Aleksashin v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, No. 3:2010cv01448 - Document 25 (D. Or. 2012)
Court Description: OPINION & ORDER: The Commissioner's decision is Affirmed and this case is Dismissed. Signed on 6/29/12 by Magistrate Judge Paul Papak. (gm)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT FOR THE DISTRlCT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION SERGEY ALEKSASHIN, Plaintiff, Case No. 3:1O-cv-01448-PK OPINION AND ORDER v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. PAPAK, Magistrate Judge: Sergey Aleksashin ("plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), to obtain judicial review ofa final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"). The Commissioner granted plaintiffs application for Title XVI supplemental security income ("SSI") under the Act, finding him disabled as of July 1, 2003; due to plaintiff s excess resources, however, the Commissioner determined that he was not eligible for retroactive SSI benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED.' BACKGROUND Born on May 22, 1957, plaintiff filed his first application for SSI in January 1995, alleging disability as of September 2, 1993; his case has been ongoing since that time. Tr. 12. On March 25, 2005, a prior administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a decision finding plaintiff disabled as ofJuly 1,2003, his amended alleged onset date. Tr. 12,23. On April 19, 2005, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") requested additional infonnation in order to detelmine whether plaintiff s SSI payments would need to be adjusted due to excess resources. Tr. 12, 54. This additional infOlmation revealed that plaintiff owned four vehicles: a 2002 Honda (the "Honda"), a 1998 Isuzu Trooper (the "Trooper"), a 1998 Volkswagon Jetta (the "Jetta"), and a 1995 Chevrolet Astro Minivan (the "Astro Van"). Tr. 25, 33. The SSA calculated that, based on the National Auto Dealers Association's ("NADA") listed values, the Trooper, the Jetta, and the Astro Van had a combined market value exceeding the SSI resource limit of $3,000. Tr. 12, 62-67. As such, the SSA found that plaintiff was not eligible to receive SSI payments until August 1,2006. Tr. 113. Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration of this decision, which was denied on Jlme 22, 2005. Tr. 12,62. Thereafter, plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 12,70. On September 25,2007, an ALJ hearing was held before the Honorable Ralph W. Jones; a supplemental hearing was held on October 30, 2007, at which plaintiff testified and was represented by counsel. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. I Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER Tr. 12, 116-33. In addition, an EnglishlRussian interpreter appeared at and translated both hearings, as plaintiff is only in fluent in Russian. Tr. 116. On December 15, 2007, ALJ Jones issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not entitled to retroactive SSI benefits because his resources exceeded the Act's limit. Tr. 14-15. After the Appeals Council declined review of the ALJ's decision, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. Tr.2-5. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to suppOli a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citing Consolo Edison CO. (1938)). V. NL.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 The court must weigh "both the evidence that suppOlis and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." }v1artinez V. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). "Where the evidence as a whole can suppOli either a grant or a denial, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's." lvfassachi V. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly assessing the value of his vehicles; and (2) denying his constitutional right to have a "full and fair hearing." Pl.'s Opening Br. 2-4. 1. The ALJ's Vehicle Valuation Plaintiff asserts that "the use of a valuation method that only involved the NADA guidelines and a general formula versus the consideration of the patiicularities that would necessarily reduce Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER the vehicles' value" constitutes reversible error. Id. at 8. When these particularities are taken into consideration, plaintiff argues that the collective value of his vehicles would not exceed the resource limit for SSI eligibility; as such, he asserts that the ALl's conclusion to the contraty was not based on substantial evidence. Id. at 4, 8. The SSI program was enacted to provide financial assistance to "needy people" who are blind, disabled, or sixty-five years of age or older. Hartl'. Bowen, 799 F.2d 567,569 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Thus, to be entitled to benefits, the claimant must meet certain income and resource requirements. Id.; 42 U.S.c. §§ 1381a, 1382; 20 C.F.R. § 416.110. Amarl'ied SSIrecipient may not receive benefits for any month in which his countable resources exceed $3,000. 42 U.S.c. § 1382(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205. Countable resources are defined as "cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to cash to be used for his or her SUppOlt and maintenance." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201. As such, automobiles are generally considered countable resources. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218. Nevertheless, "[o]ne automobile is totally excluded regardless of its value" ifit is used for transpOliation of the claimant or a member of the claimant's family. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218(b). All remaining vehicles, however, are "treated as nonliquid resources and counted as a resource." Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(c). Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff has four vehicles registered under his name. 2 Tr. 14,25, Plaintiff attempted to circumvent the regulations by "giving away [these] resource[s]." Tr. 33, 13. As such, shOlily after the SSA started its investigation, plaintiff "sold" the Trooper to his sisterfor $985; plaintiff also "sold" the Jetta to his son for $925. Tr. 114-15. Plaintiffs son, however, was not yet 16 years old at the time of this transfer and still lived at home. Tr. 14,24, 122. Accordingly, the AU determined that the Jetta "remain[ed] in [plaintiffs] household" for the purposes of the excess resources analysis. Tr. 14. In addition, the AU found that plaintiff had "given away the resources" and the "amount of$7,090 (the difference between the current 2 Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 33, 122-23. It is also undisputed that the newest of these vehicles, the Honda, was excluded from the ALJ's resource calculation pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218(b)(1). Tr. 13-14. Further, it is undisputed that the NADA and Kelly Blue Book each assess the collective value of these vehicles to drastically exceed the SSI resource limit. Tr. 13, 36-52, 65-67. Thus, the sole issue is whether the ALJ's determination that plaintiffs three vehicles were worth more than $3,000 was supported by substantial evidence. Pursuant to his request for reconsideration, plaintiff submitted several detailed photographs of the Trooper and Astro Van showing body damage. Tr. 85-105. He also submitted an appraisal of the Trooper, Jetta, and Astro Van from Eastside Auto Sales ("Eastside"). Tr. 29-31, 59. Eastside collectively valued these cars at $2,800. ld However, the dealership made clear that the quoted prices reflected only what it would pay plaintiff for the vehicles and not what it would sell them for, which was "much more." Tr. 29-32. For example, Eastside stated that it was selling a 1998 Isuzu Trooper with substantially greater mileage for $3995. Tr. 32. In addition, Eastside stipulated that the appraisal was based on the assumption that the vehicles did not have airbags; the dealership also reduced the overall value of the vehicles by 50% due to theirreconstructed titles. Tr. 35-36. Beyond stating their mileage, Eastside's quotes provide no information regarding the intemal functioning of these vehicles. Tr. 29-31. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he did not submit pictures of the Jetta because it had no visible defects; rather, he stated it had electrical problems. Tr. 129. Moreover, plaintiffsought to elaborate upon the physical defects present in the pictures he submitted ofthe Trooper and Astro market value and the amount for which the vehicles were sold)," resulting in a COlTesponding "deduct[ion] from his benefit payment" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1)(A). Tr. 14-15. Plaintiff does not challenge these findings. See generally PI.' s Opening Br. Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER Van. Tr. 123-28. Plaintiffs main contention was that these defects rendered his vehicles valueless. Tr. 119. The ALJ, however, stopped the hearing after thirty-three minutes because plaintiffs "testimony is pretty much what is annotated in the photographs" and, as such, was "essentially redundant of what's already in the record." Tr. 128, 13l. In his opinion, the ALJ expressly discussed all of the evidence that plaintiff submitted pursuant to his request for reconsideration. Tr. 13-14. The ALJ found that "Eastside['s] appraisal [was] not the best evidence, as [the] dealership admitted that it would buy the cars at certain prices, but sell them for much more on the lot," indicating that their appraisal did not accurately reflect the fair market value of these vehicles. Tr. 13,35. The ALJ also concluded that Eastside's appraisal was oflittle evidentiary value because it was based on misinformation. Tr. 13. Eastside discounted the prices of these vehicles due to their lack of airbags, yet the record reflects that at least the Jetta was equipped with this safety feature. Tr. 13, 30, 35-36. FUliher, as the ALJ noted, Foster Auto reported that the value of vehicles with reconstructed titles is usually decreased 10% to 20%, rather than the 50% reduction articulated by Eastside. Tr. 13,35-36. A third dealership indicated that each vehicle would need to be looked at individually, regardless of the reconstructed title, in order to assess its value. Tr. 13,33. Moreover, the ALJ discussed how an SSA representative's on-site inspection was contrmy to plaintiffs statements that "the vehicles are junk and not something he can readily sell." Tr. 13. The SSA representative repOlied that the Astro Van appeared to be in "average" condition, the Trooper appeared to be in "excellent" condition, and the Jetta appeared to be in "excellent condition [and an] extremely nice car." Tr. 32. An additional on-site inspection ofjust the Trooper confitmed that the "car was in excellent condition on the outside [and] looked like a new car." Tr.35. Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER Based on the totality of the evidence, including the annotated photos submitted by plaintiff, the ALJ determined that the vehicles in question had the following values: the Trooper was worth $4,940; the Jetta was worth $3,240; and the Astro Van was wOlih $1,700. Tr. 13. The ALJ anived at these amounts by taking the NADA listed values for these vehicles and then reducing that amount by 20% "because of the [reconstructed] title[ s]." Id. The ALJ therefore concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to retroactive SSI benefits due to his excess resources, remarking that "the market value [for the Jetta] alone exceeds $3,000." Id. This Comi finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff failed to provide any objective evidence regarding the internal functioning of these vehicles, such as a mechanic's report or a DEQ inspection. Further, the record reveals that all of the cars in question were running during the relevant time period. As such, the ALJ did not en by only considering defects in the bodies of these vehicles in determining their value. This evidence reveals that plaintiff s cars were, with the exception of the Astro Van, in very good condition. While plaintiff is correct that Eastside collectively valued the vehicles at slightly less than the $3000 SSI limit, a price quote from one dealership does not constitute substantial evidence, especially where, as here, there is ample contradictOlY evidence in the record. As the ALJ properly determined, that appraisal only reflected what Eastside would buy the vehicles for based on inaccurate information, including the assumption that these vehicles had no airbags and warranted a 50% reduction in value due to their reconstructed titles. However, the record establishes that these vehicles had a much higher market value; in fact, by Eastside's own admission, a cal' comparable to plaintiffs Trooper would retail for nearly $4,000. In sum, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff s vehicles had a fair market value of substantially less than those amounts listed in the Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER NADA. Therefore, the ALl's decision is affirmed as to this issue. II. Alleged Violations of Plaintiffs Due Process Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated his due process rights by refusing to permit additional testimony regarding the true value ofthe Jetta and Trooper. PI. 's Opening Br. 2-4 (citing j\;fafhews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Accordingly, plaintiff asserts that "remand is required for rehearing so that [p]laintiff can be afforded the opportunity to submit all relevant evidence and testimony so that an accurate valuation of the subject vehicles can occur." [d. at 8. Under the Social Security regulations, a claimant has a right to appear and present evidence, including testimony, at a hearing before an ALl 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 404.950(a). Further, the Constitution's "procedural [due process] protections" apply in Social Security cases. See }vfafhews, 424 U.S. at 333-35. However, "due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances"; as such, the amount of process that is required to comport with the Constitution "is flexible" and requires a case-by-case assessment of a number of private and public factors. ld. at 334-35 (citations and intemal quotations omitted). The Commissioner contends "that the ALJ complied with the demands of the ]vlafhews case, that is, he conducted' some fonn of hearing' before [plaintiff! was' deprived of a property interest." Def.'s Resp. Br. 10 (citing },Iafhews, 424 U.S. at 333). The Court agrees with the Commissioner. Plaintiff had two hearings regarding the issue of excess resources. Tr. 12, 116-33. At the second hearing, the ALJ did not permit additional testimony because plaintiffpreviously provided annotated photos of his vehicles that, with the exception of the Jetta, accurately detailed their condition. Tr. 85-105. The ALJ detennined that plaintiffs testimony, tln'ough which he sought to further outline the defects depicted in the photographs, was duplicative of evidence already in the record and, as Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER such, would not be helpful. Rather, the ALJ explained that the photographs, combined with plaintiffs annotations, provided "enough information" for him to make a decision. Tr. 129. Plaintiff does not cite to, and this Court is not aware of, any authority that holds that a claimant is allowed to testifY or provide evidence on evelY issue at a Social Security hearing. In fact, the regulations grant the ALJ discretion over "when the evidence will be presented and when the issues will be discussed." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.944. Regardless, contrmy to plaintiffs assertion, the record reveals that the ALl's decision to stop the hearing did not prevent plaintiff from testifYing about "the relevant facts"; the ALJ merely concluded, in his discretion, that he was sufficiently appraised of the relevant facts fi'om the evidence in the record. Thus, the ALJ did not deprive plaintiff of his due process rights by truncating his testimony. Moreover, plaintiff does not detail what "procedural protections" were absent in this case other than to state generally that "allowing testi[mony] about the relevant facts ... would have entirely ameliorated the due process violation." PI.'s Opening Br. 8. This testimony, however, would consist of plaintiff expounding upon information already in the record, which the ALJ considered pursuant to his decision. The burden of establishing that an enor is harmful falls on the pmty attacking an administrative agency's detelmination: "[w]here harmfulness of the enor is not apparent from the circumstances, the pmty seeking reversal must explain how the enor caused ha11'll." McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (as amended) (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 410 (2009)). Because, as discussed above, the ALJ properly determined that the fair market value for the vehicles in question exceeded the SSI resource limit, plaintiff is unable to demonstrate prejudice from the ALl's refusal to pelmit additional testimony. In addition, because he neglected to Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER specifically address what fUliher procedure was mandated under these circumstances, and it is not apparent to this Court, plaintiff cannot establish that the ALJ's early cessation of the hearing was harmful. Therefore, for this additional reason, the AU's decision to stop the hearing early did not deprive plaintiff of any procedural due process rights. Finally, the COUli rejects plaintiffs contention that this case should be remanded to more fully develop the record regarding the value of these vehicles. In cetiain limited circumstances, the AU has an independent duty to develop the record. Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992). However, the AU's "duty to futiher develop the record is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." }viayes v. l'viassanari, 276 FJd 453, 460 (9th Cir. 200 I). FUliher, the AU is required to seek additional evidence only if the evidence already present consistently favors the claimant. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 FJd 503, 514-15 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, neither the AU nor the SSA found the record to be ambiguous or insufficient for proper evaluation. In addition, contrary to his contentions, plaintiff was provided over two years to submit evidence relating to value of the Trooper, the Jetta, and the Astro Van; thus, the fact that he failed to introduce any evidence, beyond his own testimony, indicating that his vehicles had severely impaired values is not indicative of any deficiency in the record. More importantly, because there is ample evidence in the record that conflicts with his statements, plaintiffs testimony, alone, is not dispositive. This is especially true since plaintiffs "attemp[t] to conceal ownership" of the Jetta and Astro Van created "a credibility problem." Tr. 129, 14-15. Simply put, plaintiff's failure to cany his burden of proof does not equate to an inadequacy or ambiguity in the record. Therefore, because the existing evidence is neither ambiguous or insufficient, and does not consistently favor plaintiff, Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER the AU's duty to more fully develop the record was not triggered. CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRlVlED and this case is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 2CJlily of June, 2012. "~-~ (-) \-a1i~~aP Paul Papak United States Magistrate Judge Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER
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