Williamson v. Munsen Paving, LLC

Filing 13

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION - Munsen's motion 6 to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, with leave to Williamson to amend. Munsen's Rule 12(e) motion also should be GRANTED and Williamson should b e required to provide a more definite statement of what conduct Munsen alledgedly engaged in and what specific regulations that conduct violated. Objections to the Findings and Recommendation are due by 11/20/2009. If objections are filed, a respons e to those objections may be filed within fourteen days of the filing date of the objections. Signed on 11/6/09 by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg) (Corrected attachment added on 11/6/2009: # 1 Attachment f&r) The original attachment was incorrect, and has been removed from this entry. (peg).

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IN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON J O S H U A WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff, No. 09-cv-736-AC FINDINGS A N D RECOMMENDATION v. M U N S E N P A V I N G , LLC, Defendant. A C O S T A , M a g i s t r a t e Judge: B e f o r e the court is D e f e n d a n t M u n s e n P a v i n g L L C ' s ( " M u n s e n " ) m o t i o n to d i s m i s s p u r s u a n t to Federal R u l e o f Civil P r o c e d u r e 12(b)(6) ( " R u l e 12(b)(6 y ' ) , and m o t i o n t o m a k e m o r e definite a n d c e r t a i n p u r s u a n t t o F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 12(e) ( " R u l e 12(e)"). M u n s e n a r g u e s t h a t P l a i n t i f f J o s h u a W i l l i a m s o n ( " W i l l i a m s o n " ) has failed to state facts sufficient to s u p p o r t his claim FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 1 {AM} under the Oregon Safe Employment A c t ("OSEA"), and that this claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which r e l i e f can be granted. Munsen also argues t h a t Williamson has p l e a d e d several v a g u e a n d ambiguous s t a t e m e n t s t o w h i c h i t c a n n o t r e s p o n d w i t h o u t additional detail, and therefore asks the court to require Williamson to identify specific rules and regulations upon which he relies. M u n s e n ' s R u l e 12(b)(6) m o t i o n s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d i n p a r t a n d d e n i e d i n part. W i l l i a m s o n may bring a cognizable claim against Munsen under the Oregon Safe Employment Act, but his complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state such a claim. M u n s e n ' s Rule 12(e) motion should be granted because certain allegations fail to adequately describe the conduct Munsen allegedly engaged i n t h a t v i o l a t e d specific O S E A p r o v i s i o n s o r i m p l e m e n t i n g regulations. D i s m i s s a l s h o u l d be without prejudice, and Williamson should be allowed leave to replead his complaint because the d e f i c i e n c i e s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t c a n be remedied. Background O n o r about June 1 1 , 2 0 0 8 , Williamson, while i n the course o f his employment for Wikel Excavation, LLC ("Wikel"), was operating a pickup truck waiting to p i c k u p gravel from a loading area at M u n s e n ' s facility. Christopher Paul Murchie ("Murchie"), an employee o f Munsen, i n the course o f his employment, backed up the dump truck he was driving, striking Williamson and driving over Williamson's left leg and right foot. As a result o f the injury, Williamson alleged that he sustained traumatic and numerous injuries. W i l l i a m s o n h a s s u e d M u n s e n o n theories o f n e g l i g e n c e , v i o l a t i o n o f t h e O r e g o n E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t (ELA), a n d v i o l a t i o n o f t h e O S E A . FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 2 {AM} Legal Standard A. M o t i o n to D i s m i s s . Rule 12 (b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which r e l i e f c a n b e g r a n t e d . A w e l l - p l e a d e d c o m p l a i n t r e q u i r e s only " a s h o r t a n d p l a i n s t a t e m e n t o f t h e claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A federal claimant is n o t r e q u i r e d to d e t a i l a l l factual a l l e g a t i o n s ; h o w e v e r , t h e c o m p l a i n t m u s t p r o v i d e " m o r e t h a n l a b e l s and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation o f the elements o f a cause o f action will n o t do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). "Factual allegations m u s t be enough to raise a right to r e l i e f above the speculative level." Id. While the court must assume that all facts alleged i n a complaint are true and v i e w them i n a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Reynolds v. Giusto, No. 08-6261-PK, 2009 W L 2523727, at *1 (D. Or. Aug 1 8 , 2 0 0 9 ) , citing Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999), i t need n o t accept as true any legal conclusion set forth i n the complaint. A s h c r o f t v. Iqbal, _ U.S. _ , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Additionally, a p l a i n t i f f must set forth a plausible claim for r e l i e f - a possible claim for r e l i e f is n o t s u f f i c i e n t . " I n s u m , f o r a c o m p l a i n t to s u r v i v e a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , t h e n o n - c o n c l u s o r y ' f a c t u a l content,' and reasonable inferences from t h a t content, must be plausibly suggestive o f a claim e n t i t l i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f to r e l i e f . " Moss v. U s . Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). I n Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), t h e Supreme Court revisited the s t a n d a r d f o r a d e q u a t e l y s t a t i n g a c l a i m . Twombly s h i f t e d t h e s t a n d a r d t o w a r d i n c r e a s e d f a c t - b a s e d a l l e g a t i o n s and away from m e r e r e c i t a t i o n o f a c l a i m ' s elements: " W h i l e a c o m p l a i n t a t t a c k e d b y a Rule l 2 ( b ) ( 6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a p l a i n t i f f ' s obligation FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 3 {AM} to provide t h e ' g r o u n d s ' o f his 'entitlement to r e l i e f requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation o f the elements o f a cause o f action will not do." Id. at 555 (brackets omitted). The Supreme Court expanded o n Twombly in A s h c r o f t v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), by identifying two principles informing their decision in Twombly. First, although the court must accept a s true all facts asserted i n a pleading, i t need not accept as true any legal conclusions set forth i n a pleading. Id. at 1949. Second, the complaint m u s t set forth facts supporting a plausible claim for r e l i e f and not merely a possible claim for relief. Id. The Court instructed that " [ d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for r e l i e f will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to d r a w o n its judicial experience a n d common sense." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949- 50 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-158 (2nd Cir. 2007)). T h e Court concluded: " W h i l e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s c a n p r o v i d e t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m p l a i n t , t h e y m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d b y factual allegations. W h e n t h e r e are w e l l - p l e a d e d f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s , a c o u r t s h o u l d a s s u m e t h e i r v e r a c i t y and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to a n entitelement t o relief." Id. at 1950. I n Moss v. U S . Secret Service, 572 F. 3 d 962 (9th Cir. 2009), the N i n t h Circuit explained the n e w T w o m b l y - I q b a l standard. T h e Moss c o u r t r e e n f o r c e d t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y p r e m i s e b y o b s e r v i n g t h a t a " c l a i m has facial plausibility w h e n the p l a i n t i f f pleads factual content t h a t allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that t h e defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Moss, 572 F. 3 d at 969," q u o t i n g Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. " T h e plausibility standard is n o t akin to a 'probability requirement,' but i t asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Moss, 572 F. 3d at 969, quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The N i n t h Circuit concluded by o b s e r v i n g : " I n s u m , f o r a c o m p l a i n t to s u r v i v e a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , t h e n o n - c o n c l u s o r y ' f a c t u a l c o n t e n t , ' a n d reasonable inferences from t h a t content, m u s t b e p l a u s i b l y suggestive o f a c l a i m FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 4 {AM} entitling the p l a i n t i f f to relief." Moss, 572 F. 3 d at 969. B. M o t i o n to M a k e M o r e D e f i n i t e a n d C e r t a i n . Rule 12(e) provides that " A party m a y move for a more definite statement o f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed b u t which is so vague o r ambiguous that the party cannot r e a s o n a b l y p r e p a r e a r e s p o n s e . " " M o t i o n s f o r a m o r e defiiiite s t a t e m e n t a r e v i e w e d w i t h d i s f a v o r , and are rarely granted." Margarita Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 5 7 5 , 5 7 8 (N.D. Cal. 1999). As one court observed, " R u l e 12(e) motions attack the intelligibility o f the complaint, n o t the lack o f detail, and are properly denied where t h e complaint notifies the defendant o f the substance o f the claims asserted." Presidio Group, L L C v. G M A C Mortg., LLC, 2008 W L 3992765, *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, i n evaluating a m o t i o n under Rule 12(e), the proper test is to determine "whether the complaint provides the defendant with a sufficient basis to frame his responsive pleadings." Federal Say. a n d L o a n Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988).1 Discussion A. R u l e 12(b)(6) M o t i o n . I. Cognizable claim. M u n s e n f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t W i l l i a m s o n h a s n o t p l e a d e d s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s to s t a t e a c l a i m u n d e r the OSEA because he cannot bring a cognizable Claim under that act. It contends that t h e O S E A was adopted for the protection o f employees against their direct employers, a n d that Williamson cannot plead membership i n the group intended to be protected by the OSEA because he is not M u n s e n ' s 1 W h e t h e r a n d t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h T w o m b l y - I q b a l h a s a f f e c t e d t h e R u l e 1 2 ( e ) s t a n d a r d is a n o p e n question. FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 5 {AM} employee. Williamson responds that the OSEA imposes liability upon owners o f places o f employment, not only direct employers. Thus, Williamson contends, as applied to owners, the duties under the OSEA extend to workers o f other employers. The OSEA, ORS 954.001-654.295 and 654.750-654.780, codifies the common-law duty to provide safe places o f employment. Important to the instant motion, the statute separately defines "employer" and "owner." Under ORS 656.005(6), the definition o f "owner" is "means and includes every person having ownership, control or custody o f any place o f employment o r o f the construction, repair or maintenance o f any place o f employment." I n ORS 656.015, the OSEA describes an o w n e r ' s duty: "No employer o r owner shall construct or cause to be constructed or maintained any place o f employment that is unsafe o r detrimental to health." (Italics added.) The OSEA further mandates that an owner must comply with every requirement o f every order, decision, direction, standard, rule o r regulation in connection with the matters specified under the OSEA statutes, " o r in any way relating to or affecting safety and health i n employments or places o f employment, or to protect the life, safety and health o f employees in such employments o r places o f employment." ORS 654.022. Munsen cites several cases to support its contention that the OSEA was not intended to apply to indirect employers. I n Flores v. Metro Machinery Rigging, Inc., 99 Or. App. 636 (1989), the Oregon Court o f Appeals held that "the purpose o f the SEA is to require an employer to take necessary steps to protect its own employees, not those o f other employers." Id. at 641. The court followed Flores in German v. Murphy, 146 Or. App. 349 (1997), stating "because plaintiff was not a direct employee o f defendant, the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgement o n plaintiff's claim for negligence p e r se." Id. a t 357. FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A n O N 6 {AM} Munsen's contention misses the mark, because Williamson does not base his OSEA claim upon the premise that Munsen is his indirect employer. Rather, Williamson relies on the O S E A ' s applicability to owners and Munsen' s undisputed status o f owner o f the premises where Williamson's injury occurred. I n Moe v. Beck, 100 Or. App. 177 (1991), the court o f appeals discussed the applicability o f the OSEA to owners and clarified the statutory test for detennining ownership status under the act. I n Moe, the defendant owned a dump truck which it leased to another party, who subleased the truck to the p l a i n t i f f s employer. The plaintiffwas injured when the truck's brakes failed. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging the defendant had been negligent in failing t o comply w i t h various O S E A provisions. The defendant successfully moved for summary judgement, contending it had no liability as an owner under the OSEA. On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment, holding that "the legislature did not defme as ' o w n e r ' any person w i t h ' o w n e r s h i p , control a n d c u s t o d y ' . Rather, it defined as ' o w n e r ' any person who has 'ownership, control or custody.''' Id. at 180-18I. I n Brown v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 150 Or. App. 391 (1997), the Oregon Court o f Appeals explained owners' liability under the OSEA. Brown expanded M o e ' s discussion by observing that although the word "owner" is ambiguous, the OSEA clearly defmes an owner in the disjunctive: as a person who has either control, custody, o r ownership o f a place o f employment. Brown, 150 Or. App. at 407. The Brown court then observed that " a t least in some circumstances, ownership ~f a premises where OSEA violations occur is sufficient to support negligence p e r se liability even i f the . defendant had no direct involvement in, or control over, the injury producing activity." Id. However, ownership liability under the OSEA lies "only i f the regulation whose violation underlies the OSEA claim is one that either explicitly, o r b y nature, imposes obligations on owners o f FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 7 {AM} premises." Id. at 408. The Brown court also cited Moe as an example o f h o w OSEA regulations apply to an owner. I n Moe, driving was the ordinary and foreseeable use o f the "workplace" t h a t the defendant owned, t h e dump truck. Providing and maintaining adequate brakes was essential to the safe operation o f that "workplace." "Thus, although regulations underlying the plaintiff's negligence per se claim in Moe did not expressly refer to owners, the defendant there was nevertheless subject to those regulations." Brown, 150 Or. App. at 408. The Brown court then analyzed the p l a i n t i f f s particular a l l e g a t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g h i s O S E A c l a i m b a s e d o n the M o e a n a l y s i s , a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s cited rules pertaining to inadequate lighting did apply to the defendant owner. Brown and Moe m a k e clear that Williamson may bring an OSEA claim against Munsen as a n owner, and t h a t he m a y p r o p e r l y rely o n t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s i n t e n d e d t o i m p l e m e n t t h e O S E A ' s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to o w n e r s . A c c o r d i n g l y , W i l l i a m s o n m a y b a s e h i s c l a i m a g a i n s t M u n s e n o n t h e O S E A , b e c a u s e t h e a c t a p p l i e s t o o w n e r s s u c h as M u n s e n , a n d h e m a y a l l e g e t h a t t h e a c t ' s i m p l e m e n t i n g regulations are standards o f care against which M u n s e n ' s conduct should b e evaluated. Therefore, M u n s e n ' s 12(b)(6) m o t i o n s h o u l d b e d e n i e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t s e e k s d i s m i s s a l o f W i l l i a m s o n ' s c o m p l a i n t for failing t o a l l e g e a c o g n i z a b l e claim. 2. Sufficiently pleaded facts. Second, Munsen argues that Williamson has n o t pleaded facts sufficient to state a n OSEA claim against it. O n this aspect o f M u n s e n ' s motion, the court agrees. Williamson alleges that M u n s e n violated t h e OSEA i n six specific ways, b u t h e cites to t h e p r i o r version o f the OSEA i m p l e m e n t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e r e g u l a t i o n s ' n u m b e r i n g , as w e l l as t h e i r f o r m , c h a n g e d in 1997. Brown, 150 Or. App. at 403 n.9. The change is a substantive one, because not only were FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAn O N 8 {AM} the regulations renumbered b u t their content was reorganized, thus preventing a n easy c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n the t w o v e r s i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , W i l l i a m s o n m u s t a m e n d h i s c o m p l a i n t t o c i t e t h e c o r r e c t l y n u m b e r e d regulatory p r o v i s i o n s u p o n w h i c h h e r e l i e s for his o w n e r s h i p liability c l a i m a g a i n s t M u n s e n u n d e r t h e O S E A . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t W i l l i a m s o n ' s c o m p l a i n t c o n t a i n s specific factual . ~-;.. . allegations regarding M u n s e n ' s alleged conduct, i n accordance w i t h the Twombly-Iqbal standard, Williamson m u s t amend his complaint to tie those factual allegations t o the regulations he cites. A c c o r d i n g l y , W i l l i a m s o n ' s O S E A c l a i m s does n o t m e e t t h e Twombly-Iqbal p l e a d i n g s t a n d a r d a n d M u n s e n ' s Rule 12(b)(6) m o t i o n should be granted, without prejudice and with leave t o Williamson to amend. B. R u l e 12(e) M o t i o n FRCP 12(e) provides t h a t " A party m a y move for a more definite statement o f a pleading to w h i c h a responsive pleading is allowed b u t which is so vague o r ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." M u n s e n contends t h a t W i l l i a m s o n h a s pleaded several vague a n d ambiguous statements t o w h i c h i t cannot respond unless additional detail is provided. Specifically, M u n s e n r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i d e n t i f y p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e s , codes, r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t h a v e been violated. In support, Munsen cites Kverageas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 96 F . R D . 425 (D. Tenn. 1983), a c a s e w h e r e t h e c o u r t r e q u i r e d a m o r e d e f i n i t e a n d c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t o f a c o m p l a i n t w h i c h alleged a party had disobeyed ' ' t h e provisions o f the applicable statute o f the State o f Tennessee." Id. at 426. T h e c o m p l a i n t h e r e i s u n l i k e t h a t i n K v e r a g e a s b e c a u s e W i l l i a m s o n d o e s , i n fact, c i t e t o s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d O r e g o n laws a n d r e g u l a t i o n s . A s n o t e d a b o v e , h o w e v e r , s o m e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t are i n c o r r e c t o r n o t c u r r e n t , o r a l t o g e t h e r vague. F o r e x a m p l e , W i l l i a m s o n alleges t h a t FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 9 {AM} Munsen was negligent i n "violating safety regulations promulgated by OSHA, O R O S H A and p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e O r e g o n Safe E m p l o y m e n t A c t . " ( C o m p l a i n t ~ 7(g).) A n y n u m b e r o f s a f e t y regulations are implicated by this allegation, and Munsen is entitled to a more definite statement o f which specific regulations Williamson claims i t violated. Thus, the claims asserted here are n o t d e s c r i b e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t d e f i n i t e n e s s , a n d M u n s e n ' s R u l e 12(e) m o t i o n s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d . Conclusion M u n s e n ' s m o t i o n to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should b e GRANTED i n part and D E N I E D i n p a r t , w i t h l e a v e t o W i l l i a m s o n t o a m e n d . M u n s e n ' s R u l e 1 2 ( e ) m o t i o n also s h o u l d b e G R A N T E D a n d W i l l i a m s o n s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d to p r o v i d e a m o r e d e f i n i t e s t a t e m e n t o f w h a t c o n d u c t M u n s e n a l l e g e d l y e n g a g e d i n and w h a t s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t c o n d u c t violated. S c h e d u l i n g Order The above Findings and Recommendation are referred, effective this date, t o a United States District Judge for review. Objections, i f any, are d u e no later t h a n fourteen (14) days from this date. I f n o objections are flIed, review o f the Findings and Recommendation will go u n d e r advisement o n t h a t date. I f objections are filed, any party may file a response within fourteen (14) days after the date the objections are flIed. R e v i e w o f the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement w h e n the response is due o r flIed, whichever date is earlier. DATED this t£... ::A day o f N o v e m b e r , 2009. JO V.ACOSTA United State's Magistrate Judge I . FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 10 {AM}

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