GILLIS v. COLVIN, No. 1:2014cv00426 - Document 22 (M.D.N.C. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 08/04/2015; that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 15 ) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 18 ) be GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Garland, Leah)
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GILLIS v. COLVIN Doc. 22 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STEVEN F. GILLIS, Plaintiff, v CAROLYN SIi. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) l:14CY426 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Steven F. Gillis, btought this action pursuant to Sections 205(9) and 1,631,(c)(3) of the Social Secudty 1383(c)(3), to obtain review denying his claims ,\ct (the ",{.cC'), as amended (42 U.S.C. $$ a05(g) and of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security for a Period of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insutance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Secutity Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The Coutt has befote it the certified administative record and cross-motions for judgment. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff fìled applications fot DIB, a POD, and SSI in January of 20'11 alleging disability onset date 1 of January 1, 2006. (t a 224-238.¡r The applications were denied Ttanscript citations refer to the administrative record. Additionally, Plaintiff was'tncarcerated, and, thus, ineligible fot benefits, from the alleged onset date untlJanuary 201,1,. $$ aOz(x) (r) (Ð (Ð, 1 382(e) (r) (A). Qt266,514.) 42 U.S.C. Dockets.Justia.com initially and upon teconsideration. (d. at 1,49-1,56, 1,62-'179.) Plaintiff requested a hearing befote an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 180-82.) Present at the September 201.2heanng were Plaintiff, his attorney, and a vocational expett (1/E'). 5, (Id. at 35-88.) The ALJ determined in his November 23,201,2 decision that Plaintiff was rìot disabled under the ct. (Id. at7-26.) On March 28,201,4, the Äppeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making the AIJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision fot review. (d. at 1-4.) II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW The scope of judicial teview of the Commissionet's final decision is specifìc and narrow. Snith u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343,345 (4th detetmining if thete is substantial evidence C:r.. 1986). Review is limited to in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hanter u. Sulliuan, 993 tr.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. Sulliuan,907 tr.2d 1,453, L456 (4th Cir. 1990). 1.992); Hay In teviewing fot substantial evidence, u. the Cout does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater,76 tr.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1,996). The issue befote the Coutt, thetefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but whether the Commissioner's fìnding that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon ^ correct application of the relevant laut. Id. III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The AIJ followed the well-established five-step sequential analysis whethet the claimant is disabled, which is set fotth in 20 C.F.R. See SS to ascettain 404.1520 and 41,6.920. Albrigltt u. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 tr.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). Here, 2 although the AI-J found that Plaintiff had performed some work dudng the alleged period of disability, working as a secudty guard and making and selling fish sandwiches, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff had not engagedin sub¡tantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of January 1,2006. Qr 12.) 'l'he ,AIJ next found in step two that PlarntitT had the following severe impairments: mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; mild osteoatthritis of the right hand; mild post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"); depression; and a substance addiction disorder. (Id. at 13.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impaitment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in .{ppendix Priot to step four, the 1. (Id. ,\IJ ^t 1.4.) determined PlaintifPs RFC. (Id. at 16-24.) The ,\IJ detetmined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform medium work with certain additional limitations. (Id. at 16.) Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was limited to undetstanding, remembeting, and carrying out simple instuctions; in a low stress envitonment, which meant that he could not work in a fast-paced production environment, but could only work in an environment where he made simple work-related decisions and in which thete were few ot no changes in the work setting. (d. at 16.) The ALJ found too that Plaintiff could work in proximity to, but not in coordination with, coworkers and supervisots, and that he should not have contact with the public. (1/.) Àt the foutth step of the sequence, the AIJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform his past televant wotk as a caddy, cleaner, golf attendant, grill man, security guard, stocket, or assemblet. (Id. at 24.) ,{.t the fifth step of the sequence, the ALJ concluded that considedng the claimant's age (50 on the alleged onset date), education (at least a high school a J education), and RFC (descdbed above), there were jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Qd. at 24.) Specifically, based on VE testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could pedorm wotk as alaundry checker and office cleanet. (Id. at25.) IV. ANAIYSIS Plaintiff makes two arguments. Fi-tst, he asserts that the LJ failed to propetly weigh the Department of Veteran Affair's ('1/4") opinion on disability. pocket E.rtty 1,6 at 1,.) Second, he contends that the .A.LJ failed to propedy weigh the "acceptable medical source" opinion of examining psychiatrist Scott T. Schell, M.D. (Id.) I The ALJ's Assessment of the VA's Determination Is Supported by Substantial Evidence. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating a prior disability determination by the V-4. (Docket E.rtty 16 at 7-1.4.) More specifically, the VA DisabiJity Rating Decision, dated January 26,201.2, and effective as gtanted him a 50%o service connected rating for PTSD. issued Plaintiff a V of lt4ay 4,2011,, which (r.252-256.) The ,{LJ attributed the V determination "little weight." Qd. at 23.) Evalt:ating the strength of Plaintiffs argument tequires an undetstanding of Bird u. Commi¡sioner,699 F.3d 337,343 (4th C1r.201,2) and SSR 06-03p. l¡. Bird v. Commissioner In Bird, the Fourth Citcuit considered two issues. First, it addtessed when an ALJ must give retrospective consideration to medical evidence genetated after the date last insuted ("DLI"). The claimant in Bird argued that the .À{ etted in failing to retrospectively evidence in the form of a VA ralng decision created after the considet DLI. Bird,699 F.3d at 338-39,340. The Fourth Ckcuit held that the .LJ was tequfued to give retrospective 4 consideration to the VA's determination, even though it post-dated the claimant's DLI, because the evidence placed the claimant's "symptoms in the context of his work and social histories, dtawing a l-ink benveen his curent condition and his condition predating his DLI." Id. at 342. Second, and mote importantly for this case, in Bird the Fouth Circuit addressed "the ptecise weight that the SSÅ must afford to a VA disability ra:J;ng." Id. at343. In addressing this question, the Fourth Circuit noted that, "the VÀ and Social Secutity progtams serve the same govetnmental purpose of ptoviding benefits to persons unable to work serious disability." Id. at 343. because of a It reasoned furthet that "þ]oth programs evaluate a claimant's abiìity to petform full-time wotk in the national economy on a sustained and continuing basis; both focus on analyztng a claimant's functional limitations; and both require claimants to present extensive medical documentation in support of their claims." Id. (citations, intetnal quotations omitted). From this, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "þ]ecause the purpose and evaluation methodology oF both ptograms are closely related, a disability r^tuîg by one agencies is highly televant of the nvo to the disability determination of the other agency." Id. Thus,"in making a disability determination, the SSA [Social Security Administration] must give substantial weight to a V-4. disabiJity raing." Id. "Flowever, because the SSA employs its own standatds for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability, and because the effective date of covetage for a claknant's disability under the two programs likely will vary, an ALJ may give less weight to a V-d disability rating when the record before the ÀLJ cleady demonsttates that such a deviation is appropriate." Id. Consequently, 5 the Fourth Circuit held in Bird that the .AIJ erred in finding Bird's V,{. disability tating irrelevant based solely on the Fact that the VA decision became effective aftet Bird's DLI. See ìd. ^t 346 ("[B]ecause the ALJ made two errors of law in conducting his analysis of the evidence concerning the issue whether Bird was disabled before his DLI, we vacate the disttict court's judgment and temand the case to the district court for further remand to the ALJ fot ptoceedings consistent with the pdnciples of law exptessed in this opinion.") B. SSÃ 06-03p The Social Security Rulings also speak to whether and when an N,J is obligated to consider disability determinations from other agencies. Accotding to SSR 06-03p: Out tegulations make cleat that the fìnal tesponsibility for deciding certain issues, such as whether you are disabled, is reserved to the Commissioner . . . . However, we are required to evaluate all the evidence in the case tecord that may have z beadng ori our detetmination or decision of disability, including decisions by other Thetefore, governmental and nongovernmental agencies evidence of a disability decision by another governmental or nongovernmental ageîcy cannot be ignoted and must be consideted. SSR 06-03p, Considering Opinions and Other Euidence From Soarce¡ Who Are Not 'Acceptable Medical Sources" in Di:ability Claims; Considering De¿isions on Disabilifl b1 Other Couemmental and Nongouernmental Agencie¡, 41,6.91,2þ)(v); see 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 Q006); 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1512þX"), øl¡o 20 C.tr.R. SS 404.1504,416.904. C. The AIJ Cleady Demonstrated That His Decision to Give "Little Weight" to the VA Determination Was Supported by Substantial Evidence. As noted, the V,\ issued Plaintiff a VA Disability Rating Decision, dated January 26, 201,2 and effective as of May 4,2011,, which granted him a 5070 service connected rating fot PTSD. Çr.252-256.) In according "little weight" to this determination, the AIJ 6 stated: The undersigned is awaLte that the claimant has a Veteran's Administration sèrvice connected tating of 50 percent for PTSD (Ex. 8D). Furthet evidence ftom the Vetetan's Àdministration (r/A) reveals that the claknant has a 20 petcent impairment rating for lumbosacral or cervical strain @,x. 19F). While the undersigned is not bound by disability decisions made by othet govetnmental agencies, the undersigned must, pursuant to SSR 06-3p, nonetheless considet these disability decisions. Per SSR 06-03p, decisions ftom other agencies ptovide insight into the claimants impairments only to the extent they reveal the evidence used to reach the decision of disability. The Ruling instrLrcts the undersigned to evaluate the opinion evidence ftom medical sources, as well as "non-medical sources" who have had contact with the individual in their professional capacity, used by othet agencies that arc in our case recotd, in accotdance with Agency policy. While the decision at issue has been submitted and made pat of the record @,x. 8D), the services connection evaluation perfotmed on October 28, 201,1,1 by QTC Medical Services for the claimant's PTSD have not been submitted. Therefore, the undersigned cannot tell what medical or vocational evidence was used to reach the conclusion of disability or whether said evidence was similat to or diffetent from the evidence of record before the undersigned. As such, the decision of the VA as to the claimant's disability tating ptovides no insight into the claimant's impairments and the undersigned accords it little weight. More importantly, the undetsigned finds that a V,\ t^trng of 50 percent for PTSD is not consistent with the longitudinal medical evidence before the undetsþed, which teveals that the claimant has had a good response to teatment, that upon examination, his mental status is largely normal, and that his conditions have resulted in minimal symptoms. To the extent that the VA's tating decision was based upon the same medical evidence before the undetsigned, it has been considered as outlined herein. (Id. at23.) The undersigned agrees with Defendant that this is not a case where the explain the consideration given to the VA rating. (Docket E.rtty 20 at undetsigned agrees futher with Defendant that the ,{fJ 7 8.) IJ failed to Moreover, the considered Plaintiffs VA detetmination in light of the entite tecord and gave proper reasons to afford it less weight. ,{.s an initial matter, the ALJ gave the V,\ tating less weight because "decisions from othet agencies ptovide insight into the claimant's impairments only to the extent they reveal the evidence used to reach the decision of disability." Çr. 23 (citing SSR 06-03p)). lØhile Plaintiff submitted the V-d decision into the tecord, he did not submit the evaluation performed by QTC Medical Services on October 28,201'1, upon which the tating appears to be pdmadly based. Qr.23 referencingTr.253-54.) It is also important to note that the ALJ acttally held the recotd open hete aftet Plaintiffs administrative headng specifically so Plaintiff could submit the evaluation to the Commissioner. (Id. at 45.) Defendant corecdy points out that the burden is on a claknant to present evidence of his disability. 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX5XÐ; 20 C.F.R. S$ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); Blalock u. Nchard¡on, 483 tr.2d 773,775 (4th Cit. 1,972). This includes fumishing medical evidence suppoting his claim. 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1512(a),'1,516;416.91,2(a). The undetsigned can see no error in the ALJ propetly noting that the tecotd did not contain the QTC Medical Services report. nd, even setting this issue aside, the ALJ's handling of the VA determination is supponed by substantial evidence. This is because the ,\LJ also gave the VA rating less weight because it was inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence, which demonsttated that Plaintiff had a good response to treatment, latgely normal mental status examinations, and minimal symptoms.2 Qr.23.) Hart u. Coltin, No. 3:14-CV-00169-FDW, 2015 WL 470448, *3-4 (ìø.D.N.C. Feb 04, 2015) (affrrming ALJ's decision to afford litde weight to Medicaid disability determinarion where it was not consistent with the tecotd as a whole); Bennett u. Coluin, No. 13-871, 2015 WL 354170, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Jan.1,7,2015) ('The court concludes that the ALJ's assessment of the VA's decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. The court accorditgly rejects 2 See, e.g., 8 Mote specifìcally, an AIJ must evaluate alI of the medical opinions in the record in light of: the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion relies on relevant evidence, the consistency of the opinion with the tecotd as a whole, the specializatton of the source of the opinion, and othet factors brought to the ALJ's attention. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(c),4L6.927(c). A medical source's opinion must be both well-supported by medical signs and laboratory findings as well as consistent with othet substantial evidence in the case record. Id. "Ef u physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence ot if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Cmig76 F.3d at 590. In reviewing fot substantial evidence, the Court does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make determinations, or omitted); accord credibility to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. (crtatton Mastro r.,4pft/,270F.3d171,178 (4th Cir. 2001) Hete, the ,{LJ accurately observed that objective medical evidence revealed that during a June 201.1. evaluation with Muty Fruit, Psy.D., Plaintiff was neatly dtessed with good gtooming/hygiene; was polite and coopetative; had normal speech; had logical and goaldirected thoughts without evidence of disordet ot delusion; had no hallucinations; had insight and judgment within normal limits; had good self-esteem; and no problems with concenttation. Qr.20 referencircgTr. 511-15.) The -{LJ further cotrectly noted that Dt. Ftuit indicated that PlaintifPs evaluation scotes did not support the ptesence of full critetia fot diagnosis of PTSD or major depressive disorder. Qr. 20 referenùng a Tr. 517). Dt. Fruit plaintiffs challenge to it."); Johnson u. Coluin, No. 13-509,201,4\Xry,4636991, at *B-10 (E.D.N.C. Sept.16, 201,\ (fndnq no error under Bird standard fot ALJ accotding VA decision less weight); Mills a. Coluin, Case No. 5:1.3-cv-432-FL,201.4 \7L 4055818, at * 5 (E.D.N .C. Aug. 1,4,201,4) (same). 9 indicated further that Plaintiff was receiving treatment for deptessive disorder and the absence of several major deptessive episode symptoms was arì indicator that his anti- depressant medication was effectively treating his symptoms. The ,{.LJ also accurately observed that in August of fft. 201.1., 20 refereeingTr. 517-18.) Plaintiff teported his mood swings were less, and psychiatnstMizanur Rahman, M.D., indicated that he had a genetally untemarkable mental status examination-he made fat eye contact, did not have abnormal involuntary movemenq and his speech was riot ptessuted-apart from his mood being "down" and his affect constricted. flr. 20 referencingTr.433-84.) Evidence from 2012 also demonstrated that Plaintiff had only mild limitations, as indicated by his active participation and insight gained in gtoup therapies. 201.2, Tr Qr 21 referencingTr. 579-84.) Additionally, by July Plaintiff denied hearing voices and tepotted he was tecently marrted.3 Çr. 21, referendng 622-23.) And, as the .AIJ noted, Plaintiff testified that he was able to attend school in that he completed one semestet of community college where he passed all. of his classes without special accommodations with the help of support and tutoting ftom Ptoject Promise.a Qt 23,46-51,.) Given this evidence, the LJ properþ considered the V-d rating ' Plaintiff also told Dr. Fruit that he was doing "odd jobs a little here and there" and had applied for "social secutity disabiJity income, so þe] canriot work too much or it will impact his claim." (Tr. 51,4.) He also reported to Dr. Rahman in June 2011, that he was doing some work part-time, and Dt. Rahman noted that Plaintiffs mental status examination ws generally normal apart from deptessed mood and constricted affect. (Id. at 521,-23.) o Plaintiff contends that the ALJ þored his testimony describing special assistance in his entollment in community college. (Docket Etrtty 16 at 13 referenùngTr. 49-50,72-75.) However, at the hearing, Plaintiff stated that whjle he saw a psychologist once a week at the community college, he did not receive diffetent treatment from other students in terms of test taking and homework. (Ir. a9-50.) ,\nd, given the considetable evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled, and given that the ALJ discussed Plaintiffs time at community college at some length, any error here would be, at most, harmless. (Id. at 15,23.) 10 and, consistent with Bird and governing regulations, suffi.ciently articulated ptopet reasons for giving it II less weight.s The AIJ's Assessment of Dr. Schell's Opinion Is Supported by Substantial Evidence. Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ committed reversible etrot in his analysis of the medical opinion of examining psychiatrist Scott T. Schell, M.D. (Docket E.rt y 16 at 1, 1.4- 20.) s explained below, the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Schell is well-supported. '\s noted, an ALJ must evaluate all of the medical opinions in the record in light of: the examining relationship, the treatmerit relationship, the degree to which the opinion relies on televant evidence, the consistency of the opinion with the tecord as a whole, the specials,zaton of the source of the opinion, and othet factors brought to the ,\LJ's attention. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(c),41,6.927(c). Here, upon considedng Dr.Schell's two reports, the AIJ accurately noted that each report is vague, conclusory, and not expressed in vocationally televant ¡sm5-¡þat is, neither report provides functional limitations arising ftom PlaintifPs mental impairments. Qr. 22 rqferenùng 457-460, 467-10.) Thus, although Dr. concluded that PlaintifPs mental impairments "adversely influenced" his behaviot 469), Schell Çt 459, Dr. Schell did not provide any specific functional limitation beyond those set forth in the RFC that,if supported, could be incorporated into an RFC assessment. 404.1,527 See 20 C.F.R. SS (a)(2), 416.927 (a)(Z). Consequently, these reports were not entitled to any partcular weight.6 s Insofar as Plaintiff argues in Section I above that Dr. Schell's opinions support his VA rating, the aïgument is not petsuasive fot the reasons set forth below in Section II. o The Cotrrt notes too that the "limitations" assessed by Dr. Schell do not indicate that Plarntiff was l1 ,\nd even setting that issue aside, the -{LJ propetly declined to give Dr. opinions greater weight because Dr. Schell's Schell's observations were in conflict in and of Qr 20,22.) Specifically, Dr. Schell themselves and in addition to other medical records. noted that Plaintiff was able to do chores and go to church on a regular basis, was able to form a working relationship and sustain concentration, and had a global assessment of functioning ("Gr\F") score of 60 in Match201,1, a score on the bordetline between mild and modetate symptoms.T Qd. at 20, 457-59). Dr. Schell also indicated that Plaintiff was coopetative and a reliable historian, was oriented, could sustain concenttation, and had genetally normal mental status examination in March second examination, presented with what the proportion with those present in the 201.1 presentation In then two months later, at the noted were symptoms greatly out of ftst examination. ptesentation as "inconsistent"),458,467-68.) Plaintiffs l/ray AIJ 201,L; a (Id. at 23 (describing Plaintiffs fact, the ALJ specifi.cally noted that to Dr. Schell was at odds with his March 2011 presentation to Dr. Schell and was also at odds with his ptesentation to the V-A (described in gteater detail in Section I above) in the summer of 201J. (r. 23 (descdbing ll{zy 201,1 visit with Dr. Schell as "completely inconsistent with his presentation to treating sources at the Vr\ dudng completely precluded from performing all work. t The GAF is a scale nngþg from zero to one hundred used to ïate individual's psychological, ^tr social, and occupational functioning. See Am. Psychiatric Assoc, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ('DSM-IV") 32-34 (4th Ed., Text Revision 2000). Scotes between 51-60 indicate modetate symptoms or moderate difficulties in social, occupational, or school functioning. 1/. Scores between 61, and 70 indicate mrld symptoms or some difñculty in social, occupational, or school functtoúng. Id. The Fifth Edition of the DSM discontjnued use of the GAF, in patt because of "conceptual lack of clanry" and "quesd.onable psychometrics in routine practice." Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Nlental Disorders 16 (5th ed., Am. Psychiatric Äss'n 2013). t2 this same period of time" and "further inconsistent with his presentation to same examinet just two months prior").) And, as Defendant coffectly points out, Dr. Schell's reports appeared based in large part on Plaintifls self-teporting, which the ,{LJ found were not fully ctedible based on his repotted daily activities, including caring school, working part-time, and getting engaged and then married. fot his mother, [r.23-24). attending See CraigT6 F.3d at 590 n.2. For these reasons, the ALJ propedy gave these reports little weight.s The state ^gency physicians also reviewed the medical evidence and determined that, glven his ability to engage in daily activities and tecords indicating genetally unrematkable mental status examinations, Plaintiff could petform simple, toutine, repetitive work with limited social intetaction. 41,6.927(e)Q)Q; Mitchell u. (Ir. Astrwe, 94-98, 121-26.) See 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1.527(e)(2XÐ, Civil Action No. 2:08cv632,2009 \XT- 4823862, at x7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11,2009). t the initial level of review, Dr. Schell's March 2011 report-his only existing medical opinion on Plaintiff at the time-u/as given only "modetate" weight because it relied heavily on Plaintiffs own subjective reports and the diagnoses of schizoaffective and somattzatton disorders were not entirely consistent u/ith the othet medical evidence tecotd. (Tr. 98.) .{t the reconsideration level, the state agency physician gave of Dt. Schell's subsequent May 2011 report only "little weight" because it was not consistent v/ith the other record evidence, but gave Dr. Schell's eadier March 2011 opinon "great weight" because it was consistent with other tecotd evidence. (Id. at 121.) Plaintiff contends that it was inconsistent and theteforc mateital ertot to give "great weight" to the opinions of the non-examining state agency medical consultants (one of 8 Insofar as Plaintiff argues in Section II above that his VA. rating supports Dr. Schell's opinions, the argument is not persuasive for the reasons set forth above in Section I. 13 whom gave Dr. Schell's March 201L report"greatweight") while at the same time giving Dr. Schell's nvo opinions "little is not petsuasive and any weight." pocket Enry eror 1.6 at 19-20.) Yet Plaintiffs argurnent here is at most harmless. First, in giving the non-examining physicians "gteat weight," the ALJ appeared to be refetencing no more than the non-examining physicians' opinions on Plaintif?s p@sical limitations. AIJ (r. 23.) Second, even assuming the corrtrary-that is, even assuming that the intended to give "great weight" to the opinions oF the non-examining state agency physicians as to both Plaintiffs physical and mental limitations-¡þs decision of the AIJ remains suppotted by substantial evidence. As explained, both the non-examining state agency physicians and the purported AIJ gave to tecord a significant Dt. Schell's May 201.1. deteriotation opine¡-¡þs opinion that in Plaintiffs mental health after Match 201.1.-"httle weight," aÍrd, as explained above, this is amply supported by substantial evidence in the record. Consequently, there is no ettot ot inconsistency hete in the manner the ,ALJ addtessed Dr. Schell's May 2011 opinion. As For Dt. Schell's Match 20LL opinion, not only did the ÄLJ cleady intend to give it "little weight," but despite this he also crafted an RFC that essentially took account vocationally relevant terms. If of that opinion insofat as it thete is any error hete, it is harmless. See was expressed in Morgan u. Bamltart, 142Fed. Åpp'* 71.6,722-23 (4th Cir.2005) ftolding that reversal not required upon error in assessing treating physician's opinion where errot cleatly has no bearing on the proceeding). PlaintifÎs arguments to the contrary are not convincing. V. CONCLUSION Aftet a carcfuI consideration of the evidence of tecord, the Coutt finds that I4 the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Åccotdingly, this Coutt RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs Motion fotJudgment on the Pleadings @ocket Entry 15) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 18) be GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissionet be upheld. August Jo. &otu Uni l5 eb States Magisttate Judge
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