Trawick v. Kelly et al, No. 4:2012cv01714 - Document 4 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
Court Description: Opinion and Order. For the reasons set forth herein, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 11/5/2012. (H,CM)
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Trawick v. Kelly et al Doc. 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION MARQUET TRAWICK, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. BENNY KELLY, et al. Defendants. CASE NO. 4:12 CV 1714 JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO OPINION AND ORDER CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.: Pro se Plaintiff Marquet Trawick filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”) Warden Benny Kelly, TCI Warden’s Assistant Robin Ware, TCI Institutional Inspector K. Fredericks, and Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Assistant Chief Inspector Eugene Hunyadi. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process in connection with a conduct rules infraction. He seeks monetary damages and reversal of the conviction on the conduct charge. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff includes very few factual allegations in his Complaint. He indicates he arrived at TCI on January 17, 2012. He indicates he registered for black history and Christianity programs Dockets.Justia.com that he believed were available to all inmates in the general population. When he arrived at one of the programs, he was told “that he was bound by a ‘TCI Sanction Policy’ that deprived him of his liberty to attend these programs alleging that he had violated some rule infraction.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Other sanctions were also imposed, including restrictions on electronic items, clothing packages, food packages, visits, and telephone calls. He disputes that he violated rules and contends he met the criteria for attending the programming. He claims he cannot be deemed a security threat. II. LAW AND ANALYSIS Standard of Review Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 1 An in forma pauperis claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the Plaintiff and without service of process on the Defendant, if the Court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985). -2- entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998). Due Process As an initial matter, it is not clear whether Plaintiff was charged with a conduct violation prior to attending the programming, or whether he was charged with a violation for attending the programming. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST . amend. XIV. In addition to setting the procedural minimum for deprivations of life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause bars “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). It does not prohibit every deprivation by the state of a person’s life, liberty or property. Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994). Only those deprivations which are conducted without due process are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The Due Process Clause has a procedural component and a substantive one. The two components are distinct from each other because each has different objectives, and each imposes -3- different constitutional limitations on government power. A procedural due process limitation, unlike its substantive counterpart, does not require that the government refrain from making a choice to infringe upon a person’s life, liberty, or property interest. It simply requires that the government provide “due process” before making such a decision. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 -1353 (6th Cir. 1996). The goal is to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation, to assure fairness in the decision-making process, and to assure that the individual affected has a participatory role in the process. Id. Procedural due process requires that an individual be given the opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful manner.” See Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir.1983). Many procedural due process claims are grounded on violations of state-created rights, or rights that do not enjoy constitutional standing. See Id. The rationale for granting procedural protection to an interest that does not rise to the level of a fundamental right is to prevent the arbitrary use of government power. Howard, 82 F.3d at 1349. Procedural due process claims do not consider the egregiousness of the deprivation itself, but only question whether the process accorded prior to the deprivation was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 1350. Although the existence of a protected liberty or property interest is the threshold determination, the focus of this inquiry centers on the process provided, rather than on the nature of the right. Substantive due process, on the other hand, serves the goal of preventing “governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,” regardless of the fairness of the procedures used. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Substantive due process serves as a vehicle to limit various aspects of potentially oppressive government action. Id. It serves as a check on legislation that infringes on fundamental rights otherwise not explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights; or as a check on official misconduct which infringes on a “fundamental right;” or as a -4- limitation on official misconduct, which although not infringing on a fundamental right, is so literally “shocking to the conscious,” as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Howard, 82 F.3d at 1349. 1. Procedural Due Process Plaintiff claims he was sanctioned with restrictions on attending programing, receiving packages, and electronic items for one year, and restricted visitation and telephone calls for 60 days. Prisoners have narrower liberty and property interests than other citizens as “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). The question of what process is due is answered only if the inmate establishes a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The Due Process Clause, standing alone, confers no liberty or property interest in freedom from government action taken within the sentence imposed. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480. “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id. at 485. “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. A prison disciplinary action does not give rise to a protected liberty interest unless the restrictions imposed constitute an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Generally, unless the disciplinary action is accompanied by a withdrawal of good time credits or is for a significant period of time that presents an unusual hardship on the inmate, no -5- liberty or property interest will be found in the case. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Where good time credits are at stake, due process requires only that a prisoner receive: 1) written notice of the hearing at least twenty-four hours in advance; 2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and 3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reason for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). Further, some evidence must exist to support the disciplinary conviction. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). Plaintiff does not provide much information in his Complaint about the reasons the sanctions were imposed, other than to indicate his “name and identity [will be] indefinitely televised as an exhibitionist.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) He does not suggest he was sent to segregation or that he received a reduction in good time credits. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest the Defendants deprived him of a protected liberty or property interest. 2. Substantive Due Process Plaintiff's substantive due process claim is also subject to dismissal. Due process claims of this nature involve official acts which cause a deprivation of a substantive fundamental right. Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353,1367 (6th Cir. 1993). In addition, under substantive due process, courts have invalidated laws or actions of government officials that “shock the conscience.” See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). These actions are unconstitutional regardless of the procedural protections provided. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 1989). A citizen, however, does not suffer a constitutional deprivation every time he is subjected to some form of harassment by a government agent. Id. at 833. The conduct asserted must be “so severe, -6- so disproportionate to the need presented, and such an abuse of authority as to transcend the bounds of ordinary tort law and establish a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. Because Plaintiff does not allege facts to suggest he was deprived of a fundamental right not otherwise specified in the Constitution, Plaintiff's substantive due process claim must be based, if at all, on conduct alleged to be so severe that it shocks the conscience. Plaintiff provides very few facts to shed light on the nature of the Defendant’s actions. He does not indicate how each of the Defendants is involved or what actions each took in connection with the allegations in his Complaint. There is no indication in the Complaint that the Defendants denied him substantive due process. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.2 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Christopher A. Boyko CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: November 5, 2012 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith. -7-
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