Tesfa v. American Red Cross
Filing
66
ORDER denying 40 Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and denying as moot 51 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave Instanter to file a Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 10/21/13. (sem1)
<![CDATA[
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SEFANIT TESFA,
Case No. 2:12-cv-0397
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN RED CROSS,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s
Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff
did not file a timely response to Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. As a result, also before
the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave instanter to file a brief in opposition to the motion for
reconsideration. (ECF No. 51.) The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 40) and
DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address motions for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders, the authority for a district court to hear such motions is
found in both the common law and in Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health
& Welfare Fund, 89 Fed. Appx. 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Traditionally, courts will find
justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change of
controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or, (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice. Id. at 959(citing Reich v. Hall Holding Co., 990 F. Supp. 955, 965 (N.D. Ohio
1998)). In this case, Defendant does not seek reconsideration on either of the first two grounds.
1
Defendant relies only on the third prong, contending that this Court made a clear error of law in
the disposition of its motion for summary judgment.
In support of its view that the Court got it wrong in denying Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, Defendant focus on this passage of the Court’s summary judgment ruling:
[I]t very well could be that Boxill was the more desirable and appropriate
candidate for promotion to Laboratory Supervisor for entirely legitimate business
reasons. But on the record before it, the Court finds that a reasonable jury might
find otherwise.
(ECF No. 38 at PageID# 710.) Relying on Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 627
(6th Cir. 2006), Defendant argues that the Court’s reasoning cannot support a triable issue
concerning whether Defendant’s reasons not to promote Plaintiff were a pretext for
discrimination. Specifically, Defendant relies on the passage of Bender explaining that” in the
case in which there is little or no other probative evidence of discrimination, to survive summary
judgment the rejected applicant’s qualifications must be so significantly better than the
successful applicant’s qualifications that no reasonable employer would have chosen the latter
applicant over the former.” Id. at 627. Thus, Defendant reasons that the Court’s analysis
dictates that “summary judgment should have been entered in favor of the Red Cross because if
it ‘could be’ that Boxill was the more desirable candidate, then Plaintiff has not met her burden
to demonstrate that ‘no reasonable employer’ would have chosen him.” (ECF No. 40 at PageID#
717-18.)
The Court is not persuaded. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bender, which this Court
cited in its decision, also provides:
Whether qualifications evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of fact as to
pretext will depend on whether a plaintiff presents other evidence of
discrimination. In the case in which a plaintiff does provide other probative
evidence of discrimination, that evidence, taken together with evidence that the
2
plaintiff was as qualified as or better qualified than the successful applicant, might
well result in the plaintiff's claim surviving summary judgment.
Bender, 455 F.3d at 626-27. Though Defendant understandably believes otherwise, this is the
portion of the Bender analysis that applies here and counsels against summary judgment in
Defendant’s favor. The Court’s pretext analysis revealed a number of circumstances apart from
the relative qualifications of Plaintiff and Boxill from which a reasonable trier of fact could find
that Defendant’s proffered reasons for pretextual. (ECF No. 38 at PageID# 705-710.) Thus,
there was “other probative evidence of discrimination”; this is not a case where simply the
relative qualifications of the successful and unsuccessful applicant were the only evidence of
pretext relied upon by the plaintiff.
Defendant has failed to show this Court committed a clear error of law. Reconsideration
is therefore unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 40). Having found no basis for reconsideration demonstrated in
Defendant’s motion in the first place, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file a response instanter to Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 51).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
