MUNDY v. COLVIN, No. 1:2015cv00496 - Document 14 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 08/24/2016; that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED, and that the matter REMANDED to the Commi ssioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for further administrative action as set out above. To this extent, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10 ) should be GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 12 ) be DENIED. (Garland, Leah)
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MUNDY v. COLVIN Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ELIZABETH MUNDY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. l:15CY496 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE IUDGE Plaintiff, Elizabeth Mundy, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(9) of the Social Security A,ct (the ",{.ct"), as amended (42 U.S.C. $ a05G), to obtain review of a final decision Insurance Benefits Act. of the Commissioner of ("DIB") Social Security denying her Disability and a Period of Disability ("POD") under Title II of the The Court has before it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for judgment. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a POD and DIB in July of alleging a disability onset date of 4pri19,2011..1 (Ir. 201,2 184, '147-1,50.) Her claims were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Qd. at72-80,82-89.) Plaintiff then requested a headng before an Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ"). (Id. at94-1,01,.) ,{,t 1 Transcdpt citations refer to the administlative record filed manually with the Commissioner's Answer. (Docket Entry 6.) Dockets.Justia.com the December 5, 2013 hearing, were Plaintiff, her counsel, and a vocational expet ("VE"). (d. at27-44.) On February 25,201.4,the Adminisrrative LawJudge ("LJ") determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the 201,5, Act. Qd. at15-22.) On ApÅ|24, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's fìnal decision for purposes of review. Qd. at'1.-7, 10-11.) Plaintiff then initiated this action. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disabiliry within the meaning of the Act. Under 42 U.S.C. S 405(9), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and narrow. Snith u. Schwei,ker,795tr.2d343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05O; Hanter u. Salliuan,993 F.2d 3'1,,34 (4th Cir. 1,992); Hay u. Sølliuan,907 F.2d 1,453,1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate Hwnter, 993 F.2d "consists to support a conclusion." at 34 (citing Nchard¡on u. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It of more than a mere scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than preponderance." Id. (quoangLøws u. Celebre3ry,368tr.2d640,642(4th Cir. The Commissioner must make findings evidence. HoJt,907 tr.2d ^t of 2 1966)). fact and resolve conflicts 1.456 (citing King u. Calfano, 599 a in the F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1,979)). The Court does not conduct a de nouo review Commissioner's fìndings. Schwei/eer,795 F.2d ^t of the evidence nor of the 345. In reviewing for substantal evidence, the Court does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility determinations, or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craigu. Chater,76tr.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Ha1s,907 tr.2d at 1,456). "V?here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissiòner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the 589 (quotin glhalkeru.80wen,834F.2d635,640(7th Cir. ALJ)." Craig76tr.3d 1987). at The denial of benefits will be reversed only if rìo reasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to support the determination. See Nchard¡on u. Peraler,402 U.S. 389,401. (1971). The if Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the issue before the Court, therefore, is not Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See id.; Cofman u. Bowen,829 tr.2d 5'1,4, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The Commissioner follows a fìve-step sequential analysis to ascertain whether the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 tr.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th determine in sequence: J See Albright u. Cir. 1999). The ALJ must Whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (1) the claimant is working). If (2.ø., whether so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Whether the claimant has a severe impairment. If not, then the claimant Q) is not disabled and the inquiry ends. \X/hether the impairment meets or equals to medical criteria of 20 C.F.R., (3) Part 404, Subpart P, .{ppendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments thatwarrant a finding of disability without considering vocational criteria. If so, the claimant z¡' disabled and the inquiry is halted. Whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past (4) relevant work. If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry is halted. Whether the claimant is able to perform any other work considering both (5) her residual functional capacity ("RF'C") and her vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 c.F.R. S 404.1s20. In rendering his disability determination, the ALJ made the following findings: 1,. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31.,201,6. . . . 2. The claimant has not engaged in substanaal gainful activity since April 9,201,1, the alleged onset date . . . 3. The claimant has degenerative disc the . following sevefe lmparfments: disease of the cervical spine and 4 degenerative joint disease shouldets 4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity one of the listed impairments . . . . 5. ,\fter careful of of the entire record, consideration the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacrty to perform light work, as defined tn 20 CFR 404.1,567 þ), except that she is to have the option to alternate between sitting and standing at least everT hour; and she is to avoid more than frequent stooping, climbing, or overhead reaching with the bilateral upper extremities. . . . 6. The claimant is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. . . 7. . The claimant was born on ,{,pril 28, 1,963 and was 47 yearc old, which is defìned as a younger individual aged'19-49, on the alleged onset date. The claimant's categorT ^ge closely subsequently changed to that of an individual approaching advanced 8. ^ge. .. . The claimant has at least a high school education, and she is able to communicate in English . . . . 9. Ttansferability of iob skills is not m^teúaI to the determination of disability, because using the Medical Vocational Rules as a framework supports a fìnding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not she has uansferable jobskills.... work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbets in the national economy that she can perform. . . . 10. Considering the claimant's age, education, 11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defìned in the Social Security Act, from April 9,201,1 through the date of this decision ... . . Qr.1,7-22.) 5 IV. ANALYSIS Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner erred in determining that she was not disabled. (Docket Entry 11). Specifically, Plaintiff raises two objections. First, she contends that the ALJ erred by giving little weight to the opinion of Dr. Arcedo Perico, her treating physician Qd. at 1.1. ^t 4-10.) Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to ptopedy explain the weight assigned to the mêdical opinion of consulting physician Dr. Janal<tram Setty, M.D. (Id. at 11,-1,3.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes that while PlaintifPs fìrst objection is without merit, her second objection has substance and that remand is therefore proper. A. The ALJ's Decision to Give "Little Weight" to the Medical Opinion of Dr. Perico Is Suooorted bv Substantial Evidence. The tteating source rule requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to the opinion of a lrcaang source tegarding the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment. 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1,527(.X2) ('Flteating sources . . . provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical fìndings alone or ftom reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations."). The rule also recognizes, however, that not all treating sources or treating source opinions merit the same deference. The nature and extent of each treatment relationship appreciably tempers the weight an ALJ affords an opinion. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,521(cX2Xü). As subsections (2) through (a) of the rule describe in detail, a tre íng source's 6 opinion,like all medical opinions, deserves deference only if well-supported by medical signs and lal:,ontoty fìndings and consistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. See 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(c)Q)-@. "lIlf a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accotded signifìcantly less weight." Cmig76 tr.3d at 590. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible enor in failing to "propedy explain the reasons for the weight assigned to the medical opinion physician," Dr. Arcedo Perico. pocket Entry 11 at 4.) of þer] treating Plaintiff visited Dr. Perico between May and November of 2013 for neck and lower back pain. Qd. at 346,358, 361,373.) Dr. Perico performed a Physical Capacities Evaluation on October 201,3, 22, which involved circling a number a limitations followed by a short explanation in suppott of these proposed limitations. (ld. at 354-56.) The limitations circled by Dr. Perico indicated Plaintiff could only occasionally lift and carry up to five pounds. Qd. at 355.) He concluded further that Plaintiff could never bend, squat, crawl, climb, or reach above shoulder level. Qd.) Dr. Perico also indicated that Plaintiff would be unable to stand or walk without interruption for, respectively, ten and fìfteen minutes and even then Plaintiff could only stand for thirty minutes per day total and walk forty- five minutes per day total. (Id. at 354.) Dr. Perico further concluded that Plaintiff could only sit for one hout a day without interuption and could only sit for a total four hours per of day. (Id.) Dr. Perico cited the results of Plaintiffs MRI and her sratus post-spinal fusion, as objective evidence on which his opinion was based. (Id. at356.) 7 The,{LJ afforded "little weight" to Dr. Perico's medical opinion. (Tr. 18,20.) In support, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Perico's opinion "was offered without any analysis ot f¿ttonale, and . . . was inconsistent with Dr. Perico's own treatment notes, with X-rays and MRI, and with the weight of the medical evidence." (Id. at20.) The ,\LJ's decision to give Dr. Petico's opinion little weight is supported by substantial evidence for a number of reasons. First, the limitations Dr. Perico circled2 are inconsistent with his own progress notes. Specifìcally, Dr. Perico's progress notes indicate that Plaintiff abnormal sensation in her exhibited rþht arm and tenderness in the right cervical paraspinal muscles, with normal gait and sensation, and decreased reflexes in the upper extremity. (d. at 18,330, 347,349,359,362.) Dr. Petico prescribed opioid medications and transcutaneous electronic nerve stimulator, and in November of a 201,3, Plaintiff reported that het pain was "tolerable" with medication management, and she rated it as 4.5/1,0. Qd. at 1,8,346-350, 358-363,374,377-379.) These notes, therefore, are inconsistent with the more extreme limitations circled by Dr. Perico in his Physical Capacities Evaluation on Octobe r 22,201,3. Second, Dr. Perico's proposed limitations are inconsistent with the remainder of the tecord. Fot example, the ALJ corectly pointed out that (1) other than 2 a slight Pre-printed forms that require little in the way of explanation re generally not looked upon favorably. See 20 C.F.R. $ 404.1527(c)(3) þtating that the better explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight the Commissioner gives that opinion); Ma¡on a. Shølala,994F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Form reports in which a physician's obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best."). 8 deficit of reflexes and some dght arm weakness, due to pain, Plaintiffs examinations were essentially notmul, Q) het X-rays and MRI revealed a solid post-surgical3 fusion, without residual neurological impingement, and (3) PlaintifPs physical therapist concluded that her complaints were out of proportion with the medical findings. (Id. at 20, 252-53; 254-55; 256-57 ; Moreover, 287 ; 290; 312; 332; 346-350, 358-363, 37 4.) Dr. Perico's conclusory limitations were inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician, Dr. Janal<ram Setty, that Plaintiff could stand/walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; sit fot six hours in an eight-hour day; and lift ten pounds occasionally and frequently; all without an assistive device. (d. at 304). Likewise, Dr. Perico's opinion was also inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. A. K. Goel, a non-examining state agency physician. (Id. at 62-64.) Dr. Goel reviewed the available medical evidence, including Dt. Setty's opinion, and concluded that Plaintiff was capable of light exertional work, including lifting twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently, and standing/walking for about six hours in an eight-hour day. (Id.) The opinions of Drs. are inconsistent Setty and Goel, both of which were discussed by the ,{.LJ, with the limitations proposed by Dr. Perico.a (d. at20-21,.) The ALJ did not etr in his evaluation of Dr. Perico's medical opinion. 3 Dr. Thomas Dimming performed a two-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion on Plaintiff in June of 20'11,. (I'r. 256-57 .) a Though the medical opinions of Drs. Setty and Goel are at odds regarding whether Plaintiff can lift more than ten pounds, neither opinion supports a conclusion that Plaintiff can lift no more than five pounds. 9 B. The ALJ's Evaluation of Dr. Settv's Opinion Is Not Susceotible to Iudicial Review. Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to propedy explain the weight attributed to Dr. Setty's medical opinion. (Docket Entry 1,1, at't1,.) The ALJ must evaluate consultative opinions like Dr. Setty's using the factors outlined above in the regulations, and exptessly indicate and explain the weight he or she affords to such opinions. See 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(c); Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-8p, Assessing.Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 ìíL 2, 1996) ("The adjudicator must also explain how any material 374'1.84, atxT inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved.'); Cordon u. Schweiker,725 F.2d 23'1, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) generally "cannot determine if [uly ¡ee al¡o ftolding that reviewing court findings are supported by substantial evidence unless the [,{,LJ] explicitly indicates the weight given to all of the relevant evidence"). -A.s noted, Dr. Setty concluded that Plaintiff could stand/walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; sit fot six hours in an eight-hour day;andlift ten pounds occasionally and ftequently. (Tr. 304.) The ALJ gave this opinion "greatet weight" than Dr. Perico's yet, the ALJ's RFC determination also concluded that Plaintiff could perform light wotk. Qd. at 1,9,21,.) Light work, in pertinent part, is defined as lifting no more than twenty pounds at a :jrme with frequently lifting or carrying up to ten pounds. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567&). Plaintiff thus faults the ALJ for failing to explain his conclusion that she is capable of lifting twenty pounds, after giving "gteater weight" to Dr. Setty's conclusion she can only lift ten pounds. (Docket E.ttry l0 1,1 at 11.) ,{,ssessment of this argument requites closer scrutiny of the ALJ's decision, which reads as follows: The undersigned has given greater weight to the assessment of Dr. Setty, the consultative examiner, who opined that claimant was capable of a limited range of light work, due to tenderness, loss of muscle mass, and decreased raîge of motion in the shoulder. The undersigned finds that Dr. Setty's opinion was supported by detailed objective findings and that it was more consistent with the weight of the medical evidence. Non-examining State agency consultants assessed the record and opined that the claimant was capable of performing a wide range of light to medium work, with limitations of her overhead reaching (Exhibits 2A and 4A). The undersigned has given considerable weight to the more restrictive of these assessments,5 which was consistent with the opinion of Dr. Setty and with the overall medical evidence. Qr21,.) ,{s noted, the ALJ could gave "greater lift no more than ten pounds weight" to Dr. Setty's opinion that Plaintiff and gave "considerable weight" to Dr. Goel's opinion that Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds. This is troubling because the Court must speculate as whether the failure to address this inconsistency v/as an oversight by the ,\LJ, or a tacit rejection of Dr. Setty's lifting limitation. \X/hat is more troubling is that there are significant reasons to conclude that the .LJ?s failure to address Dr. Setty's ten pound lifting limitation was an oversight and s Dr. Goel's assessment is the "more restrictive" of the two non-examining physician assessments and so is the assessment referred to above by the ALJ. (Tr. 51-53, 62-64.) ll that, consequently, the ALJ never actually considered the lifting limitation in Dr. Setty's opinion. First, in his decision, the ALJ refers to Dr. Setty as resticting Plaintiff to a "limited range of light work." (Id. at'18,21,.) But Dr. Setry found that Plaintiff could only lift a maximum of ten pounds, which is consistent with sedentary, not light, work. Compare 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(a) ("[s]edentary work involves lifting rìo more than 10 pounds at a time') with id. pounds at S 404.1567þ) ("Light work involves lifting no more than20 a ttme with frequently liftin g or c^ttying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.'). The ALJ thus appears to have been under the impression that Dr. Setty limited Plaintiff to light work (i.e.,ltîangrwenry pounds), which is not the case. Second, the .A,LJ also "fìnds that Dr. Setty's opinion was supported by detailed objective fìndings and that it was more consistent with the weight evidence." Qr.21.) The logical infetence here, then, of the medical is that the ALJ found Dr. Setfy's ten pound lifting limitation to be "supported by detailed objective fìndings" and to be "consistent with the weight of the medical evidence." Yet, if so, this conclusion is at odds with the ,\LJ's RFC fìnding that Plaintiff can perform a limited range of light work. An explanation from the ALJ, rather than silence, is therefore in order. Third, the r\LJ concludes that Dr. Goel's assessment was "consistent with the opinion of Dr. Setty and with the overall medical evidence." (d. at 21,.) But this is not so. As explained, the two doctots disagteed on a fundamental issue: whether Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds. This matters, because the hypothetical presented to the VE, and ultimately accepted by the A,LJ, presumed that Plaintiff could lift twenry t2 pounds. (Id. at 41,-43.) However, the VE also acknowledged thata claimant that could not lift twenty pounds occasionally would be limited to sedentary work, and all the jobs identifìed by the ALJ at step five required the performance of light 43.) work. (Id. at 22, Consequently, the ALJ's failure to draw a logical bridge between his RFC fìnding restricting Plaintiff to light work and the medical opinions of Drs. Setty and Goel prevents this Court from engaging in substantial evidence review on a matter central to this case.6 The Commissioner, on the othet hand, contends that none of this is ptoblematic. She accurately points out that, "Dr. Goel rejected Dr. Setty's workrelated limitations as 'too restrictive."' pocket Entty 13 at 6 1.1. qøoting "h. 64.) In ìüL 3741.84, at*7 ("'ïhe adjudicator must also explain how any mateÅal inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved."); see also CaEardo u. Asttae, No. 1:08CV01071, GSA,2009 WL2230851, at *9 (E.D. Jes SSR 96-8p, 1996 24,2009) ('Because the ALJ mistakenly believed [the consulting examiner] and the nonexarnining consultive physicians agreed with regard to Plaintiffls ability to walk and stand for a pedod of six hours in an eight-hour workday, and because the Court concludes that error [of basing a disability decision on a mistaken premise] ws not harmless, substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner's decision that Guajardo is not disabled."); ll/illiam¡ a. Coluin, No. 3:13CV701-RLV, 2015 WL 9094803, at*1.2 (ìø.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 201.5); Snags u. Coluin, No. 3:14-cv-00466,2015ìøL 2250890, +3 flX/.D,N.C. May '1,3,201,5) ('[I]mportantly, however, the ALJ-as opposed to the state agency medical consultants-is tasked with performing a function-by-function assessment of a claimant's RFC" and "is solely responsible for detetmining the RFC of a claimant") (citations omitted); Garner a. Coluin, No. 1:12CV1280, 2015 ìøL 71,0781,, t *7 (N{.D.N.C. Feb. 18,201,5) ("Defendant argues that all three IQ tests were consideted by the state gency consultants and therefore the ALJ's failure to weigh the tests explicitly was harmless. This argument misunderstands the role of the state agency consultants. The ALJ is required to balance conflicting evidence and make a determination of disability, not the consultants. In doing so, the ALJ is required to discuss relevant evidence that weighs against his decision. The ALJ did not do this here. Consequently, the undersigned cannot determine whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence because it is impossible to tell what weight, if any, was given to the pril 2005 and November 2009 IQ tcsts.") (citations omittcd). Cal. July l3 futher support, the Commissioner also correctly points out that "Dr. Goel wrote that Plaintiff retained full strength and sensation, and that a 201,'1, MRI of her cervical spine and an x-ray shoulder were negative." (d. dtingTr 64,254-255.) The Commissioner accutately notes furthet that "Dt. Goel saw'no indication'in the evidence that Plaintiff could not lift more than 10 pounds." (Id. qaotingTr. 64) The Commissioner concludes from this that "Dt. Setty's opinion was considered and discounted by the state agency physician who found Plaintiff capable of light work, and the ,LJ afforded considerable weight to the state agency opinion." Qd. citingTr 21.) \X/hile the Government's argument is not a frivolous one, the Court is ultimately unpersuaded that the ,A,LJ meaningfully reconciled in the first instance conflicting evidence regarding PlaintifPs exertional limitations in lifting and carrying. This is because the Commissioner's interpretation begs the question of whether the ,\LJ was even cognizant discussed of the discrepancy between the opinions of Drs. Setty and above. The Commissioner's interpretation further ignores the Goel reasons articulated above suggesting that the LJ never actually considered in his review of the record Dr. Setty's ten pound lifting limitation. (Ir. 303.) The Commissioner's reading of the ALJ's Decision also requires the Court to conclude that the ALJ incorpotated explanation, Dr. Goel's rejection of Dr. into that Decision, silently and without Serry's opinion, even though the ALJ also effoneously concluded that the fwo opinions were consistent. Given that the .{LJ wtongly concluded that the two opinions were consistent, there is little reason to t4 believe that the ALJ evet reached the point of favoring one over the other regarding Plaintiffs ability to lift more than ten pounds. In short, the ALJ appears to have rendered his disability decision based on a mistaken premise. As explained earlier, it is not the province of the Court to review the evidence de novo, reconcile conflicting evidence left unaddressed by the .LJ, or fìnd facts in the fhst instance. That is the duty of the ALJ and because it is not clear whether the ALJ meaningfully discharged this duty here, remand is proper. Put differently, the ALJ in this case had a duty to consider "all the evidence and explain on the record the reasons fot his fìndings, including the reason for rejecting relevant evidence in support of the claim. Even if legitimate reasons exist for rejecting or discounting certain evidence, the [Commissioner] cannot do so for no reason or for the wrong reason." King u. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1,020 (4th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). The ALJ's duty of explanation is satisfied "$ff areviewing court can discern 'what the ,{LJ did and why he did it."' Pinel Mountøin Coal co. u. Mø1s,176 tr.3d753, 762 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ failed to provide suffìcient explanation to support his RFC assessment and the Court simply "cannot tell whether þis] decision is based on substantial evidence." Cook u. Heckler,7ï3F.2d 1168, 1,1,72 (4th Cir. 1986). None of this necessadly means that Plaintiff is disabled under the ,{.ct and the Court expresses no opinion on that matter. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the proper course here is to remand this matter for further administrative proceedings. l5 V. IT IS CONCLUSION THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision fìnding no disability be REVERSED, and that the matter be REMANDED ro the Commissioner under sentence fow of 42 U.S.C. $ a05@. The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for further administrative action as ser out above. To this extent, Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Ent y 10) should be GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Judgmenr on rhe Pleadings (Docket Entry 1,2)be DENIED. J U .4, ususrÀt 2016 16 tef d States Magistrate Judge
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