Hampton et al v. Steen et al, No. 2:2012cv00470 - Document 232 (D. Or. 2014)

Court Description: Opinion and Order: County defendants' motions to quash subpoenas 193 and 195 are GRANTED. Defendants' motions to dismiss 157 , 211 and 215 are GRANTED. Defendants' motions to strike 155 and 206 are DENIED as moo t. The parties' requests for oral argument are DENIED as unnecessary. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot and this case is DISMISSED. See formal Opinion and Order. Copy of this order sent to Pro Se Defendant. Signed on 10/28/2014 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh)

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Hampton et al v. Steen et al Doc. 232 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PENDLETON DIVISION BRUCE HAMPTON, an individual; VENESE HAMPTON, an individual; and BRUCE HAMPTON, as trustee of the Bruce & Venese Hampton Charitable Trust I and the Bruce & Venese Hampton Charitable Trust II, OPINION AND ORDER Case No. 2:12-cv-00470-AA Plaintiffs, v. FRED STEEN, individually and as Sheriff of Wallowa County; WALLOWA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, a municipal subdivision of the State of Oregon; WALLOWA COUNTY, a municipal subdivision of the State of Oregon; PAUL CASTILLEJA, individually and as Commissioner of Wallowa County; and LLOYD TRACKWELL, JR., aka Lloyd R. Trackwell, aka Lloyd Ray Trackwell, individually and as an agent and informant for Wallowa County and Wallowa County Sheriff's Office, Defendants. Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER Dockets.Justia.com David H. Angeli Benjamin N. Souede Angeli Ungar Law Group LLC 121 SW Morrison St, Suite 400 Portland, OR 97204 D. Zachary Hostetter Hostetter Law Group, LLP 203 E. Main St, Suite 2 P.O. Box 400 Enterprise, OR 97828 Attorneys for plaintiffs Steven A. Kraemer Leslie A. Edenhofer Hart Wagner LLP 1000 S.W. Broadway, Twentieth Floor Portland, OR 97205 Attorneys for defendants Fred Steen, Paul Castilleja, Wallowa County Sheriff's Office, and Wallowa County Lloyd Trackwell, Jr. 4830 Woodhaven Drive Lincoln, NE 68516 Pro se defendant AIKEN, Chief Judge: Plaintiffs Bruce Hampton, Venese Hampton, and Bruce Hampton as trustee of the Bruce & Venese Hampton Charitable Trust I and the Bruce & Venese "Hamptons") Hampton filed a Third Charitable Trust Amended Complaint defendants Wallowa County Sheriff Fred Steen Wallowa County Castilleja"), County Commissioner Paul II Jr., a/k/a Lloyd R. Trackwell ("Trackwell"). against ("Sheriff Steen"), Wallowa County Sheriff's Office Lloyd Trackwell, ("TAC") Castilleja (collectively "County defendants"), (collectively ("Commissioner ( "WCSO"), Wallowa and pro se defendant Trackwell, a/k/a Lloyd Ray The TAC alleges 27 claims under 42 U.S.C. Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("ORICO"), Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715-166.735, the Oregon Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act ("OUDCPA"), Or. Rev. Stat. Collection Practices Act 697.005-697.115, §§ ("FDCPA"), the Fair Debt 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o, and numerous state common law torts. Before the Court are a total of seven motions by defendants. County defendants move to quash subpoenas (docs. 193 & 195) issued to nonparties Frontier Communications and U.S. Cellular. County defendants and Trackwell separately move to strike portions of the TAC (docs. 155 & 206). Finally, County defendants and Trackwell separately move to dismiss the TAC (docs. 157, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), 12 (b) (6), and 12 (b) (7). set forth below, 211 & 215) under For the reasons the motions to quash subpoenas are granted, the motions to dismiss are granted, the motions to strike are denied as moot, and this case is dismissed. BACKGROUND Since 2008, lawsuits against Circuit Court. the Hamptons and Trackwell have filed numerous one between in this Court and Wallowa County See Order (doc. 104) at 2 n.l (summarizing lengthy litigation history). lawsuit another the Now, once again, this Court is faced with a Hamptons Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER and Trackwell related to debt collection attempts by The Trackwell. Hamptons' 44-page TAC includes 92 paragraphs of facts and 27 claims for relief. In August 2007, Trackwell sought and procured an agreement to serve as an agent for the American Bank of Missouri ("ABM"), collect a debt allegedly owed by the Hamptons to ABM. TAC <Jl The Hamptons, however, insist they were never indebted to ABM. to 14. Id. The Hamptons assert that beginning on September 1, 2008, Trackwell attempted to activities. collect Id. <JI 15. the debt through a series of unlawful The Hamptons also allege that such attempts by Trackwell occurred without him registering as a debt collector with the Oregon Department of Consumer ("ODCBS"), as required by Or. Rev. Stat. On September 1, 2008, Trackwell and § Business 697.015. and ABM Services Id. filed a <JI 16. lawsuit against the Hamptons and others in Wallowa County Circuit Court ( "ABM lawsuit") covenant of alleging breach of contract, good faith fraudulent conveyance, and fair and fraud. dealing, breach of implied unjust enrichment, See Compl., American Bank of Missouri et al. v. John Doe et al., Case No. 08-01-12961 (Wallowa Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, 2008) . 1 The Hamptons argue Trackwell lacked probable cause to initiate and prosecute the ABM lawsuit, and did so with malicious intent. 1 TAC <JI<JI 15, 38. The Hamptons See Decl. of Leslie A. Edenhofer, Ex. A, May 6, 2014. The Court takes judicial notice of the complaint as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER further assert beginning in 2008, Trackwell, along with Sheriff Steen and WCSO, separately filed false reports about them with the ODCBS, Oregon State Police, Oregon Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of Treasury, and the U.S. Observer, alleging they had conspired with Marilyn Suarez, Wallowa Title Company, and others, to commit money laundering, theft, tax evasion, and fraud. Id. 12, 13, 15. Beginning July 1, 2009, conspired with Sheriff Steen, efforts to wrongfully Hamptons. 2 Id. became agent an 17. the WCSO, collect the Hamptons allege Trackwell and Wallowa County, alleged ABM debt in his from the Specifically, the Hamptons argue Trackwell and informant for WCSO, and Sheriff Steen instructed Trackwell to report "everything that squeaks or moves" about the Hamptons. 3 Hamptons allege Id. Trackwell 34. Also beginning July 1, 2009, the intentionally interfered with the Hamptons' business and contractual relationships with various third parties including the United States Department of Agriculture 2 The Hamptons also state defendants "developed their conspiracy and plan" against the Hamptons in 2007, however they allege no facts related to collection of the ABM debt by defendants dating back to 2007. Compare TAC 14 with TAC 15. 3 The Hamptons allege this statement was made in 2007, however they also allege the conspiracy between Trackwell, Sheriff Steen, and WCSO began July 1, 2009. Compare TAC 17 with TAC 34. Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER ("USDA"), the United States Natural Resource Conservation Service ("NRCS"), the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board ("OWEB"), 4 Junior and Rose Lewis, The Nature Conservatory, Marilyn Suarez and Wallowa Title Company, First American Title Company, Russ Ruonavaara and the General Land Office in Joseph, Oregon, and Community Bank, and in some cases wrongfully told these third parties the Hamptons were under investigation by various law enforcement agencies. 15, 24-26, 29-31, 33. The Hamptons also allege in August 2009, Trackwell contacted their pastor and other church members at the Joseph Baptist Church and falsely accused the Hamptons of failing to pay their debts, Id. CJICJI evading taxes, committing fraud, 15, 27. On September 1, 2009, the Hamptons filed a lawsuit against Trackwell in Wallowa County Circuit Court alleging violations Trackwell, Case No. 2009). 5 and lying. In April of the OUDCPA. 09-09-13224 2010, consolidated Hampton lawsuit the I ("Hampton lawsuit I") See Compl., Hampton v. (Wallowa Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, Wallowa County with ABM lawsuit Circuit Court ("consolidated 4 The Hamptons allege Trackwell intentionally interfered with their relationships with the USDA, NRCS, and OWEB in 2007, however they don't allege he began collection of the ABM debt until September 1, 2008. Compare TAC CJI 15 with TAC CJI 24. 5 The complaint and amended complaint are part of the record in Hampton v. Trackwell, Case No. 2:10-cv-01233-SU (D. Or. Oct. 8, 2010). The Court takes judicial notice of these pleadings as they are part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER case"), and Trackwell removed the consolidated case to this Court. See Notice of Removal, Hampton v. Trackwell, Case No. 2:10-01233-SU (D. Or. Oct. 8, 2 010) . 6 However, the consolidated case was ultimately remanded to Wallowa County Circuit Court by this Court. Hampton v. Trackwell, 2011 WL 653891, *1 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2011) adopted by 2011 WL 653875, *1 (D. Or. Feb. 14, 2011). On September 15, 2010, the Hamptons allege Trackwell, in furtherance of a scheme developed by him, Sheriff Steen, and WCSO, drove slowly past the Hampton residence numerous times, in attempts to lure them out of their home and to discredit, defame, and injure TAC '[['[[ 15, them. past, 22. The Hamptons allege when Trackwell drove he video recorded the events and was on a cell phone with Sheriff Steen stating "there may be gunfire." Id. '[['[[ 15, 23. The Hamptons assert this occurred because a hearing was scheduled the next day in Wallowa County Circuit Court to determine whether a Temporary Stalking Order issued against Trackwell should be made permanent. 7 Also in 2010, the Hamptons allege Trackwell contacted their friend and former banker Richard Wood, and falsely 6 The Court takes judicial notice of the removal as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. 7 It is unclear which Wallowa County Circuit Court case this hearing pertained to as the Hamptons do not provide case information. As discussed below, Trackwell has been subject to both civil and criminal stalking charges. Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER accused the Hamptons of failing to pay their debts and committing crimes. Id. 15, 28. On December 30, 2010, the Hamptons filed a lawsuit against Sheriff Steen in Wallowa County Circuit Court I I") seeking injunctive relief and a certain records ("Hampton lawsuit declaratory judgment that in possession of Sheriff Steen constitute non- exempt public records under Or. Rev. Stat. § 192. See Compl., Hampton v. Steen, Case No. 10-12-13446 (Wallowa Cnty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2010) . 8 the Hamptons On April 15, 2011, Trackwell filed a lawsuit against and others in this alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. slander. Court §§ ( "Trackwell lawsuit I") 1983 & 1985, conspiracy, and See Compl., Trackwell v. Hampton, Case No. 3:11-cv-00463- MO (D. Or. April 15, 2011) . 9 On May 23, 2011, Trackwell filed a second lawsuit in this Court against the Hamptons, Sheriff Steen, and others ("Trackwell lawsuit II") seeking a declaratory judgment that production of the records sought by the Hamptons in Hampton lawsuit II would violate his rights under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5113, et 8 The complaint is part of the record in Trackwell v. Hostetter, Case No. 3:11-cv-00627-MO (D. Or. May 23, 2011). The Court takes judicial notice of the complaint as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F. 3d at 689. 9 See Edenhofer Decl., Ex. B. The Court takes judicial notice of the complaint and first amended complaint as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER See Compl, Trackwell v. Hostetter, Case No. Or. May 23, 2011) . 10 On July dismissed Trackwell lawsuit II. 29, 2011, 3:11-cv-00627-MO Trackwell (D. voluntarily See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Trackwell v. Hostetter, Case No. 3:11-cv-00627-MO (D. Or. July 29, 2011). On December 29, 2011, Judge Michael W. Mosman dismissed from Trackwell lawsuit I various defendant State of Oregon employees for failure to state a claim. Hampton, Case No. 29, 2011). lawsuit I See Opinion and Order, Trackwell v. 3:12-cv-00463-MO, 2011 WL 6935325 (D. Or. Dec. On July 24, in its 2012, Judge Mosman dismissed Trackwell entirety due to Trackwell' s failure to serve remaining defendants, including the Hamptons, and for failure to prosecute the action. See Order, Trackwell v. Hampton, Case No. 3:11-cv-00463-MO (D. Or. July 24, 2012). The Hamptons assert Trackwell lacked probable cause to initiate or prosecute Trackwell lawsuits I and II and did so with malicious intent against them. TAC <][<][ 39-40. 10 The Court takes judicial notice of the complaint as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evict. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. 11 The Hamptons also allege Sheriff Steen lacked probable cause to initiate or prosecute Trackwell lawsuit II. TAC <][ 40. However, the complaint in Trackwell lawsuit II lists Sheriff Steen as a defendant. See Compl. <][ 11, Trackwell v. Hostetter, Case No. 3:11-cv-00627-MO (D. Or. May 13, 2011). Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 11 Finally, in 2011, the Hamptons allege Trackwell intentionally interfered with the Hamptons' business relationship Bushen and the General Land Office in Joseph, with Bill Oregon, by falsely accusing the Hamptons of failing to pay their debts and committing crimes. Id. 15, 32. Also in 2011, the Hamptons Commissioner Castilleja joined in the conspiracy. Hamptons allege Trackwell, Sheriff Steen, Id. and assert 19. The Commissioner Castilleja, regularly met in the WCSO office in the Wallowa County Justice Center, to coordinate conspiracy to discredit, Hamptons. Id. their defame, plans coerce, in furthering extort, their and injure the 41. On July 6, 2011, Trackwell filed bankruptcy petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, Case No. 11-38050, and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska, TAC 52. Case No. ( "Trackwell bankruptcy cases") . 12 The Hamptons allege these bankruptcy petitions were fraudulent. Trackwell, 11-418 30 Id. On or about August 10, 2012, the Hamptons assert Sheriff caused the U.S. Steen, Commissioner Castilleja, and others, Observer to publish an article containing false statements about the Hamptons, in furtherance of defendants' scheme to discredit, Hamptons. Id. defame, 54. coerce, extort, humiliate, On or about October 8, 12 and injure the 2012, the Hamptons Records for the Trackwell bankruptcy cases are not before this Court. Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER allege Sheriff Steen caused the U.S. Observer to publish an article stating Sheriff Steen "was going to be making arrests [of the plaintiffs and others] soon" in furtherance of defendants' scheme to discredit, Hamptons. Id. defame, coerce, extort, humiliate, and injure the 55. In 2010 and 2011, the Hamptons sought a civil stalking order against Trackwell in Hampton v. Trackwell, Wallowa County Circuit Court Case No. 10-08-13395 ("civil stalking case") . 13 74-77, 82-85. In 2011 and 2012, Trackwell was TAC 56-64, charged with criminal stalking in State of Oregon v. Trackwell, Wallowa County Circuit Court Case No. 11-M6789 ("criminal stalking case") . 14 70-73. counts of On October 24, violating a 2012, stalking Trackwell was convicted of two order and sentenced consecutive six month sentences and three years probation. for Stay (doc. 79) 6. TAC On January 17, 2013, two Motion Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan stayed all proceedings in this case pending release of Trackwell from jail. to (doc. 104) The stay was also granted pending resolution of the consolidated case remanded to Wallowa County Circuit Court. 13 On April 11, 2014, Wallowa County Circuit Records for the civil stalking case are not before this Court. 14 Records for the criminal stalking case are not before this Court. Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER Court Judge Lynn W. Hampton 15 entered a stipulated order holding the consolidated case in abeyance. See Stipulated Order, Hampton v. Trackwell, Case No. 09-09-13224 (Wallowa Cnty. Cir. Ct. April 11, 2014) . 16 According to the terms of the the stipulation, consolidated case is to be dismissed upon resolution of this case. Id. As a result of Trackwell' s release from jail and Judge Hampton's order, Magistrate Judge Sullivan vacated the stay in this case on April 18, 2014 On April 14, 2014, (doc. 149). Trackwell filed another lawsuit in this Court against U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew ("Trackwell lawsuit III") seeking a declaratory judgment under the Bank Secrecy Act, an order requiring Secretary Lew to enforce the provisions under the Bank Secrecy Act, and an order requiring certain persons See Compl., to provide documents to state or federal agencies. Trackwell 2014) . 17 15 v. Lew, Case No. 3:14-cv-00618-AA (D. Or. April 14, On June 3, 2014, the Court dismissed Trackwell lawsuit III Judge Hampton is not related to the plaintiffs in this case. 16 See Decl. of D. Zachary Hostetter, Ex. 1, April 15, 2014. The Court takes judicial notice of the Wallowa County Circuit Court order as it is part of the public record and therefore "not subject to reasonable dispute." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. 17 Although Trackwell's lawsuit is filed under seal, the Court takes judicial notice of the record as it is nonetheless "readily verifiable" and therefore "the proper subject of judicial notice." See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), because the Bank Secrecy Act does not provide a private cause of action, and because Trackwell's allegations in Trackwell lawsuit III appeared to be defenses he would like to raise in this case. See Order, Trackwell v. Lew, Case No. 3:14-cv-00618-AA (D. Or. June 3, 2014). STANDARDS I. Subpoenas The court must quash a subpoena that: reasonable time to comply; ( i) fails to allow a (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45 (c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden. R. Ci v. P. 4 5 (d) ( 3) (A) . Fed. An attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1). is required must Fed. "The court for the district where compliance enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction-which may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney's fees-on a party or attorney who fails to comply." Id. District courts have broad discretion to determine whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome. Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F. 3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). A subpoena is unduly burdensome where it seeks to compel production of documents regarding topics Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER unrelated to or beyond the scope of litigation. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2003). II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Where the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. standing is Fed. R. appropriately Civ. P. raised A challenge to 12 (b) (1). pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1). Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). "A Rule 12 (b) (1) facial or factual." jurisdictional attack may be either Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 103 9 (9th Cir. 20 0 4) (citation omitted) . "In a facial attack, the challenger assets that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. By the contrast, a factual allegations that, jurisdiction." consider Id. evidence by themselves, 1987). "disputes the outside the complaint and omitted). F.3d resolve factual Roberts v. Carrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 If the substance of a Rule 12 (b) ( 1) motion is the court employs the standard applicable to a summary judgment motion. 424 of would otherwise invoke federal intertwined with the merits of the case, States, truth In evaluating a factual attack, the court may disputes, if necessary. (9th Cir. attack 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005) Autery v. United (internal citation That is, the motion to dismiss should be granted "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER to prevail as a matter of law." Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) 1074, 1077 (citing Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d (9th Cir. 1983)). III. Failure to State a Claim Where the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the court must dismiss the action. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must P. 12 (b) (6). allege Fed. R. Civ. facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its Bell Atl. face." Corp. v. Twombly, 550 For purposes of a motion to dismiss, (2007) . U.S. 544, 570 the complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. 1983). a Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. Bare assertions, however, that amount to nothing more than recitation of the elements" of a claim and not entitled to be assumed true." 662, 681 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. Rather, to state a plausible claim for relief, (2009). the complaint conclusory contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts" to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, where standards apply. state the time, fraud is See Fed. R. Civ. P. place, and heightened alleged, 9(b). specific pleading The plaintiff content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations." Schreiber Distrib. Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 quotations omitted). (9th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal Likewise, the plaintiff is required to "set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false." Cir. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (citation 2003) and USA, 317 F.3d 1097, internal 1106 quotations (9th omitted) . Additionally, "Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together differentiate their allegations but plaintiffs require[s] to . and inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in fraud." 2007) Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764-65 (9th Cir. (citation and internal quotations omitted). DISCUSSION I. Motions to Quash Subpoenas County defendants move to quash five subpoenas issued and served by the Hamptons through their attorney D. Zachary Hostetter on nonparties Frontier Communications and U.S. Cellular. Defs.' Mot. Defs.' Quash Pls.' Subpoenas Frontier Communications at 2; Mot. Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Cellular at 2. The subpoenas seek telephone records of five phone numbers belonging to Sheriff Steen, Commissioner Castilleja, and nonparty Sheriff Steve Rogers. Leslie A. Edenhofer Supp. Communications, Exs. A-B; Mot. Decl. Quash. Pls.' Leslie A. Subpoenas Frontier Edenhofer Supp. Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Cellular, Exs. A-C. Decl. Mot. County defendants object to the subpoena requests on the grounds they are irrelevant, Page 16 - OPINION AND ORDER overbroad, and seek protected personal information. 18 Defs.' Mot. Quash Pls.' Defs.' Mot. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes the Hamptons' five Subpoenas Frontier Communications at 2; Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Cellular at 2. subpoenas served on Frontier Communications and U.S. not appear to be signed or dated by Mr. Hostetter. Decl. Exs. Supp. Mot. A-B; Quash. Pls.' Edenhofer Decl. Cellular, Exs. A-C. R. signed by at least addition to Supp. Mot. Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a) (3) requires an attorney Civ. this See Edenhofer Subpoenas Frontier Communications, issuing a subpoena to sign the subpoena. see also Fed. Cellular do P. one 26 (g) (every discovery request must be attorney defect, Fed. R. Ci v. P. 4 5 (a) ( 3) ; the of Nonetheless, record) . Hamptons' subpoenas fail in for substantive reasons. On June 27, 2014, Magistrate Judge Sullivan issued an opinion and order in this case (doc. 191) quashing nine subpoenas served by Trackwell on various nonparties, members of Mr. Hostetter's family. including Mr. Hostetter and Magistrate Judge Sullivan found all nine subpoenas were facially irrelevant, unduly burdensome, and 18 County defendants also request the Court quash additional subpoenas served by the Hamptons to Frontier Communications and U.S. Cellular to the extent they seek telephone records of other Wallowa County employees and commissioners. Defs.' Mot. Quash Pls.' Subpoenas Frontier Communications at 3 n.1; Defs.' Mot. Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Cellular at 3 n.1. Because the County defendants have not provided copies of those subpoenas, the Court declines to quash them. Page 17 - OPINION AND ORDER were served to harass and annoy nonparties, and not for the purpose of obtaining information related to this case. Magistrate Judge Sullivan also entered a discovery order prohibiting Trackwell from serving additional subpoenas in this case without Court approval. For the reasons listed above, the Court quashes the subpoenas served by Cellular. the Hamptons on Frontier Communications and U.S. The Hamptons' subpoenas request production of "[a] ny and all call, toll, and subscriber records and files" for four phone numbers from January 1, 2011 to present, and for one phone number from January 1, 2008 to present. See Edenhofer Decl. Supp. Mot. Quash. Pls.' Subpoenas Frontier Communications, Exs. A-B; Edenhofer Decl. Supp. Mot. The Hamptons' Quash Pls.' Subpoenas U.S. Cellular, Exs. A-C. subpoenas seek a large amount of material, much of which is irrelevant and private, and therefore unduly burdensome. See Mattel, 353 F. 3d at 813-14. As such, County defendants' motions to quash the subpoenas are GRANTED. II. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12 (b) A. (1) Article III Standing The standing jurisprudence of federal courts "contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement, [and] prudential standing, which embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 11 (2004) Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, (citations and Page 18 - OPINION AND ORDER internal quotations omitted). The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" requires three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) the injury must be "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) "it must be likely will be redressed by a favorable decision." . that the injury Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations and internal quotations omitted) . Trackwell argues the Hamptons fail to meet the three elements of Article III standing because "certain key facts, central to each cause of action are either false or intentionally misrepresented by Plaintiffs." this Trackwell Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 4. argument, Trackwell totaling 238 pages, provides the Court including documents In support of with 38 exhibits, related to the Bruce & Venese Hampton Charitable Trust I and the Bruce & Venese Hampton Chari table Trust II, documents from the Wallowa County Circuit Court cases between the Hamptons and Trackwell, and various other letters and documents. Trackwell Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Exs. 1-38. An attack on subject matter jurisdiction may be either facial or factual. Trackwell' s See Safe Air for Everyone, challenge to standing is a 373 factual F.3d at attack given he disputes the truth of all the allegations in the Hamptons' See id. 1039. TAC. Because the relevant facts are dispositive of both the Rule 12(b) (1) motion and the merits of the Hamptons' claims, the Court applies the standard applicable to a summary judgment motion. Page 19 - OPINION AND ORDER Autery, 424 F.3d at 956 (9th Cir. 2005). Employing a summary judgment standard, the Court cannot resolve these issues at this stage as all of the facts in the TAC are in dispute. For these reasons, Trackwell's motion to dismiss based on lack of standing is denied. B. Prudential Standing The "prudential component of standing precludes the exercise of [subject-matter jurisdiction] 'irreducible minimum' even where the Constitution's requirements have been met." Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F. 3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) jurisdiction, "rais [ es] due to prudential another person's (the court lacks subject-matter limitations, legal rights" where a plaintiff or where a "complaint [does not] fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked") . "As a general rule, a third-party does not have standing to bring a claim asserting a violation of someone else's rights." 1050 Martin v. Cal. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, (9th Cir. (1991)). 2009) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 This rule exists to avoid "the adjudication of rights which those not before the [c]ourt may not wish to assert, and [to ensure] that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them." Elk Grove, (citations and internal quotations omitted). Page 20 - OPINION AND ORDER 542 U.S. at 15 n.7 County defendants argue the Hamptons do not have standing to assert their claims in paragraphs 9 through 13 of the TAC on behalf of third parties Marilyn Suarez a/k/a Maryilyn Preston ("Suarez"), Wallowa Title Company, and County Defs.' "Hubbards") . 19 Donald and Mot. Dorothy Dismiss at Hubbard 2-3. (the County defendants contend the Hamptons lack standing because nowhere in the TAC do they allege a close relationship to any of these third parties or that the third parties are unable to protect their own interests. Id. at 3. Contrary to County defendants' argument, paragraphs 9 through 13 of the relief. TAC consists See TAC of background facts 9-13. and not claims for In these paragraphs the Hamptons allege Sheriff Steen and nonparty Judith Trackwell filed lawsuits against Suarez and Wallowa Title Company in this Court and Wallowa County Circuit Court. Judith Id. Trackwell, 9-10. Mary The Hamptons also assert nonparties Dorrenbach ( "Wickenkamp") , and Lloyd Trackwell, Sheriff WCSO, Steen, and purposes of discrediting, Sr., Trackwell, defaming, a/k/a Mary Wickenkamp along with defendants associated coercing, together and injuring them, along with Suarez, Wallowa Title Company, and the Hubbards. 11. for Id. Finally, the Hamptons contend nonparties Judith Trackwell and Wickenkamp, along with defendants 19 Sheriff Steen, WCSO, and Paragraphs 9 through 11 of the TAC are also subject to the County defendants motion to strike. County Defs. Mot. Strike at 6-8. Page 21 - OPINION AND ORDER Trackwell, filed false reports with various state and federal law enforcement agencies Suarez, Wallowa crimes. Id. alleging Title the Company, Hamptons and had others, conspired to commit with various 12-13. Although Suarez, Wallowa Title Company, and the Hubbards are mentioned in these paragraphs, the Hamptons do not assert their claims of behalf of these nonparties. See TAC 100-206. Rather these nonparties are discussed as background information. For these reasons, the County defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of standing is denied. III. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12 (b) ( 6) A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims The Hamptons assert five claims (Claims 1 through 5) against defendants liberty under and 42 property U.S.C. § 1983: interests, (1) deprivation without due of their process; (2) retaliation; (3) defamation; (4) arbitrary law enforcement; and (5) wrongful initiation and prosecution of civil proceedings. 100-28. To state a claim against an individual under plaintiff must allege: § TAC 1983, the (a) the conduct complained of deprived him of an existing federal constitutional or statutory right; and (b) the conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 974 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 F.2d 119, (1993). 120 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. (1988); L.W. v. Grubbs, denied, 508 U.S. 951 Where a plaintiff seeks to impose liability against a Page 22 - OPINION AND ORDER municipality under § 1983, he or she must also prove a policy or custom existed that was the moving force behind the violation at issue. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 91 (1978); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2011) 1. (citation omitted). Due Process (Claim 1) The Hamptons allege defendants deprived them of their liberty and property interests, without due process, including but not limited to their interests in: (a) actual and prospective business and contractual relationships; (b) pursuing the common occupations or professions of life; (c) future profits from real property sales and other transactions; (d) real property owned by the plaintiffs, including but not limited to their interest in being able to sell such property for its full value; and (e) goodwill. TAC <J[<j[ 100-105. "To state a prima facie substantive or procedural due process claim, one must, as a threshold matter, identify a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution." United States v. Guillen-Cervantes, 2014) citation omitted). 748 F.3d 870, Further, 872 "[a] (9th Cir. constitutionally (internal cognizable property interest in a benefit requires more than an abstract need or desire or a unilateral expectation of it-rather, there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement. individual to demonstrate Page 23 - OPINION AND ORDER that This typically requires an an existing law, rule, or understanding makes the conferral of a benefit mandatory." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the cognizable defendants. them of Hamptons liberty to property allege interest a that constitutionally was violated by The Hamptons allege generally that defendants deprived actual relationships, goodwill. or fail TAC and prospective future CJl profits 101. from business real and contractual property sales, and In order to have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" and not a mere "unilateral expectation." at 872. Guillen-Cervantes, 748 F.3d The Hamptons' conclusory allegation that they lost actual and prospective business relationships, profits, and goodwill from third parties are all unilateral expectations and therefore insufficient to create a property interest. The Hamptons also allege generally that defendants deprived TAC CJl 101. Pursuing an occupation of one's choice is a liberty interest. See them of pursuing common occupations or professions. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1999). "[A] plaintiff can make out a substantive due process claim if she is unable to pursue an occupation and this inability is caused by government basis." Cir. that were arbitrary and lacking Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 2007) involves actions a (internal complete citation omitted) . prohibition Page 24 - OPINION AND ORDER of the a 478 F.3d 985, This right right to rational 997 (9th however, engage in a calling, not a brief interruption. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1029. The TAC is void of any information as to the occupation or profession of either Bruce Hampton or Venese Hampton, and neither alleges in the TAC that they are completely prohibited from pursuing their occupation or profession as a result of defendants' conduct. such, to their conclusory allegation is insufficient As create a liberty interest. Therefore, the Hamptons fail to allege the deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest necessary to state a claim for denial of their substantive or procedural due process rights. As such, Claim 1 is dismissed. 2. Retaliation (Claim 2) The Hamptons allege defendants' desire to retaliate against conduct "was motivated by a [the Hamptons] for their exercise of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, including but not limited to the right of access to the courts and the right to government for redress of grievances." TAC ']['][ petition the 106-111. The Court interprets this as a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. To recover under § 1983 for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, the plaintiff must establish: "(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; ( 2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness Page 25 - OPINION AND ORDER from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action." Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010). The Hamptons do not specify precisely what constitutionally protected activity they engaged in and what retaliation. Because the Hamptons assert defendants did in they exercised their right of access to the courts, presumably their constitutionally protected activity was filing Hampton lawsuit I, Hampton lawsuit II, and the civil stalking case. However, the TAC contains a multitude of allegations against defendants and it is unclear which of these, if any, were taken in retaliation of the Hamptons filing their civil cases. 20 establishing defendants' a Because the Hamptons have not alleged facts causal-link between their prior speech and subsequent conduct, their retaliation claim fails at the pleading level, and is dismissed. See Handy v. Lane County, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1305 06 (D. Or. 2013). 3. Defamation (Claim 3) The Hamptons allege the conduct of defendants was defamatory and "committed with the purpose of, and had the effect of, causing the persons and/ or entities described above to terminate their ° Claim 2 the TAC. 2 merely incorporates paragraphs 1 through 105 of TAC 106. Page 26 - OPINION AND ORDER existing and/or prospective relationships with plaintiffs." business TAC and/or contractual 112-117. Defamation by itself does not support a claim under § 1983 because injury to reputation alone is not a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2006) 693, 711-12 (1976)). Hart v. Parks, 450 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. To state a claim for defamation under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege injury to reputation in conjunction with loss of a recognizable property or liberty interest. County of San Diego, 593 F.3d 841, 879 Crowe v. (9th Cir. 2010). This is known as the "stigma-plus" test and can be satisfied in two ways: (1) the injury to reputation was inflicted in connection with the deprivation of a federally protected right; or (2) the injury to reputation caused the denial of a federally protected right. Hart, 450 F.3d at 1070 (emphasis in original). As discussed above for Claim 1, the Hamptons' allegation that defendants deprived them of actual and prospective business and contractual relationships fails to state a cognizable property or liberty interest. Thus, the Hamptons have not shown either an injury to their reputation in connection with the deprivation of a federally protected right or an injury to reputation that caused the denial of a protected right. Claim 3 is dismissed. Page 27 - OPINION AND ORDER Hart, 450 F.3d at 1070. As such, 4. Arbitrary Law Enforcement (Claim 4) The Hamptons allege defendants' conduct constituted "arbitrary law enforcement activity for the purpose of harassment and interference" and deprived them of their liberty and/or property interests, without due process, including but not limited to: (a) actual and prospective business and contractual relationships; (b) pursuing the common occupations or professions of life; (c) future profits from real property sales and other transactions; property owned by plaintiffs, (d) real including but not limited to their interest in being able to sell such property for its full value; and (e) goodwill. TAC 118 123. The Court construes the due process claim in Claim 4 to be the same as the due process claim in Claim 1. 21 Because the Court dismissed Claim 1, Claim 4 is similarly dismissed. 5. Wrongful Initiation and Prosecution of Civil Proceedings (Claim 5) Finally, the Hamptons allege defendants' conduct constituted "wrongful initiation and prosecution of civil proceedings" against TAC filing of the ABM lawsuit, lawsuit II, 124-128. Specifically, them. "was Trackwell rnoti vated by the Hamptons lawsuit defendants' I, desire allege the and Trackwell to retaliate against plaintiffs for their exercise of rights guaranteed by the 21 In response to County defendants' Motion, the Hamptons clarify that Claim 4 is a substantive due process claim. Pls.' Resp. County Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 18-19. Page 28 - OPINION AND ORDER United States Constitution including, but not limited to, plaintiffs' right of access to the courts, their right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and by defendants' desire to defame plaintiffs for the purpose of causing Junior Lewis, Rose Lewis, and The Nature Conservancy to terminate their existing and/or prospective business and/or contractual relationship with plaintiffs." Malicious Id. prosecution support a§ 1983 claim. Cir. 1974) through civil proceedings does not Paskaly v. Seale, 506 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th (rejecting a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in a civil proceeding because "[m]alicious prosecution is a concept applicable only in criminal proceedings."); see also Heil v. Sierra Sands United Sch. (unpublished) . without more, Furthermore, does not Dist., 843 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1988) "the tort of malicious prosecution, constitute a civil rights violation." Paskaly, 506 F.2d at 1212 (internal citations omitted). ABM lawsuit, Trackwell lawsuit I, and Trackwell lawsuit II are all civil cases, and therefore cannot support a claim for malicious prosecution. To the extent Claim 5 alleges a due process, retaliation, or defamation claim, those claims have been previously dismissed in Claims 1 through 4. 6. As such, Claim 5 is dismissed. Conclusion The Hamptons have failed at the pleading level to demonstrate that defendants deprived them of an existing federal constitutional Page 29 - OPINION AND ORDER or statutory right to support a claim under § 1983. As a result, the Court need not determine whether defendants were acting under color of law. Furthermore, County defendants' the Court declines additional arguments to address for dismissal the including statute of limitations and absolute immunity. B. RICO Claims The Hamptons assert two claims (Claims 20 and 21) under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. TAC 178-82. Specifically, the Hamptons assert defendants violated 18 U.S. C. §§ 19 62 (c) & 19 62 (d) 22 "causing each plaintiff to suffer direct financial losses on and after July 1, 2009, in the sum of $4,805,000.00." Id. 179, 182. Section 1962 (c) (Claim 20) 1. To state a RICO claim under§ 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege " ( 1) conduct ( 2) of an enterprise racketeering activity." (9th Cir. 2007) 479, 496 causation. ( 3) through a pattern of Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 547 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. (1985)). ( 4) Imrex Co., 473 U.S. The plaintiff must also establish proximate Canyon Cnty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Rezner v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank AG, 630 F.3d 866, RICO purposes 873 requires (9th Cir. 2010) some direct 22 The Hamptons assert 1961(c) & 1961(d). TAC not exist. The Court will violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ Page 30 - OPINION AND ORDER ("Proximate Causation for relation between the injury defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 179, 182. However, these statutes do assume the Hamptons intended to assert 1962(c) & 1962(d). asserted and the injurious conducted alleged.") omitted). RICO claims that include (internal citations allegations of fraudulent activities as predicate acts of racketeering must be pled with particularity under Fed. R. Civ. 553-54 P. 9(b). See Odom, (" [T] he pleader must state the time, place, 486 F.3d at and specific content of the false representations as well as the identifies of the parties omitted). to the misrepresentation.") (internal citations The Hamptons' RICO claim under§ 1962(c) is defective in many respects. Significantly, "enterprise." the TAC fails to show the existence An "enterprise" is "any individual, of an partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of entity." indi victuals associated 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). in fact although not a legal An associated-in-fact enterprise is "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkette, pleading "[t]o level, Odom, 486 F.3d at 552 452 U.S. establish 576, the 583 (1981)). existence of (quoting At the such an enterprise, a plaintiff must provide both 'evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,' and 'evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'" Id. 452 U.S. (quoting Turkette, at 583); see also Eclectic Props. East, LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 Page 31 - OPINION AND ORDER (9th Cir. 2014). The TAC alleges in a conclusory fashion that "[t]he associated persons operated as a single enterprise that constituted 'association-in-fact' enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(4)." TAC en 37. The only facts the Hamptons provide an § to establish the existence of an associated-in-fact enterprise among the defendants is a vague allegation that Sheriff Steen, Commissioner Castilleja, and Trackwell have raised livestock and sold hay on the "Imnaha Ranch" since 2007. this alleged business arrangement, regarding a common continuing unit. purpose, an Id. en 35. the Hamptons provide no facts ongoing organization, See Odom, 486 F.3d at 552-53. the claims in the TAC, Aside from or a As it relates to the Hamptons merely allege Sheriff Steen, Commissioner Castilleja, and Trackwell, "have regularly met in the office of WCSO, Wallowa County Justice Center, 104 W. Greenwood Street, Enterprise, Oregon, to coordinate their plans in furthering their Enterprise and their conspiracy to discredit, defame, coerce, extort, and injure Venese Hampton and Bruce Hampton. " 23 TAC <JI 41. Such limited facts are insufficient to establish an "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO. 23 The TAC contains several allegations that Judith Trackwell, Wickenkamp, and Lloyd Trackwell Sr. committed acts "in furtherance of the Enterprise." TAC enen 42-44. However, Judith Trackwell, Wickenkamp, and Lloyd Trackwell Sr. are not parties to the case, these facts are not relevant to the Hamptons' claims, and many of these allegations are subject to the County defendants' motion to strike. Page 32 - OPINION AND ORDER Furthermore, the Hamptons racketeering activity. fail to allege a pattern of A pattern "must be based on at least two acts of racketeering, must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." 205 F. Supp. omitted). 2d Cooper Indus., 1157, 1165 (D. Inc. v. Lagrand Tire Chains, Or. 2002) (internal citations For the RICO claims, the TAC lists nine predicate acts by Trackwell of mail fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice. TAC ']['][ 78-91. other than However it is unclear how these acts are related, the bare allegation that each predicate act committed by Trackwell "in furtherance of the Enterprise." was See id. "The relationship requirement is satisfied by a showing that the racketeering predicates have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Cooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) Here, the Hamptons fail to allege any form of relationship. Similarly, the Hamptons do not contend there is any continuing threat of committed justice. criminal acts activity; of mail TAC ']['][ 78-91. fraud, the TAC merely alleges wire fraud, and Trackwell obstruction of "The continuity element is satisfied by a showing that the predicate acts pose a threat of continued criminal activity, such as when the illegal conduct is a regular way of Page 33 - OPINION AND ORDER conducting a defendant's ongoing legitimate business." F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (internal citations and Cooper, 205 quotation marks omitted). While the TAC vaguely alleges Sheriff Steen, Commissioner Castilleja, business, and Trackwell have engaged in a the Hamptons do not allege the livestock and hay illegal conduct is a regular way of conducting the business. Finally, the Hamptons assert their TAC i "defendants." 178-180. § 19 62 (c) However, the TAC alleges predicate acts by Trackwell only. TAC i i 78-91. predicate acts or facts alleging fraudulent Steen, claim against Commissioner Castilleja, WCSO, The Hamptons provide no actions by Sheriff or Wallowa County. "Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but require [ s] allegations surrounding Swartz, F. 3d omitted) . to differentiate and inform each defendant allegations 47 6 plaintiffs at his 7 64-65 alleged ( citation "In the context of a separately of the participation and fraud suit their internal in fraud." quotations involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, identify the role of each defendant in the fraudulent internal quotations omitted). scheme." ( citation and Thus, the Hamptons' RICO claim also fails to allege the particularly required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). For all these reasons, Claim 20 is dismissed. Page 34 - OPINION AND ORDER 2. Section 1962 (d) (Claim 21) Section 1962(d) prohibits the act of conspiring to violate§§ 1962(a)-(c). Although a civil RICO conspiracy claim can survive even if the substantive RICO claim does not, where the plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite substantive elements of RICO, a RICO conspiracy claim cannot stand. 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2000) Howard v. Am. Online, (internal citation omitted); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wallersheim, Cir. 1992). Inc., 971 F. 2d 3 64, 3 67 n. 8 (9th As described above, the Hamptons have failed to state a substantive RICO claim under§ 1962(c). As a result, Claim 21 is also dismissed. C. FDCPA (Claim 29) The Hamptons Trackwell, 1692g. one claim under alleging he violated 15 U.S. C. TAC The assert to purpose be of the liable FDCPA under threshold requirement, "debt collector." 2d 1188, FDCPA §§ 1692c, against 1692e, and 14-15, 202-205. is "to eliminate collection practices by debt collectors." Thus, the 1203 (D. the FDCPA, a fall within the abusive 15 U.S.C. defendant debt § 1692 (e). must, as a statutory definition of See Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. Or. 2002); see also Romine v. Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998). Diversified The FDCPA defines "debt collector" as "any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who Page 35 - OPINION AND ORDER regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." U.S.C. § 15 1692a(6). Based on the limited facts provided in the TAC, the Court cannot conclude Trackwell is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. 2007, The TAC states in a conclusory fashion that in August Trackwell sought and procured an agreement to serve as an agent for ABM to collect a debt allegedly owed by the Hamptons to ABM, whereby Trackwell would receive 45% of any money collected. TAC 14. Such an arrangement does not appear to make Trackwell a person in a business whose principal purpose is to collect debts, or a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts. The TAC alleges Trackwell conducted these collection attempts without registering as a debt collector with the ODCBS, as required by Or. finds Rev. the Stat. § Hamptons 697.015. have failed Id. to 16. Therefore, plead sufficient the Court facts to establish Trackwell is a "debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA. Furthermore, the statute of limitations for a claim under the FDCPA is one year from the date on which the violation occurs. u.s.c. § 1692k(d) 15 The Hamptons filed this action on March 15, 2012 (doc. 1) making any violations of the FDCPA by Trackwell prior to March 15, 2011, barred by the statute of limitations. The TAC states all violations of the FDCPA by Trackwell occurred "on or Page 36 - OPINION AND ORDER between September 1, 2008 and the present in the state of Oregon." TAC '.II 15. Thus, much of the misconduct by Trackwell is likely barred by the statute of limitations, but the Hamptons have failed to plead sufficient facts regarding when precisely these violations occurred. Regardless, the Hamptons have failed at the pleading level to establish a claim under the FDCPA and therefore, Claim 29 is dismissed. D. State Law Claims In addition to the federal claims, the TAC alleges nineteen state law claims against defendants under ORICO OUDCPA (Claim 28), and common law torts (Claim 22), the (Claims 6 through 19 and Claims 2 5 through 2 7) . 24 Dismissal automatically of the deprive Hamptons' a federal court district claims of subject-matter jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims. Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 does not (2009). Carlsbad Rather, where a district court dismisses "all claims over which it has original jurisdiction," it may in its discretion, "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" over pendent state law claims. 28 U.S.C. 896, 940 § 1367(c) (3); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, this Court declines exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Hamptons' claims. M The TAC does not contain a Claim 23 or Claim 24. Page 37 - OPINION AND ORDER to state law IV. Remaining Motions In addition to arguing that the Hamptons have failed to state a claim, Trackwell argues the Hamptons have failed to join required parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (7). Dismiss at 22. Trackwell Br. Supp. Mot. the Court has determined the Hamptons have failed to state a claim, the Court declines to address Trackwell's arguments regarding required parties. Furthermore, County defendants and Trackwell separately move to strike portions of the TAC (docs. 155 & 206). Because the Court has found the Hamptons' TAC fails to state a claim, the motions to strike are moot. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, County defendants' motions to quash subpoenas (docs. 193 & 195) are GRANTED. Defendants' motions to dismiss (docs. 157, 211 & 215) are GRANTED. Defendants' motions to strike (docs. 155 & 206) are DENIED as moot. The parties' requests for oral argument are DENIED as unnecessary. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot and this case is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED Dated this October 2014. Ann Aiken United States District Judge Page 38 - OPINION AND ORDER

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