trial, but could receive a fair trial. Coultas nonetheless pleaded no contest because he did not believe he factual allegations to As the above recitation demonstrates, Coultas has set forth sufficient state a claim or claims against DOJ Defendants, though the claims themse lves may not be stated with the viability of the claims extreme clarity. Based on the allegations before it, the court considers below. A. Malicious Prosecution ous prosecution Coultas has plead facts which, if true, could give rise to a claim for malici 3 , 510 u.S. 266 (1994), that pursuant to section 1983. The Supreme Comt stated in Albright v. Oliver a claim for malicious prosecution was not independently actionable under section 1983. Id. at 270 ants n.4. However, a claim may lie where plainti ff proves "that the defend acted for the purpose of of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, depriving him of a 'specif ic constitutional right[. ]''' Awabdy v. City 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995» . 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City o/San ta Ana, 68 F.3d show As such: "[T]o prevail [on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff! must that the defendant[] did so for the purpose of prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that [she] denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional right." Meislin v. City o/Hawthorne, v. City ofSanta Ana, 68 F.3d 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10054 (9th Cir. Cal. May 17,201 1) (Freeman 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995» . state law claim for malicious prosecution under Oregon law, instead tution. Thus, any malicious couching each of his claims as violations of the United States Consti prosecution claim would necessarily arise under section 1983. 3 Coulta s did not asselt a OPINION AND ORDE R 8 {KPR } A claim for malicious prosecution is typically lodged against a prosecuting attorney, because "the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from an independent determination on the part of the prosecutor, and thus, precludes liability for those who Patiicipated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of proceedings." AlI'abdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Smid((l' v. V(//'I1ey, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1981). However, other state or local officials may be liable for malicious prosecution where they "improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation oflegal proceedings." Id. (citations omitted). Relevant to the present motion, Coultas has at least pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 against Tichenor and Payne. He has alleged that Tichenor and Payne modified the allegations against him to conform to available evidence and concealed other evidence that would have exonerated Coultas. Even so, Coultas's claim is barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisolmlent, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid ... a [section] 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.] Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). This rule prevents a district court from entering a judgment in a civil action that would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [aJ conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. Furthermore, the Heck doctrine extends beyond malicious prosecution and applies to section 1983 OPINION AND ORDER 9 {KPR} claims in general to the extent the validity of the conviction or sentence would be undermined by a successful civil challenge. See Lockett v. Ericson, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18104, at *8-9 (9th Cit'. Aug. 25, 2011 ) (distinguishing claims in which the section 1983 challenge implicates harms that are actionable, but upon which the legality of the conviction or sentence does not depend). Here, Coultas was granted a new trial on the basis of forensic computer evidence. However, rather than proceed with the second trial, Coultas elected to enter a "no contest" plea. He explains that he did not believe he could receive a fair trial in light of the willingness of certain defendants to continue to peljure themselves and make false representations to the court. Regardless of Coultas's reasoning in entering a "no contest" plea, the fact that Coultas remains convicted for the crimes for which he was prosecuted prevents him from asserting claims that would necessarily invalidate his conviction. See Jackson v. Barnes, Case No. CV 04-08017 RSWL (RZ), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125976 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009) (the COUIt applied Heck where the civil rights plaintiffhad been convicted initially, had the conviction reversed, and was re-convicted onll10st, but not all, of the original charges, stating that although the second conviction was "slightly less weighty," the plaintiff had failed to establish favorable termination). Here, Coultas challenges the veracity of the underlying charges, the evidence presented at trial, and the statements at trial of the prosecuting attorney and a state investigator. If the cOUit were to find in Coultas's favor - that his prosecution was malicious and led to an illegitimate judgment against him - it would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and run afoul of Heck. Accordingly, Coultas's malicious prosecution claim under section 1983 is denied. B. Sixth Amendment Coultas has alleged facts which may give rise to a section 1983 claim for violation of his OPINION AND ORDER 10 {KPR} Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to a speedy trial, an impatiial jury, knowledge of the accusations against him, the ability to call and confront witnesses, and to assistance of counsel in his defense. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. "These fundamental rights are extended to a defendant in a state criminal prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment." Herring v. Nell' York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975). "More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversaty factfinding process that has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Foutieenth Amendments." Id. Here, Coultas alleged that he was prevented from communicating exculpatOlY evidence to his counsel by a state actor. That said, the court need not decide whether Coultas alleged specific facts setting forth a scenario in which the defense was denied "the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversaty factfinding process." Id. at 858. Even if Coultas could state this claim based on the factual allegations alleged, he could again not overcome the Heck bar to section 1983 because success on this claim would necessarily undermine the validity of his conviction, which conviction has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated. C. Fraud 0/1 the COllrt Coultas has also alleged a claim for fraud on the court. 4 The Supreme Court has characterized a fraud on the comi as "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud camlOt be complacently tolerated consistently with the good 4 Although Coultas does not specifically allege fraud on the court, he Coultas mentions it in his briefing. In light of the liberal construal of pro se pleadings, the court will address the claim as if properly pleaded. OPINION AND ORDER 11 {KPR} order of society." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Har(ford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). The Ninth Circuit interprets this somewhat more broadly than other circuits, such that "fraud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an officer of the court." In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should base its analysis "not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process[.]" Id at 917 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 246). Significantly, "[t]here is no statute of limitations for fraud on the COUlt." Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870 at 250 (1973)). However, even if Coultas could state this claim based on the factual allegations alleged, he could again not overcome the Heck bar to section 1983 because success on this claim would necessarily undermine the validity of his conviction, which conviction has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Hisel' v. Hickel, No. 95-35405,1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27742, at *6 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs due process claim alleging fraud on the court as barred by Heck). Accordingly, Coultas's claim offraud on the court is dismissed as barred by Heck. D. Fourteenth Amendment In his complaint, Coultas invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not specifY in what manner his rights under that constitutional provision were violated. The Fourteenth Amendment suppotts three kinds of claims enforceable under section 1983: (1) violations of other constitutional rights as defined by the Bill of Rights; (2) violations of substantive due process; and (3) violations of procedural due process. Zinerll10n v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 OPINION AND ORDER 12 {KPR} (1990). However, as with all other of Coultas's claims under section 1983, any claim under the FOUlieenth Amendment is barred by Heck and the court need not attempt to discern the contours of any specific claim Coultas might have otherwise stated. III. Other Arguments Defendants additionally argued that Coultas's claims were untimely and were improperly served. In light of the cOUli's conclusion that Coultas's claims are barred by Heck, the court will not address these additional grounds for dismissal. Conclusion For the reasons stated, DOl Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#22) is GRANTED. DATED this 12th day of December, 2011. JoHN V. ACOSTA U it)d States Magistrate Judge OPINION AND ORDER 13 {KPR}
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