Sayre v. Jackson County Oregon et al
Filing
42
ORDER: It is Ordered that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 26 be Granted in Part and Denied in Part. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's trespass claim is Granted; and their Motions as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and false arrest and false imprisonment are Denied. Please access entire text by document number hyperlink. Ordered and Signed on 11/24/2009 by Magistrate Judge Mark D. Clarke. (rsm)
<![CDATA[
FlLEW09 NOV 2415:22USDCiJRt1
IN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T F O R T H E DISTRICT OF O R E G O N LAWRENCE EDWARD SAYRE, Plaintiff, Civil No. 08-3035-CL ORDER
v.
JACKSON COUNTY, OREGON; GRANT F O R M A N ; and J E N N I F E R A N D E R S O N , Defendants.
C L A R K E , M a g i s t r a t e Judge: P l a i n t i f f alleges a section 1983 claim for violation o f his civil rights and alleges pendent state c l a i m s , s e e k i n g e c o n o m i c a n d n o n - e c o n o m i c d a m a g e s , p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , a n d attorney's fees and costs. T h i s c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n pur sua nt to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 a n d 1367. The parties have executed w r i t t e n consents to entry o f j u d g m e n t b y a magistrate j u d g e (## 17, 18, 20). 28 U . S . c . § 636(c). B e f o r e the c o u r t is defendants' m o t i o n for partial s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t (#26). For the reasons explained, defendants' m o t i o n is granted i n part a n d d e n i e d in part.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Pursuant to Rule 56( c), s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t "should b e rendered, i f the pleadings, the discovery a n d disclosure materials o n file, and any affidavits s h o w t h a t there is no genuine issue
1 - ORDER
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to j u d g m e n t as a matter o f l a w . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 6 3 2 , 6 3 6 (9th Cir. 2002). T h e c o u r t c a n n o t w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e or d e t e r m i n e t h e t r u t h b u t m a y o n l y d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r there is a genuine issue o f fact. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 7 9 6 , 8 0 0 (9th Cir. 2002). A n issue o f fact is genuine " ' i f the evidence is such that a reasonable j u r y could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9 th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party must carry the initial burden o f proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The moving party meets this burden by identifying for the court portions o f the record on file which ,demonstrate the absence o f any genuine issue o f material fact. Id.; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1 0 7 0 , 1 0 7 6 (9 th Cir. 2001) (en bane). In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen v. City o f Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor o f the non-movant. Gibson v. County o f Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). I f the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 & n A (1986). Summary judgment should be granted for the movant, i f appropriate, in the absence o f any significant probative evidence tending to support the opposing party's theory o f the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); THI-
2
- ORDER
Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 2 5 3 , 2 9 0 (1968). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F .2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.
FACTS
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the following facts are undisputed 1: Defendants, Deputy Forman and Deputy Anderson, were dispatched to 3990 E. A n t e l o p e Road, E a g l e P o i n t , b e c a u s e o f a duress a l a r m c a l l f r o m t h a t r e s i d e n c e . ( D e c l a r a t i o n s o f F o r m a n and A n d e r s o n . ) Prior to Defendants' arrival, Plaintiff did not know that a duress alarm call had issued from his residence's alarm system. (Deposition o f Plaintiff, p. 32.) Plaintiff, who was in front o f his house, told Deputy Anderson that someone else was in the house. (Deposition o f Plaintiff, pp. 27, 31-32.) Deputy Anderson asked Plaintiff to let her check the house. P l a i n t i f f agreed. (Deposition o f Plaintiff, p. 31.) B o t h D e p u t y F o r m a n a n d D e p u t y A n d e r s o n r e c a l l t h a t P l a i n t i f f w a s agitated. (Declarations o f Forman and Anderson.) Deputy Forman recalls P l a i n t i f f stating that the
Defendants cite to the deposition o f plaintiff in their concise statement, but did not attach any deposition pages in support to their motion. However, p l a i n t i f f disputes only paragraphs 8 and 9 o f defendants' c o n c i s e statement.
1
3
- ORDER
deputies needed to leave Plaintiffs property before he did something they would both regret. (Declaration o f Forman.) P l a i n t i f f t h e n w a l k e d t o w a r d t h e garage. ( D e p o s i t i o n o f P l a i n t i f f ; D e c l a r a t i o n o f Forman.) Deputy Fo r ma n grabbed p l a i n t i f f s arm. (Declarations o f F orm an and Anderson.) D e p u t y F o r m a n a n d D e p u t y A n d e r s o n recall P l a i n t i f f r e s i s t i n g p h y s i c a l l y w h e n D e p u t y Forman grabbed P l a i n t i f f s arm. (Declarations o f Forman and Anderson.) A physical altercation ensued. (Deposition o f Plaintiff, pp. 35-36; Declarations o f Forman and Anderson.) D e p u t y F o r m a n h a n d c u f f e d Plaintiff. ( D e c l a r a t i o n o f F o r m a n . ) Deputy Anderson cited P l a i n t i f f for interfering with a peace officer. (Declaration o f Anderson.) P l a i n t i f f w e n t to t r i a l f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h a p e a c e o f f i c e r o n F e b r u a r y 2 4 - 2 5 , 2 0 0 9 . T h a t trial e n d e d i n a h u n g j u r y . ( A f f i d a v i t o f M i t t o n . ) P l a i n t i f f went to trial again for interfering with a peace officer o n April 21-22, 2009. P l a i n t i f f w a s acquitted. ( A f f i d a v i t o f Mitton.)
DISCUSSION Claim f o r M a l i c i o u s P r o s e c u t i o n a n d C l a i m f o r F a l s e A r r e s t / F a l s e I m p r i s o n m e n t
In the pretrial order lodged with the court, p l a i n t i f f alleges that defendants initiated and caused him to be charged with interference with a police officer w h e n the officers did not have probable cause or lawful justification for initiating and causing the charges to be filed, c o n s t i t u t i n g c o m m o n l a w m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n . ( # 2 0 L o d g e d P r e t r i a l O r d e r a t 6-7.) Malicious prosecution is:
4
-
ORDER
"( 1) the institution o r c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the original criminal proceedings; (2) by or a t t h e i n s i s t e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ; (3) t e r m i n a t i o n o f s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e p l a i n t i f f s f a v o r ; 4 ) m a l i c e i n i n s t i t u t i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s ; (5) l a c k o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e p r o c e e d i n g ; a n d (6) i n j u r y o r d a m a g e b e c a u s e o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . " Blandino v. Fischel, 179 Or. App. 185, 190-91 (2002) ( q u o t i n g R o s e v. Whitbeck, 277 Or. 791, 7 9 5 , m o d i f i e d , 2 7 8 Or. 4 6 3 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . D e f e n d a n t s m o v e f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t no genuine issue o f material fact exists as to the e l e m e n t o f "lack o f p r o b a b l e cause for the proceeding. " W h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t h a d probable cause is a m a t t e r for the c o u r t to decide rather than the JUry. Gustafson v. Payless D r u g Stores N w . , Inc., 2 6 9 Or. 354, 357 (1974). In the context o f a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m , the e l e m e n t o f "probable cause" m e a n s the subjective and objectively r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t defendant c o m m i t t e d a crime. Blandino, 179 Or. App. at 192. Here, p l a i n t i f f w a s c i t e d f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h a p e a c e o f f i c e r , a n d w e n t t o t r i a l o n t h a t charge. Defendants c o n t e n d t h a t they subjectively and objectively b e l i e v e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f committed the crime o f interference w i t h a peace office because p l a i n t i f f "Refuse [d] to o b e y a lawful order [to stop] b y a p e a c e o f f i c e r . . . . " O R S 1 6 2 . 2 4 7 ( 1 ) ( b ) . D e f e n d a n t s o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t , w h e n p l a i n t i f f w a l k e d to the garage, defendant F o r m a n told h i m to stop a n d t h e n grabbed his arm. (Forman Dec!. at 2; A n d e r s o n Dec!. at 2.) However, p l a i n t i f f p o i n t s to evidence that no such o r d e r w a s given. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d a t t h e first trial t h a t h e s t a y e d o u t s i d e w i t h d e f e n d a n t Forman: Q: A: Q: A: W h a t were you doing? W e were j u s t s t a n d i n g outside o n t h e sidewalk. A n d y o u s a i d t h a t y o u o p e n e d up y o u r g a r a g e d o o r ? Yes, b e c a u s e as soon as they left I w a n t e d to go i n a n d start to w o r k in the garage.
5 - ORDER
Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:
A n d w h e n y o u e n t e r e d t h e p i c k u p to d o t h a t , w a s D e p u t y F o r m a n p r e s e n t ? Yes. D i d h e t r y to s t o p y o u i n a n y w a y f r o m d o i n g t h a t ? No. D i d h e h a v e any c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h y o u a b o u t w h a t y o u s h o u l d o r shouldn't do? No. Did he have any conversation with you? No.
( N o v . 9, 2 0 0 9 M i t t o n A f f . A t t a c h . T r i a l T r . 2 0 4 , F e b . 2 5 , 2 0 0 9 . ) 2 D e s p i t e d e f e n d a n t s ' a r g u m e n t t h a t t h i s t e s t i m o n y d o e s n o t r a i s e a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t a s to w h e t h e r t h e d e p u t i e s subjectively b e l i e v e d t h a t a s t o p o r d e r w a s issued, t h e c o u r t finds t h a t t h e reasonable inference f r o m p l a i n t i f f s t e s t i m o n y a t trial w a s t h a t n o s t o p o r d e r w a s g i v e n b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t F o r m a n g r a b b e d h i s a r m . T h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a s t o p o r d e r w a s g i v e n a f f e c t s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r it w a s s u b j e c t i v e l y o r o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e to b e l i e v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e o f i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h a p e a c e o f f i c e b y r e f u s i n g t o o b e y a l a w f u l order. S e e B l a n d i n o , 179 Or. App. a t 191. A c c o r d i n g l y , a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s w h i c h m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d b y a j u r y b e f o r e t h e c o u r t m a y d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t s h a d p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o cite a n d / o r initiate p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f . S e e G u s t a f s o n , 2 6 9 Or. a t 3 5 7 - 5 8 . A l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t h a s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l facts e x i s t s as to w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t s F o r m a n a n d A n d e r s o n h a d p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o cite p l a i n t i f f a n d / o r initiate the criminal p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t h i m , it will address defendants' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e h u n g j u r y in p l a i n t i f f s f i r s t t r i a l e s t a b l i s h e s p r o b a b l e c a u s e for p l a i n t i f f s p r o s e c u t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h a p e a c e officer. I n m a k i n g t h i s a r g u m e n t , d e f e n d a n t s r e l y o n S e c o n d C i r c u i t c a s e s applying N e w
P l a i n t i f f refers t o t h i s e v i d e n c e i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n , b u t he did n o t a t t a c h a n y e v i d e n c e . T h e r e f e r e n c e d e v i d e n c e is a t t a c h e d t o d e f e n d a n t s ' r e p l y b r i e f .
2
6 - ORDER
York law. The Second Circuit in Singleton v. City o f N e w York, 632 F.2d 185, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1980), determined that the jury's inability to reach a verdict "confirm [ed] that there surely was probable cause for his prosecution and indicating at least a real possibility that upon retrial he might be convicted." See Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 2 0 7 , 1 8 0 F.3d 4 0 9 , 4 1 7 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1999). As defendants assert, there does not appear to be any Oregon or Ninth Circuit cases addressing probable cause in the case o f a trial resulting in a hung jury. However, the court is not persuaded by the reasoning o f Singleton that a hung j u r y establishes the element o f probable cause for prosecution. Singleton is distinguishable on its facts since, in this case, on retrial, plaintiff was acquitted o f the charge o f interfering with a peace officer. The court declines to apply Singleton to the facts o f this case. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to p l a i n t i f f s malicious prosecution claim is denied. Plaintiff also alleges that the act o f defendant Forman in physically restraining and handcuffing him constituted false arrest and false imprisonment. As to this claim, defendants challenge the element that the alleged confinement was unlawful. They contend that, i f they are entitled to summary j u d g m e n t on the malicious prosecution claim, they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. For the same reasons as stated, supra, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the claim o f false arrest! false imprisonment is denied. C l a i m for T r e s p a s s In p l a i n t i f f s complaint, he alleges that defendant Anderson's and Forman's actions in remaining on his property and entering his residence, despite being advised by him that they
7
- ORDER
were not needed constituted an unlawful trespass. Defendants move for summary judgment as to this claim. P l a i n t i f f s trespass claim was not included in the pretrial order lodged with the court. By omitting from the pretrial order the trespass allegations o f his complaint, plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed this claim. See DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 8 2 9 , 8 4 1 - 4 2 & n.8 (9 th Cir. 2001) (in determining the scope o f the claims presented, "'[a] pretrial order generally supersedes the pleadings, and the parties are bound by its contents.'" (Quoting Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9 th Cir. 1993)). However, even considering plaintiffs trespass claim, the court finds this claim is appropriate for summary judgment. "Trespass to real property is an intentional entry upon the land o f another by one not privileged to enter." Collier v. City o f Portland, 57 Or. App. 341 344 (1982). Here, the undisputed facts are that plaintiff agreed to defendant Anderson's request to check the house. Consent is a defense to an action for trespass. Hager v. Tire Recyclers, Inc., 136 Or. App. 439, 443, modified, 138 Or. App. 120 (1995). P l a i n t i f f asserts in his opposition to defendants' motion that he verbally consented to entry into his house but he did so only under duress after first asking defendants to leave. However, p l a i n t i f f offers no evidence in support. Accordingly, even considering p l a i n t i f f s trespass claim as a viable claim, defendants' motion for summary j u d g m e n t is granted as to this claim. ORDER Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that defendants' motion for summary judgment (#26) be granted in part and denied in part: defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
8 - ORDER
plaintiffs trespass claim is granted; and their motions as to p l a i n t i f f s malicious prosecution claim and false arrest and false imprisonment claim are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 - ORDER
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
