LILLY v. CARTER et al, No. 1:2016cv00400 - Document 71 (M.D.N.C. 2017)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 7/14/2017. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motions to amend (Docket Entries 51 , 60 ) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth herein, Defendant Glover's motions to strike (Docket Entries 49 , 53 , 62 ) be GRANTED, and Defendant Glover's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 28 ) be GRANTED.(Butler, Carol)

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LILLY v. CARTER et al Doc. 71 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHESTE,R LILLY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) V DR. CARTER, et al., Defendants 1:16CV400 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE IUDGE This mattet is before the Court upon several motions: Defendant Susan Glover's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 28), Plaintiff Chester Lilly's motion to amend complaint (Docket Entry 51), Defendant Glover's motion to stike, or alternatively, dismiss Plaintiffs supplement to his complaint (Docket Entry 49), Defendant Glover's second motion to strike (Docket Entry 53), PlaintifPs motion for leave to fìle an amended complaint @ocket Entry 60), and Defendant Glover's renewed motion to strike pocket E.rtty 62). These matters are ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that Plaintiffls motions to amend (Docket Entries 51, 60) be granted in part and denied in part, Defendant Glovet's motions to suike (Docket Enries 49,53,62) l:e granted, and Defendant Glover's motion to dismiss (Docket E.rtry 28) be granted. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff fìled this 20'16, S 1983 action against Defendants Dt. Carter and Glover on May 3, for delibetate indifference to a serious medical need. (See generalþ Complaint, Docket Etttty 2.) Between May 4,201,6, to SeptemberL6,201,6, Plaintiff filed fìve supplements to his Dockets.Justia.com Complaint. (Docket Enuies 3, 5, 23,25,26.) Defendant Glover filed an answer (Docket Entty 27) and a motion to dismiss on October 1,1,201,6, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1,2þ)(6), claiming that Plaintiff has failed to state aclaimagainst her. pocket Entry 28.) On November 7 ,201.6, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, asserting Defendant Glover was delibe rately indifferent by ignoring PlaintifFs medical needs.l (Docket E.ttty 34.) Defendant Glover thereafter filed a reply. (Docket Entry 36.) This case was scheduled for a hearing on all pretrial matters. (Jee Text Order dated 11/22/2016.) Plaintiff fìled several additional motions prior to the date of the hearing. (See DocketEntties38,39,40,43,44,45,46.) AtthehearingheldonJanuary24,20lT,theparties discussed several of the motions pending before the Court. Plaintiff informed the Court of his attempts to amend his Complaint. (See'lextOrder dated 1,/24/17.) Plaintiff indicated that he wanted to add "D. Loflin" as ^ defendant to the pending suit. Defense counsel stated that if the Court were to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint, it would not be opposed so long as the new allegations be raised as to persons other than Defendant Glover. Defense counsel further asked the Court that no discovery be permitted in this matter until there was a ruling on Defendant Glover's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeared to understand the positon of Defendant Glover's counsel, and the Court indicated that it would allow Plaintiff to supplement his Complaint to add the newly named defendant and assert any allegations against that individual. (Id.) t To the extent Plaintiffs response brief to Defendant Glover's motion to dismiss addresses new claims or allegations, the Court will not consider them. Foster a. f-isher, No. 1:14-CV-292-MR-DSC, 2016WL900654, at *7 (\ü/.D.N.C. Mar. 9,201,6) (unpublished), afi'd, No. 16-1792,20'1,7 WL2197875 (4th Cir. May 18, 2017) (disregarding allegations in plaintiffs opposition brief which is not a pleading under Rule 7(a)). 2 Aftet the hearing, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his complaint on January 27, 201,7. (Docket Ent y 48.) Plaintiff also fìled a motion to amend his complaint. (Docket Entry 51.) Thereafter, Defendant Glover filed a motion to strike the motion to supplement. (Docket F,ntry 49.) Additionally, Defendant Glover fìled another motion to strike or dismiss allegations against Defendant Glover and response to Plaintiffs motion to amend complaint, which was also accompanied by a brief. (Docket Entties 53,54.) Plaintiff then filed another motion for leave to file amended complaint (Docket Entry 60) and Defendant Glover filed third motion to strike (Docket F,ntry a 62). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this S 1983 action naming Defendant Glover and several others in this matter. (See in the custody of the Noth generalþ Compl., Docket Entty 2.) Plain:j.ff is a State prisoner Caroltna Department of Public Safety, Division of Adult Corrections ("NCDPS"), and is currently housed at lexandet Cortectional Institute in Taylorsville, North Caroltna. Plaintiff alleges that while at Piedmont Cortectional Institution ("Piedmont") in Salisbury, North Carohna, Defendant Glover, a nurse, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs medical needs, which resulted in injury to Plaintiff. (ld.) More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Glover advised Plaintiff to make two sick calls to acquire his pain medicine, and Plaintiff made 16 sick calls and never acquited his medicine. Qd. at 3.) Thus, Plaintiff claimed Defendant Glovet lied because she gave Plaintiff ill-advised informatio". (Id.) Ultimately, Defendant Carter did not prescribe Plaintiff his requested pain medication . (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs complaint alleges several further inactions of other defendants as it relates to Plaintiffs medical needs. J (See id; see al¡o Docket Entries 3,5,23,25, 26.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $400,000 for pain and suffering, and mental anguish. (Compl. at 6.) III. DISCUSSION Standard of Review A. Rule 1.5 Amendments Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ptovides that "a pafiy may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). It further states that "[t]he court should fteely give leave when justice so requires." Id. Graning a motion to amend a complaint is within the discretion of the Court, "but outtight refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of disctetion." Foman u. Dauh,371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Fourth Circuit has stated that "fa] disttict court may deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing parry, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile." Equal kight¡ Ctr. u. Ni/es Bolton Arncl, 602tr.3d 591,603 (4th Cir. 2010). An amended complaint is futile if it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss fot failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure tZþ)(6); thus, the Court may deny the motion. Perkin¡ a. United States,ss F'.3d 910,9'17 (4th Cir. 1995) (addition of negligence claim futile because case would not survive motion to dismiss). B. Rule 12(0 Motion to Strike Pursuant to Rule 1,2(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may "stike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" on its own or on motion of a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(Ð; ll/a¡te Mgrt. 4 Holdings, Inc. u, Gilm0re,252tr.3d31,6,347 (4th Cir. 2001). In reviewing a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(Ð, the Court reviews "the pleading under attackin a light most favorable to the pleader." Gaet$òrd u. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ca¡. Int. C0.,918 F. Srpp. 2d 453,467 (À{.D.N.C. 201,3). "The Fourth Circuit has recognized that Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavot because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy." Id. (citalons and quotations omitted). C. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12þ)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. E,dwarcls u. Ciry of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d sufficient factual matter, ccepted as 231,, 243 (1999). ,\ complaint rhar does not "contain true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"' must be dismissed. Ashtroft u. 550 U.S. 544,570 Q007)). "A claim has factal plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual Iqba/,556 U.S. 662, 678 Q00g) (quoting Bell Atlantic' u. Twombþ, content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct." Id.; rce al¡o Simnon¡ dv Unind Mortg dy l-.oan Inuest., 634 tr.3d 754,768 (4th Ch. 2011) ("On a Rule 12þ)(6) motion, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege enough facts to state a claim to telief that is plaaible on its face.") (emphasis in original) (intetnal citation and quotation marks omitted). The "court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of factual enhancementl,] . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Cheuro/et, Ltd. u. Consømerffiirs.tvm, Inc.,591. F.3d 250,255 (4th Cir.2009) (citations omitted). In other words, the standard requires 5 a plaintiff to articulate facts, that, when accepted as true, demonstrate the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible he is entitled to relief. F'ranr.i¡ u. Giacomelli,588 F.3d 186,193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678, and Twombþ,550 U.S. at 551). Pro ¡e complaints aÍe Rules of Civil Procedure . to be liberally construed in assessing suffìciency under the Federal Erickson u. Pardu¡ 551 U.S. 89,94 Q007). However, even undet this liberal consttuction, "generosity is flot plaintiff's claim for him. ^ fantasyi' and the court is not expected to plead Bender u. Suburban Ho¡P., Inc.,'1.59 a F.3d 186, 1,92 (4th Cir. 1998). "Lllsenl construction is particulady appropriate when a þro se complaint taises civil rights issues." Moo$t-ll/illiønt original); see u. UpoSdenæ,953 al¡o Brown u. N.C. Dept. oJ' F.Supp.2d 677,680 (E.D.N.C. 201,3) (emphasis in Con , 612 tr .3d 7 20, 7 22 (4th Cir. 201,0). Analysis PlaintifPs Amended Pleadings In light of the Court's discussion at the oral heating on Januaty 24,201,7 , Plaintiff filed a supplement to the Complaint, as well as his two motions to amend. Q)ocket Entries 48,51., 60.) s requested at the hearing, and in the interest of justice, Plaintiffs motion to amend his Complaint to add "D. Loflin" ^s a defendant should be granted. However, as to any further allegations against Defendant Glover, the Court should sttike those allegations in the amended/supplemental pleadings as they exceed the scope of leave previously granted by the Court, thereby prejudicing Defendant Glover in this action. Thus, Plaintiffs motions to amend (Docket trntries 51, 60) should be granted only to the extent they set forth allegations against "D. Loflin." Having recommended that any further allegations against Defendant 6 Glover in the amended pleadings be stricken, the Court should grant Defendant Glover's motions to strike (Docket Enuies 49,53,62). Defendant Gloverts Motion to Dismiss Defendant Glover moves for a motion to dismiss for failure to stte a claim as to PlaintifFs S 1983 claim for deliberate indifference. (Docket Entry 29.) Defendant Glover argues that the motion to dismiss should be granted because: (1) no injury resulted from Defendant Glover's actions or inactions, thus resulting in no deliberate indifference; Q) Defendant Glover is entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Defendant Glover is entitled to Eleventh A.mendment soveteign immuniry; (4) Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is moot; and (5) as to any alleged state law medical malpractice claim, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the pleading requirement of rule t. 90 of the North Caro\na Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) Deliberate Indifference As Defendant Glover correctly asserts, Plaintiff has failed to state a clatm of deliberate indifference as to the pain medication received. (Docket E.ttty 29 at 8-11.) It is well settled that not "every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a [constitutional] violation." Esîette u. Gamble, 429 U.5.97 ,1,05 (1,97 6). "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard - a showing of mere negligence will not meet it." Cralson u. Peed, 1.95 F.3d692,695(4thCir. 1999). Rather,the"deliberateindifference"prongrequiresPlaintiffto make "two showings:" First, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively recognized a substanaal risk of harm. It is not enough that the officers should have recognized it; they actually must have perceived the risk. Second, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions were "inappropriate in light of that tisk." As with the 7 subjective awareness element, it is not enough that the official should have recognized that his actions were inappropriate; the official action must have recognized that his actions were insuffìcient. Pani¡h ex re/. I-ee u. Cleueland,372F,3d294,303 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis in ortginal). "Obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error, chancterizes deliberate indifference." Gib¡on u. Foh7r 963 tr.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1,992) (citation omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference to so grossly incompetent, inadequate, a serious medical need, of excessive as "the teatment must be to shock the conscieflce or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier u. Beorn, 396 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Thus, "mere negligence or malpractice" does not constitute deliberate indifference. Id. at 852. Similarly, "[df isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care does not state a S 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged." Wright u. Collins, 7 66 F.2d 841,849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). It is well sertled, therefore, that a medical need serious enough to give rise to a constitutional claim involves a condition that places the inmate at a substantial risk of serious harm, usually loss of life or permanent disability, or condition for which lack of treatment perpetuates severe pain. a t'-arrner u. Brennan, 51,1U.S. 825, 832-33, (1994). Also, to hold a medical professional liable, that ptofessional must have had authority to perform the action. Manlelt a. S. Health l)artnen, Inc., 5:1,4-CV-111-F'D17, 2014 ìfL 5509183, at x2 flW.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 201,4) (unpublished). Further, the refusal by a medical ptofessional to give an inmate anl ptescttbed pain medication can, in some instances, amount to deliberate indiffere nce. Carter u. U /ep, No. 1 :1 3CY 1,425 LMB/JFA , 2014 WL 3421,515, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 10, 2014) (citation omitted), dismixed, 585 F. pp'" 46 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). 8 Flere, Plaintiffs own allegations demonstrate that Defendant Glover had no authodty to prescribe medicine. Plaintiff stipulates that he was told by Defendant Glover that he would have "to put in one sick call and 2 follow-up to get [his] pain pill." (Docket Entty 2 at 3.) Here, Plaintiffs statement supports the implication that Defendant Glover, a nurse, had no authority to prescribe medicine, but assisted Plaintiff with ditection on how to acquire his requested medicine by making follow-up calls. (d.) What amounts to an explanation of the sick call appointment procedure by Defendant Glover does not constitute a violation of a serious medical need. Having no authority to prescribe the medication, Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant Glover regarding her alleged failure medtless. Manley u. to prescribe Plaintifls medicine is S. Ilealth Partners,.Iør:, No. 5:1,4-CY-111-FDìø, 201.4WL 55091.83, atx2 flX/.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2014) (unpublished) ("Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of delibetate indifference against the defendant nurses because by his own admission, the nurses believed that they could not provide him with the medication until they were authorized to do so by an unnamed doctor."); see ctlso Børnett u. Alørnant;e Cry. Sheriff Office Det. C/r., No. 1:14CY732,201,6 WL 1389606, at x4 (1\4.D.N.C. Apr. 7 ,201,6) (unpublished) (citation omitted) ("Nurses cannot be found liable for something they do not have authorizaion to do."); Parkeru. 1:13CV488,201,5WL1,474909,at*7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31,,201,5) BaritNo. reþort and retvmmendation adopted, No. 1:13CV488, 2015 SøL 2169148 (N4.D.N.C. May 8, 201,5) øf'?d, 623 F. App'x 82 (4th Cir. 201,5) (finding that because alleged inaction meritless); Smith in u. a nurse regards cannot prescdbe medication, "Plaintiffs assertion that het to pain medicine amounted to deliberate indifference" was Harrh,401 F. App'" 952,953 (5th Cir. 201,0) (holding that because 9 a nurse could not write prescriptions, the plaintiff failed to establish that she acted with deliberate indifference by not prescribing him pain medication). Even if Defendant Glovet did have the authority to prescribe narcotic pain medicine, "numerous fedetal courts have determined that, absent evidence of malicious purpose, the failure of prison medical personnel to provide pain medication of suffìcient strength does not constitute deliberate indifference." Par,ëer u. Buris,2015 WL 1,474909, at *7 (collecting cases). Indeed, Plaintiffs own allegations indicate that he received some medications: "I was forced to take 2 meds for depression, and a[n] anti-inflammatory, and nothing for muscles pain." (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff also states: "[In September] I was given [nitroglycenn]." Qd.) ,\lthough "flt is ttue that the refusal to give an inmate anl prescitbed pain medication can amount to deliberate indiffetence," in our case Plaintiff claims to have teceived some pain medication, namely nitroglycerin. Cørter,201/WL 342151,5, at x3. Thus, everr if Defendant Glover could prescribe medicine, a disagreement in the type of medication provided here does not constitute a deliberate indifference 2. claim. ll/right, 7 66 F.2d at 849. Qualified Immunity Next, Defendant Glover argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs action where Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional violation. @ocket Entry 29 at 1,3.) Undet the doctrine of qualified immunity, Defendant Glover is "generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as þer] conduct does not violate cleady established statutory ot constitutional rights of which a teasonable person would have known." Harlow Lìit4¿emld,457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "(Jnless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of u. violation of cleady established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal 10 befote the commencement of discovery." Cloaninger u. McDeuitt,555 F'.3d 324,330 (4th Cir. 2009)(citaion omitted); rce also Jenkins u. Medford, 11,9 F.3d 1156, 1,159 (4th Ck. 1,997) ("Qualifìed immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss."). In the instant case, having found that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for a constitutional violation, Defendant Glover should be entitled to qualifìed immunity. See Jacknrc u. Holley 666 F. App'" 242,244-45 (4th Cu.201,6) (noting that the "conduct about which fplaintiffl complains [did] not amount to aû Eighth Amendment," thus "fdefendant] was entitled to qualifìed immunity and her motion ro dismiss should have been granted by the district court."). 3. Eleventh Amendment Next, Defendant Glover argues that Plaintiffs $ 1983 monetary claim against her in her official capacity is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. pocket Etrty 29 at 14-1,5.) The Eleventh mendment prohibits actions in federal court by individuals against a state unless the state has consented to suit or unless Congress has lawfully abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immuniry. Ballenger u. Owent,352 tr.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). The doctine of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment applies not only to actions in which the State is a named defendant, but also to actions against its departments, institutions, and agencies. Additionally, in North Carolina, "[a]ctions against officers of the State in theit official capacäes are actions against the State for the purposes of applying the doctrine of [sovereign] immunity." Green u. Kearne;/,203 N.C. ,tpp. 260, 268,690 S.E.2d 755, 762 Q01,0) (citation omitted); ¡ee al¡o Malli¡ u. Sechreú,347 N.C. 548, 554,495 S.E.2d 721,725 (1998) ("[O]fficial-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity.'). Additionally, compensatory 1,1 damages ^te unavailable in official capa'ctty suitsundetS 1983. Big:r.Meadowr^,6óF.3d 56,61, (4thCir. 1995). Here,asuitagainst Defendant Glover in her official capacity is a suit against the NCDPS and North Carolina. Neither has consented nor waived .immunity; therefore, any monetary clarms against Defendant Glover in her official capaciry should be dismissed. 4, Iniunctive Relief As Defendant Glover correctly stated, Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief pertaining to Plaintiffs $ 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need should be dismissed as moot because Plaintiff has been tansferred to a different correctional institution. pocket Entty 29 at 1,5-1,6.) "[r\]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarcemion there." I\endelman u. Roøre,569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). To the extent injunctive telief is sought, Plaintiff is no longet incarcerated at Piedmont and thus no longer subject to the challenged conditions in his claims. Thus, Plaintiff's claim fot injunctive relief is moot due to his transfer to another prison facility. 5. Recuirements of Rule 9lil Defendant Glover also asserts that Plaintiffs medical malpractice claim, to the extent alleged, fails because he did not obtain an expert review of "the medical care and.all medical records" before fìling a lawsuit. (Docket Etttry 29 at (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. $ 1A-1, Rule 9(,) )) In North 1,6 Carohna, a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must comply with North Carohra Rule of Civil Procedute 9O which requires a plaintiff to include in his complaint an assertion that that an expert in the same field reviewed the medical cate at issue and is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care. t2 -1¿¿ N.C. R. Civ. P. 90). Failure to comply with Rule 9(j) is grounds for dismissal. State¡ 528 F. App'r 289,292 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (fìndingin Act ("FTCA") case, "that, where applicable, See Uttlepaige u. Unind a Federal Tort Claims a Rule 90) certifìcation is a mandatory requirement for a plaintiff in a North Catolina medical malpractice action."); Boala u. United States, 1.:1.1cv366, 2013 WL 5962935, at *2 (À4.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 201,3); Moore u. Pitt Cnfl Men. FIatþ.,139 F'.Supp.2d71,2,71,3-1,4 (E,.D.N.C. 2001). The only exception to this de is where "[t]he pleading alleges facts establishing negligence under the existing corrrnon-law doctine of re¡ þv loquitur." Rule 9(iX3). Here, "Plaintiffs complaint fails to allege that he obtained certifìcation from an expert willing to testify that his treating medical personnel did not comply with the applicable standard of c fe." Deal u. Cent. Pri¡on Hotp., No. 5:09-CT-31,82-trL,2011,WL 322403, at*4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 201,1) (unpublished). His þro Lv prisonet status does not excuse his obligation to comply with Rule 90's certificatìon requirements. No. 1:08CV838(LOIJFA), 2010 WL 256595, at x3 n.5 (E.D.V See e.g., Snìth u. United Stater, a. Jan. 19, 20'1,0) (unpublished) (citations and quotations omitted) ("It has been held in several occasions that federal inmates proceeding pro teunder the FTCA are not exempt from the certifìcate of merit requirement, despite the fact that his or her prisoner status adds hurdles to any attempt expert."). Also, Plaintiff has failed to suffìciently allege the doctrine of to the extent Plaintiff asserts a state law claim Glover, the motion to dismiss should be granted. t3 res to obtain an þn loquitor. Thus, for medical malpractice against Defendant IV. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs motions to amend (Docket Enries 51, 60) be GRANTED IN DENIED IN PART to strike (Docket as set forth herein, Defendant Glover's motions PART AND Entries 49,53,62)be GRANTED, and Defendant Glover's motion to dismiss (Docket Entty 28) be GRANTED. L \IHmrer Stuc* Irl4gistrrtr Jucþ July 1.4,2017 Durham, North Carolina 14

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