Carrel v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
21
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 4 Complaint filed by Richard W. Carrel. It is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED. Objections to R&R due by 11/15/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 10/29/2013. (pes1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RICHARD W. CARREL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil Action 2:12-cv-1028
Judge Smith
Magistrate Judge King
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.
Background
This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income.
This matter is now before
the Court on Plaintiff Richard W. Carrel’s Statement of Specific
Errors (“Statement of Errors”), Doc. No. 14, Defendant’s Memorandum in
Opposition, Doc. No. 19, and Plaintiff Richard W. Carrel’s Reply to
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 20.
Plaintiff Richard W. Carrel filed his applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income on March 6, 2009,
alleging that he has been disabled since December 31, 2006.
171, 178.
PAGEID
The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration,
and plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law
judge.
An administrative hearing was held on May 13, 2011, at which
plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did
George Coleman III, who testified as a vocational expert.
76.
PAGEID 75-
In a decision dated July 14, 2011, the administrative law judge
concluded that plaintiff was not disabled from December 31, 2006,
through the date of the administrative decision.
PAGEID 67.
That
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security when the Appeals Council declined review on September 21,
2012.
PAGEID 45.
Plaintiff was 51 years of age on the date of the administrative
law judge’s decision.
See PAGEID 67, 171.
Plaintiff has a limited
education, is able to communicate in English, and has past relevant
work as a dump truck driver and golf course lawn keeper.
PAGEID 65.
Plaintiff was last insured for disability insurance purposes on
December 31, 2012.
PAGEID 57.
He has engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the following periods: May 2008 through October 2008;
May 2009 through October 2009; and May 2010 through October 2010.
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
October 2010.
II.
Id.
Medical Evidence
Plaintiff has treated with Andy C. Lee, M.D., since some time
prior to 2006.
See PAGEID 327.
On October 6, 2006, Dr. Lee opined
that plaintiff has “significant degenerative osteoarthritis and
degenerative disk disease in both the cervical and lumbar spine.”
PAGEID 327.
Dr. Lee further opined that plaintiff “would be best
served by no longer continuing” in his profession as a truck driver
2
Id.
for a stone quarry because “the constant jarring and pounding on the
spine is not in his best interest both medically and physically.”
Id.
Plaintiff treated with Dr. Lee for, inter alia, elbow pain,
PAGEID 329, 347-48 (Dec. 2006), 351 (Oct. 2007), hernias, PAGEID 349
(Mar. 2007), back pain, PAGEID 342 (Oct. 2006), hemorrhoids, PAGEID
342 (Oct. 2006), rashes and sores, PAGEID 350 (May 2007), chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), PAGEID 452 (Aug. 2010), 451
(Nov. 2010), joint pain in his hips, neck, and shoulders, PAGEID 353
(Nov. 2008), diabetes, PAGEID 351 (Oct. 2007), 354 (Dec. 2008), 355
(Jan. 2009), 414 (Aug. 2009), 453 (Apr. 2011), depression, PAGEID 414
(Aug. 2009), 417 (Oct. 2009), seizures, PAGEID 356 (Jan. 2009), 357
(Mar. 2009), and sleep apnea, PAGEID 353 (Nov. 2008).
On February 4,
2011, Dr. Lee treated plaintiff for low back pain, hypertension, and
muscle spasms.
PAGEID 450.
At that time, plaintiff reported doing
“fairly well” overall, although he complained of muscle spasms in his
legs and hands.
Id.
On examination, Dr. Lee noted that plaintiff’s
left arm was neurovascularly intact with good grip strength; there was
a “weakly positive Phalen and Tinel sign.”
Id.
Dr. Lee diagnosed
carpel tunnel syndrome in both hands, greater on the left than on the
right, and hypertension.
Id.
In February 2011, Dr. Lee diagnosed diabetes, neuropathy,
osteoarthrosis, COPD, diabetic retinopathy, and depression. PAGEID
457.
He identified plaintiff’s symptoms as “loss of feeling in lower
legs and feet, shortness of breath, cough, fluctuating blood sugars,
hand tremors, mood swings,” “low back pain, muscle spasms in both
legs, [and] muscle spasms in hands.” Id. Dr. Lee opined that plaintiff
3
frequently has pain severe enough to interfere with attention and
concentration, has marked limitations in his ability to deal with work
stress, and that his medication makes him drowsy.
PAGEID 458.
Plaintiff could sit for one hour before needing to stand or walk, and
could sit for a total of two hours in an eight hour workday,
minutes, more than three times in an eight hour workday.
for 15
PAGEID 458-
59. Plaintiff could stand or walk for one hour before needing to
“l[ie] down or recline[e] in a supine position.”
Id.
He could stand
or walk for a total of two hours in an eight hour workday.
Id.
Plaintiff could lift six to 10 pounds frequently, 11 to 20 pounds
occasionally, but could never lift 21 to 50 pounds.
PAGEID 460.
Plaintiff could occasionally balance when standing/walking on level
terrain, could never stoop, could never rotate his neck right or left,
had no forward or backward flexion, could occasionally reach in any
direction, and could occasionally handle by seizing, grasping, turning
or otherwise working primarily with his whole hand.
Id.
Dr. Lee
further opined that plaintiff’s conditions and restrictions have
persisted since at least 2006, and that plaintiff’s impairments or
treatments would require him to be absent from work about twice a
month.
PAGEID 461.
In June 2009, Herbert A. Grodner, M.D., examined plaintiff,
PAGEID 365, and noted normal toe and heel walking, decreased sensation
over the ulnar aspect of the left forearm and hand, 5/5 muscle
strength in all muscle groups, normal grasp and manipulation, normal
range of motion in all joints and normal gait. Plaintiff could
partially squat.
PAGEID 366.
Dr. Grodner also noted that plaintiff
4
was morbidly obese and had a history of neck and back pain but no
surgery, and that his diabetes is “under relatively good control,
without complication.”
Id.
Dr. Grodner opined that plaintiff
might
have
some
difficulty
with
sustained
climbing,
kneeling, bending, walking, and standing over a long period
of time.
He may also have difficulty bending and lifting
more than 25 or 30 pounds repetitively. He also would have
some difficulty using his hands in a repetitive fashion.
However, I do feel that he could perform sedentary
activity.
His morbid obesity may prevent him from
performing certain types of activity.
PAGEID 367.
Dr. Grodner supplemented his report to reflect a March 2010
pulmonary function study, which showed mild obstructive airway
disease,
PAGEID 447,
and normal x-rays of the knee.
PAGEID 440.
X-
rays of the lumbar spine revealed normal anatomical alignment with
some narrowing of the intervertebral spaces in the upper lumbar
vertebrae with anterior osteophyte formation.
Id.
There was no
evidence of compression fracture, spondylosis, or spondylolisthesis.
Id.
In late 2009, after plaintiff had reported syncopal episodes, Dr.
Lee referred plaintiff to Robert J. Mazo, D.O., for evaluation.
PAGEID 356-57, 391.
An EEG was normal and an MRI of the brain
revealed no “overt pathology;” plaintiff’s neurological status was
stable.
Id.
PAGEID 389-90.
A 24-hour ambulatory EEG was also “essentially normal.”
Dr. Mazo diagnosed r/o seizure disorder.
PAGEID 392.
Michael Stock, M.D., a state agency physician, reviewed the
record and, on July 18, 2009, completed a physical residual functional
capacity assessment.
PAGEID 373-80.
According to Dr. Stock,
plaintiff could perform light work, could occasionally lift and/or
5
carry 20 pounds, could frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, could
stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight hour
workday, and could sit for a total or about six hours in an eight hour
workday.
PAGEID 374, 379.
Plaintiff could occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.
PAGEID 375.
Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, etc.
PAGEID 377.
Myung Cho, M.D., reviewed the record and, on February 25, 2010,
affirmed Dr. Stock’s assessment.
PAGEID 419.
Mark D. Hammerly, Ph.D., performed a consultative psychological
evaluation on January 4, 2010.
PAGEID 402-09.
Plaintiff reported “no
problems getting along with people on the job, no problems with work
speed, quality, or understanding unrelated to his medical issue(s).”
PAGEID 404.
Plaintiff’s mood was dysphoric and his affect was
constricted and sometimes tearful.
PAGEID 405.
There were no signs
of anxiety and plaintiff’s mental control, concentration, and memory
were “grossly intact.”
Id.
Dr. Hammerly diagnosed an adjustment
disorder with depressed mood and assigned a global assessment of
functioning score (“GAF”) of 60.1
PAGEID 407-08.
Dr. Hammerly
characterized plaintiff’s ability to relate to others, including to
fellow workers and supervisors, as mildly impaired; plaintiff would
1
The GAF scale is a method of considering psychological, social,
and occupational function on a hypothetical continuum of mental
health. The GAF scale ranges from 0 to 100, with serious
impairment in functioning at a score of 50 or below. Scores
between 51 and 60 represent moderate symptoms or a moderate
difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning . . . .
Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-5424, 2012 WL 372986 (6th Cir. Feb. 7,
2012).
6
“be able to relate sufficiently to coworkers and supervisors for
simple, repetitive tasks, which did not require complicated or
detailed verbal instructions and procedures.”
PAGEID 408.
Plaintiff’s mental ability to withstand the stress and pressures
associated with day-to-day work activity was moderately impaired.
PAGEID 409.
Plaintiff had no impairment in his ability to understand,
remember, and follow instructions or in his ability to maintain
attention, concentration, persistence, and pace sufficient to perform
simple, repetitive tasks.
PAGEID 408-09.
Cynthia Waggoner, Psy.D., completed a mental residual functional
capacity assessment and psychiatric review technique form on February
26, 2010.
PAGEID 420-37.
According to Dr. Waggoner, plaintiff was
moderately limited in his ability to (1) understand and remember
detailed instructions, (2) carry out detailed instructions, (3)
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, (4)
complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, (5) accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors,
and (6) respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.
420-21.
PAGEID
Plaintiff was not significantly limited in 14 areas of
functioning but would have moderate difficulty in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace, and mild restrictions in
activities of daily living and in maintaining social functioning.
PAGEID 434.
7
III. May 13, 2011 Administrative Hearing
Plaintiff testified at the May 13, 2011 administrative hearing
that he had worked up to 32 hours per week at a golf course from May
through October every year since 2007.
PAGEID 82.
In that job,
plaintiff cut grass, using a riding mower, from approximately 6:00
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. with two 30-minute breaks and four to five sevenminute breaks. PAGEID 82-85.
Plaintiff testified that he cannot work fulltime because of back
pain, arthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, and depression.
PAGEID 85.
His back pain occurs daily, is constant and lasts all day.
PAGEID 85-86.
He uses a heating pad, but nothing completely
alleviates the pain.
PAGEID 86.
Plaintiff also reported COPD, emphysema, and difficulty
concentrating.
PAGEID 88-89.
His blood pressure and diabetes were
under control and his depression was “sort of control[led]” by
medication.
PAGEID 87-88.
He has never seen a psychologist or
psychiatrist; he treats primarily with Dr. Lee.
PAGEID 87-89.
Plaintiff sleeps eight to 10 hours per night, using a CPAP
machine.
PAGEID 91.
He is able to cook meals, wash dishes, drive to
work, and go grocery shopping, but his wife helps him put on his socks
and shoes.
PAGEID 91-93.
Plaintiff descends stairs sideways “because
of the movement in [his] back.”
PAGEID 93.
He can lift 20 pounds,
walk five to 10 minutes before experiencing shortness of breath, stand
for 10 minutes, sit for 15 minutes, and walk for one hour total, stand
for 45 minutes total, and sit for six hours total throughout an eight
hour day.
PAGEID 95-96.
8
The vocational expert was asked to assume a claimant with
plaintiff’s vocational profile and the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) eventually found by the administrative law judge.
In
response, the vocational expert testified that such a claimant could
not perform plaintiff’s past relevant work but could perform such jobs
as storage facility rental clerk (990 jobs locally; 147,450 jobs
nationally); warehouse checker (24 jobs locally; 5,329 jobs
nationally); and factory laborer (278 jobs locally; 33,950 jobs
nationally).
IV.
PAGEID 101-03.
Administrative Decision
The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s severe
impairments consist of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and
lumbar spine, diabetes, and obesity.
PAGEID 58.
The administrative
law judge also found that plaintiff’s impairments neither meet nor
equal a listed impairment and leave plaintiff with the RFC for
lifting up to 20 pounds occasionally; lifting/carrying up
to 10 pounds frequently; standing/walking for about 6 hours
and sitting for about 6 hours in an 8 hour work day with
normal breaks; unlimited pushing or pulling; occasional
climbing of ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling;
avoiding concentrated exposure to irritants such as fumes,
odors, dust, gases, and poorly ventilated areas; simple and
somewhat more detailed one and two step instructions; and a
sit/stand option.
PAGEID 60-61.
Although this RFC precluded plaintiff’s past relevant
work, the administrative law judge relied on the testimony of the
vocational expert to find that plaintiff is able to perform a
significant number of jobs in the national economy, including such
jobs as storage facility rental clerk, warehouse checker, and factory
9
laborer.
PAGEID 65-66.
Accordingly, the administrative law judge
concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act from December 31, 2006, through the date of the
administrative decision.
V.
PAGEID 67.
Discussion
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings
of the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence
and employed the proper legal standards.
Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389 (1971); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595
(6th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
See Buxton v. Haler, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); Kirk v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981).
This
Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve conflicts in
the evidence or questions of credibility.
See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this
Court must examine the administrative record as a whole.
F.2d at 536.
Kirk, 667
If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would
decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d
1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also
supports the opposite conclusion.
Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595.
10
In his Statement of Errors, plaintiff contends that the
administrative law judge improperly evaluated the medical evidence of
record.
Plaintiff specifically argues that the administrative law
judge erred by failing to follow the treating physician rule when
evaluating the February 2011 opinion of Dr. Lee.
pp. 8-10.
Statement of Errors,
The opinion of a treating provider must be given
controlling weight if that opinion is “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case
record.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
Even if the
opinion of a treating provider is not entitled to controlling weight,
an administrative law judge is nevertheless required to determine how
much weight the opinion is entitled to by considering such factors as
the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the
frequency of examination, the medical specialty of the treating
physician, the extent to which the opinion is supported by the
evidence, and the consistency of the opinion with the record as a
whole.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6); Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, an
administrative law judge must provide “good reasons” for discounting
the opinion of a treating provider, i.e., reasons that are
“‘sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion
and the reasons for that weight.’”
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at
11
*5 (July 2, 1996)).
This special treatment afforded to the opinions
of treating providers recognizes that
“these sources are likely to be the medical professionals
most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of
[the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a
unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations or brief hospitalizations.”
Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
Dr. Lee has treated plaintiff regularly since at least 2006 for
a variety of ailments.
Dr. Lee commented in February 2011 that
plaintiff’s frequent pain interferes with his attention and
concentration; plaintiff is markedly limited in his ability to deal
with work stress.
PAGEID 458.
According to Dr. Lee, plaintiff can
sit for one hour before needing to change position, can sit for only a
total of two hours in an eight hour workday, can stand or walk for
only one hour before needing to “l[ie] down or recline[e] in a supine
position.”
PAGEID 458-59.
He can stand or walk for a total of two
hours in an eight hour workday,
can lift six to 10 pounds frequently,
11 to 20 pounds occasionally, and never lift 21 to 50 pounds.
460.
PAGEID
Plaintiff can occasionally balance on level terrain, can never
stoop or rotate his neck or engage in forward or backward flexion; he
can occasionally reach and can occasionally handle by seizing,
grasping, turning or otherwise working primarily with his whole hand.
Id.
Dr. Lee further opined that plaintiff’s conditions and
restrictions have persisted since at least 2006, and that plaintiff’s
impairments or treatments would require him to be absent from work
about twice per month.
PAGEID 461.
12
The administrative law judge gave “little weight” to Dr. Lee’s
opinions because they are “not supported by the evidence in the
record.”
PAGEID 64.
The administrative law judge provided specific
reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion:
First, the claimant has been engaged in work activity since
2007 that greatly exceeds Dr. Lee’s limitations.
As
mentioned previously, the claimant is working as a golf
course grounds keeper and his job duties include riding a
rough mower outdoors in sometimes very hot weather from 6am
to 2pm on a daily basis.
In addition, the claimant has
worked in such a capacity since 2007 with no evidence of
problems dealing with work stress or his co-workers and
supervisors.
Second, Dr. Lee’s opinion contrasts sharply
with the objective medical evidence in the record, which
includes laboratory tests and medical signs from Dr.
Grodner’s examination. Third, Dr. Lee’s opinion appears to
rest at least in part on an assessment of impairments
outside his area of expertise.
Dr. Lee is a family
practitioner
and
not
a
specialist
in
the
area
of
psychiatry, psychology, neurology, or orthopedic medicine.
Lastly, Dr. Lee apparently relied quite heavily on the
subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by
the claimant, and seems to uncritically accept as true
most, if not all, of what the claimant reported.
Yet, as
explained elsewhere in this decision, there exist good
reasons for questioning the reliability of the claimant’s
subjective complaints.
PAGEID 64-65.
The administrative law judge’s analysis of Dr. Lee’s opinion
does not violate the treating physician rule.
The analysis is
sufficiently specific as to the weight given to Dr. Lee’s medical
opinion and the reasons for assigning that weight.
The administrative
law judge expressly addressed the length, nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, Dr. Lee’s medical specialty, the extent to
which Dr. Lee’s opinion is (or, more precisely, is not) supported by
the evidence, and the consistency of the opinion with the record as a
whole.
Under the circumstances, a formulaic recitation of factors is
13
not required.
See Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543,
551 (6th Cir. 2010) (“If the ALJ’s opinion permits the claimant and a
reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for the weight
given a treating physician’s opinion, strict compliance with the rule
may sometimes be excused.”).
Further, the administrative law judge’s reasons for assigning
little weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion are supported by substantial
evidence.
Significantly, Dr. Lee’s February 2011 opinion is
inconsistent with both the objective medical evidence and plaintiff’s
own testimony at the May 2011 administrative hearing.
Dr. Lee opined
that plaintiff could sit for only a total of two hours in an eight
hour workday, PAGEID 458-59, but plaintiff himself testified that he
could sit on a riding lawn mower for up to six hours and that he had
been doing so as a part-time employee at a golf course from May
through October every year since 2007.
PAGEID 82-85.
There is no
evidence, moreover, that plaintiff needed to lie down or recline in a
supine position, as Dr. Lee had opined.
See PAGEID 459.
There is
likewise no evidence that plaintiff had problems dealing with work
stress or with his co-workers.
Indeed, plaintiff reported in January
2010 that he had no community problems and “no problems getting along
with people on the job, no problems with work speed, quality, or
understating unrelated to his medical issue(s).”
PAGEID 403-04.
In a related argument, plaintiff contends that the
administrative law judge “substitute[ed] her own medical judgment as a
reason to reject” Dr. Lee’s opinion.
Statement of Errors, p. 16.
The
administrative law judge gave little weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion, but
14
she also expressly adopted the opinions of Dr. Stock and Dr. Waggoner
and gave “some weight” to Dr. Hammerly’s opinion.
PAGEID 63-64.
This
is simply not a case in which the administrative law judge interpreted
raw medical records without the assistance of medical opinions
regarding a claimant's abilities.
See Deskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
605 F.Supp.2d 908 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
Further, the RFC determination is
an administrative finding of fact reserved to the Commissioner, see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (3), 416.927(d)(2), (3); Edwards v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 97 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2004), and the
administrative law judge, in formulating a claimant’s RFC, is not
required to parrot medical opinions verbatim.
Rather, an
administrative law judge may adopt portions of a medical opinion and
reject others in making the RFC determination.
See Neace v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-cv-00202-KKC, 2012 WL 4433284, at *8 (E.D. Ky.
Sept. 25, 2012); Deaton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-00461,
2011 WL 4064028, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2011); Carroll v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 1:09cv2910, 2011 WL 3648128, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
18, 2011).
It is well-settled that the Commissioner's decision, if
supported by substantial evidence, must be affirmed even if the
plaintiff’s position is also supported by substantial evidence.
See
Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007).
Because the administrative law judge correctly applied the standards
of the treating physician rule to her evaluation of Dr. Lee’s opinion,
and because substantial evidence supports her findings, the Court
finds no error with the Commissioner's decision in this regard.
15
The administrative law judge adopted the opinions of Drs. Stock
and Waggoner because they are “well supported by the evidence in the
record.”
PAGEID 63.
Plaintiff contends that the administrative law
judge erred in making this finding because those opinions were based
on an incomplete review of the record.
18.
Statement of Errors, pp. 17-
Plaintiff specifically argues that Drs. Stock and Waggoner did
not have the benefit of Dr. Lee’s February 2011 opinion or
prescription of Fluoxetine for depression.
Id.
Plaintiff’s arguments
are not well taken.
“There is no regulation or case law that requires the
[administrative law judge] to reject an opinion simply because medical
evidence is produced after the opinion is formed.”
Williamson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11-cv-828, 2013 WL 121813, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 9, 2013).
“Indeed, the regulations provide only that an
[administrative law judge] should give more weight to an opinion that
is consistent with the record as a whole.”
404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4)).
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
In the case presently before the
Court, the administrative law judge had the opportunity to review the
entire record, including Dr. Lee’s treatment notes and February 2011
opinion. She accorded greater weight to the opinions of Drs. Stock and
Waggoner because they were “well supported by the evidence in the
record.”
PAGEID 63.
The Court agrees that the opinions of Drs. Stock
and Waggoner are supported by the medical evidence and, as discussed
supra, the administrative law judge did not err in assigning little
weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion because it was inconsistent with the
16
objective medical evidence and with plaintiff’s own testimony and
activities.
In short, the Court concludes that the decision of the
Commissioner applied all appropriate standards and is supported by
substantial evidence.
That decision must, therefore, be affirmed.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the decision of the
Commissioner be AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
28
Response to objections
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
October 29, 2013
s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
17
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