FARRINGTON v. BERRYHILL, No. 1:2015cv00846 - Document 12 (M.D.N.C. 2017)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 03/01/2017, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 8 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Garland, Leah)

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FARRINGTON v. BERRYHILL Doc. 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA EMMA FARRINGTON, on behalf HONøARD FARRINGTON, of ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, V ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NANCY BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Secutity Administtation, Defendant. 1:15CV846 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Emma Farrington, on behalf of the deceased claimant, Howard Farington ("Farrington"), seeks teview of a ltnaldecision of the Commissionet of Social Security denying his claims fot a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title the Social Security ct ("the ct").t The Court has befote it the cettified record and ctoss-motions fot judgment. (Docket Entries 6, 8, II of administtative 10.) For reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiffs motion fot judgment on the pleadings be denied, Defendant's motion fot ludgment on the pleadings be granted, and that the Commissionet's decision be affumed. 1 Nancy Bctryhìll tecently became the Actrng Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy Betryhill should be substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin as Defendant in this suit. No furthet action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(9) of the Act,42 U.S.C. $ a05G). 1. Dockets.Justia.com I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Farrington applied for DIB on or about February 1.4,201,L, alleging a disability onset date of September 30,2008. Çr. 176-79.¡z His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Qn 1.1,8-1.21,1.25-27.) Thereaftet, Farington requested befote an Administtative Law Judge vocational expert ("V8") a headng de ("ALJ"). Çt 77-78.) Fattington, his attorney, and a appeated at the headng on September 16, 2013. decision by the AIJ application for DIB. Qt T-a2.) novo Çr. 46-69.) A was issued on December 11, 2013, upholding the denial of Farrington's appealed the ALJ's decision Fardngton thereaftet tetained anothet attotney who to the Appeals Council on Februar¡ 4, 201.4. (Ir. 23-25.) Farrington died on February 28, 2014. On May 12, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Farrington's request for review of the decision. (Ir. 18-20.) The Appeals Council theteafter allowed additional infotmation to be submitted by Fardngton's counsel. Qt. 1,3-1,4.) On August 6, 201,5, aftet setting aside its eatlier denial, the Appeais Council agatn denied Farrington's request for review of the A{'s decision, theteby making the ALJ's detetmination the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. Gt. 1-5.) Farrington's widow, Emma Fatrington (proceeding as "Plaintiff in this matter), was named a substitute party and subsequently fìled the instant Complaint with this Court. (Docket F;ntry 2.) Transcript citatrons refer to the sealed administrative recotd which was filed with Defendant's Answet. (Docket Entry 6.) 2 2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissioner held that Fardngton of the Act. Under 42U.5.C. decision is specific and $ a05(g), \Ã/as not undet a disability within the meaning the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's fìnal nattow. Snith u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986)' This Court's review of that decision is ümited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the tecord to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1.992); Hay $ a05(g); Hunter u. Sulliuan, u. Sølliuan, 907 tr.2d 1,453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hzrnter,993 F.2d at34 (cittngNchardnn (1971)). It "consists of more u. of 1.456 (cittng King u. Calfarco, 599 does not conduct a de novo review 795 F.2d ^t 345. In a Celebre77e,368F.2d640,642 (4th Cit. 1966)). The Commissioner must make fìndings Schweiker, Perales,402U.5.389,401' thart a mete scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than pteponder^nce." 1/. (quotingLaws Hay,907 F.2d at u. fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. F.2d 597 , 599 (4th Cit. 1,919)). The Coutt of the evidence not of the Commissionet's reviewing for findings. substantial evidence, the Coutt does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make ctedibility determinations, or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craþu. Chater,76F.3d 585,589 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Hry4907 F.2d ^t 1,456). "$(/here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the fCommissioner] (ot the fCommissioner's] designate, IØalker u. Bowen,834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. the,{.LJ)." Craigl6F.3d at 589 (quoting 1987). The denial of benefits will be revetsed .) only See if no reasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to support the determination. Nchard¡0n,402 U.S. at 401. The issue before the Court, thetefote, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissionet's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was teached based upon a cottect application of the televant law. See id.; Cofrzan u. Bowen,829 F.2d 51,4,51,7 (4th Cit. 1987). III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The Sociat Security Regulations define "disability" for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of. any medically determinable physical or mental impairment3 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last fot a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. S 404.1505(a); .- definition, a claimartmust have work ot S ^ny a severe see al¡o 42 U.S.C. $ aæ(d)(t)(a). To meet this impairment which makes it impossible to do ptevious other substantial gainful acavitya that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a); rce øl¡o 42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(2XÐ. A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis The Commissionet follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascettain whether the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520. Sec. Adnin., 3 1.7 4 F.3d 473, 47 5 See Albright u. Comm'r of Soc. n.2 (4th Cit. 1'999). The ALJ must determine: mental impairmenC' is an mpairment resulting from "anatornical, physiological, or psychological abnormalitres which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical andlaboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. S 423 (dX3). o "substantial gainful actl'drty" is work that (1) involves performing significant ot productive physical or mental duties, and Q) is done (ot intended) for pay or ptofit. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1510. A "physical or 4 (1) Whether the claimant is engaged in substanial gainful activity claimant is working). so, the claimant is . whethet the not disabled and the inquiry ends. \X/hethet the claimant has a severe impairment. Q) (3) If (2.e., If not, then the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. ìØhether the impairment meets or equals to medical criteria of 20 C.F.R., Patt 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments thatwanant a findingof disabilitywithoutconsidetingvocationalcriteita. If so, thecluma¡tis disabled and the inqury is halted. (4) \X/hether the impairment prevents the claimant from perfotming past relevant work. If noq the claimant is not disabled (5) \)Øhether the claimant is able and the inquity is halted. to petform any othet work considering both his residual functional capacitys ("RF'C") and his vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 c.F.R. S 404j,520. Here, the ALJ frst determined that Farington had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of September 30,2008. (Ir. 35.) The ALJ next found in step two that Farrington had the following severe impafuments: alcohol dependence, s "Residual functional capactty" is the most claimant can do in a work setting despite the physical and mental limitations of her rmpafument and any related symptom (e.g.,pan). See 20 C.F.R. $ a0a.15a5(a) (1); ne ulso Hine¡ u Bamhar4 453 F.3d 559,562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a "physical exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "abilty to do sedentary, light, medium, heav/, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory or skin impairments)." Ha// a. Harrn,658 F.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 1981). 5 adjustment disorder, obesity, degenetative joint disease, cirthosis, and seizutes. thtee, the ALJ found that Farrington did not have an impurment impairments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in Appendix L. (Id') ,{.t step or combination of Qd.) At step fout, the that Fattington could not return to his past televant work. (Id. at 40.) At '{LJ determined step five, the ALJ determined that considering Fartington's age, education, wotk expedence, and RFC, there were jobs in the national economy that he could B. petfotm. (Id. at 40-41,.) Residual Functional Capacity Determination Prior to step four, the ALJ determined Fardngton's RFC based on the ALJ's evaluation of the evidence. (Id. at37-40.) Reviewing the evidence as a whole, the AIJ detetmined that Farrington retained the RFC to "petfotm light wotk, ot wotk which requires maximum Itfttng/carrying and pushing/pulling of 20 pounds, frequent hfttng/carrylng and pushing/pulling of up to 10 pounds, and sitting, standing or walking approximately six houts of an eight-hour day with normal breaks." (Id. at 37) The ALJ further concluded that Farrington could occasionally petfotm postutal activities, but with no exposrue to hazarås, such as dangerous machinery and unsupported heights. Qd.) The ALJ also concluded that Fardngton could perform simple, routine, and tepetitive tasks, but that he must avoid production, euota, and fast-paced jobs. Qd.) C. Past Relevant Work The ALJ found in step four that Farrington had past relevant work as a sous chef and short order cook. Qd. at 40.) The ALJ found furthet that these jobs were beyond Farrington's RFC, thus, he could not petfotm his past relevant wotk any longet. (Id.) 6 D. Adiustment to Other Work The claimant bears the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX5); 20 C.F.R. S 404.151 2; Smith u. Califano, 592 F.2d 1,235, 1,236 (4th Ctt. 1979). If the claimant has established at step four that he cannot do any work he has done in the past because of his severe impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner àt step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbets in the national economy which the claimant could perform consistent with his RFC, age, education, and past wotk expetience at35; Il/ilson u. Calìfun0,617 . Hønter,gg3 tr.2ð, F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 19S0). Here, the ALJ found that given Fardngton's age, education, work experience, and RFC, thete wete jobs in the national economy that he could perform, such as an otder caller, photocopy machine opetatot, and cashier. Çr 41,.) IV. ANALYSIS Plaintiff contends that the Commissionet etted in determining that Fardngton v¡as not disabled for purposes of the Act. (Docket Entry 9.) Plunttff raises three arguments. Fitst, Plaintiff contends that the ,{LJ failed to account for Farrington's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace ("CPP") in the RFC which tesulted in a flawed hypothetical presented to the VE regarding Farrington's ability to adjust to othet work. (Id. at 1'2-17.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated social secutity regulations by failing to accotd the weight given to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants. (Id. at 17-20.) Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by placing excessive weight on Farington's ability to petform daily activities, which tesulted in a flawed RFC. (Id. at 21,-22.) For the reasons 7 below, the Court concludes thar,all of Plaintifls arguments fail. A. Moderate Limitations in Concentration, Persistence, or Pace Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical presented to the VE was flawed because of the ALJ's failure to account for Farrington's modetate limitations in CPP. (Id. at 12-11.) To support this argument, Plaintiff relies upon the holdingin Mascio u. Coluin,780 F.3d 632 (4th Ctr. 201,5). In Masdo, the Fouth Circuit Court of ppeals determined that temand was appropriate for three distinct reasons, one of which is televant to the analysis of this case. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit remanded in Ma¡ùo because the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE, and the corresponding RFC assessment, did not include than unskilled work, despite the fact that, ar. ^ny step thtee of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ concluded that the claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining ^t mental limitations other CPP. Matdo,780 F.3d 637-38. The Fourth Circuit specifically held that it "agtee [s] with other circuits that an ALJ does not account for a claimant's limitations in [CPP] by testticting the hypothetical question to simple, toutine tasks or unskilled work." Id. at 638 (quoting lY/in¡chel u. Comn'r of Soc. Sec., 631. F.3d 1,176,1130 (1lth Cir. 201,1)) (internal quotations omitted). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the distinction between the ability to perfotm simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, stating that "[o]nly the latter limitation would account for aclaimant's limitation in [CPP]." Id. Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the ALJ's eror might have been cuted by an explanation as to why modetate difficulties in CPP did not ttanslate into a limitation in the claimant's RFC, it held that absent such an explanation, temand was necessaty. Id. 8 Here, the ALJ determined at step three that Fatrington had modetate difficulties in CPP. Gt. 36.) In suppott, the ALJ's assessment was that "[t]he claimant fcould] perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. As for episodes of decompensation, the claimant ha[d] experienced no episodes of decomposition, which have been of extended duration. The claimant ha[d] no history of tecent psychiattic hospital stays." Qd) "Pursuant to Masdo, once an ALJ has made a step three fìnding that a clairrrant suffers from modetate difficulties in [CPP], the ALJ must either include a corresponding limitation in het RFC assessment, or explain why no such limitation is necessary." No. ELH-14- See Talmo u. Czmm'r, Soc. Sec., 2214,2015 nØL 23951.08, at x3 (D.Md. May 19,2015) (unpublished). Here, the ALJ included in Fardngton's RFC a limitation of "simple, routine, and tepetitive tasks," with an additional limitation that he must "avoid ptoduction, quota, and fast-paced jobs." Qr.37.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC testictions do not adequately account for Farrington's moderate difficulties in CPP. Indeed, as held in Mascio, a testriction to simple, routine, repetitive tasks will not suffice to account fot a claimant's modetate limitations in CPP. Mascio, TB0 F.3d at 638. However, the Commissionet argues that unlike Mascio, the ALJ here included more than a limitation to "unskilled work," ultimately accounting fot Fartington's ability to stay on task. (Docket Entty 1,1, at 1,3.) The Coutt grees with the Iatter Since the ruling in Matù0, district courts within the Foutth Circuit have had differing results as to whether an RFC with ptoduction testtictions adequately accounts fot moderate limitations in CPP. See lVilson u. Coluin, No. 2:14-CV-3209-TLW-MGB, 201,6WL 625088, at 9 x5 (D.S.C. Jan. 15,2016) (unpublished) (holding that "ffhile production pace' in his formulation of Plaintiffs RFC . . account for a limitation in [CPP]"), . the ALJ did refet to 'non- fs]tanding alone, this does not report and recomntendation adopted,201'6 WL 613891, P SC Feb. 16, 2016) (unpublished); Strugs u. Coluin, No. 3:14-CV-00466-MOC, 2015 WL 2250890, at x6 CX/.D.N.C. May 1,3,201,5) (unpublished) (fìnding a limitation to simple, routine, tepetitive tasks in a non-production environment insufficient to account for moderate limitations in CPP). BatseeHìllu. Coluin,No. DI(C 1,5-1,027,201,6WL31,81762,atx8 (D. Md.June 8,201'6) (unpublished) ("[]he ALJ's inclusion of ahmitation in the assessment of Plaintiffs RFC to 'no production rate for pace of wotk' accounts for Plaintiffs moderate difficulties in maintaining [CPP]") report and recommendation adopted,No. CV DKC 1,5-1,027 ,201'6WI' 4269094 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 201,6) (unpublished); Linares u. Coluin, No. 5:14-CV-001,20, 2015 lfl4389533,t x4 (IX/.D.N.C. July 17 ,201,5) (unpubtished) (finding that "the ALJ limited fPlaintiffJ to 'simple, repetitive, routine tasks in a stable work envitonment at a nonproduction pace with only occasional public contact' . . . fwhich] specifically addtessed Plaintiffs ability to stay on task as required by Mavio"). The Middle District of North Catolina views. ComparePøllian u. has also taken differing Coluin,No. 1:13CV176,201,6WL843307,at*L,5 (À{.D.N.C. Mar. 1,, 2016) (unpublished) (stating that although Plaintiffs RCF had restrictions including "limitfations] to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a non-production and non-quota based environment," the Court held that "as in Mascio, the ALJ here has failed to explain why the moderate limitations in [CPP] found at step three did not translate to a limitation in the RFC assessment") with, Massel u. Coluin, No. 113CY965,201,5 WI- 3827574, at 87 (À{.D.N.C. June 10 1,9,201,5) (unpublished) (finding that the ALJ "ptopetly captured" Plaintiffs mental limitations with greater restrictions than Mascio), In a recent unpublished post-Mascio issue limitations recommendation adopted, slip op. (44.D.N.C. tg. 13,201,5). decision, our Court provided futher explanation as to the of whether non-produclion restrictions adequately account for modetate in CPP. See Grant u. Coluin, No. 1:15CV00515, 201,6 CÀ{.D.N.C. July 26, 2016) (unpublished). In WL 4007606, at *6-9 Grant, the Court noted the Foutth Citcuit's reliance upon the Eleventh Circuit (and concuning circuits) to reach "its conclusion in Masùo that a testriction to 'simple, routine tasks or moderate deficits in CPP[.]" Id. at*7. Thus, "review[ing] howthose appellate courts distict courts within those circuits) and a restriction unskilled work' did not adequately address have (and ded in cases involving a moderate limitation in CPP to non-production work in the mental RFC," (id.), our Court concluded that "the weight of authodty in the circuits that rendered the dings undergitding the Foutth Circuit's holding in Masùo supports the view that the non-production restriction adopted in thfat] case sufficiently accountfed] for Plaintiffs modetate limitation in CPP." Id. at*9. In the instant case, the ALJ found that Fartngton had moderate limitations in CPP and further provided specific restrictions in the RFC that Farrington be limited to "simple, routine, and tepetitive tasks," with an additional limitation that he must "avoid ptoduction, quot, and fast-paced jobs." Çr.37.) Thus, "the ALJ has included a specifìc restriction that facially addresses 'moderate' (not 'matked' ot 'extreme,' rce p0 C.F.R. S 404.1520a(c)(a)]), limitation in the claimant's ability to stay on task, i.e., a restriction to 'non-ptoduction oriented' work, ftherefote] Mascio does not require further explanation by the ALJ [.]" Crarct, 11 201,6 WL 4007606, úxg. Having adequately accounted for Fardngton's ability to "stay on task" in the hypothetical to the VE, Plaintifls claim fails. Dickens u. Coluin, No. 1:15CV878, 201,1 WL 31.8832,at*4 (À{.D.N.C. Jan.23,201,7) (unpublished);Andajaru. Coluin,No. 1:15CV7093,201,6 WL7471.31.3, at *7 (À4.D.N.C. Dec. 28,201,6) (unpublished)' B. Opinions of State Agency Medical Examining Consultants Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violat ed 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527 by "failing to accord what weight was given to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants." (Docket Entry 9 at 17.) The Commissionet argues to the conftarf , stating that the considered and assigned weight to the opinions. (Docket E.ttty 1,1, AIJ fully at 18.) Regardless of the source, every medical opinion teceived must be evaluated. 20 C.F.R. $ a0a.1527(c). Medical opinions are "statements fiom physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that teflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental resúictions." Id. S 404.1.527 (a)Q). The tegulations genetally provide more weight to the opinion of afteattns source because itmay "provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of fthe claimant's] medical impairment(s) fwhich] may bring a unique petspective to the medical evidence." Id. S 404.1,527 GX2). Unless contolling weight is given to a treating source, several factors must be consideted when detetmining how much weight to give any medical opinion including: (i) the frequency of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment telationship; (ü) the evidence in support of the treating physician's opinion; (-) th. consistency of the opinion with the recotd as a whole; (it whethet 1.2 the opinion is from specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Secutity Administtation's attention that tend to snpport or contradict the opinion. Id. S 404.1,527(c)Q)-(6). State agency medicai consultants are highly qualified physicians who are also expetts in Social Security disabiLity evaluation. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527 (e)(2)(i), Hete, the ALJ evaluated the medical opinions of three state agency examining consuitants: Dr. Anthony Smith, Dr. Ashley ICng, and Dt. Amanda Lam. (It. 38-40.) Although these medical ptoviders were not Fatrington's treating physicians, they did examine him, and thus are subject to the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1.527(c). See Good u. Coluin, No. CiV.A. 1:12-3380-RMG, 201,4 WL 358425, ar *3, $ 1.1. (D.S.C. Jan. 31.,201,4) (unpublished) (fìnding that an examining state agency consultant is ptopedy considered under the "Tteating Physician Rule"). The Court notes that in some cases "arì ALJ's failure to explicitly state the weight he gave to a parttculat medical opinion constitutes hatmless error, so long as the weight given to the opinion is discernible from the decision and any grounds for discounting it are reasonably afticulated." Spørlock u. Astrae, No. 3:12-CV-2062,201.3 WL 841.474, atx20 (S.D.\X/. Ya. )an. 28,201,3) (unpublished) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted sab nom. Spurlock Attøre, No. CIV.A. 3:1,2-2062, 201,3 \)fL 841483 (S.D.nø. Ya. Douer u. Astrwe, No. 1:11,CY120, 2012 WL 1,4164L0, u. Mal 6, 201'3) (unpublished); at *5 CX/.D.N.C. Mat. 1,9, 2012) (unpublished) ("temanding thfe] case so that the ALJ could explicitly state that he was assigninggreatweight...wouldbeapointlesscxetciseastheopinion...onlyservestobolstet the,tLJ's determination as to Plaintiffs [RFC], as well was not disabled"), report and as the ultimate decision that Plaintiff WL 141,6592 recornmendation adopted,No. 1.3 1:11,CY120, 201.2 CX/.D.N.C. Apr.24,201,2) (unpublìshed). WL 2433515, at See alsoNuerau. Coluin,No. 5:11-CV-569-FL,201'3 *3 (E.D.N.C. June 4,201,3) (unpublished) ("[A]n ALJ's fallure to expressly state the weight given to a medical opinion may be harmless ertor, when the opinion . . . is consistent with the ALJ's RFC detetmination."). In his decision, the ALJ appeared disinterested and that gave "weight effot to the examinet's teport that was a possible f^ctor." (Tt. fFarrington] 40.) Additionally, the ALJ "þave] weight to the examiner's report that partington's] prognoses wete stable." (Id.) The ALJ also stated that "[w] eight [was] given to the examinet's opinion that pattington's] abilities and scores might not be acct)r^te." (Id) The ALJ then concluded by stating that he "assign[ed] weight and concur[red] with the State agency medical consultant's opinion because they were able to review fFarrington's] entire medical fiIe." Qd.) Although not well aticulated, the ALJ ptopedy evaluated and gave some weight to the opinions of the state agency examining consultants. Flete, it is evident in the decision that the ALJ partially concurred with the state agency examining consultarits, and atttibuted grounds for discounting such opinions as necessatT. For example, Farrington was seen by Dr. Anthony Smith, a psychological consultative examinet gait, and pleasant and cooperative demeanor. who reported Fatrington's uneven Qr a1,9-20.) Fanington was administeted the Wechslet Adult Intelligence Scale-Founh Edition and tecorded primary index scores in the "exttemely lov/' to "botdedine" fange. Qt 421,-22.) The ALJ then gave weight to the examiner's opinion that Farrington's scores may not reflect his ftue abilities. (Tr. 38, 40') 14 Farrington also was examined by Dt. Ashley I(ing who noted that Fattington's "judgment and insight appearfed] poot, [and] his thinking concrete." ssessment of Functioning ("GF") was 35. Çr 45Q Qr afi.) -A.ithough "fe]ffott was possibly a factor in pattington's] mental status," Qt. His Global Dr. I(ng noted that 453), Dt. ICng concluded that Farrington's "emotions, comprehension, and undetstanding fwere] barely adequate to repetitive, simple tasks." Çr. a54) The ALJ consideted the G,{.F of 35, "indicative of setious limitations," but found that "this þas] based on only one visit and is inconsistent with fFardngton's] daily activities." (Tr. 39 ) The ALJ furthet noted the question of whether Farrington was providing his best efforts. Qd.) Additionally, as to the physical examination of Dr. Amanda Lam,Farrington reported left knee pain. Qr. a73.) Upon examination, Dr. Lam provided several diagnosis for Fattington, but ultimately found that his ptognosis was stable for each condition. Çr475.) She also concluded thatFarrinston's ability to "sit, stand, bft, carry, handle objects, hear, speak, and ttavel [were] not impaired," and his stamina and ability to move about [was] mildly impaired. Qd.) The ALJ weighed that in his decision. Qt3e-40.) In sum, the ALJ propedy evaluated the examining consultants. In in the articulation of the hatmless as the exacî weight given any event, ^fiy eftot to the state agency examining consultants is AIJ's assessmerit of the state agency examining consultants is supported by substantial evidence. Chandler u. Coluin, No. 1:15-CV-21,4,201.7 WL 653983, at*1.5 OJ.D.W. Ya.Jan.31,,201.7) (unpublished) ("While the ALJ's explanation of weight assigned to [medical providers were] not eloquently aticulated, the Court finds the ALJ's weight assignments of 15 these providers are suffìciently suppoted"), rEort and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15CV214, 2017 WL 653269 O{.D.W. Va. Feb. 1.6,201.7) (unpublished). To the extent necessary, the ALJ discounted the opinions such that there is a logical bddge between the opinions of the state agency examining consultants and Plaintiffs RtrC. Futthetmore, Plaintiff argued any limitations not accounted for in the Fattington's at*3. For these teasons, has not RFC. Nuera,201'3WL2433515, her atgument fails. To the extent PIu¡trff argues that the ALJ failed to tefetence sevetal exhibits containing numerous medical records, this argument too dgid requirement that the Reid u. Comm'r of Soc. 1,206,1,21,1, (1,1th AtJ Sec., 7 69 fils. Plaintiff readily admits that "there is no specifically tefer to every piece of evidence in his decision," F.3d 861, 365 (4th Cu. 201,4) (citing D1er u. Barnhart, 395 F.3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff argues that the evidence not teferenced by the ALJ "challenge some of the assertions made by the ,{.LJ in the decision." (Docket Et try 9 at20.) The Court first notes that the ALJ specifically cited to recent medical records from Duke University and concluded that they "showfed] no evidence of significant emotional issues other fthan] those related to alcohol consumption." (Tr. 39.) Plaintiff points to the ALJ's statement that Farrington "repoted depression, but þe] had not sought E.ttry 9 at 20; see also with deptession. treatment." (Docket Tr. 40.) Throughout his decision, the ALJ noted Faffington's (See, e.g., Tr. 37 (noting Fartington's testimony of his inability to wotk "because of seizures . . . and depression" ^¡dFarrington had crying spells three times weeldy"); depression and diagnosis issues repoting that"he was depressed and Tt. 38 (noting Fardngton's medical history of of major depressive disotdet); Tt. 38 (noting Farrington's statement 16 of suffedng from a "deptessed mood" during i¡ a consultative examination)). Fatdngton was fact prescribed medication for deptession in September 201,1. own admission in November (SeeTr.452 pr.I(ing 201,1,, (see Tr. 467), howevet, by his he never sought mental health treatment fot this issue.ó noting that Fattington had "nevet been psychiatically hospitalized and ha[d] no other mental health treatment except substance abuse tteatment" and furthet noting that Fardngton "reported [that] he ha[d] never had treatment for othet mental health problems); Tr. 273 fatrington denying treatment fot deptession)). failed to point to an1 specific piece of evidence þuportedly] In sum, Plaintiff not consideted by Commissioner that might have changed the outcome of partington's] disability 769 F.3d at 865 (emphasis in original). Moreover, in "has claim." the Reid, several instances, the record demonstrates that Farrington's mental status and mood: odented, logical thought processes, cooperative, goal directed, normal mood andaffect, clear speech, intact and no focal weakness, motot and sensory strength, and approptiately responsive to questioning. Qr. 274,289-90, 325-26,345,397 , 406, 47 5, 871., 905,947 , 98L,1078.) Thus, Plaintiff s claim fails. C. Farington's Ability to Perform Daily Activities Lastly, Plaintiff rgues that the ALJ placed excessive weight upon Fatrington's ability to perform daily activities which tesulted in a flawed RFC. (Docket Entry 9 at 1,8-20.) The Commissioner coriterids that Farington's daily activities were propedy accounted for, andthat the ALJ did not rely solely on Fardngton's daily activities, but evaluated the recotd as a whole. a The medial record also noted stability with the deptession medication. (SeeTt.9B7, 103s.) 1.7 Q)ocket Entty 1,1. at1,9.) Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. S 404.1529(c)(3), a claimant's daily activities are one of sevetal factors that the ALJ must considet in making credibil-ity detetminations. "While there clearly may be a difference between performing daily petsonal activities and regulat work duties, a Social Secutity claimant's toutine non-wotk activities of life may support a finding thataresidual functional capaciqr to woik exists." Keen a. Coluin, No. 1:13CV00070, 201,4WL 2115203, at *3 CX/.D. Va. May 21,201.4) (unpublished) (citing Yost u. Barnhart, T9 F. App'" 553, 555 (4th Cir. 2003)). Hete, the Á.LJ found tbat"panington'sl activities (cooking, cleaning, and walking dogs) also belie Farrington's statements disability." Gr 40.) Plaintiff contends that in the hearing and outside of the hearing contadict the ,{.LJ's summary of Fardngton's daily activities. Q)ocket E.rttT 9 at21,.) At the hearing Fardngton testified to doing a little yatd wotk and helping his wife cook and clean. CIr. 59-60.) Plaintiff also testified as to attending church twice a week. Dr. Smith and Dr. (Ir. 60.) The A{ noted the findings ICng. Gr. 38-39.) Dr. Smith indicated that Farrington reported walking dogs, showedng, washing dishes, and preparing meals on the stove during a typical 38; rce aln of day. (ft. Tr. 420.) Additionally, the AIJ noted that the report of Fardngton to Dt. I(ng that Farrington performed daily activities of cooking, cleaning, caring fot personal needs and watching television. Çr 39; see al¡oTr. 452.) Plaintiff atgues that the ALJ's summary is contradictory in that Plaintiffs reports of Farrington's lost desites to do activities QeeTr. of Fardngton's limitation of daily activities by his "tendencies to 41,9), it fails to tefetence ot Dt. I(ng's noting fall." Çr. 452.) Howevet, the undersigned finds this argument unpersuasive. First, the summry of daily activities by 1B the ALJ is not contradictory. ,tny reports of ioss of desires to do activities, ot limitations due to tendencies to fall does not suggestthat Farrington did not petform such activities. His own testimony at the hearing demonsttates his acknowledgement of perfotming some daily activities. (SeeTr.58-60.) Flere, the ALJ's teüance upon Fardngton's daily activities ws not excessive. Indeed, his daily activities wete only part of the considetation for Fatrington's RFC; the ALJ gave "cateful consideratton of the evidence" and concluded that Fattington's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of not entirely ctedible." Gt 38.) See McIQithan u. Coluin þs] No. 1:14CV688, 201,5WL 44931'32, t *7 (À4.D.N.C. July 23,201,5) (unpublished), report and recommendation adoþted, 201,5 symptoms fwere] No. 1:14CV688, WL 5178446 (^4.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 201,5) (unpublished) ([The ALJ's] ultimate conclusion regarding the RFC was based on the recotd as a whole, including the credibility determination[.]"); Keen,201.4WL21.1,5203,atx3 ("[T]he ALJ's reliance on these activities was only one minor aspect of the stated reasons fot his detetmination of fPlaintiffls P*FC]."); Barr u. Attrue, No. CIV. (unpublished) A. 1:07CV1,5, 2008 lfl- 833098, at *39 (l'{.D.!ø. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) ("[]he ALJ did not err in considering fc]laimant's against the disability alleged."); see also Gathrie u. Astrwe, every day activities as going No. CIV. 4.3:07 CV 1.41.,2009 W-L 1.362509,^t*1.2 (l\.D.W. Ya.May 14,2009) (unpublished) ("Claimant's argument that the ALJ discredited his subjective symptoms solely because the sevetity is not suppotted by objecuve medical evidence is simply without medt."). Ultimately, substantial evidence demonsttates that Fardngton's activities of daily living support the ALJ's RFC findings. Yost,79 F. App'x at 555 (finding that "[claimant's] activities of daily living, including caring fot his dogs, 19 watching television, visiting family and ftiends, attending chuch services, driving shott distances, and occasional hunting support the LJ's [RFC] detetmination" of a limited range of light wotk). Thus, Plaintiffs argument fails. V. CONCLUSION For the resons stated hetein, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs Motion fot Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket E.rtty 8) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion fotJudgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. J Uni Match 1,,201,7 Durham, Notth Caroltna 20 L. e bstet States Magistrate Judge

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