Bohannon v. Warden, Allen/Oakwood Correctional Institution
Filing
26
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - It is respectfully recommended that the Petition herein be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, Petitioner should be denied a certificate of appealability and the Court should certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous. Objections to R&R due by 11/1/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael R Merz on 10/4/2013. (kpf1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI
JAMES BOHANNON,
Petitioner,
:
- vs -
Case No. 1:12-cv-542
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN, Allen/Oakwood
Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This habeas corpus case is before the Court for decision on the merits. After review of
the Petition, Magistrate Judge Litkovitz ordered a return of writ (Order, Doc. No. 2). The Return
was filed December 6, 2012 (Doc. No. 12). Petitioner then took three extensions of time to
August 19, 2013, to file a reply (Doc. Nos. 13, 15, 17)1 and the Court eventually received the
Reply (Doc. No. 20) on September 30, 2013. In the meantime, the reference has been transferred
to the undersigned (Doc. No. 19).
Bohannon pleads the following Grounds for Relief:
Ground One: the trial court erred to substantial prejudice of the
defendant when it forced the Defense to use a peremptory
challenge to remove a vireman [sic] who would not commit to
fairness and impartiality, thereby violating the accused[‘s]
constitutional right to a fair trial by jury.
1
Although Petitioner certifies he mailed the Reply on August 19, 2013, the date it was due (See
Certificate of Service, PageID 1785), the Court doubts the accuracy of the Certificate; it rarely
takes six weeks for the United States mail to reach Dayton from Lima, Ohio.
1
Supporting Facts: While the prospective juror in the case at bar
did not unequivocally state he could not be fair and impartial, his
continuing reluctance to commit when pressed by the trial judge is
not different than a flat statement that one can be fair and
impartial. One is either wholeheartedly sure or one is not. What
happened here is a surrender to the concept because of the judge’s
persistence rather than a sincere commitment. The venireman in
question should have been excused for cause.
Ground Two: The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of
defendant by failing to make written jury instructions a part of the
record.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner would submit that since there are
[sic] no written record of what the jury had before it when it was
deliberating, there was no proof of safeguard in place to ensure it
had all the guidance it needed to make a decision. When examining
the problem, with a record of written instructions we would indeed
know whether the complete and correct elements of each crime
were in front of the jury for them to deliberate upon.
Ground Three: The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of
defendant when it failed to properly instruct the jury on the
elements of Aggravated Robbery.
Supporting Facts: Is a jury instruction on Aggravated Robbery
fatally flawed when it fails to state that the accused must use or
refer to the deadly weapon in question [?] When the trial judge
gave his instructions to the jury, he simply said that the petitioner
only had to have a firearm. Yet in the Ohio Aggravated Robbery
statute, the perpetrator must not only in effect possess the firearm,
but must also do one of the actions that follow the conjunctive
word “and.” A defendant has the right to expect that the trial court
will give complete instructions to the jury.
Ground Four: The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of
defendant when it entered a conviction based upon insufficient
evidence.
Supporting Facts: Is there sufficient evidence to convict when
alleged victim could not identify the accused [?] Several of the
victims could not identify Petitioner or changed their testimony,
during proceedings in open court.
2
Ground Five: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
and present the testimony of an expert witness on the subject of
eyewitness identification.
Supporting Facts: In petitioner’s case, trial counsel should have
called an expert witness on the subject of Eyewitness Identification
because of the cross-racial identifications and several instances of
the victims either being intoxicated or picking someone else in the
photo lineup. The victims at trial changed their testimony doing incourt identifications and showed bias while on the witness stand.
Ground Six: The trial court abused it’s [sic] discretion in failing to
severe [sic] counts thus violating defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth
amendment rights.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner was indicted with 22 counts for
various crimes. Two counts on one indictment and 20 counts on a
later indictment. Petitioner filed a motion for severence [sic] of the
prejudicial joinder. The court denied this motion. If the counts
would have been sevred [sic] Petitioner would not have been
convicted. Because of the joinder evidence was allowed in that
would not have been if charged and tried separately which
prejudiced the petitioner with the jury, which clearly lost it’s [sic]
way from their questions to the judge on the record.
Ground Seven: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to repeated and egregious misconduct by prosecutor during closing
arguments, in violation of petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth
amendment rights.
Supporting Facts: The prosecutor’s perpetual errors in closing
were so numerous and blatent [sic] that there is no excuse for trial
counsel not to have objected to comments. The prosecutors
referred to things outside of evidence, pointed to comments that
were never made by victims in open court, and referred to race to
inflame the passions of the Eleven member White jury.
Ground Eight: The trial court erred when it entered a conviction
against the manifest weight of the evidence, or sufficient evidence.
Supporting Facts: The trial court erred when it entered a
conviction against the petitioner where there was little or no
evidence to support the conviction. The victims statement against
petitioner either was invalid or false, and didn’t support the
charged offense.
3
Ground Nine: The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of
the petitioner when it merged allied counts instead of vacating
them.
Supporting Facts: The courts erred when they merged counts
instead of vacating them as Ohio and United States law says.
Petitioner went back for resentencing, where the trial court merged
counts into the stronger (allied) (multiplicitous) Count. Petitioner
argued at the resentencing that the counts that are merged should
have been vacated.
Ground Ten: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution when trial counsel
did not call an alibi witness who could put the defendant at a
different location at the time of the crime.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner submitted an affidavit of Kathy
Dudley, witness and alibi that petitioner was at the bar The Dock
Complex on the date of January 9, 2005 when it was alleged he
committed the crime against B. S..2
(Petition, Doc. No. 1, PageID3 18-25.)
Procedural History
Bohannon was indicted by a Hamilton County grand jury on numerous counts of sexual
misconduct of various sorts, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. In March 2007 a jury found
him guilty on sixteen counts and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety-nine years to
life imprisonment. The convictions were affirmed by the First District Court of Appeals. State
v. Bohannon, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278. (Ohio App. 1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2009).4 The Ohio
2
The names of all victims have been replaced by initials per Order, Doc. No. 25, dated October 15, 2013.
Effective with the installation of version 4.1.1 of the software, the Court=s electronic filing system (CM/ECF)
automatically affixes a distinctive page number (shown in the upper right-hand corner as PageID) to each page of
each filed document.
4
Although this decision was rendered on March 11, 2009, it was not reported by Lexis until September 29, 2010,
the same date the Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal in the First Appellate District vacated the sentences and
remanded the case for resentencing. 2010-Ohio-4596, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3919.
3
4
Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over Bohannon’s appeal to it. State v. Bohannon, 122 Ohio
St. 3d 1521 (2009).
On August 1, 2008, Bohannon filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio
Revised Code § 2953.21. The trial court denied the petition and the First District affirmed. State
v. Bohannon, Case No. C-080955 (Ohio App. First Dist. Aug. 26, 2009)(unreported, copy at
Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, PageID 301-304.)
On June 1, 2009, Bohannon filed a pro se application to reopen his direct appeal to raise
a claim that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his appellate attorney
did not claim error in the failure to merge the kidnapping counts with the underlying counts. The
First District found that assignment of error well taken and remanded the case for resentencing.
State v. Bohannon, 2010 Ohio 4596, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3919 (1st Dist. Sept. 29, 2010). On
November 15, 2010, Bohannon filed a second application for reopening which the First District
denied. Bohannon appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court which declined to hear the case.
Bohannon was resentenced pursuant to the remand on December 14, 2010, and appealed,
raising the claim that the allied offense counts should have been vacated instead of merged. The
First District again affirmed. State v. Bohannon, Case Nos. C-110025, C-110026 (1st Dist. Nov.
23, 2011)(unreported, copy at Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-2, PageID 529-30.) The Ohio
Supreme Court again declined to exercise jurisdiction. State v. Bohannon, 131 Ohio St. 3d 1399
(2012).
Bohannon filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on a date not discernible from
the copy of the record (Doc. No. 12-2, PageID 563). The trial court dismissed that petition as
untimely and an improper successive petition. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.
State v. Bohannon, Case No. C-110458 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. Mar. 2,
5
2012)(unreported, copy at Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-2, PageID 615-16). The Ohio Supreme
Court again declined to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal. State v. Bohannon, 132 Ohio St. 3d
1424 (2012).
On February 21, 2012, Bohannon filed an application to reopen his direct appeal from the
resentencing. The First District denied reopening. State v. Bohannon, Case No. C-110025 (Ohio
App. 1st Dist. Jul 20, 2012)(unreported, copy at Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-2, PageID 701-03.)
The Ohio Supreme Court again declined to consider an appeal. State v. Bohannon, 133 Ohio St.
3d 1468 (2012). The instant habeas Petition, which the Warden concedes is timely, was filed
July 16, 2012.
Analysis
Ground One: Fair and Impartial Jury
In his First Ground for Relief, Bohannon alleges the State denied his right to a fair and
impartial jury because the trial judge would not excuse for cause a venireman who would not or
could not say definitively that he could be fair and impartial.
The Warden concedes that Bohannon preserved this claim for merits review in habeas by
raising it as his First Assignment of Error on direct appeal. The court of appeals decided that
claim on the merits as follows:
In his first assignment of error, Bohannon contends that the trial
court should have removed a potential juror for cause because that
juror could not definitively state that he could be "fair and
impartial."
6
A prospective juror who discloses that he cannot be fair and
impartial, or that he will not follow the law, may be challenged for
cause. [Ohio] Revised Code § 2313.42(J). The decision whether to
remove a potential juror for cause is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. McGlothin, 1st Dist. No.
C-060145, 2007 Ohio 4707, at P10, citing Berk v. Matthews
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 559 N.E.2d 1301, syllabus. Here,
the trial court engaged in a thorough discussion with the
prospective juror after he had expressed concern over hearing a
case about "abuse." There was nothing in that discussion that
indicated that the juror would not or could not be fair and impartial
in considering the case against Bohannon. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss this
prospective juror for cause. The first assignment of error is
overruled.
State v. Bohanon, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278 *1-2 (1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2009).
When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a
federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision
is contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131
S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,
693-94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000).
Bohannon has conceded Ground One (Response/Traverse, Doc. No. 20, PageID 1762). It
should therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
Ground Two: Failure to Include a Copy of the Written Jury Instructions in the Appellate
Record
In his Second Ground for Relief, Bohannon claims the trial court prejudiced his case by
7
not making written jury instructions a part of the record on appeal.
In his second assignment of error, Bohannon argues that the trial
court committed reversible error in failing to preserve written jury
instructions as part of the record for appellate review. See [Ohio]
Revised Code § 2945.10(G). Because Bohannon did not object to
this alleged error at trial, we review the trial court's failure to
maintain written jury instructions for plain error under Crim.R.
52(B). State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St. 3d 118, 2004 Ohio 297, 802
N.E. 2d 643 [2004].
Here, we cannot say that the absence of written instructions from
the record amounts to plain error. First, there is no indication in the
record that the jury instructions were even reduced to writing. It
appears from the record that the oral instructions given to the jury
were tape-recorded and that a cassette tape was given to the jury.
Second, Bohannon does not argue, nor does the record indicate,
that any written instructions deviated from the oral instructions
given to the jury. Because Bohannon has not shown how he has
been prejudiced by the failure to preserve written jury instructions,
we overrule his second assignment of error.
State v. Bohanon, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278 *2-3 (1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2009).
In his
Response/Traverse, Bohannon says he never knew that the oral instructions were recorded and
given to the jury on cassette tape until he read the court of appeals’ opinion, so he could not
argue about what was on the tape nor that “any instructions deviated from the oral instructions
given because they were never reduced to writing.” (Doc. No. 20, PageID 1763.) Bohannon
asks this Court to review this claim “for due process violations.”
Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 13; 178 L. Ed. 2d 276 (2010);
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). No United States Supreme Court decision known to this Court
has ever required that jury instructions be reduced to writing and that the written instructions be
made part of the record on appeal.
The Ohio statute in question, Ohio Revised Code §
8
2945.10(G), has been a part of the Ohio Revised Code since its recodification October 1, 1953,
and was part of the Ohio General Code before that. The statute explicitly says that “The court
may deviate from the order of proceedings listed in this section.” It also requires that the
instructions be reduced to writing if requested by either party before closing argument begins and
there is no indication any such request was made here. Ground Two does not state a federal
constitutional violation.
Moreover, Respondent asserts Ground Two is procedurally defaulted because no
contemporaneous objection was made at trial. Bohannon makes no response to this affirmative
defense.
The procedural default defense in habeas corpus is described by the Supreme Court as
follows:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted
his federal claims in state court pursuant to an
adequate and independent state procedural rule,
federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless
the prisoner can demonstrate cause of the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law; or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406
(6th Cir. 2000). That is, a petitioner may not raise on federal habeas a federal constitutional right
he could not raise in state court because of procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982). Absent cause and prejudice, a federal habeas
petitioner who fails to comply with a State’s rules of procedure waives his right to federal habeas
corpus review. Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716 (6th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle, 456 U.S. at 110; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
9
Wainwright replaced the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a four-part analysis when the State alleges a
habeas claim is precluded by procedural default. Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir.
2010)(en banc); Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 965 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Eley v. Hauk,
__ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 822 (2010); Reynolds v. Berry, 146 F.3d 345, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1998), citing
Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 601-02
(6th Cir. 2001); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2001).
First the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule
that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner
failed to comply with the rule.
....
Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually
enforced the state procedural sanction, citing County Court of
Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60
L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture
is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the state
can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.
Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not
complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent
state ground, then the petitioner must demonstrate under Sykes that
there was "cause" for him to not follow the procedural rule and that
he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.
Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986).
Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule — that parties must preserve errors for appeal by
calling them to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or
corrected, set forth in State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471 (1960), paragraph one of the syllabus;
see also State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St. 3d 144, 162 (1998) — is an adequate and independent state
10
ground of decision. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 334 (6th Cir. 2012),citing Keith v.
Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2006); Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007);
Biros v. Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 387 (6th Cir. 2005); Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604 (6th Cir.
2003), citing Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 2001); Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854
(6th Cir. 2000), citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124-29 (1982). See also Seymour v. Walker,
224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000); Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 2011); Smith
v. Bradshaw, 591 F.3d 517, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 185 (2010).
The First District reviewed this claim for plain error because of the contemporaneous
objection rule. Reservation of authority to review in exceptional circumstances for plain error is
not sufficient to constitute application of federal law. Cooey v. Coyle, 289 F.3d 882, 897 (6th Cir.
2002); Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). A state appellate court’s review for plain
error is enforcement, not waiver, of a procedural default. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307,
337 (6th Cir. 2012); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 511 (6th Cir. 2008); Lundgren v. Mitchell,
440 F.3d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 2006); White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 525 (6th Cir. 2005); Biros v.
Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 387 (6th Cir. 2005); Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2001), citing
Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000)(plain error review does not constitute a
waiver of procedural default); accord, Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2003).
Ground Two should be dismissed with prejudice.
Ground Three: Failure to Properly Instruct the Jury on Aggravated Robbery
In his Third Ground for Relief, Bohannon argues the jury was not properly instructed on
the elements of aggravated robbery. Bohannon presented this as his Third Assignment of Error
11
on direct appeal and the First District decided the claim as follows:
In his third assignment of error, Bohannon argues that the trial
court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the elements
of aggravated robbery. Specifically, when giving the instructions
on aggravated robbery, the trial court failed to properly instruct the
jury that the defendant had to "display, brandish, or use" a handgun
in the commission of a theft. See [Ohio] Revised Code §
2911.01(A)(1). Instead, the trial court simply instructed the jury
that the defendant only had to possess a handgun while committing
or attempting to commit a theft offense. Because Bohannon did not
object to this improper jury instruction, he has waived all but plain
error. Plain error requires that, but for the error, the outcome of the
trial clearly would have been otherwise. See., e.g. State v. Reid, 1st
Dist. No. C-050465, 2006 Ohio 6450, at ¶ 16.
Here, we conclude that, in the absence of the erroneous jury
instruction, the outcome of the trial would not have been different.
The victims of the aggravated robberies each testified at trial that
Bohannon had pointed a small black handgun at them during the
commission of the offenses. Furthermore, the issue at trial was not
whether Bohannon had displayed, brandished, or used a gun, but
whether the victims had properly identified Bohannon as their
attacker. Accordingly, we overrule Bohannon's third assignment of
error.
State v. Bohannon, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278, *3-4 (1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2009).
As Respondent notes, no objection was made to the instruction and the court of appeals
held this failure against Bohannon by only reviewing the claim for plain error. For the reasons
given above with respect to Ground Two, this constitutes a procedural default of the claim and
Boahnnon has offered no excusing cause of prejudice.
In order for habeas relief to be warranted on the basis of incorrect jury instructions, a
petitioner must show more than that the instructions are undesirable, erroneous, or universally
condemned; taken as a whole they must be so infirm that they rendered the entire trial
fundamentally unfair. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977). The only question for a habeas
court to consider is "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the
12
resulting conviction violates due process." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), quoting
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973). The category of infractions that violate fundamental
fairness is very narrow. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
Bohannon is correct that his actual use, display, brandishing, of the firearm or reference
to it during the course of the robbery was a necessary element of the crime of aggravated robbery
and the trial judge should have instructed on that element. Nevertheless, although this element
had to be proven, there was ample unchallenged evidence at trial of the actual use or brandishing
of a firearm and the contested issue was the identity of the offender. Bohannon points to no
federal decisional law holding that failure to instruct on this element is a violation of due
process. The cases he cites in his Response/Traverse (Doc. No. 20, PageID 1764) are all cases
on direct appeal within the federal system; none of them holds such an instruction is
constitutionally required.
Ground Three for relief should be dismissed with prejudice.
Grounds Four and Eight: Sufficiency and Manifest Weigh of the Evidence
In his Fourth Ground for Relief, Bohannon claims he stands convicted on insufficient
evidence. He repeats that claim in Ground Eight and adds a claim that the conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380 (1997), the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the
important distinction between appellate review for insufficiency of the evidence and review on
the claim that the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. It held:
13
In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v.
Robinson (1955), 162 Ohio St. 486, 55 O.O. 388, 124 N.E.2d 148.
In addition, a conviction based on legally insufficient evidence
constitutes a denial of due process. Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457
U.S. 31, 45, 102, 387 S.Ct. 2211, 2220, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, 663,
citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560. Although a court of appeals may determine that a
judgment of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that
court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the
weight of the evidence. Robinson, supra, 162 Ohio St. at 487, 55
O.O. at 388-389, 124 N.E.2d at 149. Weight of the evidence
concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather
than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having
the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing
the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of
credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established
before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends
on its effect in inducing belief." (Emphasis added.)
When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the
basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a " 'thirteenth juror' " and disagrees with the
factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457
U.S. at 42, 102 S.Ct. at 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v.
Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219, 485
N.E.2d 717, 720-721 ("The court, reviewing the entire record,
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant
a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.").
78 Ohio St. 3d at 387. In State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172 (Hamilton Cty. 1983)(cited
approvingly by the Supreme Court in Thompkins), Judge Robert Black contrasted the manifest
weight of the evidence claim:
In considering the claim that the conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the test is much broader. The
court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
14
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered. …
Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, ¶3 of the syllabus. The consequences of the distinction are
important for a criminal defendant. The State may retry a case reversed on the manifest weight
of the evidence; retrial of a conviction reversed for insufficiency of the evidence is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). In sum, insufficiency of the
evidence states a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but manifest weight states a claim
only under Ohio law which is not reviewable in federal habeas corpus. The Warden correctly
asserts that a claim of conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence does not state a
claim of violation of the United States Constitution. Bohannon makes no argument to the
contrary and concentrates on showing there was insufficient evidence.
A state court finding that the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
implicitly also holds that there is sufficient evidence. Nash v. Eberlin, 258 Fed. Appx. 761, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 29645 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2007); Ross v. Miller, No. 1:10-cv-1185, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65082 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2011)(White, M.J.); Hughes v. Warden, No. 1:10-cv091, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54131 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011)(Merz, M.J.).
An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states a claim under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Coyle,
200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990)(en banc).
In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
15
[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Somerset, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76699 (S.D. Ohio 2007). This rule was recognized in
Ohio law at State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991). Of course, it is state law which
determines the elements of offenses; but once the state has adopted the elements, it must then
prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra.
In cases such as Petitioner’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214)(the “AEDPA”), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:
In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to
convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to
groups who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in
all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine
whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh the
evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our
judgment for that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d
618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not
voted to convict a defendant had we participated in jury
deliberations, we must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier
of fact could have found the defendant guilty after resolving all
disputes in favor of the prosecution. Second, even were we to
conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we
must still defer to the state appellate court's sufficiency
determination as long as it is not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2).
16
Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas
corpus case, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and
then to the appellate court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v.
Palmer, 541 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2008).
We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal
habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of
judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, "it is the responsibility of
the jury -- not the court -- to decide what conclusions should be
drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set
aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only
if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury."
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 181 L. Ed. 2d
311, 313 (2011) (per curiam). And second, on habeas review, "a
federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal
court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may
do so only if the state court decision was 'objectively
unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___,
130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, (2012)(per curiam).
As to victims D.M.,, J.H.,, D.H., and A.S., Bohannon raised his insufficiency of evidence
claim on direct appeal. The First District decided this claim as follows:
In his fourth and final assignment of error, Bohannon contests the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions with respect
to four of the victims. He argues that these four victims – D.M.,
J.H., D.H., and A. S. -- did not and could not identify Bohannon as
their attacker.[full names omitted by District Court]
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
state, any rational trier of fact could have found that all the
essential elements of the offenses had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574
N.E. 2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Roberts, 1st
Dist., No. C-040547, 2005 Ohio 6391.
After reviewing the
record, we hold that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial
17
to demonstrate that Bohannon was the attacker of D.M., J.H., D.H.,
and A.S..
With respect to D.M., a serologist from the Hamilton County
Coroner's Office testified that the semen found in D.M. 's rectum
and underwear contained Bohannon's DNA. This was sufficient
evidence, despite a lack of identification by D.M. at trial, to show
that Bohannon was the person who had raped D.M.. Turning to
J.H., we note that J.H. identified Bohannon as his attacker at trial.
This was sufficient evidence that Bohannon was J.H.'s attacker.
With respect to D.H. and A.S., although they could not identify
Bohannon as their attacker, their description of the crimes against
them matched the mode of operation used by Bohannon against his
other five victims. All the young male victims testified that a black
man, wearing dark clothing and a "beanie"-type hat, had
approached them late at night, asked them either for a cigarette or
if they had any drugs, then displayed a small black handgun (later
shown to be a air gun), dragged them to a secluded area, and
attempted to fondle or anally rape them. Furthermore, with respect
to D.H., he was familiar with handguns and described his attacker's
handgun as a Walther-style PPK or "James Bond" handgun. The
type of air gun found in Bohannon's home was modeled after a
Walther-style PPK.
Concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the
finding that Bohannon had attacked D.M., J.H., D.H., and A.S., we
overrule his fourth assignment of error.
State v. Bohannon, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278, *4-6 (1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2009).
Bohannon argues his case as to individual victims and this Report will follow that order.
In general, Bohannon argues the evidence as if he were trying to persuade a jury that there was
reasonable doubt. He further accuses the court of appeals of not reviewing the whole record.
However, on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence and again on habeas review, the
task for the reviewing courts is not to determine if they would have found a defendant guilty on
all the evidence presented, but instead to decide if sufficient evidence was presented from which
a rational trier of fact could have made a guilty finding.
18
J. H.
The First District found that victim J.H. identified Bohannon at trial. Bohannon argues
about the weaknesses in J.H.’s testimony, but does not deny that J.H. identified him at trial, as
the court of appeals found. The testimony of a victim is sufficient evidence under Jackson.
“[T]his Court has long held that the testimony of the victim alone is constitutionally
sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2008), citing
United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914, 916 (6th Cir. 1966) ("The testimony of the prosecuting
witness, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty."); see also O'Hara v.
Brigano, 499 F.3d 492, 500 (6th
Cir. 2007) (holding that victim's testimony that habeas
petitioner abducted her and raped her was constitutionally sufficient to sustain conviction despite
lack of corroborating witness or physical evidence); United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 565
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding that even if the only evidence was testimony of the victim, that is
sufficient to support a conviction, even absent physical evidence or other corroboration); United
States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction even if the "circumstantial evidence does not remove every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt") (internal quotation marks omitted).
D. H.
The First District found that D.H. could not identify Bohannon in court, but gave a
description of the method of operation of his attacker which matched the method of operation
used as to the other five victims in virtually every detail. Bohannon emphasizes the lack of
identification, D.H.’s admitted state of intoxication, his admitted poor night vision, and the
conflicting accounts he gave the uniformed officer at the scene. Those were all appropriate
19
arguments to make to the jury, but the test is whether any rational juror could have convicted,
and the circumstantial identity evidence is strong.
D. M. After D.M. was anally raped, the DNA in the recovered semen matched Bohannon’s
DNA. That is much stronger evidence of identity than eyewitness identification and plainly
sufficient.
A. S.
The First District also found that A.S. could not identify Bohannon in court, but that there
was sufficient evidence based on his description of the modus operandi of the offender, just as
with D.H.. Here, too, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient. The description by each victim
of the offender method of operation is so detailed and so consistent from victim to victim that it
is strong circumstantial evidence of guilt.
B. S., K. B., and R. C.
Although Bohannon makes lengthy arguments in his Response/Traverse about the
sufficiency of the evidence for convictions as to these three victims, those claims are
procedurally defaulted because Bohannon did not raise these claims on direct appeal. Bohannon
did not mention in his Petition that he was raising insufficiency of the evidence claims as to any
of these three victims, but of course the crimes were separately committed and the Warden was
entitled to notice of which convictions Bohannon was contesting.
Under Ohio law, a claim which can be raised on direct appeal but is not thus raised is
20
barred from later consideration in the Ohio courts by the doctrine of res judicata. Ohio’s
doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases, enunciated in State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175
(1967), is an adequate and independent state ground. Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432 (6th
Cir. 2007); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417
(6th Cir. 2001); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2000); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155,
160-61 (6th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted); Van Hook v. Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (S.D.
Ohio 2001). The Ohio courts have consistently enforced the rule.
State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St. 3d
112 (1982); State v. Ishmail, 67 Ohio St. 2d 16 (1981).
Grounds Four and Eight should be dismissed with prejudice because as to victims J.H.,
D.H., D.M. and A.S. the First District’s decision is not an objectively unreasonable application
of Jackson, supra, and the claims as to B.S., K.B., and R.C. are barred by procedural default.
Ground Five: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Failing to Present Expert Witness
In Ground Five, Bohannon asserts his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of
trial counsel when he failed to request and then present the testimony of an expert on eyewitness
identification testimony. In pleading this Ground for Relief in the Petition, Bohannon cites
several instances of trial testimony which recent general research on the subject of eyewitness
identification have shown can be problematic, e.g., cross-racial identification, effect of
intoxication on perception and memory, etc.
Respondent argues Ground Five is procedurally defaulted. The Warden asserts (Return
of Writ, Doc. No. 12, PageID 89) and Petitioner does not deny that the first time Bohannon made
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to obtain and present such an expert
21
was in his second5 Application for Reopening his direct appeal under Ohio R. App. P.
26(B)(Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, PageID 379, et seq.) Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) proceedings
are for the exclusive purpose of raising claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Bohannon recognized this in his second application Id. PageID 380). He then raised this claim
as an assignment of error omitted because of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.
PageID 382. This second application was summarily overruled by the First District. Id. PageID
407.
The record shows that Bohannon never presented his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failure to call an expert claim to the Ohio courts as an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim. It was not presented on direct appeal which Bohannon implied it should have
been by arguing an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for omitting it. It was also
omitted from his first petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21
where, if it depended on evidence outside the record, it should have been pled.
Presenting such a claim as an underlying omitted assignment of error in an application to
reopen the direct appeal does not preserve the underlying claim for decision on the merits. An
Ohio App. Rule 26(B) application preserves for habeas review only the ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel arguments, not the underlying substantive arguments.
Wogenstahl v.
Mitchell,668 F.3d 307, 338 (6th Cir. 2012), citing Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir.
2001). “The Lott court explained that permitting an Ohio prisoner to raise a substantive claim in
a Rule 26(B) motion "would eviscerate the continued vitality of the procedural default rule;
every procedural default could be avoided, and federal court merits review guaranteed, by claims
that every act giving rise to every procedural default was the result of constitutionally ineffective
5
Bohannon’s first Application for Reopening was filed June 1, 2009. (Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, Exhibit 20,
PageID 305, et seq.)
22
counsel." Id.
Even if such a claim could be preserved by raising it as an underlying ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim in a Rule 26(B) application, Bohannon would face the further
procedural default of having omitted it from his first 26(B) application. Ohio App. R. 26(B)
makes no provision for successive applications. State v. Richardson, 74 Ohio St. 3d 235 (1996).
Indeed, “there is no right to file successive applications for reopening” under App. R. 26(B).
State v. Twyford, 106 Ohio St. 3d 176 (2005), quoting State v. Williams, 89 Ohio St. 3d 179 ¶ 12
Once the issue of ineffective assistance has been raised and adjudicated, res judicata bars its
relitigation, State v. Cheren, 73 Ohio St. 3d 137 (1995), following State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d
175 (1967).
In attempting to meet the procedural default defense, Bohannon argues that he raised this
claim in his Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Sentence. (Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-2, PageID
563, et seq.) Bohannon brought that Petition under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21 at some date
in 2009.6
Id.
Judge Dewine dismissed the Petition as both untimely and successive and
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court. (Entry, Return of Writ, Doc. No.
12-2, Ex. 51, PageID 567.)
Effective September 21, 1995, Ohio Revised Code § 2953.23(A) was amended to
regulate second or subsequent petitions. The statute provides:
(A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant
to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a
petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in
division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive
petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless both of
the following apply:
(1) Either of the following applies:
6
The Hamilton County Clerk of Court’s date stamp at PageID 563 is illegible.
23
(a) The petitioner shows that the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the
petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief.
(b) Subsequent to the period prescribed in division
(A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an
earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new
federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the
petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that
right.
(2) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the
petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of
death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for
the death sentence.
The statute limits the authority of the trial court to entertain a second or subsequent
petition to situations where the petitioner shows he was unavoidably prevented from discovering
the new evidence on which he relies or he is relying on a new federal or state right that applies
retroactively. State v. Owens, 121 Ohio App.3d 34 (1997).
Bohannon claims in his Response/Traverse that he only filed this Petition “after receiving
the police reports requested.” (Doc. No. 20, PageID 1772.) In the Petition itself he references
“Currently Obtained Police Reports.” (Petition, Return of Writ, Ex. 50, Doc. No. 12-2, PageID
564.) However, no police reports are attached and the fact that they had only recently been
obtained by Bohannon would not have been material because he made no attempt to demonstrate
he had been prevented from obtaining them previously. Police offense reports are public records
in Ohio, obtainable under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43.
Because Bohannon’s referenced Petition was both untimely and successive, he
procedurally defaulted in presenting this claim to the Ohio courts by way of post-conviction
petition.
In a further attempt to excuse the procedural default, Bohannon says he is claiming
24
manifest miscarriage of just and actual innocence, which is what he says he claimed in the
referenced Petition. (Response/Traverse, Doc. No. 20, PageID 1773.)
The
“miscarriage
of
justice” standard, which is sometimes used synonymously with “actual innocence,” requires
some showing of actual innocence. In other words, they are the same standard, not alternative
ways of avoiding a procedural default. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Supreme Court recognized an exception
to the cause and prejudice requirement for a petitioner who could demonstrate actual innocence.
However, actual innocence means factual innocence as compared with legal innocence.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). "A prototypical example of actual innocence in
a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime."
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992). To come within the actual innocence exception to
the required showing of cause and prejudice with respect to an abuse of the writ, a habeas
petitioner or § 2255 movant must show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent. That is, the petitioner must show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’
in the light of the new evidence he or she is tendering. In reaching this conclusion, the habeas
court may need to make credibility determinations. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995),
adopting standard from Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
The question is whether the petitioner presents evidence of innocence “so strong that a
court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the
trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” The trial courts will be able to resolve the
great majority of actual innocence claims routinely without any evidentiary hearing. Schlup,
supra. "Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence" (Case Note on Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
25
(1993) - 107 Harv. L. Rev. 273 (1993). “[A] claim of actual innocence must be more than simply
"colorable" to invoke the Schlup gateway.” Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 606 n. 2 (6th Cir.
Ohio 2009)(Holschuh, D.J., sitting by designation).
Bohannon has not satisfied the standard of proof of actual innocence required by the
Supreme Court in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). In the first place, he has produced no
evidence at all – he has not produced a report from an expert witness reacting to the eyewitness
identification testimony in this case. But secondly, any such testimony would merely be offered
to show that the testimony of the victims is not as strong as the jury may have believed. In other
words, it would attack the credibility of evidence already in the case – it is not new evidence.
In sum, Bohannon has not offered adequate cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural
default of Ground Five, which should be dismissed with prejudice.
Ground Six: Failure to Sever Counts
In his Sixth Ground for Relief, Bohannon claims the trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to sever the various counts against him for separate trial. Bohannon asserts that if
severance had been granted, he would not have been convicted at all. (Petition, Doc. No. 1,
PageID 23.)
The Warden claims that this Ground for Relief is not cognizable in habeas corpus and is in
any event procedurally defaulted. (Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12, PageID 97, et seq.)
The Warden is technically correct that a trial court’s abuse of discretion, in itself, is not
cognizable in habeas corpus. Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1995). As a pro se litigant,
however, Bohannon is entitled to a liberal construction of his pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404
26
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); McNeil v. United States,
508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). In accordance with Haines, the Magistrate Judge will ignore the
“abuse of discretion” language and treat this Ground for Relief as alleging an unconstitutional
joinder.
However, the Warden’s procedural default defense is well taken. The claim of improper
joinder was raised in the trial court and therefore would have been available on direct appeal
because it depends on evidence of record. However, it was not raised on direct appeal and
raising it later would have been barred by res judicata. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175
(1967).
Bohannon attempts to avoid the procedural default defense by arguing that “the law the
State itself relies on State v. Schaim [65 Ohio St. 3d 51 (1992)] citing Drew v. United States,
[331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964)]” shows there was prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.”
(Response/Traverse, Doc. No. 20, PageID 1776.) Bohannon misunderstands his burden at this
point. He must show cause for his procedural default in failing to raise this claim on direct
appeal and prejudice arising from that default before the habeas court can excuse his procedural
default and reach the question on the merits of whether he was prejudiced by the joinder. He has
failed to show, or even attempt to show, cause and prejudice to excuse the default on direct
appeal. His claim of prejudicial joinder obviously does not meet the actual innocence standard.
Ground Six is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed with prejudice on that basis.
Ground Seven:
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Failure to Object to
Prosecutorial Misconduct
27
In his Seventh Ground for Relief, Bohannon argues his trial attorney provided ineffective
assistance of trial counsel by failing to object to numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct
in closing argument. (Petition, Doc. No. 1, PageID 23.)
The Warden asserts this claim is procedurally defaulted because Bohannon did not raise it
on direct appeal and then, when he did raise it in post-conviction, failed to preserve the claim by
not appealing on this issue from the denial of the post-conviction petition. (Return of Writ, Doc.
No. 12, PageID 104.)
All of Bohannon’s responsive argument is directed to how the prosecutor’s remarks were
prejudicial. (Response/Traverse, Doc. No. 20, PageID 1778-1780.) The first place he indicates
he raised this claim was in his second application to reopen under App. R. 26(B). Id. at PageID
1778. For the reasons stated above as to Ground Five, a 26(B) application only presents the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, not the underlying ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim and Ohio does not permit second or successive 26(B) applications in any event.
Ground Seven is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed with prejudice on that
basis.
Ground Nine: Merge of Allied Offenses Instead of Vacating Them
In his Ninth Ground for Relief, Bohannon claims that the trial court erred when, on remand,
it merged his kidnapping counts with the other counts instead of vacating them. (Petition, Doc.
No. 1, PageID 24.)
This claim was presented to the First District Court of Appeals in Bohannon’s first
28
Application to Reopen under Ohio R. App. P. 26(B). The court of appeals decided:
[*P1] Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant James Bohannon
was convicted of five counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of
rape, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and seven counts of
kidnapping, each with a sexual-motivation specification.
Bohannon's victims were seven young men. The trial court
imposed a separate sentence for each conviction, resulting in an
aggregate prison term of 99 years. Bohannon appealed his
convictions. We affirmed those convictions in March 2009.
State v. Bohannon (Mar. 11, 2009), 1st Dist. Nos. C-070859
and C-070860, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4278.
Bohannon
appealed our decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, but that court
declined jurisdiction. State v. Bohannon, 122 Ohio St.3d 1521,
2009 Ohio 4776, 913 N.E.2d 457.
[*P2]
In December 2009, this court granted Bohannon's
application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B), holding that
Bohannon's appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to
submit assignments of error challenging, under R.C. 2941.25, the
trial court's imposition of, and his trial counsel's failure to object to
the imposition of, separate prison terms upon the jury verdicts
finding him guilty of kidnapping and rape, of kidnapping and gross
sexual imposition, and of kidnapping and aggravated robbery,
when the paired offenses had been perpetrated upon the same
victim.
[*P3] In the reopened appeal, Bohannon brings forth a single
assignment of error, challenging the trial court's imposition of
separate prison terms upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of
allied offenses of similar import. This challenge is well taken.
[*P4] Bohannon was found guilty and sentenced for both
kidnapping and rape in connection with three armed rapes. He was
also found guilty and sentenced for kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, and gross sexual imposition in connection with the two
armed robberies involving sexual contact. Finally, he was found
guilty and sentenced for both kidnapping and aggravated robbery
in connection with two armed robberies not involving sexual
contact. Bohannon maintains that sentencing him for all the allied
offenses charged with respect to each victim was precluded by
R.C. 2941.25. We are constrained to agree.
[*P5] Under R.C. 2941.25, a defendant who commits two or
29
more allied offenses of similar import can only be sentenced for
one offense. But if allied offenses are committed with a separate
animus, the defendant may be sentenced for each offense. [Ohio]
R.C. 2941.25.
[*P6] For purposes of determining whether R.C. 2941.25(A)
precludes sentencing on allied offenses, the Ohio Supreme Court
has held that (1) kidnapping and rape are allied offenses of similar
import. [FN4]See State v. Donald (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 74-75,
386 N.E.2d 1341, syllabus; accord State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d
508, 2004 Ohio 5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, P89-95., (2) kidnapping and
aggravated robbery are allied offenses of similar import [FN5]See
State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St.3d 413, 2009 Ohio 1059, 905 N.E.2d
154, P25., and, (3) kidnapping and gross sexual imposition are
allied offenses of similar import.[FN6] See State v. Brown (1984),
12 Ohio St.3d 147, 12 Ohio B. 186, 465 N.E.2d 889.But the
supreme court has also established guidelines to determine whether
kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate
animus so as to permit separate punishments under R.C.
2941.25(B). In State v. Logan, the court held that "[w]here the
restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a
separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus
sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where the
restraint is prolonged, the confinement is secretive or the
movement is substantial so as to demonstrate a significance
independent of the other offense, there exists a separate animus as
to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.
[FN7]State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345,
syllabus; accord State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 1999 Ohio
111, 715 N.E.2d 136 (citing Logan to hold that when a kidnapping
is committed during another crime, there exists no separate animus
where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental
to the underlying crime).
[*P7] In Logan, the court found no separate animus to sustain
separate sentences for rape and kidnapping, where, after the victim
had refused to accept some pills, the "defendant produced a knife,
held it to her throat, and forced her into an alley. Under such
duress, she accompanied him down the alley, around a corner, and
down a flight of stairs, where he raped her at knifepoint." Logan,
supra, at 127.
****
[The court then compared the facts of the offenses as to each
victim.]
30
****
[*P15] Bohannon was found guilty and sentenced for both
kidnapping and robbing BS. BS testified that he had been walking
home when Bohannon ran up to him, pointed a gun at him, and
started tugging on BS's coat, trying to empty the coat's pockets.
Bohannon tried to pull BS to the side of a house, but BS began
screaming, and the house's occupant came outside, causing
Bohannon to flee.
[*P16] The facts demonstrate that, although Bohannon moved
each victim to a more secluded area to rob and/or sexually attack
him, the movement was merely incidental to the underlying crime.
In each instance, the movement of the victim was not substantial
because Bohannon had not taken the victim far from where
Bohannon had found him.
[*P17] Because, with respect to each victim, kidnapping was an
allied offense of similar import to the other charged offenses and
was not committed separately or with a separate animus as to each
offense, the trial court erred in sentencing Bohannon for
kidnapping and the other charged offenses. Accordingly, we
sustain the assignment of error, vacate the sentences, and remand
the case for resentencing. In all other respects, the trial court's
judgment is affirmed.
Sentences vacated and cause remanded.
State v. Bohannon, 2010 Ohio 4596, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3919 (1st Dist. Sept. 29, 2010).
As can be easily seen from the First District decision, what Bohannon presented to that
court was a state law question: what is the proper disposition of offenses on which there has
been a conviction but which are found to be allied offenses of similar import? That is purely a
question of interpretation of Ohio Revised Code § 2941.25. The claim that merging rather than
vacating the kidnapping charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause was simply not presented
to the Ohio courts and may not be raised for the first time in federal habeas corpus.
Ground Nine should be dismissed with prejudice.
31
Ground Ten:
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Failure to Present an Alibi
Witness
In his Tenth Ground for Relief, Bohannon asserts he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel when his attorney failed to present Kathy Dudley as a witness to his presence at a
bar called The Dock Complex on January 9, 2005, at the time it was alleged he committed
offenses against B.S.. (Petition, Doc. No. 1, PageID 25.)
Bohannon asserts this claim was raised in his petition for post-conviction relief filed
August 1, 2008. (Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, Ex. 11, PageID 255, et seq.) The claim in
question appears as Claim Number Two (PageID 257). The Petition is supported by the July 23,
2008, Affidavit of Kathy Dudley who avers that she was indeed with Bohannon on January 9,
2005, as alleged. Id. at PageID 260. She further avers “James Bohannon’s Trial Attorney was
informed of this information and did not call us [sic] to be witnesses in James Bohannon’s
Defense during trial. Id.
The trial judge filed findings of fact and conclusions of law dismissing all four claims
made in the post-conviction petition. (Findings, Ex. 13 to Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, PageID
266-67.) Bohannon appealed and argued that his trial attorney had not sufficiently investigated
Ms. Dudley’s potential testimony so as to make his decision not to call her one of trial strategy.
(Appellate Brief, Return of Writ, Ex. 15, PageID 271, et seq.) The court of appeals rejected the
trial court’s res judicata finding, but upheld its conclusion that the Dudley Affidavit did not
include “evidence setting forth sufficient operative facts demonstrating a substantive ground for
relief [b]ecause Dudley’s affidavit did not provide an alibi for the time of the crimes [against
B.S.]. The court held:
32
An alibi provides a defense to a crime "based on the physical
impossibility of a defendant's guilt by placing the defendant in a
location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time.
[Footnote omitted] The record before us does not reflect the
distance between the crime scene and the bar where Dudley placed
Bohannon "on the night of January 9, 2005." Dudley did not
specify in her affidavit the hours that night during which she could
account for Bohannon's presence in the bar. She did not provide
the photograph that she alleged had been "taken that night that is
time and date stamped. [Footnote omitted.] Nor did she specify
what the photograph depicted or what time it had been taken.
Because Dudley could not place Bohannon in the bar, instead of in
Lower Price Hill, at the time of the alleged crimes, her affidavit
could not be said to have demonstrated the physical impossibility
of Bohannon's guilt. Thus, Bohannon failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's failure to call
Dudley to testify, the result of the trial would have been different.
State v. Bohanon, Case No. C-080955 (1st Dist. Aug. 26, 2009)(unreported, copy at Return of
Writ, Doc. No. 12-1, PageID 301, et seq.)
Respondent asserts that this claim is procedurally defaulted by Bohannon’s failure to
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. (Return of Writ, Doc. No. 12, PageID 110.)
In his
Response/Traverse, Bohannon admits that this is so and attaches a letter from a Deputy Clerk of
the Ohio Supreme Court showing that his attempted appeal was filed three days late. (Doc. No.
20, PageID 1782, 1786.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that the Ohio Supreme Court’s forty-five day limit on filing an
appeal is an adequate and independent state ground of decision. Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494,
497 (6th Cir. 2004). Because he failed to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court within forty-five
days of the decision of the court of appeals on this claim, he has procedurally defaulted it.
Ground Ten should therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
33
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition herein
be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion,
Petitioner should be denied a certificate of appealability and the Court should certify to the Sixth
Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous.
October 4, 2013.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is extended to seventeen
days because this Report is being served by one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party=s objections
within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
34
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