Anup Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture et al, No. 3:2002cv01637 - Document 288 (D. Or. 2009)
Court Description: AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER - The judgment as to damages and costs is amended as follows: Szczepanski and Hyatt shall pay $85,000 in damages and $2,340.79 in costs to Engquist, consistent with this opinion. In addition, Szczepanski and Hyatt shall pay $30,000 and $45,000, respectively, to the CICA. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 3/9/09, by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON ANUP ENGQUIST, CV.02-l637-AC Plaintiff, AMENDED' OPINION AND ORDER v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, JOHN SZCZEPANSKI, and JOSEPH (JEFF) HYATT, Defendants. ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: Introduction Plaintiff Anup Engquist ("Engquist") filed suit against Defendants Oregon Dep31iment of Agriculture, John Szczepanski, and Joseph (Jeff) Hyatt (collectively "Defendants"), for claims arising from Engquist's employment and termination. This case is before the court following , The sole purpose of this amendment is to correct the amount ofpunitive damages awarded in the conclusion, on page eleven (11), such that it is consistent with the amount correctly awarded in the body ofthe opinion, on page nine (9). AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 1 {KPR} remand from the Ninth Circuit on the parties' cross motions to amend the judgment entered by this court on February 4,2005. For the reasons that follow, the court amends the judgment and awards Engquist a total of$85,000 in damages and $2340.79 in costs. Backgrollnd Engquist originally filed this action on December 4,2002. One year later, on December 15, 2003, Defendants made an offer ofjudgment to Engquist in the amountof$300,001.00, plus all costs and fees accrued through the date of the offer. Engquist did not accept Defendants' offer of judgment. The parties tried the case to a jury from November 1,2004, through November 18, 2004. The jury found for Defendants on Engquist's claims of employment discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin; and on her retaliation claim. Accordingly, Defendant Oregon Department ofAgriculture ("the Department") "[was] entitled to [a] judgment dismissing all claims" and Defendants Jolm Szczepanski ("Szczepanski") and Joseph (Jeff) Hyatt ("Hyatt") were thus "entitled to judgment dismissing claims for discrimination and retaliation based upon race, color, gender or national origin under the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1981." (Abrams Aff., Ex. A at ~ 6-7.) The jury found for Engquist on her "class of one" equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with economic relations ("TIER") claims against the individual parties, Szczepanski and Hyatt. The jury awarded damages in specific categories. For the equal protection violation, the jury awarded Engquist $150,000 in economic damages and $25,000 in non-economic damages. For the substantive due process violation, the jury awarded Engquist $10,000 in economic damages and $25,000 in non-economic damages. This amount was "merged into the larger sums awarded for AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 2 {KPR} deprivation of rights under the Equal Protection Clause[.]" (Abrams Aff., Ex. A at 'ill.) For the ITER claim, the jury awarded Engquist $35,000 in economic damages. This amount also was "merged into the larger sums awarded for deprivation ofrights under the Equal Protection Clause." ld. As for punitive damages, the jUly awarded Engquist $70,000 against Szczepanski, $50,000 of which were attributed to the equal protection violation and $20,000 of which were attributed to the ITER claim. The jury also awarded Engquist $105,000 in punitive damages against Hyatt, $75,000 of which were attributed to the equal protection violation and $30,000 of which were attributed to the ITER claim. In accordance with Oregon Revised Statutes 31.375(1), $75,000 in punitive damages, representing sixty percent of the punitive damages awarded for ITER, was allocated to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime Victims' Assistance Section, (hereinafter "CICA"), for the individual defendants' liability on the state law claim for ITER. As the prevailing party against Szczepanski and Hyatt, Engquist was entitled to reimbursement ofcosts and attomey fees. As the prevailing patiy against Engquist, the Department was entitled to reimbursement of costs. In a subsequent order dated March 29, 2005, the court addressed Defendants' bill of costs and Engquist's motion for attorney fees and costs. The court awarded Defendants costs in the amount of$3,511.43. The cOUli awarded Engquist attorney fees of$I72,740, and costs and other expenses of$21,396.16. Szczepanski and Hyatt appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the federal constitutional claims. On February 8, 2007, the Ninth Circuit reversed the equal protection claim as invalid and the substantive due process claim as unsupported by sufficient evidence. Engquist AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 3 {KPR} v. Oregon Department ofAgriculture, 478 F.3d 985, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007). The court also "vacat[ed] the damages and attorneys' fees awards, and remand[ed] to the district court to determine what portion ofthese awards can be supported by Engquist's successful state law tort verdict." Id. 2 Engquist appealed the Ninth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court granted celiiorari to decide a single issue, whether a "class of one" equal protection claim is cognizable in the public employment context. On June 9, 2008, the Court held that it was not, and it affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. Engquist v. Oregon Department ofAgriculture, 533 U.S. _,128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008). The case is thus remanded to this couli to detennine the proper allocation ofdamages, fees, and costs pursuant to the Ninth Circuit order. Legal Standards Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 60 sets fmih the standard for granting relief from a judgment or order. The rule states in relevant part: "[T]he couli may relieve a pmty or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [where] ... the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable ...." FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5) (2008). Because the originaljudgment was based on claims that have been reversed and the damages on those claims have been vacated, the court must amend its earlier judgment to reflect the appellate courts' determinations. Rule 68 governs offers ofjudgment. Where an offer is made and rejected, the rule provides that "[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made." FED. R. CIv. P. 68(d) 2 Only Enquist's federal claims carried an attorney fee provision. AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 4 {KPR} not have the discretion to (2007). The language of this rule "is mandatory; the district court does 1997). Therefore, if the final rule otherwise." Jordan v. Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102,1 05 (11th Cir. judgm ent entered by this court is less than the offer ofjudg ment Defen dants made to Engquist, she may not recover her costs incurred after that date. Discussion The language of the original judgm ent awarded damages as follows: and [Engquist] is entitled to judgm ent in the amount of$15 0,000 in economic ] on the claim $25,000 in non-economic damages against [Szczepanski] and [Hyatt uist] is fmiher for deprivation ofrights under the Equal Protection Clause .... [Engq onomic damages against entitled to $10,000 in economic and $25,000 in non-ec Due Proces s [Szczepanski] and [Hyatt] on the claim for deprivation of substantive deprivation of rights ... which amount is merged into the larger sums awarded for d to $35,000 rights under the Equal Protection Clause, and [Engquist] is further entitle for intentional in economic damages against [Szczepanski] and [Hyatt] on the claim into the larger interference with employment relations ... which amount is merge d . sums awarded for deprivation of rights under the Equal Protection Clause es on the ITER claim of (Abrams Aff., Ex. A at '11.) The judgm ent also specified punitive damag $50,000 to Engquist and $75,000 to the CICA. puniti ve damages The court must decide the amount of economic, non-economic, and appropriately attributed to the claim for ITER; the amount ofcosts recove rable by the parties; and the 3 s each issue in tum. effect of the offer of judgm ent on the ITER award. The court will addres L Amou nt of damages a. Economic damages Defendants argue for a straightforward reading of the original distric t cOUli judgment. The ent. not claim an entitlement to attorney fees as awarded in the original judgm rise to the attorney fee award Such an award is no longer available because the federal claims giving e for recovery of attorney have been dismissed, and the comm on law claim for ITER does not provid 3 Engqu ist does fees. AMEN DED OPINI ON & ORDE R 5 {KPR} to $35,00 0 in econo mic plain langua ge of the judgm ent states that Enquist is "entitl ed as IIER is the only claim damages ... on the claim for [IIER]." (Abrams Aff. Ex. A at ~ 1.) Thus, to the $35,000 economic remain ing upon which Engqu ist may recover, Engquist is entitle d only damag e award on that claim. Engquist argues that the content ofthe verdict form, and the court' s use ofthe term "merg er," award that adds together the call for a "cumu lative award " of economic damages, that is, an econo mic damages designated for each ofthe three claims upon which Engqu ist originallyprevailed. award ed damages on In particular, Engqu ist cites the entries on the verdict form that state: "Tfyou es award ed on this claim are this claim and on any other claim, indicate wheth er any of the damag A at 2-5.) The jury left each unique to this claim." (Plain tiffs Memo randum ("Pl.'s Memo ."), Ex. ed were not unique to the of these entries blank. Therefore, Engqu ist argues, the damages award is entitle d to the sum of the claims for which they were awarded and, thus, upon any liability she ent, which "merg es" the awards for all claims. Engqu ist also cites the language of the judgm with the damages awarded for econo mic damages for the substantive due process and IIER claims the equal protec tion claim. not the judgm ent Engqu ist's argum ent is unavailing. First, it rests on the verdic t form, ict submi tted to the jury, and actually entered in the case. Engqu ist never appealed the form ofverd 09 WL 118962, at *1 (9th she thus waive d that issue. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., No. 07-15 268,20 trial and the right to presen t Cir. Jan. 13,200 9) ("Hall oum contends he was wrong ly denied ajmy not object or otherwise argue closin g arguments. The record indicates, however, that Hallou m did see also Campbell v. Burt, these issues to the district court. Accordingly, we deem them waive d."); ted to the distric 141 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.1998) (refhsing to consider issues not presen AMEN DED OPINI ON & ORDE R 6 t court); see {KPR} also Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 1995) (appeals court does not consider an issue not raised below). Second, as to the form ofjudgment, on appeal, Engquist challenged only the inclusion ofthe CICA as a recipient of part of her state law punitive damages award. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 992 ("Following the verdict, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the court denied. In addition, Engquist objected to the form of the judgment, presumably because the judgment listed the State of Oregon as a judgment creditor, but the district cOUli overruled her obj ection."). Thus, Engquist never attacked the trial cOUli's interpretation ofthe jury's verdict or the court's structuring of the judgment form to reflect that interpretation, and it is this interpretation upon which the Ninth Circuit based its decision. See id. at 990 ("A jUly found the individual defendants liable for constitutional violations of equal protection and substantive due process, and for intentional interference with contract. The jury awarded Engquist $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages."). The Ninth Circuit subsequently rejected Engquist's estoppel and standing arguments, and her federal constitutional challenges to the Oregon statute that required the inclusion of CICA in the judgment form. ld. at 999-1007. Thus, Engquist never raised on appeal any ofthe issues she now raises regarding either the verdict form or the form ofjudgment, and, again, in failing to do so has waived them. Third, a proper reading ofthe verdict f0I111 and the judgment produces a conclusion opposite that advanced by Engquist. The uniqueness questions asked the jury to determine whether the amount awarded should be awarded in addition to the amounts already awarded. By leaving these entries blank, the jUly indicated that the amount awarded was not to be considered in addition to the amount already awarded. Thus, to the extent that a larger amount of economic damages had been AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 7 {KPR} awarded on another claim, that non-unique amount was subsumed by the larger award. Indeed, Engquist's trial counsel so agreed when discussing the jury's award of compensatory damages with the trial judge and Defendants' counsel immediately after the jury returned its verdict. See Second Abrams Aff., Ex. J at 10:24-11:12 ("I agree with defense counsel that the total judgment for economic damages should be 150. For noneconomic, it should be 25, because on the fOUlth claim and on the fifth claim the amounts are less than on the third claim, and the jUly has not filled in anything relating to unique damages, unique economic and unique noneconomic damages on those claims."). This conclusion is supported by the language of the judgment which states that the awards for the substantive due process and IIER violations "merge" with the award for the equal protection violation. In other words, they become part of or are subsumed by the larger award. To suggest otherwise, that a finding ofliability for only one ofthe three claims entitled Engquist to the sum of the damages for all tlU'ee claims, is contrary to the plain language of the original judgment. Accordingly, the court awards Engquist economic damages in the amount of $35,000. b. NOI/-ecol/omic damages Unlike the awards for the constitutional claims, the judgment does not award non-economic damages on Engquist's HER claim. Thus, according to Defendant, Engquist is not entitled to noneconomic damages, as her constitutional claims have been dismissed. Engquist again argues for the cumulative nature ofthe damages and that she is entitled to the sum of the non-economic damages awarded for her other claims, in the amount of $50,000. Engquist's argument for cumulative treatment ofnon-economic damages fares no better than did her argument for cumulative treatment of her economic damages. As the verdict fOlm and AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 8 {KPR} judgment make clear, the jUly did not award non-economic damages for her IIER claim. That she should be entitled to non-economic damages arising from claims that have since been dismissed is without basis. Accordingly, Engquist is not entitled to non-economic damages. c. Punitive damages The patties are in agreement that the punitive damages attributed to the HER claim are unaffected by the subsequent Ninth Circuit and Supreme COUlt rulings. Thus, Engquist is entitled to $20,000 in punitive damages from Szczepanski and $30,000 from Hyatt. The CICA is entitled to $30,000 from Szczepanski and $45,000 from Hyatt. 2. Offer of Judgment Defendants claim that Engquist is not entitled to costs she incurred after the date oftheir offer ofjudgment, which she rejected. Based on the court's determination of Engquist's damages, it is clear that the amount Engquist will actually recover is less than the offer of judgment made by Defendants on December 15, 2003. Therefore, the court is bound by the requirements ofRule 68(d). Engquist argues that Defendants' claim for costs under Rule 68 should be denied because of a risk of chilling civil rights litigation and the public interest in resolving complex constitutional questions. The Ninth Circuit stated in Stanley v. University ofSouthern California, 178 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999): [T]he imposition ofsuch high costs on losing civil rights plaintiffs ofmodest means may chill civil rights litigation in this area. While we reject Stanley's claims, we also note that they raise important issues and that the answers were far from obvious. Without civil rights litigants who are willing to test the boundaries of our laws, we would not have made much of the progress that has occurred in this nation since [Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)]." ld. However, as Defendants point out, "[this] argument was rejected by Judge Ashmanskas, who AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 9 {KPR} noted that the award in Stanley was thirteen times the size ofthe cost bill in this action[,]" and that, unlike Stanley, there is no evidence that Engquist is unemployed or indigent. (Defs.' Reply Memo. 6 (citing Abrams Aff., Ex. B at 3).) Although the case has progressed through two appeals before returning to this court on remand, there has been no material change on this point. Although Engquist accurately cites relevant authority for her position, she overlooks the essential distinction between her case and the authorities upon which she relies: she ultimately prevailed and was awarded money damages against the two individual defendants. Even without the damages awarded for constitutional claims and a reduced costs award resulting from the offer ofjudgment, Engquist still will net a recovery ofboth damages and costs. a. Defendants' Costs The court previously ruled on Defendants' costs bill. Judge Aslmlanskas wrote: "The [Department] has committed no misconduct or other default that is wOlihy of punishment. There is no evidence that [Engquist] is of modest means, is unable to pay the cost bill, or that the imposition of the award would have a chilling effect on civil rights litigants. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' Bill of Costs in the amount of $3,511.43." (Abrams Aff., Ex. B at 3.) The ¢ appellate cOUli decisions do not alter Defendants' entitlement to costs as the prevailing party on claims against the Department. Accordingly, Defendants' award of costs, in the amount of $3,511.43, stands. b. Engquist's costs Defendants' argue that Engquist's cost award must be reduced by the amount of"those sums expended by Engquist after December 15,2003 ...." (Defs.' Memo. 6.) The court agrees that Rule AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 10 {KPR} 68 dictates that result. Thus, Engquist is awarded all costs incuned prior to December 15, 2003, in a total amount of$5,852.22. That amount less the amount Engquist owes Defendants is $2,340.79 and represents Engquist's net total costs award. Conelusion For the reasons stated above, the judgment as to damages and costs is amended as follows: Szczepanski and Hyatt shall pay $85,000 in damages and $2,340.79 in costs to Engquist, consistent with this opinion. In addition, Szczepanski and Hyatt shall pay $30,000 and $45,000, respectively, to the CICA. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 9th day of March, 2009. AMENDED OPINION & ORDER 11 {KPR}
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