Chasse et al v. Humphreys et al, No. 3:2007cv00189 - Document 698 (D. Or. 2009)

Court Description: Opinion and Order - Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Humphreys and City of Portland 639 is DENIED. The City Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 640 is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in P ART. Defendant Burton's Motion for Summary Judgment 642 is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in PART. Defendant Eath's and Gayman's Motion or Summary Judgment 655 is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in PART. The AMR Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 661 is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in PART. Signed on 6/1//09 by Judge Garr M. King. (mja)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 11 12 13 14 15 JAMES P. CHASSE, JR., et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CHRISTOPHER HUMPHREYS, et al.,) ) Defendants. ) ) No. CV-07-189-HU OPINION & ORDER 16 17 18 19 Tom Steenson STEENSON, SCHUMANN, TEWKSBURTY, CREIGHTON & ROSE, P.C. 500 Yamhill Plaza Building 815 S.W. Second Avenue Portland, Oregon 97204 20 Attorney for Plaintiffs 21 James G. Rice DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY David A. Landrum DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNEY 1221 S.W. Fourth Avenue, Room 430 Portland, Oregon 97204 22 23 24 25 Attorneys for City Defendants 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 - OPINION & ORDER 1 2 3 Agnes Sowle COUNTY ATTORNEY Susan M. Dunaway ASSISTANT COUNTY ATTORNEY 501 S.E. Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500 Portland, Oregon 97214-3587 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Robert E. Barton COSGRAVE VERGEER KESTER, LLP 805 S.W. Broadway Portland, Oregon 97205 Attorneys for Bret Burton & Multnomah County James P. Martin Kari A. Furnanz HOFFMAN HART & WAGNER, LLP 1000 S.W. Broadway, Twentieth Floor Portland, Oregon 97205 Attorneys for Sokunthy Eath & Patricia Gayman James L. Dumas Sheri C. Browning LINDSAY, HART, NEIL, & WEIGLER LLP 1300 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 3400 Portland, Oregon 97201 Attorneys for AMR Defendants KING, District Judge: 17 In this civil rights action, plaintiffs bring several claims 18 against various groups of defendants, including the City Defendants 19 (Humphreys, Nice, City of Portland, Tri-Met, Potter & Sizer), the 20 County Defendants (Burton & Multnomah County), the County Nurses 21 (Eath 22 Hergert). 23 which James P. Chasse, Jr. (Chasse), died in police custody. 24 25 & Gayman), and the AMR Defendants (AMR, Stucker, and The claims arise from a September 17, 2006 incident in Presently, all of the parties move for summary judgment as to certain claims. The specifics of the motions are discussed below. 26 First, while I previously told the parties during a telephone 27 conference that I would not consider any motions directed to a 28 claim or issue that I have previously bifurcated for trial at a 2 - OPINION & ORDER 1 later date, I formalize that ruling here. I deny any motion 2 directed toward a claim that has been bifurcated, but I grant leave 3 to renew these motions following the first trial. 4 Accordingly, I deny the City Defendants' motion directed to 5 all of the section 1983 claims brought against the City (not 6 Humphreys and Nice). 7 directed 8 individual defendants. 9 the to any statutory Also, I deny the City Defendants' motion claims brought against Sizer and Potter as I deny the City Defendants' motion as to disability discrimination claims 10 plaintiff's seventh claim for relief. 11 brought in I further deny the City Defendants' motion as to the injunctive relief claim. 12 I also deny the County's motion for summary judgment on all of 13 the section 1983 claims brought against it, as well as on the 14 statutory disability discrimination claim asserted in plaintiff's 15 seventh claim for relief. 16 judgment motion directed to any of the section 1983 claims brought 17 against AMR (not Hergert and Stucker). 18 AMR Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the statutory 19 disability discrimination claims in plaintiff's seventh claim for 20 relief. I deny the AMR Defendants' summary Finally, I also deny the 21 Second, even though briefing on the summary judgment motions 22 is not yet complete, I deny some portions of some of the motions at 23 this juncture because a review of the motions shows the presence of 24 disputed facts, or opposing but reasonable inferences from facts, 25 that should be resolved by the jury. 26 motions is allowed. 27 motions because the issues are questions of law that may be 28 resolved without further briefing. 3 - OPINION & ORDER No further briefing of these I also grant some portions of some of the 1 STANDARDS 2 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue 3 of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 4 matter of law. 5 initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its 6 motion, and identifying those portions of "'pleadings, depositions, 7 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 8 the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence 9 of a genuine issue of material fact." 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 11 "If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing 'the 12 absence of a material and triable issue of fact,' 'the burden then 13 moves to the opposing party, who must present significant probative 14 evidence tending to support its claim or defense.'" Intel Corp. v. 15 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) 16 (quoting Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th 17 Cir. 1987)). 18 designate facts showing an issue for trial. 19 322-23. 20 The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and Celotex, 477 U.S. at The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a 21 fact is material. 22 Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 to the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved 24 against the moving party. 25 Radio, 26 drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 27 party. 28 T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors All reasonable doubts as Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court should view inferences T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630-31. If the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim as to 4 - OPINION & ORDER 1 the existence of a material issue of fact implausible, that party 2 must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support his 3 claim than would otherwise be necessary. 4 Research and Tech. Group, 916 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1990); 5 California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 6 Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 8 Id.; In re Agricultural DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs' Motion as to the City Defendants 9 Plaintiffs move for summary judgment against Humphreys on 10 their first claim for relief, alleging unconstitutional Fourth 11 Amendment violations, and against the City on their eleventh and 12 twelfth claims for relief, alleging false imprisonment and battery, 13 respectively. 14 I deny the motion as to the first claim because I find 15 disputed issues of fact, or varying inferences to be drawn from the 16 facts, as to (1) whether this was a Terry-investigative stop 17 requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or an arrest 18 requiring probable cause; Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 19 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The question whether Martinelli's 20 decision was a Terry stop or a custodial interrogation presents an 21 issue of fact for the jury"); (2) whether Humphreys had reasonable 22 suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, or whether Humphreys 23 had probable cause to arrest; Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 24 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) ("in a section 1983 action the 25 factual matters underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally 26 mean that probable cause is a question for the jury"), Choi v. 27 Gaston, 28 sufficient to give rise to jury question on whether officers had 220 F.3d 5 - OPINION & ORDER 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (evidence was 1 reasonable suspicion 2 Humphreys's force was unconstitutionally excessive; Smith v. City 3 of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[b]ecause the 4 excessive force inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift 5 through 6 therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment . 7 . . in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly . . . 8 because such cases almost always turn on a jury's credibility 9 determinations.") (internal quotation, brackets, and citations 10 omitted); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-83 (2007) (no 11 separate Fourth Amendment analysis for cases involving "deadly 12 force"; "all that matters is whether [the officer's] actions were 13 reasonable"). disputed to factual stop the plaintiff); contentions, and to (3) draw whether inferences 14 As to the false imprisonment claim, plaintiffs argue that 15 because Humphreys had no reasonable suspicion to stop Chasse, the 16 "confinement" of Chasse was unlawful. 17 factual 18 suspicion or probable cause as a matter of law, the unlawfulness of 19 Chasse's confinement as a matter of law can also not be determined. 20 I deny plaintiffs' motion on this claim. issues which preclude a Because there are disputed determination of reasonable 21 Plaintiffs' motion as to the battery claim depends on the 22 ability to determine as a matter of law that Humphreys's use of 23 force 24 plaintiffs' motion on the Fourth Amendment and false imprisonment 25 claims, I deny it as to the battery claim. 26 II. was not justified. For the same reason that I deny The City Defendants' Motion 27 Nice and Humphreys move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 28 second claim for relief which alleges that Nice and Humphreys, and 6 - OPINION & ORDER 1 others, unconstitutionally deprived plaintiff of adequate medical 2 care in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 contend that because they immediately summoned necessary medical 4 help for Chasse each time it appeared that he needed it, no 5 reasonable jury could find in plaintiffs' favor on this claim. 6 disagree. 7 indicates that there is a dispute about what information Nice, 8 Burton, and Humphreys provided to the emergency medical technicians 9 (EMTs) Nice and Humphreys I At a minimum, I note that the record in the case who arrived at NW 13th and Everett. If plaintiffs 10 demonstrate that the officers failed to provide all pertinent 11 information to the EMTs about Chasse's condition, such facts could 12 be relevant to a jury's determination of Humphreys's and Nice's 13 liability on this claim. Moreover, the undisputed evidence is that 14 Humphreys and Burton intended to take Chasse to Portland Adventist 15 Hospital from the jail, rather than to a closer hospital. 16 fact could also be relevant to a jury's determination on this 17 claim. 18 plaintiffs' second claim. 19 This Thus, I deny Humphreys's and Nice's motion directed to Next, Nice and Humphreys move for summary judgment on 20 plaintiff's fourth claim for relief which alleges a Fourteenth 21 Amendment violation for conduct that "shocks the conscience." 22 precise 23 Complaint. 24 explained in the November 5, 2008 Opinion & Order on motions to 25 dismiss, I grant this motion to the extent the claim is brought by 26 Mark Chasse. 27 28 contours of this claim are unclear in the The Amended However, even as presently framed, for the reasons I also grant the motion to the extent the claim is brought by Chasse's estate. Chasse's estate has challenged Humphreys's and 7 - OPINION & ORDER 1 Nice's conduct in effecting the arrest of Chasse in the first claim 2 for relief alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 estate separately challenges Humphrey's and Nice's alleged failure 4 to provide medical care to Chasse in the second claim for relief. 5 Plaintiff 6 constitutional provision in the second claim. cites the Fourth Amendment as the Chasse's applicable 7 I do not decide at this time whether the proper constitutional 8 provision for plaintiffs' second claim against Humphreys and Nice 9 is the Fourth Amendment, which applies to a broad range of police 10 conduct in effecting an arrest, Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 11 878-79 (9th Cir. 2001) ("the Fourth Amendment protects a criminal 12 defendant 13 "[b]eyond the specific proscription of excessive force, the Fourth 14 Amendment generally proscribes unreasonable intrusions on one's 15 bodily 16 substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 17 applies 18 detainees, and for which the Ninth Circuit relies on standards used 19 in similar claims brought by convicted persons under the Eighth 20 Amendment. 21 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[c]laims of failure to provide care for serious 22 medical needs, when brought by a detainee . . . who has been 23 neither charged nor convicted of a crime, are analyzed under the 24 substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see 25 also Hudson v. City of Salem, No. CV-07-226-ST, 2009 WL 1227770, at 26 *10 (D. Or. May 1, 2009) ("The Ninth Circuit has adopted the Eighth 27 Amendment 28 prisoners as a 'minimum standard of care' for determining the after arrest integrity") specifically on the (internal to trip to quotation issues of the police omitted), medical care or for station"; is the pretrial E.g., Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 standard 8 - OPINION & ORDER for providing necessary medical care to 1 rights of a pretrial detainee to the same.") (citing Jones v. 2 Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986)). 3 Regardless of which of these two constitutional provisions 4 guides the second claim, the estate cannot maintain a separate 5 "shocks the conscience" substantive due process claim under the 6 Fourteenth Amendment, as a matter of law, when the conduct at issue 7 is governed by the specific Fourth Amendment standards used to 8 evaluate police conduct, and the specific Fourteenth Amendment due 9 process/Eighth Amendment standards specifically applicable to 10 pretrial detainee medical care claims. 11 386, 395 (1989) (where specific constitutional amendment provides 12 "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a 13 particular sort of government behavior, that amendment controls the 14 analysis for the claim); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 15 271-72 (1994) (discussing the limited scope of substantive due 16 process rights and expressing "reluctan[ce] to expand the concept") 17 (internal quotation omitted); Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 18 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[s]ubstantive due process 19 analysis has no place in contexts already addressed by explicit 20 textual provisions of constitutional protection, regardless of 21 whether the plaintiff's potential claims under those amendments 22 have merit."); Wright v. Town of Southbridge, No. 07-40305-FDS, 23 2009 24 substantive due process claim is coextensive with claim under a 25 specific WL 415506, at *3 constitutional 26 27 28 9 - OPINION & ORDER n.4 (D. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. Mass. provision, Jan. court 15, 2009) considers (where only the 1 specific claim).1 2 Finally, to the extent plaintiffs' fourth claim is brought by 3 Chasse's parents James P. Chasse and Linda Gerber, I deny the 4 motion. 5 noted the parents' Fourteenth Amendment right to associate with 6 their adult son, the same type of claim asserted by Chasse's 7 parents in this case. 8 interest. 9 facts as those asserted in support of the first and second claims 10 for relief, for the reasons previously explained, I conclude that 11 there are issues of fact or inferences to be drawn from the facts, 12 that preclude 13 parents' substantive due process claim as alleged in the fourth 14 claim for relief. Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008), This is an entirely distinct constitutional To the extent the parents' claim is based on the same summary judgment to Nice and Humphreys on the 15 The remaining parts of the City defendants' motion that are 16 not part of the second trial in this case, are the motions by the 17 City 18 distress and false imprisonment claims. 19 as to these claims because there are disputed issues of fact, or 20 inferences from the facts, that cannot be resolved as a matter of 21 law on summary judgment and which are relevant to a determination 22 of, inter 23 extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable against plaintiffs' alia, whether intentional the conduct infliction of emotional I deny the City's motion at issue constituted an 24 1 25 26 27 28 Even if the inadequate medical care claim against the officers is governed by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth Amendment, the rule from Graham and the cases cited above should nonetheless apply here because the Ninth Circuit relies on specific Eighth Amendment standards in deciding these particular inadequate medical care substantive due process claims by pretrial detainees. 10 - OPINION & ORDER 1 conduct and whether the confinement of Chasse was unlawful. 2 III. 3 Burton's Motion Burton moves against plaintiffs' first claim (Fourth Amendment 4 seizure and excessive force), second claim (Fourth Amendment 5 failure to provide adequate medical care), fourth claim (Fourteenth 6 Amendment "shocks the conscience" substantive due process), and 7 fifth claim (Fourteenth Amendment equal protection based on mental 8 illness). 9 motions already discussed, I deny the motion as to the first and For the reasons explained in connection with the other 10 second claims. 11 the motion on the fourth claim to the extent it is brought by 12 Chasse's estate and I deny the motion to the extent it is brought 13 by Chasse's parents. 14 brought by Burton on this claim to the extent it was brought by 15 Mark Chasse. 16 And, for the reasons previously explained, I grant I previously granted the motion to dismiss The only separate argument by Burton that I note is his 17 qualified immunity argument. 18 immunity if (1) his conduct violated a constitutional right, and 19 (2) that right was "clearly established" at the time of the 20 constitutional violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 21 (2001). 22 favorable to plaintiffs, I cannot say that no reasonable juror 23 would conclude that no constitutional rights were violated in 24 regard to plaintiffs' first and second claims. Thus, on that basis 25 alone, Burton is not entitled to qualified immunity on those 26 claims. 27 IV. 28 Burton is not entitled to qualified Here, taking all facts and inferences in light most The County's Motion The County moves 11 - OPINION & ORDER for summary judgment on the false 1 imprisonment and battery claims. For the reasons discussed above, 2 I deny the motions because of the presence of disputed facts, or 3 differing inferences to be drawn from the facts. 4 V. Eath's and Gayman's Motion 5 Eath and Gayman move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 6 second claim for relief alleging unconstitutionally inadequate 7 medical care under the Fourth Amendment, on plaintiffs' third claim 8 for relief alleging unconstitutionally inadequate medical under the 9 Fourteenth Amendment, on plaintiffs' fourth claim relief alleging 10 a "shocks the conscience" violation of substantive due process 11 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and on plaintiffs' fifth 12 claim for relief alleging an equal protection violation based on 13 Chasse's mental illness, under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 I grant the nurses' motion on the second claim because 15 inadequate medical care provided by the nurses to a pretrial 16 detainee does not arise under the Fourth Amendment but instead, as 17 noted above, is protected by the substantive due process clause of 18 the Fourteenth Amendment, under the standards used to evaluate 19 similar claims by convicted persons under the Eighth Amendment. 20 Under the cases cited previously above, while it is less clear 21 whether the inadequate medical care claim brought against the 22 officers involved in Chasse's seizure is governed by the Fourth or 23 Fourteenth Amendments (an issue I need not resolve now), because 24 the Fourth Amendment provides the relevant law only for officers' 25 conduct in searches, seizures, and arrests (regardless of how 26 broadly courts have interpreted such conduct), there is no basis 27 for contending that actions by jail nurses who played no part in 28 effecting the seizure 12 - OPINION & ORDER of Chasse, are governed by the Fourth 1 Amendment. Thus, Eath's and Gayman's motion as to the second claim 2 for relief is granted. 3 As to the fourth claim, alleging a "shocks the conscience" 4 substantive due process claim, I grant the motion for the reasons 5 articulated above, to the extent the claim is brought by Mark 6 Chasse and Chasse's estate. 7 brought by Chasse's parents. 8 VI. I deny the motion to the extent it is AMR's, Hergert's, and Stucker's Motion 9 Hergert and Stucker move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 10 second claim alleging constitutionally inadequate medical treatment 11 in violation of the Fourth Amendment, on plaintiffs' fourth claim 12 alleging a "shocks the conscience" violation of the substantive due 13 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and on plaintiffs' 14 fifth 15 violation based on Chasse's mental illness. 16 claim alleging a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection I agree with Hergert and Stucker that plaintiffs' claim for 17 allegedly 18 Hergert and Stucker is not governed by the Fourth Amendment because 19 Hergert and Stucker were not participants in Chasse's seizure. 20 Thus, I grant the motion as to the second claim. 21 unconstitutionally inadequate medical treatment by As previously explained, a claim such as this against Hergert 22 and Stucker should be governed by the Fourteenth Amendment 23 substantive due process clause, applying Eighth Amendment standards 24 used for similar claims brought by convicted persons. 25 case, plaintiffs' third claim for relief makes such allegations. 26 But, plaintiffs did not name Hergert and Stucker as defendants in 27 that claim. 28 the claim plaintiffs are precluded from bringing it as a "shocks In this Because a specific constitutional provision governs 13 - OPINION & ORDER 1 the conscience" substantive due process claim. 2 summary judgment to Hergert and Stucker on the fourth claim to the 3 extent 4 previously articulated, I also grant the motion as to the fourth 5 claim to the extent it is brought by Mark Chasse. 6 motion at this time to the extent it is brought by Chasse's 7 parents. it is brought by 8 Chasse's estate. Thus, I grant For the reasons I deny the CONCLUSION 9 Plaintiffs' motion as to the City Defendants (#639) is denied. 10 The City Defendants' motion (#640) is denied in part and granted in 11 part. Burton's motion (#642) is denied in part and granted in 12 part. Eath's and Gayman's motion (#655) is denied in part and 13 granted in part. 14 part and granted in part. 15 The AMR Defendants' motion (#661) is denied in IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated this 1 day of June, 2009. 17 18 19 /s/Garr M. King Garr M. King United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 - OPINION & ORDER

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